JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Preventing and combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Klaus Lützenkirchen Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU), Joint Research Centre, European Commission Karlsruhe, Germany JRC Information Day and S&T Workshops Bucharest – 11 May 2006

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Traditional Safeguards and Physical Protection fail (operator accountancy versus verification) Illicit trafficking of nuclear material Seizure (border control, intelligence services) Nuclear Forensic analysis Illicit Trafficking and Nuclear Forensics

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Threat by nuclear terrorism: Theft of nuclear material to produce a nuclear explosive device Theft of radioactive material ( Dirty Bomb) Fight against Illicit Trafficking UO 2 Fuel stolen in Lithuania, seized in Poland, produced in Russia, analysed at JRC-ITU (Source IAEA)

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, – Training sessions for law enforcement services and laboratory experts jointly with IAEA (2002, …): New EU and CC, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,… – Model Action Plan: RITNUM Handbook national Response to Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material (developed jointly with ITWG) – Delivery of portable equipment for categorisation of material – Demonstration exercises inside countries and at borders : 07/2002 Bucharest, 10/2002 BG/TR, 09/2004 PL/BY, …. Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Material Projects with Romania

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, target fieldSPEC Exploranium: GR-135 XRF: ICS-4000 SAIC: RAD SMART Handheld Gamma Spectrometers NaI CdTe Illicit trafficking and radiation detection (Support to IAEA)

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Demonstration Exercise Romania 18 July, 2002

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, National Exercise on Combating Nuclear Terrorism Braşov County, Romania,10 May 2006 Interception of illegal transport

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Joint Demonstration Exercise Border Bulgaria/Turkey - Kapikule, Oct. 2002

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Future EU border: Romania with Ukraine and Moldova Joint border exercises TACIS projects with Ukraine and Moldova

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, – training of personnel – installation of hand-held and mobile equipment – Improvement of scientific/technical infrastructure – implementation of the RITNUM handbook and creation of a Model Action Plan – demonstration exercises – workshop to strengthen regional co- operation and co-ordination – Joint Analysis Agreement to analyze seized material Multicountry Project COOPERATION that counts Republic of AzerbaijanRepublic of Georgia Russian Federation Ukraine Republic of Moldova Republic of Kazakhstan The TACIS Multicountry Project to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material Estimated duration: 60 months Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, What is Nuclear Forensics ? Information on the nature of the seized material, its intended use and its origin Fingerprint ? Characteristic properties (isotopic composition, trace elements, macro- and microscopic structure) Origin, legal owner, intended use, …  Examples

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, ? Nuclear Forensics

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Nuclear Forensics Origin and intended use ? First observations/conclusions: geometry  5 x 5 x 5 cm, unconventional application/reactor elemental composition  pure U metal isotopic composition  natural U  D 2 O or graphite moderated reactor main impurities  Al, Ca, Fe, Mg, Mn, Na, Pb, Si (200 mg material)

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Origin Nuclear Materials Database nuclear fuel data from western and Russian suppliers (UO 2, MOX) (based on World Nuclear Industry Handbook and bilateral contracts, various degrees of access) Electronic literature archive on non- conventional fuels (Russian sources) Open literature Nuclear Forensics Geometry points at German origin

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Age determination spiking with 228 Th (or 233 Pa) chemical separation measurement: alpha spectrometry or mass spectrometry Nuclear Forensics 5*10 7 2*10 4 After 20 years Age via 234 U / 230 Th α-spec.: 59.0  1.5 years ICP-MS: 59.3  2.0 years => Date of production: second half of 1943 Age indicates German (or US) nuclear programme

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Case Study Illicit Trafficking - Case Study : Find 26 – Rotterdam On 16 th Dec kg radioactive material was detected in a scrap metal shipment in Rotterdam harbour. The shipment arrived from a dealer in Jordan. Materials sent to ITU on 10 th March 2004 and consisted of 2 bulk samples and 3 swipes.

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Results - bulk  Gamma spectrometry U-235 enrichment 0,7 %  TIMS and MC-ICP-MS U-234 = 0,0052 % U-235 = 0,712 % U-238 = 99,283 %  natural uranium, no indication of an enriched or irradiated uranium  Titration U-content ~70 %  Lead isotopics Pb-204 = 1.47 % Pb-206 = % Pb-207 = % Pb-208 = %  resembles natural lead, no radiogenic lead  Anions (qualitative) (NO 3 ) - and (CO 3 ) 2-  ICP-MS Main impurities (>1000 ppm): Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Results - bulk  SEM/EDX agglomerates of small crystals with an average length of 10 µm and diameter of 2 µm uranium together with Fe, Ni and Cr Al, Ca, Mg and Si were in the amorphous part around 11LineW%A% CrKa FeKa NiKa UMa  m 20  m

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Find-26: Rotterdam Bulk material: natural uranium oxides with ≈ 70% U presence of (CO 3 ) 2- main impurities: Al, Ca, Cr, Fe, Mg, Mo, Na, Ni, P lead isotopic composition Swipes: natural uranium, Cs-137, Eu-154 and Am-241 (evidence of nuclear activities) What information did the analysis yield? Intermediate product, possibly (NH 4 ) 4 (UO 2 )(CO 3 ) 3 Impurities point to phosphate rich ores (North Africa, Middle East, USA, South Africa, Brazil) Pb isotopic composition (natural) indicates low uranium content in the ore, which is the case for P-rich ores evidence of nuclear activities Origin of the material: combination of scientific results and information from other services

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Radioactive Dispersion Devices (RDDs) or Dirty Bombs) What is a “dirty bomb”? A “dirty bomb,” also known as a radiological weapon, is a conventional explosive such as dynamite packaged with radioactive material that scatters when the bomb goes off. A dirty bomb kills or injures through the initial blast of the conventional explosive and by airborne radiation and contamination—hence the term “dirty.”

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, The propagation of the radioactive cloud in a city RDD with 2000 Ci 60 Co (7.4∙10 13 Bq) 1.5 kg conv. explosives No real explosion! scale 1:10,000 DMA IKONOS satellite map (wind with 0.5 m/s from 290° north, weather conditions neutral/unstable) effective dose scale (inhalation) Time after the detonation: 10 minutes 20 minutes30 minutes40 minutes50 minutes60 minutes70 minutes Total for 2 hours Inhalation dose in the center of the explosion: 680 mSv Radioactive Dispersion Devices In collaboration with the BfS, Germany

JRC Info Day - Bucureşti, Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Conclusions: has extensive experience in working with IAEA, EU member states, national and international organisations in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear material is developing tools for modelling / scenario assessment reports for and post event support following a Radioactive Dispersion Event has the experience, dedicated facilities and extensive databases for nuclear forensic analyses The JRC…