IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Jean Maurice Crete Division of Concepts and Planning, Safeguards Training Section Capacity Building for Safeguards : Some Perspectives MANAGING THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR NUCLEAR POWER Vienna February 2010

IAEA Outline Safeguards: An international challenge A national challenge Preparing for a nuclear industry Capacity building Support activities

IAEA Safeguards Obligations : why? NPT preamble (extract) “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples”

IAEA Safeguards Obligations : why? In other words: A legal framework A technical challengeAn historical background

IAEA IAEA Board of Governors March 1995 “...the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.”

IAEA Objectives of National Verification SSAC obligation: account for and control of nuclear material collect and maintain information on nuclear and related activities provide information to IAEA (reports, declarations)

IAEA International Safeguards Implementation Other sources Evaluation Conclusions Safeguards Implementation Report REFERENCE: State Reports Inspection Reports, Samples,etc In field Activities Effectiveness Evaluation HQ Activities

IAEA At a Domestic Level A possible objective for national purpose: Making sure that no one in a place under state’s control is circumventing the national safeguards requirements “with the full knowledge of the facts” or “without the full knowledge of the facts”

IAEA Bridging International and National Safeguards Compliance with NPT through Safeguards Agreements imposes a very accurate knowledge of the entire industrial, research and commercial status and its evolution within the state, not to mention an adequate knowledge of the conditions offered to the IAEA inspectors to perform their duty. This can only be achieved with a well informed and powerful state body. In other words, such a body is the first element of a continuous chain for successfully fulfilling national and international commitment towards non proliferation.

IAEA Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – Legislation Is the national safeguards legislation and regulation suitable for implementing and regulating safeguards for a nuclear power industry? some safeguards legislations may be tailored to low level of nuclear activities or e.g. to research reactors, and will need amending Legal framework between operator and regulator is a key issue Does the national safeguards legislation cover all nuclear materials and activities in the state? Legislative independence: accepted international standard for national safeguards authorities is to be independent of operations of facilities

IAEA Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – IAEA & Safeguards Early and continued interactions with the IAEA very important Consult at an early stage with the IAEA for advice on safeguards: incorporating safeguards in the design of the facility is extremely cost effective and resources saving (including safeguards requirements in the licensing process may be considered) some reactor types may require more intensive safeguards verification activities than others

IAEA Preparing for a Nuclear Power Industry – Training Preparing and training national safeguards regulators and inspectors training takes many years more national inspectors will probably be required throughout the project Preparing and training reactor operators and managers in safeguards requirements Experience with SSS (safeguards, security, safety) with running a research reactor provides a good base for running a nuclear power reactor

IAEA Capacity Building : Synergies Domestic “safeguards” verification activities may build on or contribute to other domestic control regimes: control of radioactive materials radiation safety physical protection export/import control system

IAEA Capacity Building : Safeguards and National Infrastructure Three-floor building: Policy makers : Reference and Objective, Law, Resources, Vision Managerial level : Organization, Allotment of resources, Regulations, Control Technical/Working level : Collecting/Processing/Reporting information

IAEA SSAC’s Skills, Knowledge and Abilities LEGAL SSAC ACCESS EXPORT REPORTING ACTIVITIES NM MEASUREMENT NMAC 1 st Pu core

IAEA Three Sets of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities DECISION ACTION Decision making and action line Control loop Expertise

IAEA Support provided by the IAEA Advisory service Legal assistance (Office of Legal Affairs) Technical support Guidance Publications (examples) Nuclear Material Handbook “Facility Design and Plant Operation Features That Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards”, STR 360, dated February 2009 Other technical reports Training

IAEA Member States Training : Highlights In 2009: 245 PARTICIPANTS FROM 77 COUNTRIES TRAINED Basic training: International SSAC course in US International SSAC course for countries with Small Quantity Protocols (SQP) in the USA Regional SSAC courses in Brazil, China, Japan, Uzbekistan National Training Course in Turkmenistan Regional Technical Meeting on AP and SQP Implementation in Asia and the Pacific Region (held In the Republic of Korea in cooperation with KINAC) As more oriented training: National Training Course on DIQ in US for Indonesia regional SSAC course in Namibia in 2008 (2010: Burkina Faso) with emphasis on uranium mining “SSAC Advisory Service” Missions Romania, Niger, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, As follow-ups of ISSAS Missions: two national training courses in 2008, in Armenia and Switzerland In close cooperation with other departments or offices of the Agency: a SQP Seminar at Headquarters in 2008 Regional Training Course on Nuclear Security, Safety and Nuclear Material Accountancy organized in Ghana Expert Meeting on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Non-proliferation in Thailand INIR missions in Jordan and Vietnam, as well as a similar mission in Chile With Australia and USA : assistance on AP implementation in Malaysia, assistance on national inspectorate training for Vietnam and Thailand

IAEA As a Summary Safeguards have to be considered For international purpose As well as for national purpose The sooner the better Safety and Security of course, but also Safeguards. Take advantage of synergies (e.g. NMAC requirements, safety design of fuel handling system) Currently safeguards are often introduced after a facility’s design has been frozen which results in costly redesign and project delays Without starting from scratch: Radioactive sources management is a sound basis Collecting existing information (e.g. customs or operators data) rather than duplicating or overlapping

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