1. THE ROMAN STATE BEFORE NERO (PRINCEPS AD 54-68) 1. As the Roman state stabilized after the “Period of the Kings” and began to develop the institutions of “The Republic” from the early 400s BC onwards, GRADUALLY a “patrician-plebeian élite” emerged and by the late 300s BC was firmly in control of ‘policy’ through its institution, “THE SENATE”. 2. And that body, consisting of some 300 or so family-heads, was itself soon dominated by a “patrician-plebeian nobility” comprising some forty or so families which had managed to monopolize the annual, elective offices of state, particularly the two CONSULSHIPS. 3. While not a completely closed shop, it was not easy for “a new man” to break into the ranks of “the nobility” by getting elected to either of the two highest offices.

2. 4. But if he did, he founded a new “noble family”. 5. a) The “nobility” (supported by the bulk of other senators) believed strongly in “oligarchy” (“government by the few”). b) And one of the firm principles of ‘oligarchy’ was that no one family, let alone any single individual should dominate the state. c) State offices and all the fruits of power were to be shared as equally as possible among the forty or so dominant families. 6. Power was maintained politically and socially through the very complex “patron-client system” which saw a substantial part of the citizen body tied to “patrons” who guided their “clients” about how to vote in the technically ‘sovereign’ Popular Assemblies which were responsible for elections and the passage of laws.

3. 7. The SENATE (in practice the dominant “nobles” within it) guided the Roman state very well indeed from about 300 BC onwards as Rome i) came to control (albeit mostly indirectly through treaties) all the other 170 or so states and peoples of Italy - a process completed by about 265 BC ; ii) fought successfully the long ‘First Punic War’ (264 - 241 BC) against Carthage; iii) defended itself and the Italian Peninsula, with the aid of its allies in Italy, against Hannibal during the ‘Second Punic War’ (218 – 201 BC) ; and, iv) in the process, began to acquire an empire as “provinces” (“overseas possessions subject to annual taxation”) were conquered (or occasionally bequeathed) - until Rome had (in its “provinces”) subject peoples from the western end to the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

4. The Roman state and its allies in Italy in 338 BC Rome and its allies in Italy about 279 BC Rome, its allies in Italy and Rome’s first two “provinces” (Sicily and Corsica-Sardinia) in 237 BC Rome, its allies in Italy, and Rome’s empire about 200 BC Rome, its allies in Italy, and Rome’s empire about 133 BC

5. 8. BUT the Senate more and more was unable to deal effectively with all the rapid changes that occurred in Roman society in the half century between 200 and 150 BC. 9. What had happened? 10. Rome had become involved further and further from Italy and, as it fought wars - particularly in the wealthy, highly urbanized regions of the eastern Mediterranean - riches (including slaves) had poured into Italy, the bulk of those riches falling into the hands of the élite. 11. Also military service outside Italy, far from their homes, had caused problems for the small, independent farmers of the peninsula who formed the bulk of the peninsula’s citizen armies – including that of Rome.

6. 12. Many a change had come: a) Small-scale farmers, unable to attend to their farms, had had to sell or abandon their land, which was bought up by the upper classes (using the wealth pouring into Italy from warfare and the growing empire). b) This, in turn, had led to more and more land in fewer and fewer hands. c) And there was an ample supply of labour to work and run the growing estates - in the form of the slaves captured in war. d) State contracts and growing opportunities to lend money had seen the appearance of a new wealthy social stratum [which would come to be known as “the Equestrian Order”] below the “senatorial order” ; its members, while rich and often landowners themselves, chose not to compete for political office or to aspire to join the Senate.

7. e) Finally, traditional Roman values and the traditional Roman way of life were challenged by the influx of Greek ideas and practices. 13. By the 130s and 120s BC Tiberius Gracchus and his younger brother Gaius Gracchus were trying to introduce reform, especially land reform - losing their lives in the process as Rome experienced its first instances of political violence. 14. Part of their aim had been to try to restore citizen farmers to the land but their work had little effect. 15. i) They weren’t in any sense from “the lower classes”; they belonged to the very heart of the political élite, being part of the dominant “nobility” on both sides of their family. ii) They had expected a majority of the members of the Senate to support their proposals - to no avail.

8. TIBERIUS AND GAIUS GRACCHUS

9. 16. And when no overall support was forthcoming, they had used the office of “tribune of the Plebs” to push legislation through the Popular Assembly in defiance of the Senate. 17. Unwittingly they caused an irreparable division within the upper class. 18. Thereafter we hear more and more of “the optimates” (optimates) - the more conservative members of the Senate - and “populist” leaders (populares) who, while advocating reform, often had their own political careers in mind. “Populists”, rarely not from the “nobility”, either held the office of “tribune of the Plebs” themselves or worked with one or more sympathetic “tribunes” to push legislation through the Popular Assembly in the face of “conservative” (“optimate”) opposition.

10. 19. AND the problem of recruitment into the armed forces remained and was not solved until just before 100 BC when the “new man” and military reformer, GAIUS MARIUS, made normal the creeping practice of accepting into Rome’s legions citizens who had little or no land and who did not, therefore, meet the previous property requirements for military service. 20. BUT Marius introduced what was to become one of the banes of “the Republic”: men who signed up to fight under him (and under consequent military commanders) were promised land at the end of their service. 21. This practice necessitated the passage of a ‘land bill’ and saw the commander either having to introduce such a proposal himself into the Popular Assembly or forming an alliance with a “populist” politician, usually a sympathetic “tribune of the Plebs”, who would do this for him.

11. 22. This practice also had another consequence: the fighting man developed a close bond with his commander and directed his loyalty more to him than to ‘the state’. GAIUS MARIUS

12. THE FIRST CENTURY BC 1. After 100 BC political conflict between “optimates” and “populists” was only too common – sometimes leading to violence. 2. Lucius Cornelius SULLA, after a) marching on Rome in the 80s with an army that had served loyally under him for many years in Asia Minor, and b) reviving the office of dictator [not employed since 202 BC ], introduced a range of very conservative reforms which aimed at ensuring the SENATE controlled the political life of the state to the detriment of “populists”, the Popular Assemblies and the office of “tribune of the Plebs”.

13. LUCIUS CORNELIUS SULLA

14. 3. After Sulla had stepped down, a series of “emergencies” in the late 80s and the 70s BC in the wider Mediterranean, which could not have been foreseen, required the appointment of men with special military skills to numerous “extra-ordinary military commands” created for some time by decision of the SENATE but eventually by the POPULAR ASSEMBLY. 4. The ‘unknown’ was whether the holders of these ‘special commands’ with armies who had bonded with them and who looked to them for their reward of land at the end of their service would, on their return, remain loyal to “the state” (in practice, “the Senate”) or would use pressure to fulfil their own ambitions.

15. 5. Foremost, perhaps, (and the most successful) of these appointees was Gnaeus POMPEIUS (POMPEY) who held several “special commands”. 6. He had proved himself loyal to SULLA’s regime but had early on also shown his willingness to bring gentle pressure to bear (by keeping troops standing by) in order to pursue his own goals. 7. a) He had demonstrated his superior skills as a senator with great military ability in particular when appointed, in 67 BC, with huge resources and a mandate, with the necessary legal authority (imperium) for three years, to rid the Mediterranean of piracy. b) He completed his task in three months and was then appointed to fight for several years against King Mithridates who had a long history of threatening Roman interests in Asia Minor.

16. GNAEUS POMPEIUS

17. 8. POMPEY added two large wealthy “provinces” to Rome’s empire - SYRIA and PONTUS-ET-BITHYNIA (below the Black Sea), returned to Rome triumphant in 62 BC, disbanded his troops and quite expected the Senate a) to support the passage of a bill to grant land to his demobilized forces; and b) to give formal recognition to all that he had done to add to Rome’s empire. 9. BUT a distrustful Senate spurned him at every turn! 10. Equally frustrated at this time was Pompey’s greatest and most bitter rival, Marcus Licinius CRASSUS (allegedly the richest man in Rome) whose wealth had not enabled him to gain a second “special military command” after his service to the state in putting down the huge and frightening rebellion in Italy led by Spartacus.

18. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS

19. 11. Neither POMPEY nor CRASSUS was able to achieve his ambitions alone. 12. Enter the scene a younger, rising senator of “patrician” family and with “populist” leanings, GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR.

20. 13. Somehow (and against the odds) he persuaded POMPEY and CRASSUS to work together with him, to pool their resources, and by doing so to control the Roman state privately as members of what is known (wrongly) as “the FIRST TRIUMVIRATE” - in order to achieve their goals. THE BREAKDOWN OF “THE TRIUMVIRATE” 1. The three men achieved their aims, although POMPEY was always uncomfortable about any anti-Senate activity and had to be cemented into the relationship later by a marriage to CAESAR’s daughter Julia. 2. Crassus lost his life exercising his “special military command” and Julia died in childbirth.

21. 3. By the late 50s BC “the Triumvirate” (always a private arrangement) was no more and the tensions between the two remaining former partners, POMPEY and CAESAR, erupted in 49 BC in civil war, …….. 4. …. but not before CAESAR had added significantly to the empire by fighting in Gaul for seven or so years and conquering (and, in many instances, slaughtering) the tribes there. THE EMPIRE BY ABOUT 45 BC CAESAR’S ADDITIONS POMPEY’S ADDITIONS

22. 5. After widespread fighting in East and West (but not in Italy) for over five years between the forces of CAESAR and those of POMPEY (the latter upholding “Republicanism” and the cause of the SENATE), CAESAR emerged victorious by 45 BC and controlled the state alone (often as the officially appointed dictator) until his assassination on 15 th March 44 BC. 6. During his not infrequent visits to Rome (during the civil war) and through his partisans he was able to introduce a programme of political, economic and social reforms of a “populist” nature and to weaken greatly the power of “the oligarchy” which had dominated the state for most of the preceding three hundred years, many members of which had fled Italy anyway with Pompey. 7. In his will CAESAR named as his primary heir and ‘son’ his eighteen-year-old great-nephew, GAIUS OCTAVIUS – his sister’s grandson.

23. 8. The future depended on how GAIUS OCTAVIUS (at 18) would approach his inheritance, especially given the dissatisfaction over the terms of Caesar’s will on the part of Caesar’s right-hand man, MARCUS ANTONIUS (aged 39). GAIUS OCTAVIUS who, upon his adoption became GAIUS JULIUS CAESAR OCTAVIANUS (OCTAVIAN) MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY)

24. 9. OCTAVIAN (as OCTAVIUS became after his adoption) was at odds with MARK ANTONY for a time in 44 BC, then worked with him (and a third leading “Caesarian”, Marcus Aemilius LEPIDUS) as part of the formal “SECOND TRIUMVIRATE” which gave the three men, through formal legislation, control of the state and its institutions for five years, renewable for a further five. 10. With the disgrace of LEPIDUS, OCTAVIAN and MARK ANTONY drifted apart until military conflict between the two was, perhaps, inevitable. 11. a) OCTAVIAN more and more gained the support of “the West”; b) MARK ANTONY had the support of “the East” and access especially to the massive resources of Egypt through its queen, CLEOPATRA.

25. COIN OF MARCUS ANTONIUS AND CLEOPATRA VII

26. 12. The final confrontation came at the naval battle of ACTIUM at the beginning of September 31 BC. 13. a) A victorious OCTAVIAN was left the sole surviving military leader from what had been another civil war, although presented as a war against an ambitious foreign queen. b) All power, through the support of the armed forces, was in his hands. 14. a) He would work tirelessly for over 40 years to stabilize the state, to reform the administration, and to strengthen the foundations of society as he created the system known as “the Empire” and moulded the new position of “First Citizen” (Princeps) - never acknowledging that an autocratic political system had been created, always trying to create the impression that “the Republic” had been restored and that he was just a citizen like the rest, even if the leading one.

27. b) Ceding power for a brief moment only in January 27 BC after three years of unbridled power, OCTAVIAN accepted a new name from the SENATE, becoming “Imperator Caesar AUGUSTUS”, and was granted a huge provincial governorship for ten years which gave him authority over the two Spanish provinces, the three Gallic provinces, Syria (and Cilicia) - where the bulk of the armed forces were stationed. THE WORK OF AUGUSTUS ARMED FORCES 1. a) Augustus spent ten years creating the Roman state’s first permanent professional army, consisting initially of 28 legions (with about 150,000 well-paid men) strategically stationed towards the frontiers of the empire. b) To the legions were attached auxiliary units offering a career to about 150,000 provincial subjects - together giving a professional army of 300,000.

28. 2. The army’s loyalty to Augustus was guaranteed, since until AD 6 (that is, for well over twenty years) he paid for it himself from his own resources. VARIOUS IMAGES OF AUGUSTUS

29. CIVIL SERVICE 1. He also began to mould the state’s first ever civil service, offering in particular paid positions to members of “the Equestrian Order” – the most important appointees (answerable to Augustus alone) being the two PREFECTS OF THE PRAETORIAN GUARD, who commanded (in the end) a force of some 9000 men in Italy. 2. A very limited number of hand-picked senators served too: as the governors of the provinces assigned to Augustus in January 27 BC and as the commanders of the professional legions. CULTURE 1. The city of Rome was enhanced with an extensive building programme and literary production was stimulated through patronage, although there is little evidence of any pressure being brought to bear on the writers who were sponsored to write on any particular themes.

30. 2. “The Augustan Age” also saw the production of a superb coinage with a very impressive range of themes, many of them purely artistic and not conveying any particular political message, although some celebrated the achievements of the new political order. STRENGTHENING OF SOCIETY 1. An attempt was made through legislation (not very successfully) to strengthen the family as a unit, to encourage the procreation of children, to limit frivolous divorces, to criminalize adultery, and to regulate the flow of freed slaves (who became Roman citizens upon ‘manmission’) into society. 2. a) The religion of the state was given new life through the repair of temples and the restoration of neglected rituals.

31. b) Outside Italy (in the “provinces”) non-citizens were not discouraged from dedicating temples, shrines and altars to Augustus, on condition that ROMA was associated with his name - giving rise to “the imperial cult” (erroneously called ‘emperor worship’) and to many a surviving dedication to “ROMA ET AUGUSTUS”. TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 1. The empire grew under Augustus too (especially as it was extended to the line of the River Danube), but attempts to establish a Roman presence east of the River Rhine were abandoned after the disaster of Quinctilius Varus in AD 9 (when three entire legions were wiped out of existence). 2. Augustus, in his will five years later, recommended that there be no further expansion of the empire.

32. THE EMPIRE ABOUT 32 BC AS OCTAVIAN WAS ABOUT TO DEFEAT MARK ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA THE EMPIRE IN AD 9 (FIVE YEARS BEFORE AUGUSTUS’ DEATH) AND JUST BEFORE THE WESTWARD WITHDRAWAL BACK TO THE LINE OF THE RIVER RHINE

33. CONSTITUTIONAL REORGANIZATION 1. After OCTAVIAN ruled with an iron fist for three years from late 31 BC, probably concerned that he might meet the same fate as his adoptive father and great-uncle, he announced that any of his acts of questionable constitutionality would become null- and-void at the end of 28 BC. 2. In January 27 BC, as one of the consuls, he presided over the SENATE and announced that he was surrendering control of the empire to “the Roman Senate and People”. 3. The most unstable “provinces” were almost immediately returned to his control for a ten-year term and various honours were bestowed upon him, including the new name “AUGUSTUS”. 4. Dissatisfaction caused by his continuing monopolization of one of the two annual consulships after that led to a readjustment of Augustus’ position in 23 BC.

34. 5. He resigned the consulship, accepted the powers of a “tribune of the Plebs” for life (without the office of tribune) and had his formal authority over the provinces assigned to him in 27 BC made superior to that of other provincial governors (enabling him, if need be, to issue orders legally to the governors of the provinces which the Senate had taken back under its control). 6. Later, probably in 19 BC, he accepted the powers of the consulship for life but, again, without holding the actual office of consul. 7. It had taken time, but Augustus had gradually accumulated into his own hands a series of traditional, “Republican” powers (without the offices) and had created a new position - that of Princeps (“First citizen”). 8. His ‘problem’ was how to pass these extensive powers, entrusted to him for use in the interests of the state during his lifetime only, to the next generation.

35. “THE SUCCESSION” 1. From early on Augustus appears to have wanted a family member to follow him as ‘head of state’, but the position was not hereditary and he needed to maintain the pretence that Rome was a “Republic”. 2. a) Having no son, he ‘used’ his daughter JULIA in the most unconscionable manner through her various arranged marriages in order to obtain a male heir. b) Upon the birth in 17 BC of her second son, LUCIUS, (which gave Augustus a second grandson) he adopted both LUCIUS and his older brother, GAIUS (born in 20 BC ), as his ‘sons’ and, once they had reached ‘manhood’, began to have powers bestowed on them in preparation (presumably) for one or other of them to assume the helm of the state after his death.

36. 3. But in AD 2 LUCIUS died (aged 18) and two years later in AD 4 GAIUS died too (aged 23). 4. Reluctantly (we are told) AUGUSTUS (at the age of 66) now adopted, as his ‘son’, his stepson TIBERIUS (aged 45) who over the next nine years was gradually given the same formal powers that Augustus enjoyed. 5. Consequently, when AUGUSTUS died in AD 14 (at 76), TIBERIUS could move smoothly to become Rome’s second “PRINCEPS” with few formalities required. GAIUS JULIA, MOTHER OF GAIUS AND LUCIUS A YOUNG TIBERIUS

37. 6. The period of “the Julio-Claudian Dynasty” had begun. TIBERIUS (14 – 37) GAIUS “ CALIGULA ” (37 – 41) CLAUDIUS (41 – 54) NERO (54 – 68)

38. THE JULIO-CLAUDIAN DYNASTY TIBERIUS ( AD 14 – 37 ) 1. Augustus had done so much over 40 years that there was little of an innovative nature that was left for Tiberius to do during his 23-year “principate ”. 2. He observed essentially Augustus’ recommendation that there should be no further expansion of the empire territorially. 3. Unlike Augustus, Tiberius lacked diplomacy and he failed miserably to maintain good relations with the SENATE. 4. a) Tensions seem to have become so great that in AD 26, in the 12th year of his time at the helm, he left Rome and took up residence for 11 years on the island of CAPRI, never to return to the city.

39. b) From Capri he communicated with the Senate by letter and allowed his sole Prefect of the Praetorian Guard, Lucius Aelius SEJANUS (of the “Equestrian Order”) to accumulate far too much influence – which will have made relations with the Senate even worse, not to mention Sejanus’ non-senatorial status. c) Sejanus rose to such heights (and was called by Tiberius “my partner in my labours”) that something that is unclear to us happened in AD 31 and Sejanus was violently toppled on Tiberius’ orders. 5. Like Augustus, TIBERIUS had great difficulty with “the succession” (finding someone to follow his at his death) – not least because of the attitude of Augustus’ granddaughter AGRIPPINA to him. 6. a) Upon his own adoption, Tiberius (although he had a son, DRUSUS) had been required to adopt, as his ‘son’ and primary heir, his nephew GERMANICUS, who was married to AGRIPPINA.

40. b) The aim seems to have been that a son of theirs (a great-grandson of Augustus) would one day succeed to the office of Princeps. c) BUT GERMANICUS died in AD 19 and Agrippina, convinced that Tiberius and his mother LIVIA (Augustus’ widow) were in some way involved and that Tiberius was now hostile to her fatherless children, did not hide her opposition to him. d) Her determined stand led to her own downfall and that of her two elder sons, NERO CAESAR and DRUSUS CAESAR. e) On Germanicus’ death, Tiberius’ natural son, DRUSUS, replaced him as Tiberius’ likely successor. f) But he too died (in AD 23) and Tiberius did nothing to clarify where things now stood - leaving the way open to intrigue, manoeuvring, and back-stabbing.

41. 7. Only towards the end of his life did Tiberius indicate that he favoured Germanicus and Agrippina’s only surviving son, GAIUS, who (thanks to the efforts of MACRO, the Praetorian Prefect who had replaced Sejanus) was introduced to the Senate at the death of Tiberius (at 78) - and the process of bestowing the powers of the office of of “Princeps” on him (aged 25) began. TIBERIUS (at a younger age)

42. GAIUS (“CALIGULA”) (AD 37 – 41) 1. There is little doubt that GAIUS, who created great expectations because of his youth, very soon began to display an arrogance, a paranoia, and an erraticism that was very disturbing to those around him. 2. a) He was either conspired against frequently or believed that this was the situation. b) Victims of his suspicions included his two sisters, AGRIPPINA [the Younger] and JULIA LIVILLA - who were exiled - and his brother-in-law (the widower of his beloved sister Drusilla), Marcus Aemilius LEPIDUS, who was executed.

43. A COIN OF GAIUS (A SILVER DENARIUS ) DEPICTING HIS THREE SISTERS (HOLDIING THE ATTRIBUTES OF THREE GODDESSES) IN BETTER TIMES

44. 3. GAIUS upset the Jewish population of the empire and attempted some sort of military activity beyond the Rhine (with no evident results) and seems to have planned an invasion of Britain (which was aborted). 4. He fell foul, in January AD 41, to an actual conspiracy at the age of 28. GAIUS

45. CLAUDIUS ( AD 41 – 54) 1. When Gaius was assassinated, the SENATE began to debate whether there needed to be another Princeps, only to have any say about the future usurped by the PRAETORIAN GUARD which quickly proclaimed CLAUDIUS (the grandson of Augustus’ wife Livia, the nephew of Tiberius, and the paternal uncle of Gaius) as ‘emperor’ at the age of 48. 2. During his 13 years at the helm, “the Court” became even more important and, while Claudius seems at all times to have been in charge of policy, too much influence was allowed the palace freedmen (former imperial slaves). 3. Claudius oversaw new territorial acquisitions, not least the addition of southern Britain after the invasion of AD 43.

46. 4. The absence of any constitutional mechanism to determine who would follow a Princeps on his death meant that those with a vested interest (particularly within “the Court”) had to engage in manoeuvring and, often, back-stabbing to promote a chosen successor. 5. a) With Claudius, his third wife Valeria MESSALINA (probably at least 26 years his junior) was particularly active bringing about the downfall of any who got in her way as she tried to protect the interests of her and Claudius’ son, BRITANNICUS. b) Going to extremes, she apparently went through some sort of marriage ceremony with a rising political figure, Gaius Silius, and, when Claudius was finally convinced of her betrayal, she was tried and executed.

47. c) Although Claudius swore never to marry again, it was not long before he took as his fourth wife, AGRIPPINA (the Younger), great-granddaughter of Augustus, who used her position to remove any who got in her way too. MESSALINA (executed AD 48) AGRIPPINA (the Younger)

48. d) Even earlier and certainly from the time she married Claudius, AGRIPPINA put all her efforts into promoting the interests of her son NERO, Augustus’ great-great grandson. 6. a) By early AD 50 Claudius had adopted Nero (at 13) as his ‘son’, to the disadvantage of his (younger) natural son Britannicus. b) By AD 53 Nero was married to Claudius’ daughter Octavia. c) In AD 54 Claudius (never in good health) died (possibly poisoned) and NERO was presented to the Senate - and the process of bestowing the imperial powers on him was begun and he became Rome’s fifth “First Citizen” just short of his 17 th birthday.

49. NERO CLAUDIUS

50. NERO ( AD 54 – 68) 1. Clearly AGRIPPINA was of the view that she could be “the power behind the throne”. 2. For a time she was able to work with Sextus Afranius BURRUS (Prefect of the Praetorian Guard) and Lucius Annaeus SENECA (a leading senator, man of letters, and Nero’s tutor) in guiding the administration of the state. 3. While there were tensions with Agrippina (whose murder Nero arranged in AD 59 because he found her overbearing), BURRUS and SENECA together offered excellent leadership in the name of Nero (Nero’s “good years”) until Burrus’ death in AD 62 and Seneca’s withdrawal from public life soon after.

51. 4. a) By AD 65 NERO was becoming more assertive and openly pursuing his own personal interests (acting, lyre-playing, chariot racing) in public to the horror of conservative senators. b) But he seems to have retained the loyalty of the armed forces, not least because much was achieved in his name in terms of promoting Rome’s interests in the wider empire and against Rome’s enemies – even though Nero showed no direct interest in military affairs and had no personal relationship with the legions. 5. Even when he ordered three of his leading military commanders (his foremost general CORBULO and the governors of the two heavily militarized ‘Germanies’ on the Rhine) in AD 66 to commit suicide, there is no serious evidence that he lost the support of the legions.

52. 6. THEN in March AD 68 the governor of the province of Gallia Lugdunensis (with its capital at Lyon in south central France) rebelled, even though he did not have even one legion at his disposal. 7. Less than two months later, NERO had fled from Rome and committed suicide. 8. The issue (to which we’ll return, as our course proper begins) is whether there really was a causal link between this uprising, which was quickly crushed, and Nero’s fall and death at the age of 30. A gold aureus from late in Nero’s reign