1. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views
Main purpose of a Cut- off treaty: The main purpose of an FMCT is to put end to the quantitative growth of nuclear arsenals by stopping the production of fissile material designed for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. An FMCT should establish a legally binding, non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable ban on the production of fissile for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

2. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views
Core elements
Commensurate with definitions for « fissile material », « production » and « production facility »
To protect defense and national security interest
To respect non-proliferation obligations
To ensure implementation with an acceptable cost-effectiveness

3. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views
Fissile materials definitions
Uranium containing 20% or greater enrichment in the isotopes U235 or U233;
b) Separated plutonium containing less than 80% of Pu 238;
c) Any un-irradiated material that contains the material defined in a) or b) above;
* Separated neptunium 237 could possibly be added to the list.

4. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views
Definition of production
Isotopic enrichment of uranium to a level equal or greater than 20% in uranium 235 or 233 by any isotopic enrichment process;
Enrichment of plutonium 239 in plutonium by any isotopic separation process;
Separation of fissile material through operations to reprocess irradiated or un-irradiated nuclear fuels.

5. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views
Definition of production facilities
Any facility reprocessing irradiated nuclear material or extracting fissile material from fresh fuels where production capacities are significant with regard to the objectives of a cut-off treaty*;
Any facility enriching uranium where production capacities are significant with regard to the objectives of a Cut-off treaty.
*(Subject to capacity thresholds definition)

6. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views Verification
Verification objectives
Certify the shut-down of fissile material production facilities dedicated to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Detect production of fissile material produced in un-declared facilities.
Detect diversion of fissile material produced for civilian purposes.
Take into account of a nuclear fuel cycle for propulsion.

7. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views Verification
Monitoring of shut-down production facilities dedicated to the manufacture of nuclear weapons
Based on a comprehensive declaration of production facilities.
Shut-down may result in the implementation of more or less radical measures: Converting, closing-down, decommissioning, dismantling .
A verification regime more or less intrusive according to the status of the facility .

8. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views Verification
To detect production of fissile materials in undeclared facilities
Verification must be based on the Comprehensive Declaration by the states on all the production facilities which capacity exceeds a definite threshold.
Declaration of all fissile materials produced after entry into force of the treaty
In case of well-founded suspicions of a clandestine activity: a strictly regulated trigger procedure of challenge inspection (physical evidence, decision-making mechanisms, managed access, designations of inspectors)

9. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views Verification
Detect the diversion from civilian uses
Production of fissile materials for civilian uses is not prohibited but the verification system can be able to certify that the materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons.
In addition to the production facilities monitoring:
A tracking of produced material would be covered by verification activities on fuel fabrication plants;
And, as a transparency measure, a notification system to confirm the reception of fuels at reactors.

10. A Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty: french views Verification
Take into account of a fuel cycle for nuclear propulsion.
In order to preserve the robustness of the verification system, how to have assurance that enriched uranium (> 20%) used for nuclear propulsion is not diverted to nuclear-weapons use ?
The implementation of a verification system implies the preservation of confidential information like, for example, the geometry of fuel assemblies. For this reason, the verification could be subject to specific modalities set out in a separate protocol.