Contextualizing U.S. Foreign Policy Charles Wells International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (IRP-CWE) Professor Colette Mazzucelli

What were the drivers behind the United States’ failure to respond to the 1994 Rwandan genocide? Seen through the neorealist lens with a focus on strategic value, security and sovereignty, how did the United States try to justify inaction and active withdrawal? How are the ideas proposed by the English School, based on the concept of an international community, and the idea of global society, reshaping current U.S. responses to crimes against humanity? Research Question

What is Genocide?  Article 2 of the UN Genocide Convention defines genocide as “…acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”  Adopted December 9, 1948  November 4, 1988: The United States ratifies the Genocide Convention

 Armenia (1915)  The Holocaust ( )  Cambodia ( )  Iraq ( )  Bosnia (1992 – 1995)  U.S. unwilling to get involved

 Iran 1953  Dominican Republic 1965  Vietnam War  Chile 1973  Panama 1989

 Small  Landlocked  Bordering Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo  Subsistence agrarian  In 1993, $13.2 mil in total annual U.S. trade  Currently 158 th largest trade partner

 Social classes: Hutu majority cohabits with Tutsi ruling minority  1894 – 1918: Colonized by Germany  1918 – 1962: Colonized by Belgium  1962: Rwandan independence with majority Hutu rule  1973: Habyarimana stages coup and suspends parliament  October 1990: Rwandan Civil War

1993  August 1993: Arusha Accords signed.  October 1993: UNAMIR established

1994 – April  Apr. 6: Presidential plane is shot down near Kigali airport. Killings begin that night  Belgian PK are murdered prompting Belgian withdrawal  UNSC votes to withdraw from Rwanda  UN condemns violence - Refuses to name it genocide  ICRC estimates over 100,000 dead by end of month

1994 – May  Wholesale murder of Tutsis and moderate Hutus continues  UN decides to send 5,500 troops and uses the word genocide for the first time. Delayed over arguments of who will pay.  U.S. to supply humanitarian aid and APCs. Issue over payment causes delay  ICRC estimates 500,000 dead

1994 – June and July  France independently establishes “safe zone”. Tutsi killings continue within.  July: Tutsi RPF forces capture and hold Kigali, bringing an end to the killing  No additional UN forces are deployed  Genocide ends: ~800,000 people have died in 100 days

 Rwanda of no strategic importance to U.S. foreign policy and national security  Not a major trading partner  No major natural resources  No military importance

 Monique Mujawamariya (Tutsi human rights worker who had fled to the U.S. in April 1994):

 War fatigue following invasion of Iraq and the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia  Lack of interest among the U.S. population  Possibly damaging to approval ratings and re- election efforts  Focus on Bosnia

 U.S. against military involvement  Push to withdraw UNAMIR in UN Security Council  Humanitarian aid through neighboring countries  Aversion to the use of term genocide due to policy of military intervention once genocide declared  Contribution of funds and resources not in U.S. national interest

 The Failure of International Society  Genocide Convention and international law side-stepped in favor of non-intervention

 More recently, there has been a shift in U.S. foreign policy  Military intervention in Syria in the name of U.S. national security  Chemical weapons and extremist elements a threat to international peace and security

 Willingness by administration to take military action  Threat to international peace and stability key factor in decision-making  Chemical weapons conventions and international law invoked  Administration willing to take unpopular action to curtail use of chemical weapons

 Structural Realism still very much alive today  International community and UN only as strong as P5 willingness to act  P5 act out of strategic and economic self- interest  Possible future shift as international community, and the U.S., is willing to prevent crimes against humanity