Origins of International Safeguards Fred Wehling Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Thanks to: NNSA NA-243

Presentation Outline Early Initiatives for Nuclear Nonproliferation Atoms for Peace Establishment of IAEA Definition and Objectives of Safeguards Safeguards and the NPT Strengthened Safeguards Summary: Safeguards as an Evolving System

The Atomic Age Manhattan Project scientists were motivated to develop nuclear weapons before Nazi Germany did –Understood that the “secrets of the atom” could be discovered by anyone –Recognized that nuclear technology could be used by others to acquire fission weapons. After the war, the devastating power of these weapons focused attention on mechanisms to control their numbers and further spread. International control was seen as central to any possible success.

Acheson-Lilienthal Report A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy prepared for the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy (March 1946) –Chaired by Underecretary of State Dean Acheson –Co-authors included David Lilienthal, Robert Oppenheimer, and other prominent scientists May be regarded as beginning of nuclear nonproliferation

Acheson-Lilienthal Report Difficulty of producing nuclear material was noted as a key fact that would help to bound the problem. The report distinguished between “safe” and “dangerous” activities, with the latter to be conducted by an “international monopoly” –Safe activities included use of tracer isotopes and small quantities of nuclear materials. –Dangerous activities were uranium mining and refining; uranium enrichment; the operation of plutonium production reactors and associated reprocessing plants; and nuclear explosive research and development. Inspections alone were seen as inadequate, with additional measures needed for effective international control.

Acheson-Lilienthal Report Proposed an international agency to conduct all intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear field Individual nations and their citizens free to conduct, under license and a minimum of inspection, all safe operations

Baruch Plan Proposal presented to the United Nations in June 1946, based on the Acheson-Lilienthal report The Baruch plan was not accepted, with the strongest objections from the Soviet Union Secrecy and the control of nuclear technology and materials became the foundation of U.S. nonproliferation policies. First nuclear weapon test by the USSR on August 29, 1949 dramatically illustrated the limitations of secrecy “Genie was out of the bottle” but nuclear technology still tightly controlled at national level

Atoms for Peace President Eisenhower’s speech to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953 outlined a fundamental shift in U.S. nuclear policy –Viewed atomic energy as a universal good to be shared with humankind –Promoted international monitoring of nuclear activities –Encouraged nuclear cooperation under safeguards –Stimulated the establishment of the IAEA in 1957

Atoms for Peace Proliferation threat seen as arising from national-level efforts Massive effort on the scale of Manhattan project, or diversion from known facilities, considered to be only possible proliferation paths Possibility of non-state actors presenting a proliferation threat was not seriously considered This despite expectation of widespread use of nuclear energy

A Bright Nuclear Future

The IAEA Independent international organization established by the IAEA Statute (1957) (not by UN Charter) Has special relationship with the UN Security Council 154 Member States Statute authorizes Agency to establish and administer international nuclear safeguards IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

Definition of Safeguards “International accounting and verification system designed to ensure that fissile material is only used for peaceful purposes.”

Objectives of Safeguards “… timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices of for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection”

Safeguards Before NPT Initial concepts of safeguards developed in IAEA Statute, INFCIRC/26 and INFCIRC/66 –Item-specific safeguards applied to equipment, materials, technology, and facilities –Limited to declared facilities Member states initially under no obligation to include all facilities in safeguards agreements States not party to the NPT still do not have this obligation

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Negotiated In force from 1970 Indefinitely extended 1995 Article III requires Non-Nuclear Weapons State Parties to accept safeguards

NPT Article III § 1 Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

Comprehensive Safeguards Safeguards required for NPT NNWS are outlined in INFCIRC/153 Referred to as Comprehensive Safeguards Focused on providing timely warning of detection of diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from declared facilities Generally considered sufficient for providing credible assurance when NPT entered into force

Strengthened Safeguards Comprehensive safeguards measures focused activities on declared facilities Developments in early 1990s showed the limitations of classical safeguards –Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program –Disclosure of South Africa’s secret development of nuclear weapons –Problems with cooperation and compliance in North Korea A strengthened system of safeguards was developed to give IAEA additional tools for verification and assurance These strengthened safeguards were developed through Program 93+2

The Additional Protocol Strengthened safeguards are outlined in INFCIRC/540 (1997), known as the Model Additional Protocol –Expanded information on nuclear-related activities and facilities –Inspector access to entire nuclear fuel cycle –Short-notice inspections –Environmental sampling outside of declared facilities –Greater scope for use of open-source and third-party information

The Additional Protocol Additional Protocols are NOT required for any member state As of April 2012, 140 Member States (plus Euratom) have signed APs 116 APs ratified and in force Current controversies involving: Universality Condition of nuclear supply Proliferation threats from non-state actors

Summary International efforts toward nonproliferation began shortly after first use of nuclear weapons U.S. Atoms for Peace program played key role in initiating IAEA and international safeguards Authority for safeguards derives from IAEA statute and safeguards agreements Development of safeguards guided by perceived proliferation threats as well as political, economic, and technical concerns Safeguards are an evolving system YOU are part of the evolution!

Questions?

23 Thanks! Fred Wehling, Ph.D. Education Coordinator, Center for Nonproliferation Studies Associate Professor,Graduate School of International Policy Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 460 Pierce Street Monterey, CA USA Phone: Fax: Internet: © 2010 Fred Wehling