Presentation on theme: "Copy and Save this Template to your Syndicate Folder !!! For the backbrief save file in: S:\M-4-92\STUDENT FOLDER\ALLSYN\01. Presentation drop- box Use."— Presentation transcript:
Copy and Save this Template to your Syndicate Folder !!! For the backbrief save file in: S:\M-4-92\STUDENT FOLDER\ALLSYN\01. Presentation drop- box Use the following naming convention: SYN# Phase 3 DEL
4 This template is in line with the processes outlining Phase 3 as presented in Chapter 4 but does not strictly adhere Appendix 1 to Annex H of the COPD V1.0 dated 17 Dec 10. As annotated in Appendix 1, the template is illustrative only – actual briefing requirements are determined by the Commander. This template is intended to assist you with preparation of the mission analysis briefing, but you are not expected to adhere to it rigidly. Feel free to: –Add slides where you feel important items of analysis have been omitted –Delete slides about which you have no significant analysis to brief –Modify slides to facilitate your own presentation style Remember to make adjustments to agenda slides as necessary to support modifications. Be cognizant of the size/length of the brief – presenting more material is not necessarily conducive to a clearer operational picture ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (1 of 2)
5 Items in GREEN text are administrative notes or instructions which should be deleted prior to the presentation of the briefing. Refers to information in the notes page below. Delete prior to presentation. Items in BLACK represent information from the Zoran Sea scenario that has been input for your benefit and header information BLUE RED has been used for the classification in the header/footer and to highlight key points within your analysis Slides in light blue background require student inputs. You may reset to white for backbrief. ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (2 of 2)
6 Logistic Input into Mission Analysis
Purpose To provide the Resource Director/JOPG LOG Rep an overview of the logistics input into the Mission/Operational Analysis of the JOPG.
Agenda Key Factors Critical Logistics Requirements Assumptions Limitations Center of Gravity Inputs Risks Effects/Actions CCIRs Initial Force Estimate Estimate of Required Logistic Capabilities C2 Deployment Timeline Proposed Planning Guidance Conclusion
FactorDeductionConclusion Predeployment & deployment to SAG, PER & AUR. Different deployment in respect of time & place. Between STRATLIFT & SROM to AUR security of extensive LOC need. Planning through all options in a complex environment. SPACE Provision of small SA (s) in PER FORCE M&T capabilities +++ TIME CCIR Break or block of LOC RFI... CC Force multiplyers CR FP for RSOM ++ (Kama Sea LOC) CV LOC in Kama Sea threat by mines Key Factors and Deduction Time/Space/Force/Information
FactorDeductionConclusion Forward stage will be limited to SAG & Kama Sea. 1 APOD and 2 SPOD in PER Only 1 APOD in AUR LLOC plan to carry troops and materiel flow SPACE LLOC to cover the onwards movement FORCE M&T capabilities +++ TIME.... CCIR Break or block of LLOC RFI APOD/SPOD capabilities CC High readiness and availability of M&T CR Freedom of movement in PER, AUR CV APOD/SPOD capabilities LLOC blocked or stalled Key Factors and Deduction Time/Space/Force/Information
FactorDeductionConclusion Sustain pos for 6 months until FOF deployment Provisions (contracts, employment, etc) for 6 months support for 6 months Ensure LOC operable for 6 months SPACE Excessive storage in SAG FORCE M&T ++ TIME … CCIR... RFI HNS capabilities/capacities CC... CR M&T availability CV... Key Factors and Deduction Time/Space/Force/Information
12 FactorDeductionConclusion LOG minimum footprint Increase HNS Contract heavy spt Bi/Multi lateral NSE cooperation SPACE LLOC to cover the onwards movement FORCE NSPA involvement in the Predeployment TIME Phase I early stage CCIR … RFI HNS capabilities CC... CR Freedom of movement in PER, AUR CV PER, AUR HNS capabilities in Class I AUR collapse Key Factors and Deduction Time/Space/Force/Information
13 FactorDeductionConclusion AURThe implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance. What is the significance of the factor? The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis. What can or should be done? Fit each into a category below FS Timeline Action CCIR RFI CC CR CV Key Factors and Deduction Time/Space/Force/Information
14 Critical Logistics Requirements
15 Logistics Planning Assumptions List any assumptions that you have made during your analysis of key factors Remember that assumptions must be: –Logical –Realistic –Necessary - Planning can not continue unless an assumption is made –Valid – if assumption turns out to be false, framework of problem would have to be readdressed.
16 LIMITATIONS CONSTRAINTS (Must Do)RESTRAINTS (Can’t Do) Identify Constraints and Restraints from SSA, MRO, SPD and list those with Operational and Logistics impacts
NATO UNCLASSIFIED 17 Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions? Centre of Gravity: What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his operational objectives (to be targeted in an opponent and protect in a friend)? Critical Capabilities: What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation? Critical Vulnerabilities: What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised? Critical requirements: What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, or relationships with other actors? Conclusions: Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences could be exploited to change the capabilities and behaviour of the actor and improve conditions in the operational environment?
NATO UNCLASSIFIED 18 Alliance Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: deter VUL, assist AUR in disrupting BLA and in re- establishing internal security, set conditions for NEO, provide FoM for UN HA. Centre of Gravity: CJTF Critical Capabilities: 1. ability to deter VUL 2. ability to train AUR/PER 3. ability to disrupt BLA (ourselves) 4. ability to create a SASE 5. ability to sustain ourselves 6. ability to coordinate with external partners Critical Vulnerabilities: - Extensive LOCs - Limited APOD/SPOD capability - Weather cond in winter - Degradation of Humanitarian situation Critical requirements: - 1-6: C : FOA : strategic deployment secured (within JOA) - RSOM-I in place - 5: sustainment - 6: robust liaison & training capacity Conclusions:CJTF effectiveness depends on early activation/availability of Strategic assets, sourcing of force package and intelligence data. Furthermore, protection of APOD/SPOD is critical.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED UN Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Security for UN refugees camps and maintain flow of HA. Centre of Gravity: UNMA Humanitarian Mission Critical Capabilities: 1 Act with legitimacy 2 Intervene in critical area Critical Vulnerabilities: 2 a 1 Force Protection not adequate 2 b 1 LOC not secured 2 c 1 APOD not available Critical requirements: 1 a UN SC Resolutions 2 a Force protection (UNSECFORA) 2 b Freedom of movement 2 c Access to APOD/SPOD Conclusions: Intervene with force protection, secure LOC and reopen Capella Airport.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED AURIGA Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: preserve its territorial integrity and stability Centre of Gravity: Security forces Critical Capabilities: 1 Mantain control of its territory 2 Cooperate with PER Security Forces 3 Defeat BLA 4 Protect DPREs 5 Control of critical infrastructures Critical Vulnerabilities: 1 a 1 Moral 3 a 1 Lack of Training 3 b 1 Credibility 3 b 2 Cohesion Critical requirements: 1 a FoM 1 b High mobility/terrain Equipment 3 a COIN TTPs 3 b Effective C2 4 a Logistics Conclusions: Keep working on AUR specific training, strengthening logistic capacity, establishing FoM, supporting them in fighting BLA and in keeping the territorial integrity.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED PERSEUS Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Maintain the control of the territory and sustain AUR in containing BLA Centre of Gravity: Security Forces Critical Capabilities: 1 Defeat BLA 2 Support Auriga 3 Maintain its territorial integrity 4 Protect energy infrastructures 5 Maintain population support Critical Vulnerabilities: 1 a 1 Air Defence Force weakness 1 a 2 Limited numbers of modern weapons systems 2 b 1 Low military readiness 2 b 2 Lack of Training 5 a 1 Control of HA and of DPREs flow Critical requirements: 1 a COIN TTPs 2 a Logistics 2 b Capable Fighting Force 4 a Access to SPOE/SPOD 5 a International ties Conclusions: Increase Security Forces capabilities IOT defeat BLA and obtain a better control of the territory.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Batari National Movement Centre of Gravity Analysis Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: to create an ethnically pure BATARI state. Centre of Gravity: BLA Fighters Critical Capabilities: 1 Capability to attack refugees camp. 2 Control of etnhic batari area 3 Expel non BATARI people 4 Destabilise AURIGA 5 Acting as insurgency Critical Vulnerabilities: 2 a 1 FOM in Kandar Valley 2 a 2 Differencies in council 3 1 Support/recruitment people 4 a 1 Financial resources (VUL/ Crime Organization) 4 a 2 VUL supply lines a Cellphone network Critical requirements: 1 a Weapons 1 b FOM 2 a Support of tribal council 4 a VUL support/logistic/training/ safe heavens 5 a C2 (1c) a Communications (all) Conclusions: Prevent destabilization actions in AUR performed by BLA, cutting VUL support. The operation will focus on limiting FOM mainly in the Kandar valley and decreasing C2 capabilities. Conduct INFO operations IOT exploit council differences and gain population support to limit the effects of hostile propaganda.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Assessed Aim and desired Outcome : Political, economic and military dominance of the Zoran Sea region in order to achieve regional hegemony. Centre of Gravity : VUL Intervention Forces Critical Capabilities: 1 Deny/delay NATO’s access to the region 2 Deter/ threaten Alliance forces/ Partners 3 Directly intervene into AUR/PER 4 Support the BLA (use as proxy org.) Critical Vulnerabilities: 3 a 1 Limited avenues of approach to AUR/PER 3 b 1 Logistics and sustainment of long term operations 3 b 2 Simultaneous ops (AUR/PER) (3c) 3 b 3 LOCs and links (phys/influence) with BLA (4a) 3 c 1 Joint C2 structure and not capable for efficient joint operations a Energy exports (In case of VUL’s intervention embargo should be applied- UNSCR) Critical requirements: 1&2 Submarines, mines, SOF, Air force 2 a TBMs, WMD (Counter WMD, TBMs capabilities required) 2 b Aggressive Government (Deterrence required, PsyOps ) 3 a Armoured land forces 3 b Operational sustainment (logistics, reinforcement) 3 c Effective C2 4 a Training, bases and equipments for the BLA 4 b Effective supply chain (LLOCs) a Dependence on energy/drugs exports Conclusions: Prevent VUL from hampering our deployment to the Kama Sea (particularly with their maritime component) in coordination with SAG. TBMD may be vital should VUL launch a TBM attack. Cutting the support (physical links and influence) to BLA will prevent VUL’s proxy to act effectively. Should VUL armed forces attack, operations should focus on limited logistics capacity and joint C2 to degrade ability to conduct/continue operations. Furthermore, military reactions should include the interdiction of their LOCs to prevent resupplies thereby further reducing their sustainment. VUL Centre of Gravity Analysis
24 Operational Risks Operational Risk Assessment: Risk Name SourceConsequence forSeverityProbability - Actions of the opponent(s). - Actions of friendly forces. - Operational environmental factors. - Overall mission - Line of operation - Decisive Points - Desired effect. Extremely high - could result failure to accomplish mission. High - could result in failure to accomplish one or more objectives. Moderate - could result in failure to meet criteria for success or exceed time, space, forces/actors limits Low - minimal impact on mission accomplishment Select one & Delete rest for presentation) - High - Moderate - Low (Select 1 & Delete rest) Risk Management Can we neutralise the source? Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk? Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence? Can we reduce the probability of occurrence? Conclusion Unacceptable - risk management cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level! Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to: Modify force disposition/posture/composition. Adjust current operations. Prepare branch plan or sequel. Acceptable, no risk management actions required
Logistics Input into Operational Design Review the following 4 slides from the JOPG Review and evaluate the DC/Effects –Has the JOPG gotten this right? If not…what are your inputs? What are the Key actions logisticians will have to take to support the effects and DCs?tional Design? Keep them broad and focus on the most important actions.
Objectives MSO 1. Prevention of further escalation and widening of the Zoran Sea conflict; MSO 2. Uninterrupted international access to the region and its resources; MSO 3. Support Aurigan efforts to achieve and maintain a safe and secure environment. MSO 4. Enable safe delivery of humanitarian aid and access to DPRE camps. MSO 5. Deter Vulpecula. MSO 6. Isolate BLA Insurgency OO 1. Contribute to the deterrence of Vulpecula OO 2. Assist Auriga in defeating any external aggression OO 3. Assist Auriga to re-establish internal security OO 4. Provide for the freedom of movement for UN humanitarian activities OO 5. Enable freedom of access to the region and its energy resources BPT 1. Set the conditions for NEO BPT 2. Conduct interdiction operations in support of a potential embargo BPT 3. Support PER to maintain / re-establish territorial integrity For Reference Only
Deter&DefeatDeter&Defeat Deter&DefeatDeter&Defeat ALLIANCE CoG ALLIANCE CoG Initial Deployment Early DeploymentDeployment & ShapingSASEHandover Internation al peace and security in the Zoran Sea region is restored with full implement ation of all UNSC resolutions, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Alliance partners is preserved. VUL CoG VUL CoG OO1 OO2 OO3 OO4 COINCOIN COINCOIN FoMFoM FoMFoM UN CoG UN CoG AUR CoG AUR CoG PER CoG PER CoG MSO1 MSO2 MSO3 MSO6 MSO5 OO5 G-Day D + 30 D MSO OE:8 OE: 9,10 OE: 11,12 OE: 13,14 OE: 1 OE: 5 OE: 18 OE: 15,16 OE 17 OE:19 OE: 20 OE: 21 OE: 2,3,4 OE: BPBP 1212 BPT3 BPT1 BPT2 BLA CoG BLA CoG For Reference Only
Deter & Defeat VUL deterred AUR SF trained Terrorist activity mitigated AUR SF capable of independent ops Freedom of Movement VUL naval forces contained LLOCs secured HA delivered without interruption Critical nodes secured Decisive Conditions – By LoO COIN SLOCs secured CIA open & operational GoA stabilized BLA fractured BLA isolated SASE established in AUR GoA – Bataris dialogue established Branch plan VUL offensive operations ceased AUR territorial integrity re-established PER territorial integrity re-established For Reference Only
Effects to be Achieved : For Reference Only NrEffectLOO 1 LOO 2 LOO 3 1VUL SF returned to peace locationsX 2AUR police trainedX 3AUR border control trainedX 4AUR army trainedX 5Terrorist attacks decreasedX 6AUR army conduct ops without assistanceX 8VUL threats on SLOCs neutralizedXX 9BLA attacks on CIA ceasedXX 10Civ/Mil traffic restoredX 11Public support increasedX 12Public services providedX 13Hardliners & Moderates separatedX 14Tribal council spt to BLA decreasedX 15Tribal council spt to BLA stoppedX 16FoM for BLA deniedX 17BLA attacks in Kandar Valley decreasedX 18Comms between GoA and tribal council establishedX 19LOCs attacks reducedXXX 20Attacks on HA actors decreasedX 21Attacks on pipelines decreasedX
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Commanders' Critical Information Requirements CCIR NATO - UN 1. READINESS NATO JF 2. ACHIVEMENT OF FULL OPS CAPABILITY (NRF + FOLLOW ON FORCES ) 3. REQUIREMENT OF ACTIVATION OR USAGE OF OPERATIONAL RESERVE 4. LOSS OF CRITICAL ASSETS/CAPABILITIES (tbd) 5. SPOD AND APOD UNDER ATTACK 6. ATTACK ON NATO SECURITY FORCES/FACILITIES 7. KIDNAPPING OF NATO SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL AND VIPs 8. ATTACK ON UN ASSETS/FACILITIES OR REFUGEE CAMPS CCIR AURIGA AND PERSEUS 1. GOA COLLAPSE; 2. CIA UNAVAILABLE; 3. ATTACK SPOD IN PERSEUS; 4. ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES; 5. GOA/GOP SECURITY FORCES NOT ABLE TO CONTRAST BLA; 6. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DETERIORED; 7. AURIGA/PERSEUS ATTACKED.
31 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Agenda: Initial Force Estimate Estimate of Required Capabilities Preliminary C2 Arrangements
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Initial Force Estimate For Reference Only
NATO UNCLASSIFIED JLSG HQ JLSG HQ Sp Unit JLSG HQ FP Coy Supply Bn HQ Ammo Storage Supply Coy Water Purification Unit POL Supply Coy Field Warehousing Coy Supply and Field Service Coy (mx) Medical Log Coy Role 3 Medical Facility MOVCON Teams RSOM HQ Staging Area Support Unit JLSG JLSG HQ LOG BASE RSOM Cargo Truck Coy Ground Transport. HQ POL Truck Coy Water Truck Coy Heavy Equipment Transport Coy Gen Support Eng Coy POL Facility Const Unit Cargo Transfer Unit MOVCON Center GROUND TRANSPORTATION SPOD Sea Port Ops Coy Initial Force Estimate JLSG APOD AirPort Ops Coy Convoy Support Centers Force Protection Unit For Reference Only
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Logistics Required Capabilities Identify and highlight any significant differences between required operational capabilities based on the mission analysis and the force capability requirements provided in the Strategic Planning Directive/Initial Force Estimate. Provide assessment on the forces required. What gaps in capabilities have you identified between what is available and what actions- effects logisticians will have to create?
NATO UNCLASSIFIED Portray your initial concept for the organization of the Joint Force. Determine TOO/JOA requirements. Determine required C2 functions and locations. Determine critical liaison and coordination requirements. Include NSEs in C2 arrangements Include Role Specialist Nation & Lead Nation designations Preliminary C2 Arrangements
37 Deployment Timeline
38 Agenda: Proposed Planning Guidance Tentative Missions for Subordinate Commands Requests for SHAPE
39 Draft mission statement for the JLSG. Be sure to include the following: Who, What, When, Where, & Why…plus the assigned objectives. See Page 11 of SPD for an example from the COM JFC Naples mission statement. Tentative Mission for Component (JLSG)
40 Develop requests, requirements and issues that require action at the strategic level such as: –Requests for additional Crisis Response Measures (CRMs). –ROE requests. –Requests for Information –Pre-conditions for success. –Force requirements. Requests for SHAPE
41 CONCLUSION Provide any additional conclusions that are essential for the JFC to fully comprehend the operational problem to be solved or the specific operational conditions that must be achieved.