1. Waiting for Democracy: The Politics of Choice and Recognition

2. Representation, Citizenship and the Public Domain: Institutional Choice in Decentralization Jesse C. Ribot Equity, Poverty & Environment Group Institutions and Governance Program World Resources Institute

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5.  Research Program on Democratic Decentralization  Project  Main findings  New Research Programs  Commodity Chain Analysis as a Policy Tool  Institutional Choice and Recognition  Institutional Choice and Recognition Today’s Talk

6. Power Transfers Defining Decentralization Central Government Ministries: -Health -Environment -Education…. Democratic Local Government Administrative Local Authority Customary Authority NGO PVO CBO Donors Big NGOs Individual or Corporation Democratic Decentralization Deconcentration (Administrative Decentralization) Privatization Hybrids? 3rd Sector Government Non-market Privatization Decentralization Not Decentralization Public-Private Spectrum Private Public Participation Contracts & Delegations

7. Theoretical Mechanisms of Decentralization Benefits Advertised Benefits  Enfranchisement, Equity, Efficiency, Development, Better Management, Better Service Delivery, Benefit retention Mechanisms  Local Authorities are believed to:  Better match services to needs and aspirations (public choice theory)  Reduce transaction costs (new institutional econ) by proximity allowing:  Mobilizing local knowledge and skills for collective/public good  Mobilizing local labor for collective projects  Improved coordination among local programs  Balance of negative and positive outcomes in decision making (economic theory of “internalizing externalities”)  ALL IMPLY INCLUSION MECHANISM: REPRESENTATION *With* POWERS

8. REPRESENTATION Preferences Signals Mandates PoliciesOutcomes ResponsivenessAccountability Sanctions = Responsiveness &/or Accountability

9. Elements of Effective Decentralization Positive Outcomes are Expected from:  Local Institutions  Actors  Entrusted with Powers (executive, legislative, judicial: discretion+capabilities to exercise them)  That are Accountable to the Local Population [Representation is  integrative mechanisms in rural development]

10. Central Government Ministries: -Health -Environment -Education…. Democratic Local Government Administrative Local Authority Customary Authority NGO PVO CBO Donors Big NGOs Individual or Corporation Democratic Decentralization Deconcentration Privatization Non-market Privatization Participation ? Local Populations ?? Power Transfer Accountability Contracts & Delegations

11. Central Government Ministries: -Health -Environment -Education…. Democratic Local Government Administrative Local Authority Customary Authority NGO PVO CBO Donors Big NGOs Individual or Corporation Democratic Decentralization Deconcentration Privatization Non-market Privatization Participation ? Local Populations ?? Power Transfer Ability to Sanction Contracts & Delegations

12. What Happens in Practice? Power Choices in Practice Choice of Institutions in Practice

13. Institutional Choices in Practice  Local democratic institutions rarely empowered.  Elected local institutions, when chosen, are often not democratic.  Deconcentration to local branches of forest departments most common.  Privatization of public resources in the name of Decentralization very common:  Hunting in Senegal and Namibia  Forests to individuals and chiefs in Mali and Uganda  Land to individuals in South Africa  NGOs and community groups being chosen by donors—even where there are democratic local authorities  Competition with & de-legitimating of local democracy-[Bee-keepers in Uganda]  Proliferation of Committees, PVOs and NGOs since 90s  Institutional “pluralism” undermining democracy [pluralism is good, but it must be subordinated to representative authorities]  Participatory Processes in lieu of working with elected local authorities  Customary authority being chosen as if representative. Many of these choices take legitimacy and powers from local democratic authorities, and are used to mobilize rather than enfranchise.

14. Choice of Powers in Practice  Only a few cases discretionary powers (domain of democracy)  Fiscal resources (eg Cameroon) & some allocation decisions  Non-commercial subsistence resources transferred  Powers to allocate lucrative resources retained  Mandates: the odium of management, dominate transfers  Some funded  Most unfunded—NRM not viewed as labor  Forced labor for tree planting still included in Ugandan laws  Draconian mgt. Planning required for communities [although NOT usually necessary  double standards applied]  Local use often not ecological problem, but requires elaborate plans  Concessions get to operate with few regulations  Access to resource exchanged for labor to implement plans—participatory corvee in Senegal, Cameroon, Zimbabwe CBNRM programs  Donors and NGOs needed to assist planning  Means of transfer problem—rights vs. Privileges  Most are insecure  Secure means of transfer  legitimacy, security, stability over time

15. These choices constitute Government Tactics resisting decentralization  Choice of Institutions  Resisting Power Transfers

16. Government Tactics for Retaining Powers—Resisting Transfers Justifications for Central Control  Specious Capacity Arguments  Poor skills, ignorance, illiteracy, anarchic exploitation, etc. [Often wrong since the planning that the skills are needed for is not necessary.]  Scientistical arguments claiming need for technical skills.  [It appears that Capacity FOLLOWS power. Capacity should not be an excuse.]  Over blown Risk Management Arguments  Threats to forests – These arguments are clearly false in the Sahel  Threats of violence – There is no evidence that decentralization has caused increased violence in African contexts—however, it looks like it has shifted tensions from corporations to local government in Cameroon. In Indonesia, however, I understand there has been conflict from devolution (Resosudarmo)  National Good Arguments—claiming that the natural resources belong to the nation as a whole Methods for Central Control  Overbearing oversight and approval processes smother independence  Capacity and planning contingencies that delay or disable transferring power—You get powers if…  Requirement of management plans—not needed and overly complex [Double standards w.r.t. concessions]  Transfer of obligations and burdens, making elected bodies into administrators  Conflation of technical with political decisions—that is, who should get access is political. What trees should be protected is technical. Forest Services conflate the two, keeping allocation decisions as if they were a technical matter.  Reduction of local domain (deterritorialization) via 1) reserves creation, 2) privatization to individuals and customary authorities  Devolution only where forests already degraded (wasteland…) [retention of lucrative areas]  Selective application and non-application of laws

17. Government Tactics for Retaining Power—Institutional Choice  Devolution to upwardly accountable bodies  Making elected authorities upwardly accountable;  Institutional proliferation and use of controllable authorities and committees;  Technical and fiscal capacity arguments  Legitimacy Arguments that say “customary authorities” are legitimate.  Conflation of technical and political

18. Getting the Institutions Right?  Decentralization theory is an IF-THEN proposition [out of new institutionalism]  If we have the right institutions with the right powers  Then we get all these positive outcomes  But we’re not getting to ‘IF’ in most cases  New institutionalism is being stomped out by a larger set of political-economic forces [Sort of like “Bambi Meets Godzilla”]

19. New Institutionalism Meets Political Economy

20. CONCLUSIONS What are we doing about it? Better Match Policy to protect procedural objectives of democracy against instrumental sectoral objectives Powers: Subsidiarity/Standards Actors & Accountability: Institutional Choice New Research Program: If states resist via institutional choices: lets understand those choices and their effects.

21. Recommendations Section

23. Principles of Institutional Choice  Choose democratic local institutions where they exist; Call for them where they do not  Scrutinize and re-design local electoral processes to make elected bodies democratic  Choose and focus on fewer institutions.  Nest institutions so that any institution with powers over “public” or collective resources is subordinated to democratic authorities  NGOs, Local administrative authorities, Local forest services, customary authorities should be accountable to local elected authorities  Disciplining effect of just hierarchy  Do not transfer public powers to private institutions  Use Participation as a tool not a substitute for local democracy  Inclusion of marginal groups….  Use committees as tools within democratic structures not in place of them

24. Central Government Ministries: -Health -Environment -Education…. Democratic Local Government Administrative Local Authority Customary Authority NGO/ PVO CBO Committees Individual or Corporation Ideal Accountability of Institutions Power Transfer Accountability Local Populations

25. Subsidiarity Principles  Focus on creating local discretion  Devolve lucrative opportunities  Separate technical from political decisions— devolve political decisions.  Shift oversight and approval to a legal control model—function of forest service to assure compliance with laws, not to approve every decision.  Keep in mind that capacity follows power  Use taxation of resource to retain value [must set at higher level—do not only give locals revenues from fines.]  Shift from Planning to Minimum Standards [next]

26. Subsidiarity Principles II Limits and Context of Powers  Shift to uniform minimum standards from a planning approach  Planning not needed  Standards needed  Delimit Space of Discretion  Eliminate double standards between communities and corporations  [That much forest management being required of local communities by forest services is unnecessary is unthinkable—gather the data to make it thinkable!]  Incentives—local people do not choose to invest in the environment  Treat NRM investments as other public works—pay labor  Project solutions—reduce co-pay, pair projects, green windows

27. Framework for Future Analysis  Representation  Means of Transfer  Empowering Representation  Mix of Institutions  Citizenship and Belonging  Residency  Interest  Identity  Public Domain  Maintaining public space  Enclosure through privatization and desecularization  Public Domain  Representation and Belonging

28. The End