1. Shahryar Pasandideh PhD Student, George Washington University
Conventional Counterforce Capabilities in the China-India-Pakistan Nuclear Nexus: The Impact on Survivability and Nuclear Security
Shahryar Pasandideh
PhD Student, George Washington University

2. The Interaction of Conventional and Nuclear Development
Continued horizontal and vertical nuclear development
Simultaneous conventional force development
Recent academic research suggests vulnerability of Soviet/Russian mobile nuclear assets to U.S. conventional counterforce
How secure are the nuclear forces of India and Pakistan from adversary conventional counterforce capabilities?
What is the impact of increased survivability on nuclear security?

3. Arguments
Unfavourable prospects for conventional counterforce against mobile nuclear forces deployed operationally
Garrisoned mobile nuclear forces increasingly vulnerable to precision conventional munitions
Good news: more survivable forces may increase stability by calming arsenal development
Bad news: Increased survivability only if actively deployed in the field during peacetime
Risks: nuclear and non-nuclear accidents, terrorism, and impact on command and control

4. Land-Based Missile Launchers
India and Pakistan both primarily rely on mobile land-based ballistic missiles with Pakistan also using cruise missiles
No silos
Pakistan’s missiles are aimed at India while India’s are based at Pakistan and China
Reliable information on garrisons not publicly available
But size of launch vehicles likely means they are kept in:
Hardened garages
Underground bunkers
Regular garages
Given importance, regular garages unlikely

5. Case Study: Pakistan’s Nasr Missile I
Nasr garrisons unknown – but open source reports allege sites
Launch unit organization not known
One alleged facility near Gurjanwala, Punjab – just ~65 km from India
Nasr has reported 60 km range
Reported doctrinal role: attack invading Indian units

6. Case Study: Pakistan’s Nasr Missile II
Satellite imagery shows concrete garages
Quite robust but vulnerable to precision munitions
Current air threat from India limited but developing
Current India cruise missile threat – Mach 2.5+ BrahMos
Can hit alleged garrison in 5.5 minutes
India likely only able to attack Nasr in garrison – not outside
Impact: Pakistan may deploy Nasr outside garrison, decreasing stability and risking counterforce strikes.

7. Case Study: Pakistan’s Nasr Missile III
Nasr launchers outside garrisons comes with risks:
Launcher breaks down/immobilized/crashes into traffic (poor road network)
Trade-off between survivable against India/militants
Risk of inadvertent destruction by India if same missile/launch vehicle used for other roles
Poor topography and geography
Inadvertent nuclear detonation – are Pakistani warheads one-point safe?

8. Case Study: Pakistan’s Nasr Missile IV
Will Nasr be at high readiness in garrison?
Will Nasr be ‘scrambled’ out of garrison during crises?
Will some nuclear-armed Nasr bet out of garrison regularly?
Improves survivability, reduces security, and very escalatory
Consider impact on command and control for all scenarios

9. Case Study: India Missile Garrisons I
Locations not publicly available
Likely also garrisoned in hardened garages and/or underground bunkers
India understood to store warheads and missiles separately
But how proximate? Not clear.
Apparently no field patrols
Risk of decoupling: if warheads and missiles separate and distant, warhead- less missiles more vulnerable

10. Case Study: India’s Missile Garrisons II
Important caveat: no reason to believe Pakistan or China would undertake such a conventional strike against warhead-less missiles
But theoretical vulnerability can lead to countermeasures
Full-time mating of warheads and missiles?
Launchers with warheads outside of garrisons?
Can result in change of nuclear posture

11. Case Study: India Missile Garrisons III
How credible is conventional counterforce threat?
India’s air defense has gaps but improving
No ballistic missile defence and weak cruise missile defence
Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles very capable
Pakistan air force and ballistic missiles not serious threat
Babur land-attack cruise missile is
But Babur is subsonic – 45 minutes to go maximum range of 700 km
Threat from China much more serious and credible in theory but much less likely in reality
But India’s nuclear posture is increasingly oriented towards China

12. Case Study: India Missile Garrisons IV
Like Pakistan, India can improve survivability by deploying outside garrisons but at cost of less security
Many of same risks as Pakistan:
Vehicular accidents
Launch vehicle non-ubiquity
Risk of inadvertent nuclear detonation on soil – hostile or accident
Worse than Pakistan: more distributed population density and less uninhabited land
Unlike Pakistan India has early warning system
How would it deal with warhead ambiguity?

13. Takeaways
Trade-off between nuclear force survivability and nuclear security
In the second nuclear age, conventional counterforce in second- tier nuclear dyads may apply similar pressures on second strike capability development as did nuclear counterforce capabilities in past
The operational aspect of the conventional military balance – not just quantitative “balance of forces” may greatly impact nuclear development trajectories
India’s development of a new nuclear capability may lead Pakistan to do the same
What India develops with China in mind, Pakistan may follow
Example: Pakistan following India in developing a submarine- based nuclear capability