1. EU-UN Cooperation in the field of Crisis Management THE UNITED NATIONS IN A TURBULENT WORLD 70 years in building peace and security NUPS Mobile Academy, Budapest 06 MAY 2015 Bgen Gabor HORVATH CDR, HDF 25th INF BDE,

2. The briefer: - 2003-2006 – Deputy Military Representative of Hungary to the EU Military Committee (Brussels) - 2006-2007 – Head of the NATO Permanent Liaison Team to the EU Military Staff (EUMS) (EUMS, NATO HQ, SHAPE, Brussels-Mons) - 2007-2008 – Principal Staff Officer to the HUN Chief of Defence, responsible for multilateral military cooperation (Budapest) - 2009-2011 – Director, Concepts and Capabilities Development, EU Military Staff (EUMS, Brussels)

3. In the end of 2011, 24 EU Member States In the end of 2011, 24 EU Member States contributed with 407 police, 222 observers and 6312 military troops to UN peacekeeping operations, thus providing 7,02% of UN PK troop contribution but more interestingly, at the same time the EU Member States provided 40,7% of the UN peacekeeping budget even more interestingly, the EU MS troop contribution (6943 personnel out of 98 829 including all involved in 15 UN PKOs) to the 5 UN PKOs in Africa were only 204 EU MS personnel out of the 70 308 UN personnel deployed (0,29%). In Medias Res…

4. History of EU-UN relationship in the field of Global Security; From Political Declarations, Expectations, Aspirations, to Field Cooperation Theoretical Scenarios and Models of Cooperation What Future holds Agenda

5. History of EU-UN relationship  September 2003 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management  June 2007 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management  December 2003 EU Security Strategy (ESS)  December 2008 Follow-up to the European Security Strategy (ESS)  European Council of Nice (2000)  June 2001 European Summit of Gothenburg  October 2000 UN Secretary-General and the EU High Representative regular meetings start  June 2001 EU General Affairs Council defined three themes of cooperation (conflict prevention, crisis management and regional issues),

6. Political Declarations Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management four areas of cooperation that should be further developed Planning: including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and cooperation between mission planning units; Training: the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel the synchronisation of pre-deployment training; and the institutionalisation of training seminars, conferences and exercises; Communication: greater cooperation between situation centres; exchange of liaison officers whenever required establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels; Best practices: regular and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including information on mission hand-over and procurement

7. Political Declarations Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management A mechanism for consultations: the Steering Committee between the Department for Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) and the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) of the UN Secretariat, and the structures of the EU (General Council Secretariat, including the EU Military Staff, and the Commission, now the EEAS) The Steering Committee usually meets twice a year. This does not prevent the Head of DPKO from regularly briefing the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)on operations where both organisations are involved, and the EU High Representative – now the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union – from doing the same in front of the Security Council.

8. Political Declarations EU principles and prerequisites for participating in crisis management and for putting its civilian and military instruments at the disposal of other organisations. The EU will retain through the PSC the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations; Such cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis; There would be no automatic involvement; The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements

9. Expectations and Aspirations UN: Following its agenda towards the creation of an effective multilateralism; Alleviating the burden on its institutions caused by the increasing demands for crisis management (finding „implementers”, instead of „sub-contractors”); Finding solutions to some strategic and operational shortfalls, to include the planning and to reach a shorter reaction time; Finding solutions to some chronically missing peacekeeping capabilities, especially in the area of operational enablers; EU: Providing a global visibility to the CFSP/ESDP, thus fulfilling the ambitions set forth in the ESS; Making value of the existing comprehensive crisis management capabilities; Creating a strong legitimacy in the field of Crisis Management for the EU; Following the agenda of a number of Member States, traditionally involved in multinational peacekeeping; but also adding value to some national foreign policy interests for others; Reinforcing the EU positions within the UN and in its peacekeeping instances;

10. Field Cooperation Until 2007: Reinforcing and bridging 2003 – CONCORDIA (under UN mandate, based on Berlin+) 2003 – ARTEMIS (by specific UN request to assist MONUC) 2003 – EUPM BiH (taking over from UNBiH) 2004 – ALTHEA (taking over under UN mandate from NATO SFOR) 2006 – EUFOR RD CONGO (reinforcement of MONUC) Since 2007: „Parallel Missions” (little cooperation) EUPOL – UNAMA (Afghanistan) EUSEC RD CONGO and EUPOL RD CONGO – MONUSCO (RDC) EUNAVFOR ATALANTA – UNPOS (Somalia) Some more positive examples EULEX – UNMIK (Kosovo) EUFOR CHAD/RCA – MINURCAT (Chad, RCA)

11. Return to Political Declarations Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management four areas of cooperation that should be further developed Planning: including reciprocal assistance in assessment missions and greater contact and cooperation between mission planning units; Training: the establishment of joint training standards, procedures and planning for military and civilian personnel the synchronisation of pre-deployment training; and the institutionalisation of training seminars, conferences and exercises; Communication: greater cooperation between situation centres; exchange of liaison officers whenever required establishment of desk-to-desk dialogue through the respective liaison offices in New York and Brussels; Best practices: regular and systematic exchange of lessons learned and best practices information, including information on mission hand-over and procurement

12. Theoretical Scenarios (by Prof. Alexandra Novosseloff) an EU operation mandated by the UN Security Council conducted with or without NATO’s assets („CONCORDIA model”) the EU provides “a strategic reserve to a UN peacekeeping operation to strengthen its deterrent capacity, to be able to face any substantial disruption of the security situation. (EUFOR RD CONGO) an EU-led operation, authorized by the UN Security Council, followed by a UN peacekeeping operation – (also called “INTERFET model”) an EU-led operation in charge of the security presence, with the UN in charge of the civilian presence” – (“Kosovo model”). the EU Political and Security Committee to play the role of a “clearing house” for UN peacekeeping operations an EU generated force component operating under an EU Flag within a UN Force Notes Probability All ESDP/CSDP CMOs followed this model EU ambition: addressing the crisis comprehensively EU will not give up political control and strategic direction No utility – UN has its own force generation process Misunderstanding of the role of a FR OPRES Battalion during EUFOR RD CONGO – they were RES to the EU OPS, NOT the UN ! One ESDP/CSDP CMO (Aceh Monitoring Mission- AMM) followed this model Description

13. Practical Models by Thierry Tardy 1.National contributionsex. UNIFIL EU MS contribution (clearing house?) 2.Stand alone operationsex. ALTHEA UNSC mandated EU-led operation 3.Bridging modelARTEMIS, EUFOR Chad/RCA EU operations in support/reinforcement of an existing UN mission 4.Supporting modelEU assistance to AMIS (Darfur) EU individuals/equipment/funds in support of an existing UN mission 5.Modular approachno example yet UN-led mission with an EU component 6.Joint/hybrid operationno example yet UN/EU running jointly an operation

14. Future of EU-UN relationship UKRAINE, ISIS, Migration, Mediterranean, Sahel The EU, first time during its existence is in the middle of a geopolitical power game  accused (and, in fact perceived by some) as part of the conflict in UKR and not as a neutral benefactor;  facing challenges related to a contradiction between values (security) and interests (economy) that probes its internal cohesion;  struggles with migration and the revival of national identity. The UN, was continuously in the middle of geopolitical power games  now the geopolitical poles are multi-faceted;  facing challenges of long overdue reforms;  remains, however, the only all-accepted security broker.

15. EU-UN Cooperation in the field of Crisis Management THE UNITED NATIONS IN A TURBULENT WORLD 70 years in building peace and security NUPS Mobile Academy, Budapest 06 MAY 2015 Bgen Gabor HORVATH CDR, HDF 25th INF BDE,

16. SPARE SLIDES

17. OHQSHAPE FHQEU POLMILBXL OHQPAR FHQEU POLMILBXL OHQPOTS FHQEU POLMILBXL EU military C2 in practice 1. – Completed operations

18. EU military C2 in practice 2. - Ongoing operations and missions OHQSHAPE FHQEU POLMILBXL OHQNTW FHQEU POLMILBXL MHQEU POLMILBXL OHQLARISSA FHQEU POLMILBXL

19. IMS EUMS CEUMC UNSEC Comparison 2: EU military to NATO and UN military C2 Politico-Militarylevel Military Strategic level Military Operational level Military Tactical level OHQ FHQ CC SC(ACO,ACT) JFC (Brunssum, Naples) CCs Permanent Service HQs NAC MC MHQ ComponentHeads UNSC SG HoM EU Council PSC deployed deployed

20. Military Illustrative Scenarios 2010

21. MilitaryStrategicLevelMilitaryStrategicLevel PoliticalStrategicLevelPoliticalStrategicLevel With recourse to NATO assets and capabilities EU OHQ at SHAPE EU OHQ at SHAPE COUNCIL/PSCCOUNCIL/PSC EU Ops Centre EU COUNCIL/PSCCOUNCIL/PSC autonomous EU OHQ in a national OHQ multi-nationalised EU OHQ in a national OHQ multi-nationalised COUNCIL/PSCCOUNCIL/PSC autonomous EU MILITARY C2 – Three Options E U M S

22. EU BATTLEGROUPS CONCEPT Battlegroup (approx 1500 troops) Infantry Battalion HQ HQ Company 3x Infantry Coy Fire Support Reconnaissance Combat Support Combat Service support Staff Support Strategic Enablers AirSeaLogOther Readiness of 5-10 days Readiness of 5-10 days Sustainable for 30 days initial operation, extendable to 120 days Sustainable for 30 days initial operation, extendable to 120 days A distance of 6000km from Brussels A distance of 6000km from Brussels 2 concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations 2 concurrent single BG-size rapid response operations Capabilities E U M S