Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense in Northeast Asia Daniel A. Pinkston International Crisis Group The 8th ROK-UN Joint Conference on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Issues Sŏgwipo, Cheju-do, ROK, 17 November 2009

Long live the peerless commander General Kim Jong Il who has established our country as one of the worlds nuclear states!

Overview DPRK Missile Capabilities Nonproliferation Concerns DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric ROK Cruise Missile Program MD Policy Recommendations

DPRK Missile Capabilities DPRK began to produce multiple rocket launchers in the 1960s Acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG rockets in late 1960s Produced Scud-B ( -5; Hwasŏng-5) by mid 1980s Developed Scud-C ( -6; Hwasŏng-6) by late 1980s Tested Nodong ( ?) in 1993 Exported Scuds and Nodong to several countries

DPRK Missile Capabilities Flight-tested Paektusan-1 ( -1;Taepodong-1) with attempted satellite launch 31 August 1998 Missile exercise 5 July 2006, but Paektusan-2 failed Failed Ŭnha-2 ( -2) SLV launch 5 April 2009 Has tested and deployed improved anti-ship cruise missile KN-01 based on Chinese Silkworm Tested and probably deployed KN-02 or Toksa ( ) based on SS-21 Scarab

Ghuari, Hwasŏng, KN-01

New Missile Musudan In 2003, U.S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) liquid-fueled submarine- launched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2,500 km; land-based version has a range of 2,500-4,000 km Reportedly displayed during 25 April 2007 parade, but not on DPRK television Ŭnha-2 second stage reportedly a modified Musudan

Inventory About Scud-variants; liquid fueled and road mobile; TELs About Nodongs; liquid fueled and road mobile; TELs Musudan; no flight tests; deployed? TELs? Toksa (KN-02); solid-fueled and road mobile Paektusan-1 program terminated Paektusan-2 not operational; launched from tower Land attack cruise missiles?

Warheads Hwasŏng, Nodong, Paektusan-2, and Musudan capable of delivering nukes –DPRK probably has been able to miniaturize warhead package HE warheads, but only useful with Toksa (KN-02) CW warheads likely for all systems, but little known about number and doctrine BW warheads unlikely; but possible UAV delivery systems unknown

Institutional Structure National Defense Commission ultimate authority –Warheads have not been transferred to KPA; separate authority with NDC member Chu Kyu-chang probable head –Second Natural Sciences Academy ( 2 ) responsible for applied military research –Second Economic Committee ( 2 ), nominally subordinate to the KWP Central Committee Munitions Industry Department ( ), manages weapons production –Fourth Bureau produces rockets and missiles Ministry of Peoples Armed Forces manages training and operations during peace time Supreme Commander issues orders to General Staff during war

Youthful NDC

Nonproliferation Concerns DPRK views missiles exports as normal business UNSCR 1874 demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology Sanctions regime under UNSCR 1695, 1718 and 1874 –Bans all arms exports –Financial sanctions –Luxury goods –Travel bans

DPRK Space Program and Scientific Nationalism Building a Strong and Powerful Country ( ) –Ideology/politics –Military –Economics Missiles and SLVs have high symbolic value –Regime emphasizes S&T for economic recovery and legitimacy –Missiles serve multiple purposes for domestic politics

Modernize and Informationize the Peoples Economy

Paektusan-1 ( -1)

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 ( -1)

Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 Trajectory

Ŭnha-2 Launch

New Space Center at Tongchang-ri

Preemption Doctrine and Rhetoric Increasing rhetoric regarding the right to preemptive self- defense Increasing gap in N-S conventional balance First strike advantages 10 November 2009 N-S Yellow Sea battle

ROK Cruise Missile Program ROK ballistic missile range limited to 180km by 1979 MOU with the U.S. ROK joined MTCR in March 2001 ROK says no range limits with cruise missile payload under 500kg Began to deploy 1,000km-range LACMs early this year Developing 1,500km-range LACM

MD and NE Asian Security Japan has highest threat perception; response will be more MD ROK deploying limited MD China could respond to deployment of robust, layered MD –Weapons could target MD assets, including those in space –Possible missile build-up

Policy Recommendations Focus on sanctions regime, but… –Negotiated walk-back or erosion through sanctions fatigue? –Inter-Korean CBMs desperately needed ROK should disclose CWC compliance Cool down preemption rhetoric –Engage DPRK Link economics and security Test DPRK intentions –Begin serious discussion on peaceful space cooperation –Deploy limited MD, but realize political sensitivities and technological limitsnot a substitute for arms control

References Crisis Group Asia Report N°167, North Koreas Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs, 18 June Crisis Group Asia Report N°168, North Koreas Nuclear and Missile Programs, 18 June Crisis Group Asia Report N°169, North Korea: Getting Back to Talks, 18 June Crisis Group Asia Report N°179, Shades of Red: Chinas Debate over North Korea, 2 November Daniel A. Pinkston, The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (Carlisle, February 2008). Daniel A. Pinkston, North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles during Military Parade, Some for First Time, WMD Insights, June Daniel A. Pinkston, South Korea Tests 1,000 Kilometer Range Cruise Missile and Develops 1,500 Kilometer-range Version, WMD Insights, November Daniel A. Pinkston, South Korean Response to North Korean July Missile Exercise Includes Unveiling of New Cruise Missile, WMD Insights, October 2006.