1. Government E-1275: Nov. 6, 2007 Session #7. The Korean Peninsula

2. Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula ’60s-’70s: ROK-DPRK as “relative equals” (Cha, p. 49, 59-60). –June ’50: DPRK’s strategic “window of opportunity.” U.S. conventional & nuclear forces in ROK: –nuclear cannons, nuclear-tipped missiles, Atomic Demolition Mines (ADM). –frequent joint military exercises (Cumings, pp. 52-54). Declining position of DPRK: –End of Cold War; China’s role (Cumings, p. 58). –Economic crises/famines in the 90s; ROK’s economic miracle. DPRK’s provocations: –Troop maneuvers in Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom (’95); Taepodong missile test over Japan (Aug. ’98); naval incursions into ROK waters (June ’99). Cha’s interpretation: DPRK resorts to military provocations due to its declining relative power vis-à-vis ROK/U.S. Cumings’ interpretation: DPRK reacts to U.S. military exercises/ provocations.

3. The 1 st Nuclear Crisis DPRK’s announcement to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March ’93. Response to U.S. provocations (Team Spirit exercises, nuclear weapons, war games); IAEA’s demands for “special inspections” of undeclared sites (Cumings, p. 65). DPRK’s withdrawal of fuel rods into cooling ponds (May ’94); Clinton administration’s preparations for war (June ’94). Former President Jimmy Carter’s visit to Pyongyang (June ’94). The October 1994 Framework Agreement: in return for suspension of nuclear activities, light-water reactors (LWR) provided by Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

4. Second Nuclear Crisis (Oct. ’02-) U.S. policy: –Pres. Bush’s “Axis of Evil,” State of the Union Speech (Jan. ’02). –Assistant Sec. State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang (Oct. ’02-). –refusal to arrange for bilateral talks/deals toward U.S.-DPRK diplomatic normalization. –Proposal for a “grand bargain” (M. O’Hanlon/M. Mochizuki). DPRK’s motivations: provocative gestures to extract concessions. –Missile test (Aug. ’98): over northern Japan. –Missile test (July ’06): Nodong succeeded, Taepodong failed; Carter/Perry op-ed. –Explosion of small nuclear device (Oct. ’06). ROK diplomacy: –President Kim Dae Jung (’97-’02)’s “Sunshine Policy”; President Roh Moo-hyun inherited this policy (’02-’07). –Certain level of distrust b/w Seoul & Washington, D.C.

5. The Six-Party Talks (Aug. ’03-) U.S.: DPRK’s nuclear weapons as a global threat. –Links to the “global war on terror”; DPRK’s transfer of nuclear weapons to terrorists. –Unilateral disarmament (Libya) without concessions as a model (Park, p. 79). Japan: –Concerns about DPRK’s missile capabilities (Nodong). –Politicization of the abduction issue; fear that U.S. may abandon Japan. ROK: –Anti-Americanism and President Roh Moo-hyun’s election in Dec. ’02. –DPRK: weakness and state failure as a main problem. –Korean nationalism: Oct. ’07 summit b/w Roh and Kim Jong Il. China: –Skepticism about DPRK’s nuclear weapons capability. –Strong interest in status quo: strikes/protests in northeast China; food & oil supplies to DPRK. –Beijing’s interest in taking leadership in Asia’s multilateral forum. The Paradox: Who can and want to apply pressure to DPRK.