1. THE BRAHIMI REPORT: An Overview j DAVID T LIGHTBURN

2. CATEGORIES OF ISSUES –Peacekeeping - Substantive Issues –Process –Resources –Structure

3. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES n PREVENTIVE ACTION –Address in integrated fashion –More use of fact-finding missions n PEACE-BUILDING –Funds – quick impact –SSR & human rights –DDR and funding –Peacebuilding concept and policy at UN n PEACEKEEPING DOCTRINE –Robust ROEs

4. PROCEDURAL MATTERS n Clear, Credible Achievable Mandates n Transitional Administration –Interim Criminal Code n Deployment Timelines (30 & 90 Days) n Mission Leadership –List of acceptable experts –Mission HQ training n Integrated Mission Planning & Support n Delegate Pk Budgeting To DPKO n Better Use Of Information Technology

5. RESOURCES n MILITARY –Partnerships Of Nations (SHRBRIG) –Certification Of Contingents –100 On-call Planners n POLICE –National Pools –Regional Training –100 On-call Planners –Also For Judges, Penal, Human Rights And Other Ssr Specialists

6. RESOURCES (continued) n Civilian Specialists –Central list –Career possibilities –Staffing strategy n Public Information Capability n Logistics –5 mission start-up kits –Increased procurement authority n Funding (Authority To DPKO)

7. STRUCTURAL ISSUES n Information And Strategic Analysis n Separate Military And Police In Dpko n Restructure Lessons-learned Unit n Increase DPKO Staff n Place Peace-building In DPA n Enhance Staff Of High Commissioner For Human Rights

8. SINGAPORE MEETING ON “THE REFORM PROCESS OF UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS”

9. SINGAPORE MEETING n Included Brahimi, Shimura, Vierra de Mello, Coleman, senior reps from 3 missions n Excellent mix of practitioners, academics, military, politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, civilian field experts

10. REPORT ON THE MEETING n General Reflections And Criticisms n Peacekeeping Issues n Procedural Issues n Resources Issues n Structural Issues n Regional Views n Brahimi Approach Vs NATO Lessons- learned n Conclusions

11. REFLECTIONS & RESPONSE n CRITICISM –Learned and experienced – use in implementation –Beyond scope of study – reform of UNSC; pk by proxy; humanitarian intervention a Trojan horse for developed nations to intervene in developing nations affairs –Issues between secretariat and nations not addressed –Resistance to reform within UN n TERMINOLOGY – –PEACE OPERATIONS – used by Report –PEACEKEEPING – used by UNSC

12. REFLECTIONS & RESPONSE (continued) n Other reflections –Too light a treatment of Conflict Prevention and Preventive Measures (panel mandate was peace ops) –With more time, panel could have done more on Gender, DDR and Peace-Building –Reform is a process just beginning; don’t over-analyse –No major troop contributors represented on 10 person panel

13. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES n Robust approach – two views n Apply robust concept to civilian operations n Police – need new concepts, policies – as result of UNTAET and UNMIK – regional like-minded groupings? n Need for advance planning with Partners n Problem of Development being used synonymously with Peace-building

14. PEACEKEEPING ISSUES (continued) n Conflict Prevention - UN role important but regional actors are critical n “Humanitarian Intervention” or “Human Rights Intervention”

15. PROCEDURAL ISSUES n Information available to UNSC poor n Missions hopelessly over- regulated n Consideration of OSCE “REACT concept”

16. RESOURCE ISSUES n Need for well prepared and trained quality personnel n Need lists of SRSGs, Deputies, CIVPOL. regional coordinators… etc

17. STRUCTURAL ISSUES n Realities –No Space for more staff –Integrated Mission Task Forces – no directors available in DPA or DPKO

18. REGIONAL VIEWS n REGIONAL MEETINGS FEB/MAR 2001 n CONCLUSIONS –CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN UN (Brahimi represents minimum change) –RECOMMENDATIONS ARE TECHNICAL & OPERATIONAL SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL PROBLEMS –NEED FOR UN TO WORK WITH REGIONAL ORGANISATONS (greater role for regions) –NEED MORE EFFORT ON PREVENTION –SUPPORT ROBUST CONCEPT (but needs training, and resources to develop capacity)

19. COMPARISON NATO - BRAHIMI n Mandate/mission/capabilities – mandate approved only with resources n Robust ROEs and credible force – Robust approach n Engage partners in planning – engage troop contributors n Both NATO and UN change their approach to management of crises n Both urge of unity of effort (need for effective co-operation and co-ordination prior to and during operations)

20. SEMINAR CONCLUSIONS n Basically, Brahimi got it right – landmark report – need now to implement n Relations with troop contributors still poor (UNSC and secretariat) – Key near term issue n UN cannot take on every crisis; must select carefully; better not to engage than to engage poorly n Need for quality, well-prepared, people for missions n Take account of experience in UNTAET and UNMIK concerning a shift in policing concepts n Complex operations are now the norm

21. KEY PEACEKEEPING ISSUES - 2001 n Move beyond 1992 Agenda For Peace and acknowledge modern multi-fucntional ops as the norm n Improve preparations for a crisis –Between organizations –Within nations and organizations n Improve international community’s early management of a crisis n Need robust, professional, unity of effort from the international community