Germany’s External Relations: Context and PolicyToward theEast Carnegie Endowment Klaus Segbers Free University of Berlin Washington, November 24, 2003

Content 1National and Global Contexts of Germany’s FP 2Germany‘s Political Agenda 3Germany and Russia: An Axis Reactivated? 4Lessons from Slipping into a War

1.1National Context : Structures „Zivilmacht“ (civilian power concept) Corporatism (politics as bargaining and mediation of conflict regulation) „Handelsstaat“ (trading state; dependency on importing energy) Social and non-state actors and dimensions

Germany's Dependence on Energy Import 75% of energy consumption have to be imported Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG

Growing Dependency on Natural Gas Imports German Extraction Imports Share in % Projection Source: Verbundnetz Gas AG

1.2Global Context Post-Westphalian system (globalization) Post-Cold War system Post-bipolar system More actors, more levels, more games, more (and conflicting) rules Post-WW 2 agenda is changing Less sovereignty Decreasing consistency

1.3National Context: History Historical Contingencies Unification of 1991 Normalization and pragmatization of Germany‘s foreign relations

Foreign Deployments of German Forces ca. 300 ca ca. 430 ca ca ca Bundeswehr soldiers are involved in global conflict resolution

1.4 Foreign Policy Outcome Pursuing own interests via Politics of integration Politics of institution building Not necessarily siding with U.S. on all matters (since 1998) Greater relevance of EU

1.5FP’s Conditioning Variables Permanent media exposure Permanent elections Changing domestic and European coalitions Continuing multi-level games

2.1Priority Issues: Domestic Problems Domestic issues are by far more important than external questions. Germany is in a process of deep changes of employment, health, pension, education and tax policies. In general, there is not yet a break-through, despite “Agenda 2010”.

2.2Topics and Issues: The External Agenda Europe: Institutional reforms Europe: Enlargement Europe: Stability pact (still…) Europe: rebuilding GASP/ CFSP

2.3Topics and Interests: the Agenda Maintaining and developing effective institutions and regimes Future role of U.S.A.: balancing, interlocking, or inclusion? Demographic trends: regulating migration

2.4Issues and Problems of Transatlantic Relations How to achieve an equilibrium of global asymmetric configurations of actors? Is it possible to institutionalize the U.S. in a global world? How to modernize and stabilize the Near and Middle East? How – if at all – make political Islam and (post)modernity compatible? How to control WMD‘s? Can the CFSP be re-build, re-activated? What to do with the East-EU spaces in Europe? What are relevant macro-tendencies b/w anarchy; institutionalization; selective stability?

3.1Germany and Russia: Problems? No significant bilateral problems: Emigration – controlled Debts – managed Economies – cooperating (though unevenly) Restitution - symbolic

3.2Germany and Russia: Tasks EU – RF (economics, after „Kaliningrad“) EU- RF (security, NATO- enlargement, after Iraq) EU – RF (societies, Chechnya, Media, etc.)

3.3Germany and Russia: Dependencies? Neither way. Russia is good in balancing, vertically and horizontally (you also may call it inconsistency). D. is important, but not a gatekeeper to the EU. Germany is partly dependent on energy imports and on repayments. But not crucially.

Germany: The Main Mineral Oil Supply Countries Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2002

Germany's Foreign Trade Partners: Imports Russia ranks 15th (2002) Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003

Germany's Foreign Trade Partners: Exports Russia ranks 15th (2002) Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2003

3.4Germany and Russia – Allies? No. In global times there are no Metternich-type alliances. Germany is deeply embedded in European institutions; Russia is not (yet?). The fabric of good relations is, to a large extent, social, i.e. „beneath“ politics. D: Economic exchange, cultural images, language competences are overwhelmingly directed elsewhere.

4.1Where are we now? Substantial differences between European and U.S. politics – reflected in Europe and in the U.S. - toward Iraq: What is the mission? WMDs? Fighting Al Quaeda? Regime change? Transforming the regional landscape? Oil? Relight the last war?... reconstruction: no mission, no concept. What is the roadmap for re- building Iraq? What commitments are there?... future options for the Near and Middle East – politically and socially... trade-offs b/w effective counter- terrorism and civil liberties and rights... the future role of the U.S.A. (preemption).

4.2Is it only politics? Fortunately, the economic and social relations b/w Europe and the U.S. are not affected so far. But we see effects of new security requirements, visa rules etc. Also, in our societies there are partly diverging views and even significant differences in outlooks on how to address global problems.

Germans on U.S. Leadership in World Affairs (Source:Transatlantic Trends 2003)

4.3 Lessons... from Slipping into another War Either give the U.S. a wild card, assuming benign hegemon behavior, or build and maintain effective institutions. To become effective, institutions – including U.N. - must be modified. Rethink election cycles. Reflect media influence on modi operandi.

The end... berlin.de/~segbers

Germans and Americans on the Role of U.N. in World Affairs (Source:Transatlantic Trends 2003)

3.1 Germany‘s foreign policy since 2002: Phase 1 (Summer 2002) Tactical mission: winning elections. Excessive statements......led to self-constraints of the governing coalition: parties and society as constraints. „Zivilmacht“ by default, not design...

3.2Germany‘s foreign behavior since 2002 : Constraints, p hase 2 (Winter 2002/03) Attempts to avoid isolation; cooperation with France and Russia, China Non-communication with U.S.A. Mutual dependency b/w; pressure and need for domestic reforms and foreign behavior

3.3Germany’s externals behavior since 2002: Activism, phase 3 (Spring 2003) Later, attempts to build a win-position >>> … succeeded: no legitimation for a unfounded campaign;... failed: U.S.A. would act no matter what: costs of non- action too high; corresponds to national security strategy/ ideology; geo-political (“democratization”) and geo- economic motivations (oil, Saudi Arabia); group thinking.

3.4Germany’s Policy Since the War: Maneuvering and Balancing, Indifference Differences toward U.S. government remain substantial (on what drives politics, institutions, and many policy issues) Formally repairing relations with U.S. – back to courtesy Reducing symbolism re. the tripartite axis - while continuing attempts to strengthen the EU – CSFP Focus on domestic affairs is dominant Stressing Germany’s active role in international crises (now including Iraq)

Foreign direct investments in Russian industry Source: State Statistics Committee