Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions Tools of Statecraft Military intervention, foreign aid, and sanctions

I. Military Intervention Predicting intervention Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention Alliance Portfolios predict side choice

What is an alliance portfolio? All of the allies of a state Similar portfolios generally reduce conflict / increase cooperation Better predictor than dyadic alliance!

I. Military Intervention Predicting intervention Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention Alliance portfolios predict side choice More likely when existing parity between combatants

Balances of Power: Disparity and Parity

I. Military Intervention Predicting intervention Escalation: Joining an ongoing armed conflict Best predictor: Prior third-party intervention Alliance portfolios predict side choice More likely when existing parity between combatants Great powers intervene much more frequently!

2. Predicting War Initiation What factors increase the probability of war?

a. Contiguity and Proximity Contiguity: Sharing common border MID = Use, threat, or display of force short of war

Proximity: Loss of Strength Gradient Wealthy/Advanced State Poor State Resources that can be applied to a conflict decay at distance Shift in gradient due to technology or development

b. Different Regime Types Regime Country A Regime Country B Probability of War Democracy Lowest Autocracy Highest Middle State level finding that magnifies dyadic effects: Democracies more stable than autocracies, which in turn are more stable than intermediate regimes

c. Issue Type: Territory

d. Power Parity: A “Balance of Power” Produces War, Not Peace! Disparity = Low Risk Parity = High Risk

War initiators since 1980 United States (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) Iraq (1981 and 1990 attacks on Iran and Kuwait) Israel (1982 and 2006 invasions of Lebanon) Argentina (1982 occupation of Falklands) Armenia (1991 war with Azerbaijan, depending on definition) China (1987 attack on Vietnam) Ecuador (1995 war with Peru) Eritrea (1998 war with Ethiopia) Georgia (2008 war with Russia) Pakistan (1999 Kargil War with India) Rwanda and perhaps Uganda (1998 war with the DRC) (Note: War is defined as minimum 1000 battle-deaths/year)

B. When does intervention work? Who wins interstate wars? Who started it? Initiators win most wars quickly, but tend to lose long wars. Bigger economy usually wins (GDP outperforms military predictors) Bigger military also helps – parity makes victory less likely for both sides (stalemate)

Parity Leads to Long Wars, Makes Stalemate More Likely Source = Slantchev, AJPS, Oct 2004

2. Intervention in Civil Wars No Pro-Rebel Intervention Pro-Rebel Intervention No Pro-Government Intervention 119 (60.41%) 24 (12.18%) Pro-Government Intervention 29 (14.72%) 25 (12.69%)

2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise?

2. Intervention in Civil Wars Probability of Compromise, 1816-1997 Intervention for government No intervention

2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes Does intervention prolong wars?

2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes Does intervention prolong wars? Yes Is intervention getting more common?

Intervention Over Time 1825 - 1849 1850 - 1874 1875 - 1899 1900 - 1924 1925 - 1949 1950 - 1974 1975 - 1997 Number of Civil Wars 22 28 16 23 21 39 43 Intervention Frequency 36% 25% 31% 35% 24% 49% 51%

2. Intervention in Civil Wars Does intervention lead to compromise? Yes Does intervention prolong wars? Yes Is intervention getting more common? Yes The intervenor’s dilemma: Saving lives vs. Justice Want to end the war quickly? Help the strong crush the weak Want to find a compromise? Write off another 10,000 people

II. Sanctions and Pressure Predicting Sanctions US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions

II. Sanctions and Pressure Predicting Sanctions US Sanctions: Best single predictor is target’s relationship with US Domestic factors, target characteristics almost irrelevant Interesting: Belligerence towards US after threat reduces chance that US imposes sanctions General: Asymmetric dependence If I depend on you, I am unlikely to sanction you If you depend on me, I am more likely to sanction you Problem: Measuring dependence is hard

Example: US-South Africa 1984: Asymmetric Interdependence? US = 15% of S.A. trade, but S.A. = only 1% of US trade Issue: Apartheid US backs South Africa, vetoes UN resolutions for sanctions US imposes minor sanctions only (to forestall larger ones) Question: Why not sanction?

Example: US-South Africa Answer: Minerals USSR was obviously unreliable for strategic minerals

Example: US-South Africa US needed imports of critical minerals:

F-100 Engine Use of Imported Metals (F-15 and F-16 aircraft – key to air defense in 1980s) Titanium 5,366 lbs 77% (Australia, South Africa) Cobalt 910 lbs 73% (Norway, Finland) Tantalum 3 lbs 80% (China) Columbium 171 lbs 100% (Brazil) Aluminum 720 lbs 100% (Australia) Chromium 1,656 lbs 80% (South Africa) Nickel 5,024 lbs 63% (Canada) (Note: Metals indicated are used in more than one place in engine) 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21

Example: US-South Africa Best case: end trade = price increases Worst case: end trade = inferior hardware

Example: US-South Africa Did South Africa’s Minerals Make It Secure? No: Fear of resource conflict  nuclear proliferation 1957: US provides nuclear reactors, enriched uranium 1970s: Insecurity in southern Africa = security-based rationale for atomic bomb (South Africa fears Soviet influence) 1975-1976: US cuts off nuclear cooperation over NPT dispute; UK terminates bilateral defense treaty over apartheid “laager mentality:” Fear of Soviet invasion, need to force Western defense, conventional arms embargoes, isolation  proliferation 1977-1979: US-Soviet pressure fails to prevent probable nuclear test (possibly joint Israeli-South African test) 1980s: Six atomic bombs constructed 1990: White government dismantles arsenal before majority rule

B. Do sanctions work? The basic problem: The “best” sanctions are never imposed Keys to success Sanction must be large % of target’s GDP Sanction must not harm sender (very much) Problem: Trade is mutually beneficial. Cutoff will always harm sender Success usually takes less than 5 years

III. Foreign Aid Predicting foreign aid In general (who gets the most aid?) Free market countries (especially during Cold War) Post-Colonial states (especially during decolonization) Poverty and Debt Specific relationships US: Egypt, Israel, Iraq (since 2003) Japan: “Friends of Japan” – similar UN voting and trade Western Europe: Former colonies Source = Alesina and Weder

B. US Gives Low % of GDP for development…

…but still manages to be the largest donor

1. Recent International Affairs spending (aid and diplomacy): Surprising stability

2. Long-Term Decline in Foreign Aid

3. Top Three Recipients of US Aid: FY 2001 – FY 2009 (And 2010 Request) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1st Israel Iraq 2nd Egypt Afgh 3rd Jord Pak Israel and Egypt were the top two from 1979 to 2002 and in the top five ever since 9/11 (along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – countries where US forces have been fighting). Why?

C. Does foreign aid work? Aid and corruption: No overall correlation, positive or negative More corrupt countries tend to attract US aid Less corrupt countries tend to attract aid from Australia and Scandinavia Aid and growth “Good policies:” Aid may have positive effect “Bad policies:” Aid has no effect Problem: Hard to establish effect of aid on growth. Why? Source = Alesina and Weder 2002