1. Romanian Nuclear Safety Authority Experiences on Building the National Capability for Nuclear Security Dr. Lucian Biro Director General TM/WS Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development: Managing the Development of National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power Vienna, 9-12 February 2010 ROMANIA National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control

2. 2 Content (1) Romanian Policy Principles in the Nuclear Sector Physical Protection - Historical Background Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities NPP Safety & Security Characteristics Physical Protection Regulations

3. 3 Content (2) Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Actions Plans Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group (RCPG) Security Related Events Organized by CNCAN - Few Examples Conclusions

4. 4 Romanian Policy Principles in the Nuclear Sector

5. 5 Non-proliferation policy; Peaceful use of nuclear energy; Fully compliance of international treaties, agreements and conventions provisions; Transparency for all nuclear activities; Implementation of high level nuclear and radiation safety internationally recognized standards; Policy Principles (1)

6. 6 Implementation of Nuclear and Radiological Security measures; Export/import strictly under control; Preventing and Combating the illicit trafficking; International Cooperation. Policy Principles (2)

7. 7 Physical Protection - Historical Background -

8. 8 Historical Background (1) YearEvent 1970  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), was ratified on 4 February 1970 and entered into force on 5 March 1970; 1972  The Safeguard Agreement came into force (INFCIRC/180). 1974  Law No. 61 for the development of the nuclear activities in Romania;

9. 9 Historical Background (2) YearEvent 1976  Physical protection regulation have been issued; 1982  Quality Assurance Law was issued; 1993  1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, was ratified on 23 November 1993 and entered into force on 23 December 1993; 1996  New Nuclear Act (Law No. 111/1996);  IPPAS Mission in Romania;

10. 10 Historical Background (3) YearEvent 1998  Establish the Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group 1999  1999 Additional Protocol was signed on June 1999; 2000  1999 Additional Protocol was ratified on July 2000; 2001  The Law on third party liability in the case of nuclear damages;  New Physical Protection regulations in force;

11. 11 Historical Background (4) YearEvent 2002  Design Basis Threat (DBT) regulations in force;  CNCAN QA Manual in force;  New CNCAN structure in force;  IPPAS Mission in Romania completed;  New Physical Protection System Project for Uranium Powder Plant completed;  New Physical Protection System for VVR-S Research Reactor completed;  National Strategy for preventing and combating terrorism in force;

12. 12 Historical Background (5) YearEvent 2003  CNCAN become member of WENRA; 2005  CNCAN issued the National Strategy for Nuclear Safety for the period of 2005-2009; 2006  CNCAN celebrated 45 years;  TRIGA Reactor conversion from HEU to LEU, completed; 2009  VVR-S reactor HEU Spent Fuel transported to Russian Federation by air plane;  CNCAN issued the National Strategy for Nuclear Safety for the period of 2009-2013;

13. 13 Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities

14. 14 Lack of procedures Inefficient procedures Inefficient Physical Protection Systems Lack of Facilities Personnel Training Radioactive Sources Lost or Theft Inefficient Transportation Physical Protection Lack of communications between authorities Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (1)

15. 15 Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (2) Lack of coherent strategy Gaps in Legal Framework Inadequate Equipment No specialized response units Permissive Border Control No background history of radioactive sources No security culture

16. 16 NPP Safety & Security Characteristics

17. 17 All NPPs have comprehensive measures for safety and security; Comprehensive emergency and security plans; Robust containment, spent fuel pools, and spent fuel storage containers; Redundant and diverse plant safety systems; Trained plant staff, skilled in accident and event response; Well-trained, well-armed security forces. NPP Characteristics

18. 18 Reactor Building Bio Shield Calandria Vessel Reactor Fuel CANDU-6 Multiple Layers Protection

19. 19 Cernavoda NPP Units 1 & 2

20. 20 Cernavoda NPP Units 3 & 4

21. 21 Physical Protection Regulations

22. 22 Regulatory Powers uLaws initiator uIssues Regulations uIssues Licenses uRegulatory Directives uApprovals uAgreements uSpecifications

23. 23 Regulatory Enforcement uRecommendation for licensee action uAction Notice uRegulatory Directive uLicense amendments uRestrictions for reactor operation uReactor shutdown uRevocation or suspensions of the License uProsecutions

24. 24 Physical Protection Regulations in Nuclear Field Design Basis Threat (DBT) Regulations on using DBT Regulations on requirements for guards and security personnel qualification Physical Protection Regulations (1)

25. 25 Implementation of the INFCIRC 225/Rev.4 recommendations; To use extensively the IAEA IPPAS Missions in Romania; To use the IAEA and DOE assistance to improve the design and to built the physical protection systems at: TRIGA Research Reactor; CANDU Nuclear Fuel Plant; VVR-S Research Reactor ; Physical Protection Regulations (2)

26. 26 Physical Protection Regulations

27. 27 Radioactive Material Transport Regulations

28. 28 Safeguards Regulations

29. 29 Changing of terrorists’ motivation Interest for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Using the technology to exploit the vulnerabilities of a particular society Development of black markets may offer access to weapons The rapid spread of technological knowledge can boost terrorists weapon attempts DBT Review Process (1)

30. 30 Technical barriers should not be regarded sufficient to prevent future nuclear terrorism; Upgrading physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources; Enhancing accident prevention; DBT Review Process (2)

31. 31 Reinforcing the emergency response mechanisms; Co-operating with intelligence services; Preventing any extremist group from achieving their goals could be done by preventing the access to fissile materials through state compliance to rigorous standards of nuclear material protection, control and accountability. DBT Review Process (3)

32. 32 DBT Review Schedule

33. 33 Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Actions Plans

34. 34 National Nuclear Safety Strategy

35. 35 Actions Plan to Increase Capability and Independence of Nuclear Regulatory Authority Actions Plan to Accelerate the Reviewing Process of the National Legislative Framework Actions Plan for the Investigations of the Potential Sites with Orphans Radioactive Sources and to Set- up Corrective Measures Actions Plan to Improve the Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Systems Technical Features and Administrative Procedures Security Related Action Plans (1)

36. 36 Actions Plan for the Nuclear & Radiological Security In-field Early Detection Actions Plan for the Institutional Cooperation Development Actions Plan to Increase the Bilateral and Multilateral International Cooperation Security Related Action Plans (2)

37. 37 Actions Plan to Increase Capability and Independence of Nuclear Regulatory Authority Actions Plan to Accelerate the Reviewing Process of the National Legislative Framework Actions Plan for the Investigations of the Potential Sites with Orphans Radioactive Sources and to Set- up Corrective Measures Actions Plan to Improve the Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Systems Technical Features and Administrative Procedures Security Related Action Plans (1)

38. 38 Actions Plan for the Nuclear & Radiological Security In-field Early Detection Actions Plan for the Institutional Cooperation Development Actions Plan to Increase the Bilateral and Multilateral International Cooperation Security Related Action Plans (2)

39. 39 Romanian Counter- Proliferation Group (RCPG)

40. 40 Interdepartmental mechanism of co-operation; Created at the initiative and the assistance of the Government of the United States of America and also as a part of the Strategic Partnership between the USA and Romania; It is a result of the US Customs Service / Department of Defense Counter Proliferation Program with the Government of Romania; In force from August 1998; Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group (RCPG)

41. 41 “A multi-agency unified effort to seek to reduce the threat of WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies”. To combat the trafficking WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies that might affect the security interest of Romania; The RCPG agencies with enforcement control and investigation authority will take action for identifying and combating actions undertaking by all persons engaged in the trafficking of WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies; RCPG Mission (1)

42. 42 The RCPG members may not exceed the authority of their respective agency or position and the competencies of their respective agencies; The RCPG will only use legally established techniques and procedures for surveillance, control and investigations; RCPG Mission (2)

43. 43 Security Related Events Organized by CNCAN - Few Examples -

44. 44 Event Poster Layout (1)

45. 45 Event Poster Layout (2)

46. 46 Event Poster Layout (3)

47. 47 Event Poster Layout (4)

48. 48 RRRFR Project Partners for Romania

49. 49 Physical Protection for Nuclear Fuel Transportation

50. 50 International Meeting (1)

51. 51 International Meeting (2)

52. 52 International Meeting (3)

53. 53 Conclusions

54. 54 The building process for the national capability for nuclear security had have not only Nuclear Safety Authority as the main player; The efficiency of the system strongly depend by the cooperation with other key actors; In Romania the national capabilities for nuclear security are in compliance with national regulations and international standards; The nuclear safety and nuclear security synergy need to be considered in the national security actions plans. Conclusions

55. 55 Thank you!