Active Assailant and Emergency Response Procedures

Deputy Chief - Jason Trevino Sergeant - Ray Price

SWAT OUR WAY POLICE SHERIFF FBI MILITARY HISTORY TRIAL & ERROR

 One or more persons who are randomly or systematically involved in the act of using deadly force on others & it appears, based on available intel that the suspect will not stop their aggressive, hostile actions without immediate & direct law enforcement intervention. The ongoing loss of life should be the primary motivator for L.E. intervention

 On-going scenario based training utilizing air soft, conducted at area schools (16-24 hours)  Teaching/Training with school staff  Emergency Combat Medicine (REMSA - TCCC)  Training/Coordinating with local agencies  Interior/Exterior perimeter training  Hallway/Room clearing

Exterior and Interior Interior:  Disturbance inside the building  Active Assailant Exterior:  Environmental Issues  Neighborhood Disturbance  Outside Law Enforcement Action  Wildlife Lockdowns are predominately initiated by exterior factors.

Shelter in place  Outside/Off property or campus threat (Examples: Fire Department, Law Enforcement, Hazardous Materials, etc.)  PROCEDURES:  Secure Perimeter and doors.  Cover windows. GREEN, Room 145  Report/ your status (Example: GREEN, Room 145 )  Continue class room instruction  Wait for further instructions  Clear by “All clear, Green” *Fire Alarm activation requires escort by LE or Fire*

LOCK DOWN  IMMEDIATE life threatening crisis on the property/campus. (I.E. Subject/s with weapons, active assailant)  PROCEDURES:  Immediately secure in a room.  Cover windows. GREEN, Room 145  Report/ your status (Example: GREEN, Room 145 )  Status Cards NO longer utilized in windows!  Released by Law Enforcement (door keyed open) *Fire alarm activation requires escort by LE or Fire *

 #1 goal of law enforcement is to stop the suspect(s)  Everything else that takes place should support the #1 goal.

 Provide dispatch/responding units with details as available  Make sure school has initiated a lockdown if appropriate  Make decision to engage/isolate suspect(s) or wait for additional officers Solo/Single officer entry is trained and promoted by the WCSD PD

 70% of these successes have been by solo officers.  15% by two-officer deployments.  15% by three-officer deployments.  There have been zero successes for anything initiated by four officers or more.

Immediate Response – Going directly to the sight and sound of violence. Search Response – Unaware where the threat is and begin searching for the threat until the sight and sound of violence is found.

 As additional units arrive, the IC should be directing them as to where to go.  Additional entry elements should be formed and implemented until the suspect(s) have been stopped.

*Windows Left to Right identified by numbers*

 Kansas City (MO) PD Sgt. Ward Smith and a Force Science Analyst did a two-year study.  Over 920 officers were observed in  The targets used were 2-D, full-color, life-size photographs of male and female subjects, some threatening and some not.  Included were armed targets that had a silver KCPD badge affixed either to the figure's belt or hanging from a simulated chain at chest level.

 The targets were programmed to simultaneously turn toward officers being tested for variable amounts of time.  Officers were instructed to "take appropriate action"--to scan, move and use cover, to discriminate under time compression between shoot and no-shoot targets, and to fire until adversaries were defeated.

 Officers were briefed that they would be responding to assist an undercover plainclothes officers in an arrest situation.  It was stressed to identify each target and officers were warned that they needed to pay close attention and be alert.  Each fired about 125 rounds in the exercise.

 Overall, a no-shoot target with a belt badge was six times more likely to be shot than one with a neck badge.  Even under full-light conditions, belt-badge targets were hit 1,272 times, compared to 196 hits for neck- badge targets.  Under low light, belt-badge targets were hit 5,288 times, with neck-badge targets taking 843 hits.  Combining both badge-placement locations, the no-shoot targets were four times more likely to be shot under low-light conditions than in a bright- light setting.

 923 veteran officers were observed in  2011 results were reviewed before they began.  Shots mistakenly fired at belt-badge targets still far outweighed those striking chain-badge targets under both full-light and low-light conditions.  The total numbers of inappropriate shots fired were down remarkably.

 Hits to brightly lit belt-badge targets plunged 82% and to neck-badge targets 88%.  In low light, belt-badge targets drew 90% fewer shots and neck-badge targets showed a 92% reduction.  Making the officers aware of the blue-on-blue risk had a very positive result.  Exposure to the problem was a memorable way to have a life-saving impact.

Tactics & Survival Training Unit Los Angeles County (CA) SD  Within the first 20 scenario's the PC was shot 95% of the time.  They weren’t challenged.  Their badges weren’t seen.  They carried their badges on the belt, around the neck, in hand near their weapon, and in hand up in the air.

 Badges on belts were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PC officers' weapons in hand.  Badges around the neck were not readily identified because responders were focused on the PCs' weapons and hands (in the role players' shooting stance, the neck badges were not visible).  A badge held in the support hand next to a PC officer's weapon was not readily identified because responders focused on the PC's weapon and shooting stance.  Even when the PC officers' weapon was taken away, they were fired upon because responders identified their shooting-stance behavior and thought the badge being pointed was a gun.

The most effective badge position identified was the “HALO” position.  PC officers' held their badges high above their heads, rotating the badge around like a halo. This allowed the badge to be presented in all directions, as close to 360 degrees as possible.  Contact teams were less apt to engage the PCs because they recognized the position as less threatening, even though the PC held a gun in the other hand.  This position drew the attention of contact officers and bought enough time for them to focus on the raised hand holding the badge.

 Train first responders that not everyone holding a gun is a suspect.  Establish a challenge protocol to limit the likelihood of blue-on-blue error. (role-players being shot dropped down to 50% after stressing the importance of challenge procedures)  The longer the PC presents himself holding a gun or displaying armed behavior, the higher the likelihood of being misidentified and fired upon.  As a PC choosing to respond to an armed threat, it was recommend keeping your weapon concealed as long as possible as you maneuver to a position of advantage.  Only present the weapon when you absolutely, positively have to engage threats.

 After engaging and conducting necessary after- action procedures, immediately holster, conceal the weapon, move to cover, and be prepared to “Halo" your badge.  Train your officers in situational awareness to understand they are an UNKNOWN person when in plainclothes and their behaviors when holding a gun may be perceived as a threat to other first responders (uniformed as well as plainclothes and off-duty).

Deputy Chief Jason Trevino Sergeant Ray Price Washoe County School Police