Priming and Framing in the Public Agenda Last time: more Veto power models Today: priming, framing and the public agenda

Odysseus and the Sirens Model 2: presidential commitment Hypothesis that president can credibly pre-commit to vetoing a bill, even if signing makes him better off –reduces asymmetry, but not “subgame perfect” in single- shot games –in equilibrium, Congress overrides all vetoes –suppose president and Congress can send signals to the audience: the “Going Public” variant (president has asymmetric ability to prime/frame issues for the public, thereby affecting legislators’ induced preferences)

More veto models Prez commitment model: reduces asymmetry; Cong. compelled to give prez more of what he wants, even when he is structurally disadvantaged; how plausible? Incomplete info models: MCs have to guess what prez would accept –vetoes sometimes happen, and are never overridden in eq. –but MCs never intend to be vetoed “Blame Game”: bargaining before a moderate audience –assume president wishes to appear more moderate than his true preferences; MCs want him to appear extreme; actions entail audience costs –Cong & Prez know each others’ prefs, but voters don’t –Groseclose and McCarty model prez approval prez taste for voter approval gives Congress leverage to do better than in the standard setter model when reversionary policy is bad, but “favors” the prez

Positive agenda power can the president set the legislative table directly or indirectly? –Where does the president have unilateral ability to initiate policy change? –What shapes legislators’ policy agendas? I.e., how are issues “primed”? Can the president affect the set of salient issues? –How do specific proposals get considered? I.e., how are issues “framed”? Can the president affect the set of alternatives considered?

Constitutional authorities Negotiate treaties (needs advise and consent of 2/3 of senate) Receive ambassadors Commander in chief Nominate judges, ministers, ambassadors, officers, high officials (needs majority of senate to appoint) and all other officials not otherwise provided for by law; Fill vacancies during Senate recesses (temporary appointments) Other action-forcing authorities: –Require written opinions from principal officers of executive departments; –Call Special Sessions of Congress; Adjourn Congress when H and S can’t agree on an adjournment date –Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the U.S. not involving impeachment Other constitutional authorities: –Give periodic reports to Congress on State of Union –Take care that the laws are faithfully executed

Delegated authorities Contingency funds Reporting requirements (other than State o’ Union), e.g., the budget Trade agreement authorities Reorganization authorities Impoundments; “recission” authorities

What do legislators want? How can they get what they want? Goals: –reelection –good public policy –career advancement –cost minimization Strategies –advertising –position-taking –credit-claiming

When can the president set the legislative table directly? Legislators face a collective dilemma of who will do the hard work of writing policy proposals and trying to pull together a support coalition Legislators face a further collective dilemma in how to solve distributive problems Presidents have incentives to try to solve these dilemmas by offering entrepreneurial services –first-mover advantages when entrepreneurship and amendments are costly; prez may get policy closer to what he most wants –credit-claiming and position-taking opportunities: audience effects

Bicameral bargaining and presidents Bicameral legislatures create the possibility of bargaining failures 2-player bargaining games: –relative bargaining strengths? –are there “obvious” solutions (Schelling focal point solutions)?

Presidential persuasion “Going public” (external lobbying) –priming –framing Insider lobbying –patronage; campaigning support –persuasion

Can the president prime issues? Jeffery Cohen article on State of the Union addresses: –presidential mentions of an issue area are related to increased mentions of those issues by survey respondents (a priming effect) –prez popularity seems unrelated –leadership effects decay faster in domestic than in foreign policy arenas –no evidence of framing effects