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Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA

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1 Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA
CTF-956 CONOPS 27 Aug 2014 Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA 1 UNCLASSIFIED

2 CFMCC Mission Statement
NLT 1 AUG 2014, CFMCC CONDUCTS THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND AND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO ESTABLISH LOCAL SECURITY, RESTORE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT UNSCRS IN ORDER TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY. BE PREPARED TO (BPT) CONDUCT NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) OF U.S. AND COALITION CITIZENS. BPT CONDUCT FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA) OPERATIONS. BPT TO CONDUCT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSOI) OF FOLLOW-ON U.S. AND COALITION FORCES.

3 CFMCC Commanders Intent
PURPOSE. CFMCC FORCES WILL CONDUCT TSC OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY AND TO DEMONSTRATE COALITION RESOLVE AGAINST PHARM AND GARNET AGGRESSION.

4 CFMCC Commanders Intent
METHOD. THE EASTCOM TSC PROGRAM PROVIDES A VISIBLE BUT NOT AGGRESSIVE U.S. INFLUENCE IN TREASURE COAST. THE TSC PROGRAM INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY TO INCLUDE LANDWARD AND SEAWARD PORT AND HARBOR SECURITY AND HIGH VALUE ASSET ESCORT; C-IED OPERATIONS; CARGO HANDLING FROM BOTH EXPEDITIONARY AND FUNCTIONING PORTS; MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH COASTAL AND RIVERINE BOATS; AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION TO INCLUDE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION. CONCEPTUALLY, THIS TSC PROGRAM WILL INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AMBERLAND CIVIL AND MILITARY FORCES AND PROVIDE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS THAT BENEFIT THE CITIZENS OF AMBERLAND. MY INTENT IS TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR HN AUTHORITY WHILE IMPROVING KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NATION. WE NEED TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT WILL PRESSURE US TO LEAVE OR OTHERWISE DEGRADE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS.

5 CFMCC Commanders Intent
ENDSTATE. INCREASED SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY IN AMBERLAND AND IMPROVED CONFIDENCE AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMBERLAND CIVILIANS AND MILITARY.

6 1 August Task Organization
UN / WFP/ IMO US EASTCOM AFEAST CTF 951 ATF CTF 952 LF AMBER/AMBERLAND COUNTRY TEAMS SOCEAST AREAST NAVEAST CTF 957 MPRG CTF 954 TASW CTF 956 NEF CTF 953 LOG MARFOREAST SPMAGTF - CR UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL USA, MNFA

7 NEF Task Organization UNCLASSIFIED 4/22/2017 4/22/2017 EODMU – 30 PAX
CTF 956 NEF EODGRU2 ~73 Pax (act) PMU EODMU 6 NMCB 1 NCHB 11 CRS-4 9 pax (act) Air Det (-) CBMU 202 UCT 1 Air Cargo Co (-) EOD PLT Cargo Term Co ALPHA Co CEXC PLT Ex Support Co (-) Landward Security NMCB 5 NLD EOD PLT 10 pax (act) 54 (notional) Seaward Security UUV/VSW Air Det BRAVO Co ~640Pax (act) AS PLT 33 pax (act) Bogue 60 pax (act) MHB 249 (notional) Landward Security EODMU – 30 PAX EOD PLT – 8 PAX EACH IET 8 PAX COMCAM 6 PAX NMCB AIR DET – 89 PAX DELTA 1 113 COMCAM Seaward Security ~60 Pax (act) DELTA Co COCOM OPCON Coordination TACON TACOM Delta 1 (RCB, MK IV) Delta 2 (RPB/RAB) US Forces PSU 307 NLD Forces Landward Security VIRTUAL Seaward Security UNCLASSIFIED 7

8 Command Relationships
COMUSEASTCOM is the supported Commander USNAVFOREAST has been designated CFMCC in the EASTCOM AOR CRS-4 is supported Commander for SPOD operations at Mile Hammock Bay and Morehead City operations NMCB 1 and NMCB 5 is supported Commander for construction projects EODMU 6 is supported Commander for C-IED operations

9 Constraints / Restraint
Constraints (Must do): Increase the capabilities of the Amberland civil and military forces Protect ourselves from terrorist activities that will pressure us to leave or otherwise degrade our relationship with he legitimate governments Restraints (Can’t do): Perform TSC outside Amberland recognized borders to include sea accesses Show an aggressive U.S. influence in treasure coast Deploy forces and equipment to Amberland above those required for assigned tasks Public release of information about this operation without final approval by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) PA

10 Facts PHARM operates in major urban areas within Amberland with cells located throughout the treasure coast. Garnet is supporting the PHARM in planning, logistics and recruiting/training new members to initiate an offensive campaign to destabilize the Amber and Amberland Governments. The PHARM are known to conduct small scale attacks against Army, Police, Government officials and infrastructure to erode popular support of the government. The PHARM also conducts piracy attacks and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Amberland and use the inland waters to transport and hide weapons further exacerbating the threat to international peace and security in the TCR. CFMCC theater security cooperation operations will be executed within the recognized borders of Amberland to include sea accesses. Amberland has contracted a local firm to provide outer security at Bogue Airfield and Mile Hammock Bay. The two bases don’t have dedicated military security. Contract is good for deployment duration. RSO from US Embassy highly recommends active US security posture at and around US equipment and personnel. Current FP condition is Charlie (FPCON-C).

11 Facts 7. Amberland has contracted to provide the materials for the road project and the school renovation. They have assigned government representatives to coordinate delivery and resupply of materials. 8. No mil to mil engagements have been approved by the US Embassy. All requests should be forwarded to CFMCC coordinated through the US Embassy RSO. US Forces will have civilian engagements along the intercoastal waterway and during port and airfield operations. 9.The facility at Morehead City is a deepwater commercial port with perimeter security, tugs and escorts, and HN cargo handlers (personnel and equipment). There is sufficient secure storage in vicinity of the pier. Mile Hammock Bay is a more shallow and more local port with limited seaward and landward accesses and pier equipment. Security, tugs and escorts, and cargo handlers are contracted on an as needed basis. Although there is sufficient landward storage of cargo, it is further from the off load locations and susceptible to the weather. When handling US and Coalition vessels, the US frequently augments the local security, provides escort of high value assets, and depending on the ship and cargo will either augment the HN cargo handlers or conduct offload without HN support.

12 Facts 10. The local police doesn’t have any official C-IED capability and will often destroy suspected IEDs in place or route local traffic around the area. 11. There are no intelligence assets dedicated to NEF during Phase 0. Specific collection requests may be forwarded to this HQ. 12. The US has had some SOF presence in Amberland. Individual US Military members have transitioned through the Treasure Coast region. COMUSEASTCOM and staff have conducted visits with Amberland government and military leaders. 6 US Marines serve aboard the US Embassy. 13. US footprint in Amberland will generate interest from terrorists in the region, but no specific changes in TTPs are expected. Report all indications and warning regarding terrorist activities in Amberland. 14. There have not been any reported major attacks against soft targets in the vicinity of Bogue, MHB or MHC. Regional and local violence (verbal threats, minor crimes, looting, sporadic undirected gun fire, dog fighting) continues and can be expected.

13 Proposed Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)
1. PIR-An Increase of local population support to terrorist groups 2. PIR-Emerging trends in implementing IEDs 3. PIR-Terrorist activity interfering with operations in the NEF AO 4. PIR-Terrorist activity targeting NEF personnel 5. PIR-Movement of terrorist personnel and equipment 6. FFIR-Change to LAD 7. FFIR-Change to ROE 8. FFIR-Change to Host Nation Support 9. FFIR- Inability of units to start/complete task as directed

14 CTF 956 Proposed Mission Statement
NLT 01 AUG 2014, EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP TWO (FWD) DEPLOY AS CTF 956 (NEF COMMANDER) AND ESTABLISH A SECURE MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER (MOC) AND FORWARD OPERATING BASES (FOB) AT BOGUE FIELD AND MILE HAMMOCK BAY. CTF 956 WILL CONDUCT THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) IN AMBERLAND AND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO ESTABLISH LOCALIZED SECURITY, RESTORE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT UNSCRS IOT INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY. CTF 956 WILL BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA), NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO) AND RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSO&I) FOR FOLLOW ON U.S. AND COALITION FORCES.

15 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Purpose: STRENGTHEN EXISTING RELATIONS WITH AMBERLAND AND REDUCE POPULAR SUPPORT FOR RADICAL IDEOLOGY. REINFORCE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE AMBERTINE GOVERNMENT IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE IN ORDER TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES, AND ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY; AND DEMONSTRATE COALITION RESOLVE AGAINST PHARM AND GARNET AGGRESSION

16 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Method: I INTEND TO ACCOMPLISH OUR MISSION BY LEVERAGING THE FULL SPECTRUM OF CTF 956 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CAPABILITY. THE NEF PROVIDES A VISIBLE BUT NOT AGGRESSIVE U.S. INFLUENCE IN TREASURE COAST. THIS INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING CAPABILITIES: critical maritime infrastructure security to include landward and seaward port and harbor security and high value asset escort; C-IED operations; cargo handling from both expeditionary and functioning ports; maritime security operations with coastal and riverine boats; infrastructure construction to include horizontal and vertical construction. WE WILL PARTNER WITH OUR HOST NATION COUNTERPARTS AT ALL LEVELS DURING THE PLANNING PROCESS AND GIVE THEM THE LEAD DURING THE EXECUTION PHASE OF ALL INITIATIVES, PROJECTS, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS. WE WILL DEMONSTRATE COALITION SUPPORT FOR AMBERLAND AUTHORITY WHILE IMPROVING KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NATION. WE WILL PROTECT OURSELVES FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT WILL PRESSURE US TO LEAVE OR OTHERWISE DEGRADE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS.

17 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Endstate: INCREASED LOCAL AMBERLAND CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT FOR THEIR NATION.

18 Deployment CTF 956 (NEF) T: Release OPORD NLT 2 Sep
T: Deploy N4,N6 ADVON to Bogue Field Oct T: Deploy N3 ADVON to Bogue Field Oct T: Deploy Main Body to Bogue Field Oct T: Establish NEF Command and Control (C2) of assigned forces NLT Oct T: Redeploy Main Body to Norfolk, VA Nov T: Redeploy N4 ADVON to Norfolk, VA NLT 11 Nov CTG (FDPMU) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Submit Phase 0 CONOPS to CTF 956 NLT 02OCT T: Establish C3 of assigned forces at Bogue Field NLT Oct CTG (EOD MU6) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Submit Phase 0 CONOPS to CTF 956 NLT 02 Oct T: Deploy to Bogue and establish C3 assigned forces at Bogue Field NLT Oct CTG (NMCB 1) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Establish C3 of assigned forces at Gulfport, MS NLT Oct T: Deploy Air Det to MHB NLT Oct T: Deploy Air Det (-) to Bogue Field to support Camp operations NLT Oct **All times are Eastern will be in converted to ZULU for OPORD NEF NMCB 1 Gulfport, MS PSU-307

19 Deployment CTG (NMCB 5) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Submit Phase 0 CONOPS to CTF 956 NLT 02OCT T: Establish C3 of assigned forces at Port Hueneme, CA NLT Oct CTG (NCHB 11) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Establish C3 of assigned forces at Bogue Field NLT Oct T: BPT support CRS-4 deployment and redeployment from Norfolk, VA to Mile Hammock Bay, NC T: BPT support cargo handling at MHB ISO CRS-4 Port Operations. CTG (CRS-4) T: Submit CTG TPFDD NLT 12 Sep to CTF 956 T: Establish C3 of assigned forces at MHB NLT Oct **All times are Eastern will be in converted to ZULU for OPORD NEF NMCB 1 Gulfport, MS PSU-307

20 Time Line for Deployment
CTF 956 N3, ADVON DEPARTS NORFOLK CTF 956ARRIVAL OF DJC2 BOGUE FIELD CTF 956 MAIN BODY DEPARTS NORFOLK CTF 956 MAIN BODY DEPARTS BOGUE FIELD CTF 956 N4, N6, ADVON DEPARTS BOGUE FIELD ECH 5 CONOPS DUE CFT 956 COMM CHECK CFT LIVE CTF 956 N4, N6, ADVON DEPARTS NORFOLK ECH 5 TPFDD DUE CTF 956 CTF 956 OPORD RELEASED 2 SEP 12 SEP 2 OCT 24 OCT 11 NOV OCT OCT OCT OCT NOV

21 Execution CTF 956 (NEF) T: Deploy to FOB Bogue
T: Maintain Common Operating Picture (COP) for NEF forces T: Collect on, assess and refine Intelligence Carry On Program (ICOP) T: Identify and assess emergent threats to EASTCOM and Host Nation (HN) forces T: Provide daily reports to Combined Forces Maritime Component Command (CFMCC) T: Assess, maintain, report and adapt to force protection measures CTG (FDPMU) T: Be Prepared To (BPT) provide preventive medical services to US, Coalition and HN forces T: O/A 26 Oct conduct water purification testing ISO CTG 956.3/4 CTG (EOD MU6) T: BPT conduct Counter-IED (C-IED) operations T: BPT perform Sensitive-Site Exploitation (SSE)/Post-Blast Analysis (PBA) T: BPT conduct integrated Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) ops T: BPT conduct integrated EOD and Diving ops T: BPT conduct Anti-Terrorism/Force-Protection (AT/FP) diving ops ISO CTG 956.6 T: O/A August conduct AT/FP diving ISO Expeditionary Sea Port of Debarkation (ExSPOD) at Morehead City (MHC) ISO CTG 956.6 **All times are Eastern will be in converted to ZULU for OPORD

22 Execution (cont.) T: Deploy to FOB Bogue
CTG (NMCB 1) T: Deploy to FOB Bogue T: BPT provide camp security of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bogue ISO CTF 956 T: O/A 21 August support Combat Outpost and Tactical Operations Center (TOC) setup at MHC ISO CTG 956.6 T: O/A August to conduct U/W Hydrographic survey or MHC ISO CTG 956.6 T: NLT 15 Oct coordinate with HN to renovate school and make assessment T: NLT 26 Oct begin well-water construction T: BPT provide security escort for movement of NEF forces CTG (NMCB 5) T: NLT 10 August coordinate construction of Main Supply Route (MSR) 1 T: NLT 25 August begin construction of MSR 1 CTG (NCHB 11) T: O/A August conduct offload/onload of High-Value Assets (HVAs) in MHC ISO CTG 956.6 T: BPT provide camp security for NEF forces ISO of Theatre Security Cooperation (TSC) operations T: BPT support camp functions at FOB Bogue ISO CTF 956 **All times are Eastern will be in converted to ZULU for OPORD

23 Execution (cont.) T: Deploy to FOB Mile Hammock Bay
CTG (CRS-4) T: Deploy to FOB Mile Hammock Bay T: NLT 15 August conduct Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) along Inter-Coastal Waterway (ICW) from MHB to MHC T: NLT Aug establish TOC in MHC to provide Port Ops to include escort of HVAs, landward/seaward security, and other tasks to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid/supplies T: BPT provide 24-hour landward/seaward security in Mile-Hammock Bay (MHB) T: On order conduct other Maritime Security Operations (MSO) T: BPT provide security escort for movement of NEF forces COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL SUBORDINATES: T: Conduct TSC operations in Amberland T: BPT coordinate with interagencies and HN ISO TSC operations and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) T: BPT conduct Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSO&I) T: BPT support Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) T: Provide daily reports to CTF 956 T: Maintain a COP T: BPT conduct Key-Leader Engagements (KLE) **All times are Eastern will be in converted to ZULU for OPORD

24 MSR G Completion Begin well project School renovation/ assessment Turnover ExSPOD to HN Begin MSR project Establish ExSPOD at MHC NLT 1 Dec Conduct ISR of ICW NLT 26 Oct NLT 15 Oct Survey MSR NLT 25 Aug Deploy 25 Aug 21 Aug NLT 15 Aug NLT 10 Aug 1 Aug

25 4/22/2017 N1 Concept of Support Provide full range of administrative support to include casualty reporting, MEDEVAC support, ITEMPO accounting as well as personnel, pay, MWR, postal and religious services as required TOCEX III ~ 28 Aug N1’s request TAD funding from NECC for CTF956 HQ Pers Prep Battle Jackets for CTF956 personnel (Page 2 / SGLI) * Passports/wills/POAs (real world deployment) ~ 5 Sep ADVON submit DTS orders (see matrix) ~ 10 Sep N1’s draft group DTS orders for main body (see matrix) 29 Sep – 3 Oct Upon standup of N1, provide administrative support as required and muster all NEF personnel. BPT complete muster NLT 1700 / 1200 thereafter NLT 10 Oct ADVON and main body personnel submit DTS voucher NLT 10 Oct N1’s input ITEMPO into BOL 2525 UNCLASSIFIED

26 N1 Concept of Support (cont’d)
4/22/2017 N1 Concept of Support (cont’d) BA14 NLT 28 Aug Request augmentation support from USFFC via naval msg NLT 2 Sep Request for Religious Services support/info from Camp Lejeune Chaplain NLT 6 Oct N1’s request TAD funding from NECC for CTF956 HQ Pers Request for Religious Services support/info from Camp Lejeune Chaplain Prep Battle Jackets for CTF956 personnel (Page 2 / SGLI) ~ 10 Oct ADVON submit DTS orders (see matrix) ~ 15 Oct N1’s submit main body group DTS orders (see matrix) 25 Oct Upon standup of N1, provide administrative support as required and muster all NEF personnel. BPT complete muster NLT 1700 / 1200 thereafter NLT 14 Nov Main body submit DTS voucher NLT 17 Nov ADVON submit DTS voucher NLT 17 Nov N1’s input ITEMPO into BOL 2626 UNCLASSIFIED

27 N1 Concept of Support (cont’d)
4/22/2017 N1 Concept of Support (cont’d) Authorized Per Diem Dates/Amounts Present – 28 Sep 29 Sep – 3 Oct 4 Oct – 24 Oct 25 Oct – 7 Nov 7 Nov - FINEX Full Per Diem $0 lodging / $12.50 day $0 lodging / $12.50 daily & $3.50 Sat/Sun (MRE) When NOT residing at Bogue Field/MHB and NOT using galley * When residing at Bogue Field/MHB and using galley * When NOT residing at Bogue Field/ MHB and NOT using galley * When residing at Bogue Field/ MHB and using galley/ eating MRE’s * When NOT residing at Bogue Field/MHB and NOT using galley 2727 UNCLASSIFIED

28 N2 Concept of Support Provide IPOE Develop NEF Collection plan
4/22/2017 N2 Concept of Support Provide IPOE Provide threat environment and its effect on both friendly and enemy COAs. Weather Terrain Avenues of Approach Observation & fields of fire Key terrain Obstacles Cover & concealment Enemy composition, disposition & strength Enemy Capabilities Enemy Intentions Most Likely/Dangerous COAs Collection on Intelligence Requirements (IRs), information is collected and converted into intelligence, and intelligence is disseminated to users. DISUM Significant enemy activities Current situation analysis Assess probable enemy COAs in AO TOC Intelligence update Develop NEF Collection plan Liaison to exchange information and obtain assistance LNOs: KIWC, ISR, IC 2828 UNCLASSIFIED

29 Deployment/Execution
4/22/2017 N4 Concept of Support Deployment/Execution Movement: ESU2 to provide TOA, and trasnport of TOA, for main NEF cell and camp support units (CBMU, NCHB) and ETG/NMCB Response cell (FA/HA). (TRANSCOM) Deploy/Redeploy ADVON by POV/GOV and Main Body by Charter Bus (NAVFAC/Local). Subordinate units/LNOs use organic support. (Airlift) Supply Route/Source: N4 will utilize JEB as main Source of Supply (SOS) (Utilize CTG 953 Amethyst Island as Point of Entry for requests with delivery by Air/JSSV as required) FA/HA: Utilize CTG 953 for contract for local economy supplies/services ISO tasking rel to Humanitarian Aid. Services: Primary method will be to utilize existing facilities and capabilities within MCALF/Cherry Point to provide Class 1, 3 and camp support services. 2929 UNCLASSIFIED

30 4/22/2017 N4 Concept of Support CLASS 1: Meals provided by MAW on MCALF during the week. MREs for midrats and weekends. Water will be largely from water bowl/bottled. (Utilize MREs/bottled water until HN capability both exists and is certified) CLASS 2: TOA will be provided by ESU2 to support berthing for all units at Bogue. Tent/C2 support equipment will be provided only to the TOC inhabitants (to include LNOs) and camp support subordinates and ETG. CLASS 3: POL will be provided either through MCALF (minimal capability) or via Cherry Point to provide diesel, pending approved request. MOGAS available in town for white gear (WEX). CLASS 4: Initial requirement transported with ADVON. Utilize local economy for re-supply as required. (Same) CLASS 5: Minimal support capability for re-supply – reachback to HQ. 3030 UNCLASSIFIED

31 4/22/2017 N4 Concept of Support CLASS 6: ESU2 to provide minimum basic hygiene items to ensure proper operation of latrine/dining facilities. (personal hygiene kits supplied if local economy cannot support) CLASS 7: CESE utilized to transport material to site and for camp support (fueling, offload/onload to stake, transportation). CLASS 8/9: Initial requirement moves with main body/advon. Resupply accomplished via reachback to HQ as needed. (CTG 953) CLASS 10: Utilize local economy to supply items for HN support. If required, utilize CTG 953 as SOS for advanced items directly supporting LNs. 3131 UNCLASSIFIED

32 Camp Czar Concept of Support General Unit Berthing
EODESU 2 will provide TOA facilities and assemblies to enable expeditionary camp operations at MCALF Bogue to support : ETG Cell NMCB 5 Exercise response Cell CBMU 202 NCHB 11 Units required to provide their own TOA facilities and assemblies. MCP FDPMU DJC2 UCT 1 Unit Berthing MCALF Bogue will provide access and use of permanent structures (K-Spans) for camp berthing. K-Spans are not environmentally controlled. EODESU 2 will provide portable Environmental Conditioning Units (ECU) for 11 berthing K-Spans and one general use/field messing facility K-Span

33 Camp Czar Concept of Support (cont’d) Head and shower facilities
MCALF Bogue has head and shower facilities located adjacent to the berthing area are adequate to support the camp Male 11 Showers 10 toilets 4 urinals Female 3 female 3 toilets Watch Section and services EODESU 2 and CBMU 202 personnel will provide manning to support all watch sections Camp Czar Security Chief Camp LPO/Trouble Desk Maintenance & Fuels Team Roving Security Entry Control Point Armory (NEF & EODMU 6 only)

34 AT/FP Concept of Support
4/22/2017 AT/FP Concept of Support Concept of Support Exercise start is FPCON C Terrorist activity is imminent or has occurred Traffic routes to FOB Bogue is restricted Protective measures Controlled access/100% ID check at ECP Implement RAM Vehicle and facilities inspections Roving security patrol through out FOB 3434 UNCLASSIFIED

35 FOB Bogue ECP Main Camp Road Secured

36 FOB Bogue Security Host Nation will provide outer perimeter security for Bouge Field. CBMU 202/ESU2 personnel will provide 24 hours roving patrols and QRF (Quick Reaction Force). Group 2 MAC will respond to security incidents. 1 Entry Control Point (ECP) - Will be in place at entrance to FOB. ECP will be manned by (2) actual watch standers provided by CBMU 202/ESU2, and (1) virtual watch stander (over watch). Barbed Wire/Barricades in serpentine configuration leading to FOB, light carts will be on station for night operations.

37 FOB Bogue Security MOC Tent – Manned 24 hours. Will have barbed wire/barricades around entire perimeter with light carts for night operations. Access Control watch will be posted to vet personnel entering. Communications Tent – Manned 24 hours. Will have barbed wire/barricades in place around tent perimeter with light carts for night operations. No other security requirements required. Armory – 1 ISU shelter will be utilized for the armory. Armory will be located maintenance compound, barbed wire/barricades in place around perimeter with light carts for night operations.

38 N6 Concept of Communication Support
4/22/2017 N6 Concept of Communication Support CTG Identified Deliverables: 1. Collaboration Sites a. Unclassified APAN b. CENTRIXS Combined Maritime Forces Central Command (CMFC) c. SIPRNET Collaboration at Sea (CAS) Deliverables for APAN for CTG commands Register for an APAN account. Designate an Action Officer (work with your OPS) and send a list of person(s) needing access to the CTF956 and MSEL sites and needing access to the trusted agent’s folder. 3838 UNCLASSIFIED

39 CENTRIXS CENTRIXS CMFC Deliverables for CENTRIXS
1. The plan is for everyone to move to CENTRIXS CFMC NLT October 26th 2. If you’re unable to access CENTRIXS, SIPR CAS will be the alternative. Deliverables for CENTRIXS Determine units that do not have CENTRIXS CMFC capability.

40 SIPRNET SIPRNET CAS Deliverable for SIPR CAS
1. Units that do not have CENTRIXS capability will utilize the CTF956 collaboration site. - An automated RFI process will exist that will allow the Task Groups to RFI CTF956 (EODGRU2) before and during the Exercise. - In addition, each CTG will have an individual folder to share information with their CTUs’ on the site. (Function for IM/KM) Deliverable for SIPR CAS Register for SIP CAS account: If you have a CAS account, go to this link.

41 Voice COMMS Voice Communications (UHF/VHF/HF)
1. Adequate number of SATCOM circuits provided for the NEF by USFF 2. Primary voice circuit between CTF956 and CTG(s) we’ll be VoSIP provided by NWDC. Backup for the primary CTF956 CMD net we have a CONUS 25k IW circuit that we can use for green gear. Deliverables for Voice Nets; a. EODMU6 b. CRS-4; Provided information. c. NCHB-11 d. FDPMU e. PSU-307

42 N6 Concept of Communication Support
** CTG956.5 CRS-4 (Kharon) Mile Hammock Bay FDPMU (Hermes) Bogue Field CTF956 AFP EODGRU2 (Olympus) (P) CENTRIXS CMFC CENTVoIP (S) Classified SIPRNET CAS VoSIP VoIP (T) UNCLASS APAN Chat TACVOX (P) VoSIP (S) SATCOM Limited Commercial Phone Service ** (S) CENTRIXS CMFC CENTVoIP (P) Classified SIPRNET CAS\VoSIP\VoIP ** CTG956.4 NCHB 11 (Kronos) CTG956.3 NMCB 1 (Atlas) Gulfport MS CTG956.2 NMCB 5 (Vulcan) Port Hueneme ** CTG956.1 EODMU 6 (Nemesis) BA14 NEF Hot Date October 26th 0800 NAVEAST USFFC NWDC Norfolk ESG\2MEB

43 NECC Expetionary Force
Common Operational Picture USFF Tabor, James E II CIV USFF, N6 (757) FFC_COP1 GCCS-J 22.6.xxx.xxx CMFC COP2 CMFC COP1 USFFC EXERCISE/SIMULATION FFC C2PC GW #2 v7.0.3 C2PC GW #1 7.0.3 xxx.xxx FFC_COP2 C2PC GW #2 Radiant Mercury Mile Hammock NC CRS 4 C2PCGW Ports: IP: CTG956.5 CRS-4 C2PC_Client JEB BLDG 3509 NCTE Port Hueneme CA (TDN) Gulfport MS (TDN) Bogue Field NC EODGRU 2 C2PC_Client Ports: IP: C2PCGW CTG956.4 NCHB-11 CTG956.1 EODMU6 CTF956 CTG956.3 NMCB 5 C2PC_Client Ports: IP: C2PCGW CTG956.3 NMCB 1 C2PC_Client Ports: IP: C2PCGW EXCON ETG C2PC_Client Ports: IP: C2PCGW

44 PAO Concept of Support Active Posture
4/22/2017 PAO Concept of Support Active Posture Communication of Commander’s Intent through: Key Leader Engagement Direct Engagement External Media Operations (embeds, news releases) Internal Controlled Media (PA/MC/COMCAM assets) Key Theme: “Crisis Response across the range of military operations.” Key Message: “Improving Navy-Marine Corps amphibious core competencies along with Coalition, NATO, Allied, and partner nations is a necessary investment in the current and future readiness of our forces.” Alignment/Support: NECC/Fleet Forces/COMCAM 4444 UNCLASSIFIED

45 4/22/2017 Commander’s Comments 4545 UNCLASSIFIED

46 BACKUP

47 CTF-956 Mission Analysis Brief
26 Aug 2014 Overall Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL TO USA,MNFA 4747 UNCLASSIFIED

48 Agenda Area of Operations (AO) Initial Intelligence Estimate
Enemy COAs Higher Headquarters Mission/Intent Task Organization Command Relationships Forces Available Specified/Implied/Essential Tasks Limitations Assumptions/ IRs Proposed Initial CCIRs Risk Assessment Proposed Mission Statement Conclusions - Shortfalls/Showstoppers/Recommendations Initial Staff Estimates Commander’s Comments

49 Area of Operations (AO)
1Aug – EOM Mile Hammock Bay Bogue Field 21 Aug – 25 Aug Morehead City (Sea buoy (RADCON buoy) to Gate exit) 25 Aug – 1 Dec MSRs TBD (O/A 15 Oct) (N35 33’ W077 00’ ) Amberland School 26 Oct – EOM Water Well (N35 36’ W076 51’ )

50 10 Miles Area of Operations

51 Area of Influence Connecting Area to Area of Operations plus 3 miles out to sea within natural borders

52 10 Miles Area of Operations

53 Area of Interest (AOI) Amberland plus 40 miles north and south
Amberland plus 12 nm out to sea

54 Tropical / Nontropical Storm Tracks (Oct / Nov)
OCTOBER NOVEMBER Seasonal Discussion Hurricane Season runs from June 01st, through November 30th . The peak for tropical storm activity is normally near September 10th. CFMCC forces need to maintain situational awareness regarding the potential for tropical storm activity along the southeastern area of the Treasure Coast during this period.

55 Climatology: October Amberland

56 Climatology: November
Amberland Amberland

57 Terrain: Water table Amberland
A coastal plain is an area of flat, low-lying land adjacent to a seacoast. Physiographic Province Landtype (geomorphic setting) Average annual ground water depth Upper Coastal Plain lakes, rivers, and reservoirs 0 feet wetlands ,wet floodplains, and bays 0-5 feet flats ridges, hills, slopes, and scarps 5-15 feet Physiographic Province Ridge-to-Stream Dist ance Search Radius Upper Coastal Plain 6000 feet 10 cells

58 Proper Home for Ambertines Revolutionary Militia (PHARM)
(Asymmetric Threat) PHARM (aka Lovisa-PHARM) is a tribal Escambian Shahida fundamentalist militia. Primarily operates in Amberland, with possible cells located throughout the treasure coast. HQ Jacksonville Established to create an Ambertine- controlled and administered independent republic Objectives Drive Amber’s government out of power in favor of a PHARM approved regime Promote radical Shahida ideology through terrorism as well as political means Jacksonville, XZ Primary Leaders Supreme Leader: Peter Polva President: Aplai Onbil-Hamblit PHARM PIA

59 PHARM: Situation Composition: Primarily Lovisa guerrillas
Disposition: HQ in Jacksonville, XZ Strength: Unknown Training Status: Unknown Logistics: Unspecified Garnetian support, financial aid received from wealthy businessman Effectiveness: Historically able to force Amblerland government into negotiations Electronic Tech Data: Unknown Personalities: Peter Polva and Artis Plants Jacksonville, XZ 13 miles Bogue Field, XZ 8 miles Mile Hammock Bay, XZ

60 PIA: Situation Composition: Unknown
Disposition: Headquarters in Myrtle Beach, Amberland. Cells throughout Treasure Coast Strength: ~ active members Training Status: Unknown Logistics: Logistical network consist of warehouses Front companies and NGOs Assessed ~$120 million budget Effectiveness: Has successfully caused multimillion dollar damage to US assets Electronic Tech Data: Unknown; however, a communications company is with the group’s support network Personalities: Jibril al-Tariq, Manfred al-Tariq, Kire al-Tariq, Dr. Neiland Wascowiczk Mile Hammock Bay, XZ 102 miles Myrtle Beach, XZ

61 PIA: Capabilities & Limitations
Day & Night attacks Land & Maritime attacks Attacking hard & soft targets Military & Commercial targets Bombings and SAF Deception False documents Disguises Limitations: Finite funding Limited manpower Trained members

62 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)
PHARM Recruit through religious motivation Damage critical infrastructure to weaken national government Employs explosive devices PIA Attacks lightly defended targets Attacks targets representing ideals counter to their own ideals Blend in to their operating environment by altering their appearance Utilize fraudulent documentation for pre and post operation movements

63 Enemy Center of Gravity
PHARM COG * Lovisa Clan Support CC 1) Maintain Sizable force CR 1a) Legitimacy resulting in receptive population to their messaging 2) Maintaining logistical flows 1b) Porous border allowing for supply/personnel/training 2a) Positive control over border crossings CV Legitimacy required for messaging PIA COG * Financial Network CC 1) Funding Operations CR 1a) The ability to funnel money from front companies to illicit activities 2) Funding Training 1b) Have access to Jibril's ~120M USD 2a) Funds to purchase false documents CV Funds for activities come for legitimate sources vice illicit

64 Enemy COAs PHARM: PIA: Most Likely Most Likely Most Dangerous
Maintain intermittent asymmetrical attacks on Amberland government interest Most Dangerous Begin targeting US interest, including Bogue Field or the US Embassy, to force Amberland government into negotiations PIA: Most Likely Sporadic harassing attacks with explosives along LOCs and SLOCs to limit US and coalition freedom of movement Most Dangerous Attack employing disguises and falsified documents to gain entry to the US Embassy in order to conduct an attack employing small arms and explosives

65 CFMCC Mission Statement
NLT 1 AUG 2014, CFMCC CONDUCTS THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND AND ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS TO ESTABLISH LOCAL SECURITY, RESTORE INFRASTRUCTURE AND SUPPORT UNSCRS IN ORDER TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY. BE PREPARED TO (BPT) CONDUCT NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION (NEO) OF U.S. AND COALITION CITIZENS. BPT CONDUCT FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (FHA) OPERATIONS. BPT TO CONDUCT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT AND INTEGRATION (RSOI) OF FOLLOW-ON U.S. AND COALITION FORCES.

66 CFMCC Commanders Intent
PURPOSE. CFMCC FORCES WILL CONDUCT TSC OPERATIONS IN AMBERLAND TO INCREASE HOST NATION CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND REGIONAL STABILITY AND TO DEMONSTRATE COALITION RESOLVE AGAINST PHARM AND GARNET AGGRESSION.

67 CFMCC Commanders Intent
METHOD. THE EASTCOM TSC PROGRAM PROVIDES A VISIBLE BUT NOT AGGRESSIVE U.S. INFLUENCE IN TREASURE COAST. THE TSC PROGRAM INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING TASKS: CRITICAL MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY TO INCLUDE LANDWARD AND SEAWARD PORT AND HARBOR SECURITY AND HIGH VALUE ASSET ESCORT; C-IED OPERATIONS; CARGO HANDLING FROM BOTH EXPEDITIONARY AND FUNCTIONING PORTS; MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH COASTAL AND RIVERINE BOATS; AND INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION TO INCLUDE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONSTRUCTION. CONCEPTUALLY, THIS TSC PROGRAM WILL INCREASE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AMBERLAND CIVIL AND MILITARY FORCES AND PROVIDE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS THAT BENEFIT THE CITIZENS OF AMBERLAND. MY INTENT IS TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR HN AUTHORITY WHILE IMPROVING KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NATION. WE NEED TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES THAT WILL PRESSURE US TO LEAVE OR OTHERWISE DEGRADE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS.

68 CFMCC Commanders Intent
ENDSTATE. INCREASED SECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY IN AMBERLAND AND IMPROVED CONFIDENCE AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMBERLAND CIVILIANS AND MILITARY.

69 1 August Task Organization
UN / WFP/ IMO US EASTCOM AFEAST CTF 951 ATF CTF 952 LF AMBER/AMBERLAND COUNTRY TEAMS SOCEAST AREAST NAVEAST CTF 957 MPRG CTF 954 TASW CTF 956 NEF CTF 953 LOG MARFOREAST SPMAGTF - CR UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO/REL USA, MNFA

70 NEF Task Organization UNCLASSIFIED 4/22/2017 4/22/2017 EODMU – 30 PAX
CTF 956 NEF EODGRU2 ~73 Pax (act) PMU EODMU 6 NMCB 1 NCHB 11 CRS-4 9 pax (act) Air Det (-) CBMU 202 UCT 1 Air Cargo Co (-) EOD PLT Cargo Term Co ALPHA Co CEXC PLT Ex Support Co (-) Landward Security NMCB 5 NLD EOD PLT 10 pax (act) 54 (notional) Seaward Security UUV/VSW Air Det BRAVO Co ~640Pax (act) AS PLT 33 pax (act) Bogue 60 pax (act) MHB 249 (notional) Landward Security EODMU – 30 PAX EOD PLT – 8 PAX EACH IET 8 PAX COMCAM 6 PAX NMCB AIR DET – 89 PAX DELTA 1 113 COMCAM Seaward Security ~60 Pax (act) DELTA Co COCOM OPCON Coordination TACON TACOM Delta 1 (RCB, MK IV) Delta 2 (RPB/RAB) US Forces PSU 307 NLD Forces Landward Security VIRTUAL Seaward Security UNCLASSIFIED 70

71 Command Relationships
COMUSEASTCOM is the supported Commander USNAVFOREAST has been designated CFMCC in the EASTCOM AOR CRS-4 is supported Commander for SPOD operations at Mile Hammock Bay and Morehead City operations NMCB 1 and NMCB 5 is supported Commander for construction projects EODMU 6 is supported Commander for C-IED operations

72 CTF 956 Force Available UNIT CAP TASK PAX GEAR MODE/LOC UNCLASSIFIED
4/22/2017 CTF 956 Force Available UNIT CAP TASK PAX GEAR MODE/LOC CTF 956 (GRU2) C2 Naval Command and Control of NEF Forces in Amberland 73 (act) J04ESU(-) J04MCP Line Haul/Bogue CTG 956.1 (FDPMU) Prev Med Conduct prev med operations to sustain all forces under CTF 956 and render humanitarian aid as required 9 (act) 14 (not) FDPMU Mobile Lab CTG 956.2 (EODMU6) EOD Counter IED and underwater clearance operations 60 (act) J04MU6(-) CTG 956.3 (NMCB1) (CBMU202) (UCT 1) Vert & Horz Const Civil military operations support; water well, MSR maint, host nation public infrastructure, camp maintenance/support, underwater construction 29 (act) 122 (not) P25(-) Water Well P25FIE(-) CTG 956.4 (NMCB5) Civil military operations support; water well, MSR maint, host nation public infrastructure 3 (act) 125 (not) Com Air/Bogue CTG 956.5 (NCHB11) Port Ops Support APOD and SPOD operations ISO CTF 956. 10 (act) 54 (not) F01(-) CTG 956.6 (CRS-4) Port Sec Provide security, interdiction, point defense of critical assets. 640 (act) Port Sec Package Line Haul/MHB 7272 UNCLASSIFIED

73 Specified Tasks Specified 1: Establish NEF MOC & FOB w/ Security at Bogue, Amberland & establish comms with CFMCC, USEASTCOM Implied 1.1: Deploy to NAVEAST AOR Implied 1.2: Coordinate with NAVEAST N6 Implied 1.3: Coordinate with Interagency and Amberland Implied 1.4: Coordinate with subordinate units for embark/movement Implied 1.5: Establish C2 of assigned forces Specified 2: Establish FOB w/ Security at MHB, Amberland for Expeditionary SPOD Ops Implied 2.1: Deploy to NAVEAST AOR Implied 2.2: Coordinate with NAVEAST N6 Implied 2.3: Coordinate with Interagency and Amberland Implied 2.4: Coordinate with subordinate units for embark/movement Implied 2.5: Establish C2 of assigned forces

74 Specified Tasks Specified 3: Provide daily report/update to this HQ all military actions or movement of NEF forces inside Amberland Implied 3.1: Establish NEF Battle rhythm IAW with CFMCC Battle rhythm Implied 3.2: Establish and maintain Common Operating Picture Implied 3.3: Establish and maintain Force Structure equipment status Specified 4: NLT 10 Aug, coordinate w/ officials & conduct assessment to repair and maintain roadway along route Green. Construction should begin NLT 25 Aug with anticipated completion by 1 Dec Implied 4.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 4.2: Track status of operations and report to HHQ Implied 4.3: Coordinate with interagency and Amberland Implied 4.4: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Implied 4.5: Provide financial service support for procurement of construction materials and contracting services as required

75 Specified Tasks Specified 5: O/A 21 Aug, conduct expeditionary port ops at MHC, Amberland for offload of humanitarian supplies from MSC and international shipping and delivery to HN. Upon completion, approx 25 Aug, turnover port operations to Host Nation. Port Operations Include: Escort of U.S. Vessels; Pier Vetting; Cargo handling off U.S. Vessels; Landward and seaward security; other tasks as required to ensure the safe transit, arrival, offload and delivery to HN of Humanitarian supplies. Implied 5.1: Establish TOC IVO MHC Implied 5.2: Establish areas of operations from Sea buoy to MHC terminal gate Implied 5.3: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 5.4: Provide security for humanitarian supplies while under NEF control Implied 5.5: Perform hydrographic U/W survey to ensure safe passage of HVA IVO MHC

76 Specified Tasks Specified 6: NLT 15 OCT make coordination with appropriate officials and conduct assessment to renovate school. Implied 6.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 6.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 6.3: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Specified 7: NLT 26 Oct begin construction of a water well. Implied 7.1: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 7.2: Track status of operations and report to HHQ Implied 7.3: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 7.4: Establish and maintain appropriate Information Operations IAW CFMCC Implied 7.5: Perform water testing to certify water purification Specified 8: NLT 15 Aug conduct ISR operations along the intercoastal waterway from Mile Hammock Bay to Morehead City, Amberland. Implied 8.1: Coordinate with AFEAST/CFACC as functional component commander for air and space operations

77 Specified Tasks Specified 9: O/A conduct other maritime security operations tasks. Implied 9.1: Coordinate with Composite Warfare Commander (when required) Specified 10: BPT conduct C-IED throughout Amberland. Implied 10.1: Maintain C-IED Operations Picture Implied 10.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 10.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Implied 10.4: Perform C-IED Biometric and exploitation ISO HN C-IED efforts Specified 11: BPT conduct Non-combatant evacuation operations. Implied 11.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 11.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON Specified 12: BPT conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) operations. Implied 12.2: Coordinate with interagency and HN Implied 12.3: Establish and maintain security IAW FPCON

78 Specified Tasks Specified 13: BPT to conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of follow-on U.S. and Coalition forces. Implied 13.1: Maintain APOD and SPOD Implied 13.2: Maintain and track TPFDD of U.S. and coalition forces Implied 13.3: Coordinate with CTF 953 Specified 14: Provide CONOPS to CFMCC NLT 25 July 14 Implied 10.1: Complete Mission Analysis and COA development Specified 15: Provide interim proposed public affairs guidance (PPAG) via separate message to OASD (PA) Implied 15.1: Coordinate with CFMCC PAO Specified 16: Implement, adjust and report accordingly force protection measures appropriate to anticipate terrorist threat Implied 16.1: Maintain intelligence picture

79 Specified Tasks Specified 17: Determine pre-deployment and theater force protection training requirements. Implied 17.1: Coordinate with CFMCC AT/FP officer Specified 18: Collect on, assess, and refine priority intelligence requirements as the intelligence picture of the operation environment dictates. Implied 18.1: Maintain Intelligence picture. Specified 19: Identify and assess emergent threats to EASTCOM and host nation forces Implied 19.1: Maintain Intelligence picture. Specified 20: CFMCC conducts theater security cooperation (TSC) operations in Amberland and its territorial waters to establish local security, restore infrastructure and support UNSCRS in order to increase host nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability.

80 Operational Limitations
Restraint/Constraint Implication Construction equipment in theater is limited to initial lift. Due to the expected duration of the operations, requests for additional assets will likely not be approved. (R) Any change of project scope will change completion time and limited capacity to support additional requirements Repair parts and construction equipment limited to U.S. Equipment only (R) Can not give repair parts or equipment to HN during Mil-to-Mil engagement CFMCC TSC operations will be executed within the recognized borders of Amberland to include sea accesses. Operations within Amberland only

81 Facts PHARM operates in major urban areas within Amberland with cells located throughout the treasure coast. Garnet is supporting the PHARM in planning, logistics and recruiting/training new members to initiate an offensive campaign to destabilize the Amber and Amberland Governments. The PHARM are known to conduct small scale attacks against Army, Police, Government officials and infrastructure to erode popular support of the government. The PHARM also conducts piracy attacks and armed robbery within the territorial waters of Amberland and use the inland waters to transport and hide weapons further exacerbating the threat to international peace and security in the TCR. CFMCC theater security cooperation operations will be executed within the recognized borders of Amberland to include sea accesses. Amberland has contracted a local firm to provide outer security at Bogue Airfield and Mile Hammock Bay. The two bases don’t have dedicated military security. Contract is good for deployment duration. RSO from US Embassy highly recommends active US security posture at and around US equipment and personnel. Current FP condition is Charlie (FPCON-C).

82 Facts 7. Amberland has contracted to provide the materials for the road project and the school renovation. They have assigned government representatives to coordinate delivery and resupply of materials. 8. No mil to mil engagements have been approved by the US Embassy. All requests should be forwarded to CFMCC coordinated through the US Embassy RSO. US Forces will have civilian engagements along the intercoastal waterway and during port and airfield operations. 9.The facility at Morehead City is a deepwater commercial port with perimeter security, tugs and escorts, and HN cargo handlers (personnel and equipment). There is sufficient secure storage in vicinity of the pier. Mile Hammock Bay is a more shallow and more local port with limited seaward and landward accesses and pier equipment. Security, tugs and escorts, and cargo handlers are contracted on an as needed basis. Although there is sufficient landward storage of cargo, it is further from the off load locations and susceptible to the weather. When handling US and Coalition vessels, the US frequently augments the local security, provides escort of high value assets, and depending on the ship and cargo will either augment the HN cargo handlers or conduct offload without HN support.

83 Facts 10. The local police doesn’t have any official C-IED capability and will often destroy suspected IEDs in place or route local traffic around the area. 11. There are no intelligence assets dedicated to NEF during Phase 0. Specific collection requests may be forwarded to this HQ. 12. The US has had some SOF presence in Amberland. Individual US Military members have transitioned through the Treasure Coast region. COMUSEASTCOM and staff have conducted visits with Amberland government and military leaders. 6 US Marines serve aboard the US Embassy. Amberland military information is available in the country study. 13. US footprint in Amberland will generate interest from terrorists in the region, but no specific changes in TTPs are expected. Report all indications and warning regarding terrorist activities in Amberland. 14. There have not been any reported major attacks against soft targets in the vicinity of Bogue, MHB or MHC. Regional and local violence (verbal threats, minor crimes, looting, sporadic undirected gun fire, dog fighting) continues and can be expected.

84 Assumptions Assumption Supporting Info Requirement
1. HN will continue to provide security to their bases and major infrastructures (MHB, MHC, Bogue Field) Will HN continue security to their bases and major infrastructures 2. HN will provide limited support Services i.e. fuel, water, food, berthing at (MHB, MHC, Bogue Field) What support services will HN provide to NEF 3. HN has construction materials available to support NEF Phase 0 projects What construction materials are available to support NEF projects 4. The HN and majority of civilian populace within our Area of Influence will support U.S and Coalition increased footprint in Amberland What is the U.S. Embassy assessment of increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland

85 Requests for Information (RFI)
Info Requested Response 1. Will HN continue security to their bases and major infrastructures 2. What support services will HN provide to NEF 3. What construction materials are available to support NEF projects 4. What HN units will support Mil-to-Mil engagement for construction projects and what are their capacity and capability 5. What port facility equipment does the HN provided at MHC and MHB 6. What HN units will support Mil-to-Mil engagement for C-IED and what are their capacity and capability

86 Requests for Information (RFI)
Info Requested Response 7. What intelligence assets are available from CFMCC 8. Which units will provide NEF security during Mil-to-Mil events 9. Will HN provide dedicated security to NEF for movement outside established FOB 10. Will PHARM adapt/change TTPs based on increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland 11. What Friendly forces have been operating in Amberland for the last 6 months 12. What is the U.S. Embassy assessment of increased U.S. and Coalition footprint in Amberland 13. Has there been any attacks against “soft” targets (NGOs) IVO Bogue, MHC, MHB

87 Proposed Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs)
1. PIR-An Increase of local population support to terrorist groups 2. PIR-Emerging trends in implementing IEDs 3. PIR-Terrorist activity interfering with operations in the NEF AO 4. PIR-Terrorist activity targeting NEF personnel 5. PIR-Movement of terrorist personnel and equipment 6. FFIR-Change to LAD 7. FFIR-Change to ROE 8. FFIR-Change to Host Nation Support 9. FFIR- Inability of units to start/complete task as directed

88 RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION
Risk to Mission HAZARD/THREAT ASSESSED RAC RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION REVISED RAC SUPERVISION Withdraw of Host Nation Support D, I = 3 Maintain good international relationship with HN D, II = 4 US government leadership Asymmetric attack B, I = 1 Maintain aggressive security posture Utilize intelligence assets to predict potential attacks B, II = 2 NEF leadership NEF N2 Inclement weather B, III = 3 Utilize most accurate and up-to-date weather prediction models available B, IV = 4 N2 METOC Civil Unrest C, II = 3 Ensure forces receive comprehensive cultural awareness and sensitivity training Maintain good relationships with civilian populace C, III = 4 All personnel Change in TTPs of enemy forces A, I = 1 Utilize intelligence assets to predict potential changes in TTP A, II = 1 I II III IV 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D Probability Severity RAC 1 – CRITICAL 2 – SERIOUS 3 – MODERATE 4 – MINOR 5 - NEGLIGIBLE A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur Probability I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal Threat, no impact to mission success Severity

89 RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION
Risk to Forces HAZARD/THREAT ASSESSED RAC RISK CONTROLS & MITIGATION REVISED RAC SUPERVISION Medicinal threat C, II = 3 Ensure all forces receive appropriate immunizations and are in a medically deployable status prior to deployment Maintain a fully-staffed and equipped medical facility in theater C, III = 4 NEF Medical NEF leadership Inclement weather B, III = 3 Utilize most accurate and up-to-date weather prediction models available N2 METOC Civil Unrest Ensure forces receive comprehensive cultural awareness and sensitivity training Maintain good relationships with civilian populace All personnel Change in TTPs of enemy forces A, I = 1 Utilize intelligence assets to predict potential changes in TTP A, II = 1 NEF N2 I II III IV 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D Probability Severity RAC 1 – CRITICAL 2 – SERIOUS 3 – MODERATE 4 – MINOR 5 - NEGLIGIBLE A: Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time B: Probably will occur C: May occur in time D: Unlikely to occur Probability I: May cause death, loss of facility/asset, mission failure II: May cause severe injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation III: May cause minor injury, illness, property damage, mission degradation IV: Minimal Threat, no impact to mission success Severity

90 CTF 956 Proposed Mission Statement
O/A 1 Aug 2014, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Group TWO (FWD) deploy as CTF 956 (NEF Commander) and establish a secure Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and Forward Operating Base (FOB) at Bogue and Mile Hammock Bay. CTF 956 will conduct theatre security cooperation operations in Amberland and its territorial waters to establish local security, restore infrastructure, and support UNSCRs in order to increase Host Nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability. CTF 956 will be prepared to conduct humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuation operations and reception, staging, onward-movement and integration (RSO&I) for follow on U.S. and Coalition forces

91 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Purpose: Strengthen existing relations with Amberland and reduce popular support for radical ideology. Reinforce the legitimacy of the Ambertine government in the eyes of the people in order to increase host nation capacity, capabilities and regional stability, and demonstrate coalition resolve against PHARM and Garnet aggression.

92 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Method: I intend to accomplish our mission by leveraging the full spectrum of CTF 956 theatre security cooperation and humanitarian assistance capability. The NEF TSC program provides a visible but not aggressive U.S. influence in treasure coast. The TSC program includes but is not limited to the following tasks: critical maritime infrastructure security to include landward and seaward port and harbor security and high value asset escort; C-IED operations; cargo handling from both expeditionary and functioning ports; maritime security operations with coastal and riverine boats; infrastructure construction to include horizontal and vertical construction. We will partner with our host nation counterparts at all levels during the planning process and give them the lead during the execution phase of all initiatives, projects, training, and operations of their government’s relationship with the world community. Demonstrate coalition support for Amberland authority while improving key infrastructure in the nation. We need to protect ourselves from terrorist activities that will pressure us to leave or otherwise degrade our relationship with the legitimate governments.

93 CTF 956 Proposed Commander’s Intent
Endstate: Increased local Ambertine capacity and capability to provide security and infrastructure support to their nation.

94 Initial Staff Estimates
N-1- Manning Facts/Current Status: Lack of C2PC operators and air planners, lack of religious service Issues: Manning shortfalls, No religious service available during BA Conclusions/Recommendations: Submit augmentation message to USFF ISO BA14 augmentation. Offer ex-scenario event on Sunday to perform religious services at CL N-2- Intelligence Facts/Current Status: Garnet provides supplies, arms, ammunition to Lovisa Clan; Anti-Government demonstrations throughout Amberland; Ji’Stern Militia supporting PHARM (rearm-refit); PHARM employing explosive devices. Issues/Requirements: ICOP not fully operational; Need NEF collection plan. Conclusions/Recommendations: None.

95 Initial Staff Estimates
N-3- Operations Facts/Current Status: Developing Phase 0 CONOPS, Movement plan Issues: NMCB task and location Conclusions/Recommendations: Work with CFMCC on determining actual location of task. MSR IVO Jacksonville, XZ N-4- Sustainment Facts/Current Status: Services support requires confirmation from MAW and MARHQ. Access to Class 8 will be minimal, requires reach back to HQ. Issues: Class 1 sourcing (MARHQ) Conclusions/Recommendations: Solidify support from Marine HQ to NEF for Class 1, 3, and support services.

96 Initial Staff Estimates
N6- Communications Architecture and Status Facts/Current Status: operational status of communications circuits and command, control, communications, computers & intelligence (C4I) systems; bandwidth allocation; communications paths for various C2 functions; planned outages and degradations Issues: Shortfalls, show-stoppers, and major concerns Conclusions/Recommendations: Projected C4I systems and communications status during operations, impact of loss or degradation of C4I systems or communications PAO- Facts/Current Status: Manning reduction, cultural preparedness, morale. Issues: Loss of connectivity, greater embed demand than can be accommodated, equipment failures/shortages Conclusions/Recommendations: Ensure higher echelon support, redundancy in equipment/connectivity where possible

97 4/22/2017 Commander’s Comments 9797 UNCLASSIFIED


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