1. The Wicked Problem of Somali Piracy
David West & Garry Hindle
Deputy Director for Operational Analysis, Combined Maritime Forces / Lead Operational Analyst, UK Maritime Component Command - Bahrain
July 2010 – February 2011 & February 2011 – August 2011
Defence Science & Technology Laboratory
UK Ministry of Defence
Briefing to Cornwallis XVII, 2nd April 2012

2. Contents Historical Context Modern Day Piracy Wicked Problems
Counter Piracy
Conclusions

3. UNCLOS Definition of Piracy
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

4. 1. History of Piracy
Brief look at some examples of how piracy has differed over the ages
State sponsored and private initiatives
Range of methods used to tackle problem
Military, political, social

5. Sea Peoples First recorded pirates in history
Devastated the eastern Mediterranean during the late 2nd Millennium BC
Fought extensive campaigns on both land and sea
Finally defeated by the Egyptians in naval battle off Xois, Egypt in 1178 BC
Military solution

6. Rome and the Cilician Pirates
Based in what is now SE Turkey
Menaced the eastern Mediterranean during 2nd and 1st centuries BC
Pirate raids strangled Roman commerce
Julius Caesar (75 BC)
Captured by a Cilician pirate group and ransomed
Returned and crucified his captors
Pompey (67 BC)
Deployed 500 ships, 120,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry to defeat the pirates
Sea and land campaign lasted only 3 months
Defeated Cilicians treated generously

7. Piracy in Europe
Lack of centralised power after fall of Rome allowed piracy to flourish through Dark Ages and Medieval Period
Vikings best known example
Other prominent groups were Irish, Friesian, Slavic, Arab
No clear solution – many pirates eventually settled down (e.g. Vikings → Normans)
Barbary pirates
Operated out of North Africa between 16th-19th Centuries, taking over 1 million Europeans as slaves
Defeated by US and Royal Navies in Barbary Wars of the early 19th Century

8. Pirates of the Caribbean
Golden age from 1560 to 1720
Preyed on lucrative trade from New World colonies
Some given legal status by rival states (Privateers)
Finally eliminated by expanded European Navies after Thirty Years War
Royal Navy formed the main counter-piracy force
Rigorous ROE - captured pirates were usually summarily hanged

9. 2. Modern Day Piracy Follows two primary types:
Robbery of crew and/or stealing of cargo
Current hotspots include Gulf of Guinea and Bangladesh
Major problem in Strait of Malacca in early 2000s
Seizure of vessels for ransom
Requires safe anchorages where vessels and crews can be held
Typical of current day Somalia-based piracy

10. History of Malacca Strait Piracy
500 miles long, narrowest point 1.7 miles
90,000 vessels per year, 40% of world trade
Long history of piracy – often associated with local politics
Increased with arrival of European colonisers
Largely eradicated by British / Dutch Navies during 1870s

11. Re-emergence of Straits Piracy
Continuous activity at a low level, but seeing a rapid increase in late 1990s
Several high profile attacks occurred, these may have:
Increased awareness of piracy in population
Increased tendency of ship owners to report attacks/attempts
Lack of co-operation between local navies (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia) – sovereignty an important issue

12. Counter Piracy in the Straits
Attacks peaked in 2004 at 38, to 12 in 2005 and 2 each year – now virtually eliminated
Increased military co-operation a major factor
2005: Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia joint air surveillance
2006: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) established
Greater economic and political stability
Peace deal with rebels in Aceh, Sumatra, following 2004 tsunami
Solution a mix of military and political/economic factors

13. Somali Piracy – Context
Non-existent to limited central government.
No central bank or banking system.
Limited regional governments.
Extensive & comprehensive legal system.
Functioning monetary system - notes & hawalla.
Access to foreign investment – Diaspora.
Functioning entrepreneurial economy.
Devolved informal “political” institutions.
Phone subscribers (per 100 inhabitants)
Country
2000
2009
Somalia
1.4
8.1
Eritrea
0.8*
3.7
Ethiopia
0.4
6.0
Nigeria
0.5
49.1
*mainline phone data only
Source: UN data (via BBC)

14. Somali Piracy - Origins
Origins in the collapse of the central Somali state in the early 1990s
Strong local belief that piracy emerged as a local reaction to exploitation by foreigners
Illegal fishing in Somali waters
Widespread dumping of toxic waste
Armed local fishermen began extorting ‘taxes’ from foreign vessels
Realisation that the vessels and their crews were valuable – taxes became ransoms
Now a highly organised criminal activity
Incredibly lucrative in an area with little other employment prospects

15. Somalia Piracy - Environment
Longest continuous coastline in the world
Somalia is made of several distinct areas and more tribal areas
Safe anchorages where pirates can be based and retreat to with their prizes

16. Somali Piracy – Area of Operation
20% of world’s oil goes through Strait of Hormuz
23,000 ships pass through Gulf of Aden each year
Diverting around Africa adds ~2 weeks to journey time to Europe / North America
Monsoons twice a year limit boat operations in seas off eastern Somali coast

20. Piracy Incidents: Period 2009
UNCLASSIFIED

21. Piracy Incidents: Period 2010
UNCLASSIFIED

22. Piracy Incidents: Period 2011
UNCLASSIFIED

23. 3. Wicked Problems
Wickedness reflects the resistance of a problem to resolution, not its moral character
Problems that cannot be treated with traditional, linear, analytic approaches
Characteristics:
often multi-causal
unstable
have complex interdependencies
may lack a single specific authority responsible for their resolution
attempts to resolve them may lead to unforeseen consequences

24. Countering Somali Piracy
Application of military force
Offensive, protective and reactive
Self protection measures (Best Management Practice)
Industry looking after itself
Political / Economic resolution
Address causes of the symptom of piracy within Somalia
The unique complexity of Somali Piracy makes understanding and predicting the effect of counter piracy activity problematic

25. Regional Naval Operations
Three co-ordinated Task Forces
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) Counter Piracy Task Force
NATO: Operation Ocean Shield
EU: Operation Atalanta
Wider group of ‘Independent Deployers’
India, Russia, China and others – meet with coalitions and industry at 2-monthly ‘Shared Awareness and De-confliction’ (SHADE) meetings
Other regional Navies: Oman, South Africa, Kenya
Conducting law enforcement operations

26. Regional Naval Operations
Area Patrol
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in GOA
Wider Somali Basin (most of Western Indian Ocean)
Escorts & Convoys
Independent Deployers in Gulf of Aden
EUNAVFOR escorts World Food Programme ships
Surveillance
Land-based Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Ship-based helicopters

27. Somali Piracy - Organisation
Complex organisational hierarchy
Operations:
Former fishermen (navigation)
Ex-militia (vessel assault / protection at shore)
Technical experts (GPS and Comms)
Logistics supply
Negotiators
Financial backers
Local and international
No known significant, direct links with terrorism

28. Somali Piracy - Tactics
Attacks launched from small number of skiffs – each with ~ 5-10 pirates
Use ladders with hooks to board target vessels – usually underway
Typically armed with AK-47s, RPGs also common
Once boarded pirates head to the bridge and round up the crew

29. Somali Piracy – Range of Operations
Traditionally Pirate Action Groups were 2-3 skiffs, plus a larger whaler for supplies, launched from the shore
Relatively short range / duration
Somali Basin activity limited to within ~200 miles of Somali coast
High seas during Monsoon seasons prevent pirates accessing in Somali Basin
But now..

30. Somali Piracy – Use of Motherships
In recent years pirates have developed the use of motherships
may be a captured dhow or a pirated merchant vessel
Allows pirates to operate over a thousand miles from Somalia, for long periods
Allows operating throughout Monsoon period
Motherships can be used to transport skiffs to calmer waters
Presence of crews as hostages reduces military options
Hostages valuable as crew and commodities for ransom

31. Somali Piracy - Hostages
Hostages valuable as crew and commodities for ransom
Little evidence of increased violence towards hostages
Held in poor conditions generally and threatened but actual levels of violence reflect their status as a commodity
Threatened as a means of control and as part of the negotiation process
Some violence by inexperienced, frustrated pirate groups

32. Counter Piracy - Disruption
Disruption of motherships constrained by hostages
Limited to monitoring pirates and warning other nearby vessels
Disruption of skiffs depends on the presence of legally defined ‘tripwires’
e.g. hooked ladders, multiple motors, fuel drums, weaponry
Naval forces may seize vessels / paraphernalia
Arrest if caught in the act
Reluctance to prosecute and imprison pirates - ‘Legal Finish’ remains a significant problem

33. Best Management Practice (BMP)
Industry needs to take responsibility for its own security
Pirate operating area too large for Navies to effectively control
Pirate attacks often too quick for Naval response
BMP Recommends:
Use of IRTC, higher speed, manoeuvring, look-outs, informing UKMTO / MSC-HOA organisations
Defensive measures including barbed wire, fire hoses, deck lighting and citadels

34. BMP: Citadels
Designated area built into the ship where crew can seek protection
To increase the time between boarding and taking of hostages
Naval forces will only consider boarding to release crew in a Citadel if:
100% of the crew are secured in the Citadel
The crew of the ship have self contained, independent, reliable 2-way external communications
The pirates are denied access to ship propulsion
The use of a Citadel will not guarantee a Naval response, but increase the window of possible intervention
Pirates know they only have a limited time to access Citadel before Naval forces arrive
Complexity: Pirates develop better TTPs to break into Citadels, Industry develops better Citadels…

35. Armed Security Teams
No vessel with an embarked, armed security team (EST) has been pirated
BMP / Naval Forces neutral on ESTs
Increased risk of violent escalation and harm to all involved
Legality of arming vessels varies with jurisdiction
Quality / proficiency of ESTs variable
Risk of mistaken attacks on fishing vessels
BMP4 recommends Military Vessel Protection Detachments rather than Private Maritime Security Contactors if armed security is required

36. Attacking Pirate Land Bases
New ROEs for EUNAVFOR
Will permit attacks on boats, fuel dumps, land vehicles, bases
Short-term tactical gains, but significant strategic risk
Pirates may respond by moving inland, merging with civilian areas
Likelihood of violent escalation – pirates will fire on naval vessels
Risk of retaliation to hostages
Risk of collateral damage to innocent Somalis and property
Undermines Counter Piracy influence operations

37. Decline of Somali Piracy?
Since early 2011 Somali piracy has declined
Q1 2012: 36 attacks, 7 hijackings
Q1 2011: 97 attacks, 18 hijackings
13 ships currently held, with 197 hostages (26 Mar 2012),
Down from 30+ ships with 700+ hostages in early 2011
Most probable causes:
Use of effective BMP, particularly Citadels & increased disruption
Embarked Security Teams

38. 5. Conclusions
Historical and recent examples indicate solutions to piracy require:
The ruthless application of deleterious and deterrent lethal force, or
The combination of military, political and economic levers
The financial rewards for Somalis are unparalleled and the impact on global trade negligible – the primary cost is human
Piracy is not the most significant factor driving efforts to effect political change in Somalia
Piracy is a symptom of the current Somali political situation which lacks the potential for medium term resolution
Containment is the objective at sea for Navies and Industry
Somali Piracy lacks a Naval ‘fix’
Pirates have shown themselves to be able to adapt their Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTPS) rapidly and in unexpected ways

39. 5. Conclusions
Somalia Piracy presents a Wicked Problem born of a complex, lawless state, inherent pirate operational and tactical advantage, and constraints on international action

40. Questions?