US Civil War: Moves Toward Total War Lesson 12

ID & SIG: objective, McClellan, Peninsula Campaign, Antietam, conciliation, Emancipation Proclamation, Pope, Harrison Landing letter, Stuart, Anaconda Plan, Lee, Second Manassas

Scott’s Anaconda Plan Aging Mexican War hero Winfield Scott was still on active duty when the Civil War broke out and he was responsible for recommending the initial Federal strategy Reflecting his Mexican War experience with limited war, Scott proposed the “Anaconda Plan” which would build a massive army, establish a blockade, secure the Mississippi River to cut the South in two, and wait

Winfield Scott and Limited War Scott argued that his plan “will thus cut off the luxuries to which the people are accustomed; and when they feel the pressure, not having been exasperated by attacks made on them within their respective States, the Union spirit will assert itself; those who are on the fence will descend on the Union side, and I will guarantee that in one year from this time all difficulties will be settled.”

Winfield Scott and Limited War If, on the other hand, Lincoln chose to invade the South, Scott predicted, “I will guarantee that at the end of a year you will be further from a settlement than you are now.” –Indeed, Lincoln would have to always bear in mind that too much damage inflicted on the South and its people would imperil the reunification that was his object. –Nonetheless Lincoln rejected Scott’s plan because it would take too long and instead an “On to Richmond” strategy gained ascendancy

The Peninsula Campaign

Peninsula Campaign: George McClellan Among the Army’s best educated officers… “the Young Napoleon” Excellent organizer and administrator –The right man to rebuild the Federal Army after the defeat at First Manassas Extremely cautious; always wants more troops and more time to prepare –Prone to believe enemy is stronger than he really is Mutual distrust with Lincoln Strong experience with sieges (Vera Cruz and Sevastopol) Advocated the limited war and the conciliatory approaches

Peninsula Campaign: Joe Johnston Reinforced Beauregard at First Manassas Highest ranking officer to leave the US Army for the Confederacy –However the letter Davis sent to the Senate requesting confirmation of his full generals listed Johnston fourth –This infuriated Johnston and from that day on he had a difficult and quarrelsome relationship with Davis Defensive-minded

Peninsula Campaign: Faulty Intelligence McClellan near Washington with 100,000 men Johnston near Centreville with 40,000 –Allan Pinkerton, McClellan’s intelligence officer, estimated Johnston had 150,000 Pinkerton’s exaggerated estimate reinforced McClellan’s natural tendency toward caution Pinkerton’s (left) skill in running a railroad detective agency did not translate to being a good military intelligence officer

Peninsula Campaign McClellan hoped to avoid attacking Johnston frontally Instead he hoped to insert himself between Johnston and Richmond, forcing Johnston to evacuate his strong Manassas-Centreville line in order to defend the Confederate capital Johnston evacuated before McClellan could implement his first plan to land at Urbanna, so McClellan changed his landing site to Fort Monroe

Peninsula Campaign: Security Lincoln was not overly enthusiastic about the Peninsula Campaign but he was happy that McClellan was at least doing something Among Lincoln’s concerns was the safety of Washington after McClellan’s army departed He asked McClellan to explain his plan for safeguarding the capital and McClellan never really gave Lincoln a straight answer –McClellan was very condescending to Lincoln –He seemed to think that as a professional soldier he did not need to bother sharing his plans with an amateur

Peninsula Campaign: Mass and Security Amphibious movement began March 17 –121,500 men, 14,492 animals, 1,224 wagons, 200 cannon –One British observer described it as “the stride of a giant” (mass) On April 3 Lincoln started asking serious questions about the safety of Washington and became convinced it was inadequate –He ordered McDowell’s 30,000 man corps to remain in place rather than join McClellan (security) McClellan’s failure to make Lincoln feel comfortable about Washington came back to haunt him

Peninsula Campaign: Confederate Defenses McClellan began his advance inland on April 4 Facing him was a 13,000 man force commanded by John Magruder While Magruder was executing a masterful deception of McClellan, Lee, as President Davis’s military advisor, was able to begin a “reconcentration” of forces which would ultimately bring 53,000 Confederates into position to oppose McClellan (balance)

Peninsula Campaign: Yorktown Magruder’s deception, poor maps, difficult terrain, uninspired actions by subordinates, Pinkerton’s exaggerated reports, and McClellan’s natural caution led him to stop his advance within 24 hours and begin siege operations against Yorktown Joe Johnston said, “Nobody but McClellan would have hesitated to attack.” Mortars used in the Federal siege of Yorktown

Peninsula Campaign: Confederate Withdrawal On March 8-9 the Monitor and the Virginia fought the Battle of Hampton Roads On May 3 Johnston began to evacuate Yorktown and withdraw up the Peninsula –This opened up the York and James Rivers to Federal gunboats, especially after the Confederates were forced to scuttle the Virginia Currier and Ives print of the destruction of the Virginia

Jackson’s Valley Campaign While all this is going on on the Peninsula, Stonewall Jackson was having a big effect in the Shenandoah Valley The Valley represented a potential Confederate avenue of approach to Washington, which concerned Lincoln While still in his capacity as Davis’s military advisor, Lee began coordinating with Jackson to help relieve pressure on the Peninsula

Jackson’s Valley Campaign Jackson used interior lines to neutralize Federal forces three times larger than his own Fought six battles between March 23 and June 9: Kernstown, McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester, Cross Keys, and Port Republic “Jackson’s foot cavalry” –676 miles in 48 marching days; an average of 14 miles a day Interior Lines Exterior Lines

Jackson’s Valley Campaign Jackson’s success in the Valley effected things on the Peninsula (synergy) On May 18, McClellan had been told by Secretary of War Stanton that McDowell’s Corps would be marching from Fredericksburg where it had been held previously for fear of Washington’s safety Jackson’s new threat caused Lincoln to change his mind and on May 24 he telegraphed McClellan, “In consequence of Gen. Banks’ critical position I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell’s movement to join you.” –McDowell complained, “If the enemy can succeed so readily in disconcerting all our plans by alarming us first at one point then at another, he will paralyze a larger force with a very small one.” (simultaneity and depth)

Peninsula Campaign: Seven Pines On May 28 Johnston received a report from Jeb Stuart that McDowell was not moving toward Richmond but was instead returning to Fredericksburg –With McDowell held in place thanks to Jackson, the Confederates could act more aggressively Johnston learned from other reconnaissance that McClellan’s army was divided by the Chickahominy River Jeb Stuart’s cavalry gave the Confederacy an incredible intelligence advantage over McClellan

Peninsula Campaign: Seven Pines Johnston tried to crush the isolated southern wing of the Federal army in the Battle of Seven Pines May 31 –Johnston mismanaged the battle, issued vague orders, and was wounded –Robert E. Lee replaced him

Robert E. Lee Johnston was well- liked by the soldiers and Lee was initially looked at with suspicion However, even Johnston admitted, “The shot that struck me down is the very best that has been fired in the Confederate cause yet.” Lee Takes Command by Mort Kunstler

Robert E. Lee Lee would go on to completely change the Confederate command situation –Good relationship with Davis –Offensive-minded and extremely audacious –Made excellent use of intelligence and cavalry –Strong advocate of the turning movement

Seven Days Jackson’s success allowed Lee to concentrate his forces against McClellan –Lee planned to defend Richmond with 20,000 and use 60,000 to attack Plan depended on the timely arrival of Jackson who was to attack Porter from the flank and rear –Jackson was inexplicably late Result was Mechanicsville (June 26) turned out to be an unsupported frontal attack rather than an envelopment

Seven Days Gaines’s Mill (June 27) –Another poor performance by Jackson limited the Confederate victory, but Lee succeeded in causing McClellan to go on the defensive Savage Station (June 29) Frayser’s Farm (June 30) Malvern Hill (July 1) –Federal artillery defeated Confederate frontal assault McClellan then withdrew to Harrison’s Landing under protection of Federal gunboats on the James River

Harrison’s Landing Letter On July 7, McClellan gave Lincoln a letter outlining McClellan’s ideas on how the war should be waged and clearly advocating the conciliatory approach “This rebellion has assumed the character of a war. As such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment.”

Harrison’s Landing Letter “In prosecuting the war all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations; all private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked.” After his defeat, McClellan was, of course, in no position to offer such advise and Lincoln pocketed the letter without comment

End of the Peninsula Campaign Even though McClellan had been defeated, his army was still in a strategic location, just 25 miles from Richmond and on a supply line it could keep open (it would be 1864 before the Federals got this close to Richmond again) One course would have been for Lincoln to keep the army where it was and remove the commander Instead, Lincoln ordered the Army of the Potomac to withdraw from the Peninsula –It would be 1864 before the Federal army again got as close to Richmond as it did during the Seven Days Ultimately, most of the Army of the Potomac would come under the command of John Pope as the Army of Virginia

Pope’s General Orders When Pope assumed command he issued an abrasive and boastful address on July 14 which served to alienate and insult many in his new command Then issued a series of General Orders that certainly enraged the Confederacy and showed he had an aggressive and hostile policy toward civilians and private property That Lincoln acquiesced to these orders showed that perhaps he was shifting away from the mild, conciliatory approach to something more authoritarian

Pope’s General Orders General Order Number 5 stated that the army should live off the land. General Order Number 7 outlined how Pope planned to deal with the local citizenry. General Order Number 11 called for the immediate arrest of all disloyal male citizens and compelled them to either take an oath of allegiance to the United States or be deported further south. –Pope appeared naively surprised when he learned that soldiers had taken his orders as a license to plunder and maraud, and he attempted to correct this situation with General Order Number 19.

End of the Peninsula Campaign and Lee’s Offensive As soon as Lee ascertained the army was withdrawing from the Peninsula, he went after Pope in northern Virginia Lee was able to operate within his enemy’s decision cycle (anticipation) Lee ordered his army to move the day of the Federal withdraw and before the first divisions of the Army of the Potomac had landed at Aquia Creek, Lee had raced north and had Pope surrounded just south of Manassas

Lee and the Turning Movement The Peninsula confirmed Lee’s belief in the turning movement and was the beginning of his partnership with Jackson –Lee learned during the Seven Days the wisdom of “not attacking [the Federals] in their strong and chosen positions. They ought always to be turned.” –He told Jackson, it was “to save you the abundance of hard fighting that I ventured to suggest for your consideration not to attack the enemy’s strong points, but to turn his position… I would rather you have easy fighting and heavy victories.” Pope would be the first victim of this wisdom

Second Manassas Pope had been trying to relieve pressure on McClellan by operating against Confederate rail communications at Gordonsville and Charlottesville His forces were largely in defensive positions along the Rappahannock River When Lee realized McClellan was withdrawing, he boldly ordered Jackson to break things open by leading his 24,000 men on a wide swing around Pope’s right to strike his supply lines and cut his communications with Washington

Second Manassas Jackson marched 51 miles in two days, struck Manassas Junction, and then withdrew to a defensive position and waited for Lee to arrive with the rest of the army Pope ordered his scattered forces to concentrate near Centreville to counter Jackson and to be ready to receive McClellan’s reinforcements In the meantime, Longstreet arrived with 28,000 men and took positions on Jackson’s right

Second Manassas On Aug 30, Pope attacked with 7,000 men he expected to use to finish off Jackson (who he thought was beaten and withdrawing) In reality, Pope was advancing into the jaws of a trap Jackson had not retreated at all but was standing fast with 18,000 men Concealed at a right angle was Longstreet with 28,000 fresh soldiers

Second Manassas Jackson not only held but forced the Federals to fall back Lee unleashed Longstreet and the jaws of the Confederate trap closed on Pope The Federals suffered 14,462 casualties (the Confederates 9,474) Pope was transferred to Minnesota and the Army of Virginia was disbanded and incorporated into McClellan’s Army of the Potomac Lee then built on this victory to invade Maryland

Antietam In desperation, Lincoln restored McClellan to command As Lee marched into Maryland he expected the Federals to abandon their 12,000-man garrison at Harper’s Ferry When they didn’t, Lee was forced to divide his army in order to deal with this threat to his rear Harper’s Ferry sits at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah Rivers

Antietam Lee divided his army into four parts –Three of them under Jackson headed toward Harper’s Ferry –A fourth under Longstreet headed for Boonsboro

Antietam Lee’s army was now scattered and McClellan had time to organize his forces –He was aided by finding a copy of Lee’s plan Still McClellan lacked the killer instinct necessary to take full advantage of the situation The “Lost Order”

Antietam In the actual battle, McClellan moved slowly and committed his forces piecemeal which allowed Lee to shift his outnumbered forces from one threatened point to another –Neither the Federal V or VI Corps, some 22,000 men, would play a significant role in the battle

Antietam Antietam was the bloodiest single day of the war –The Confederates suffered 13,700 casualties out of 40,000 engaged –The Federals lost 12,350 out of 87,000 The battle ended a tactical draw, but a strategic victory for the Federals because Lee was forced to withdraw back to Virginia It was enough of a victory for Lincoln to issue his Emancipation Proclamation Confederate dead in the Bloody Lane

The End of Conciliation Up to this point the dominant policy among the Federals was conciliation: the idea that mild treatment of Southerners, their property, and their institutions would ultimately result in their returning their allegiance to the US George Meade for example said he “felt like the afflicted parent who is compelled to chastise his erring child, and who performs the duty with a sad heart” McClellan had argued for this practice in a letter he gave Lincoln at Harrison’s Landing stating, “A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.”

Moves toward Emancipation A few generals such as Ben Butler, John Fremont, and David Hunter however were pushing for emancipation Lincoln too was beginning to move in that direction and on July 22, 1862 he showed his cabinet a preliminary draft of the Emancipation Proclamation –But Lincoln needed a battlefield victory to give him an opportunity to make the Proclamation public –Antietam had accomplished that

Emancipation Proclamation Issued September 22, 1862 “That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free…”

Emancipation Proclamation The Emancipation Proclamation changed the very nature of the war, giving it a completely new objective Conciliation was no longer an option Represented a move toward total war –The North was now not merely fighting to restore a union it thought was never legitimately separated. It was fighting for freedom of a race. –The South was no longer fighting merely for independence. It was fighting for survival of its way of life.

Diplomatic Impact The South had longed hoped for European recognition and intervention The Emancipation Proclamation made that virtually impossible because England had abolished slavery in 1833 and France in 1848 John Slidell represented the Confederacy in France

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