The State Evaluation Process Therese Renis Section Head Division of Operations B Department of Safeguards 08 February 2007

2 Outline IAEA Safeguards – past and present Strengthening the Safeguards System The Model Additional Protocol

3 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime Global, Regional and Bilateral Agreements Export GuidelinesPhysical Protection International Safeguards Control of the supply of nuclear and non-nuclear material, technology and equipment Protection from seizure, theft and criminal activities International Safeguards

4 IAEA safeguards inspectors verify States’ compliance with their Safeguards Agreements Safeguards implemented in 153 States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (based on INFCIRC/153 Corr.) in force Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreements (nuclear weapon States) Item-specific Safeguards Agreements (based on INFCIRC/66)

5 Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements (INFCIRC/540) New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May Provides Agency with more rights of access to information and to locations in a State. Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement. As of 1 February 2007, additional protocols (AP) have been approved by the Board for 118 States and 78 States have APs in force.

6 Safeguards conclusions are reported in the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) … the declared nuclear material and other items remained in peaceful nuclear activities … For States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols: … all nuclear material remained in peaceful nuclear activities … For States with safeguards agreements:

7 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear programme consistent? Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned nuclear programme complete? Is there sufficient information available on which to draw a conclusion? The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

8 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information

9 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information CSAs focus on verification of declared nuclear material and facilities

10 IAEA Board of Governors March 1995 “...the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.” Safeguards strengthening measures were needed.

11 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information

12 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information Some strengthening measures could be introduced under existing safeguards agreements

13 Strengthened Measures under Inspections Unannounced/short-notice inspections Remote monitoring Environmental sampling Enhanced cooperation with SSACs or regional systems Early provision of facility design information

14 Additional Information Requested from States Under INFCIRC/153 Information on closed-down and decommissioned facilities Information on past activities Voluntarily-Offered Responses to State System of Accountancy and Control (SSAC) questionnaires Periodic reporting on exports and imports of sensitive equipment and non-nuclear material Holdings and exports of separated americium and neptunium Response to Agency requests for further information

15 State evaluation includes the use of open and other sources of information IAEA information Scientific and technical literature Academic and research institutions Trade publications Newspapers/radio/television/magazine reports Satellite imagery Third party sources

16 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements Is all relevant information on the State’s nuclear programme consistent? Is the “picture” of the State’s present and planned nuclear programme complete? Is there sufficient information available on which to draw a conclusion? Under comprehensive safeguards agreements alone, there is insufficient information and access to answer these questions. The State evaluation process seeks to answer several questions:

17 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information

18 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information Under an additional protocol the Agency has more extensive information and access.

19 Measures Contained in the Additional Protocol Information about, and inspector access to, all aspects of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle - From mines to nuclear waste - Information on, and short-notice inspector access to, all buildings on a nuclear site Information about, and inspector access to, other locations where nuclear material is present Information about, and mechanisms for inspector access to, fuel cycle-related R & D

20 Measures Contained in the Additional Protocol Information on the manufacture and export of specified equipment and non-nuclear materials Collection of environmental samples beyond declared locations Information on future plans to develop the nuclear fuel cycle Administrative arrangements – Visas – Inspector designation – Access to communication means

21 In addition, the Agency can request: Amplification and clarification of declared information Information to clarify and facilitate the resolution of questions and inconsistencies Operational activities of safeguards relevance

22 Complementary Access under an Additional Protocol On a selective basis to assure the absence of nuclear material and activities To resolve a question or inconsistency related to the declaration To confirm the decommissioned status of a facility

23 Evaluation of “State as a whole” to draw Safeguards Conclusions Nuclear material accountancy; facility design information Voluntary reporting Additional protocol declarations State-supplied information Inspection Design information verification (DIV) Complementary access Results of verification activities Open and other sources Other information Only with full information and access can a conclusion be drawn on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

24 State evaluation has become the basis for safeguards implementation Analyze all information State Declarations Results of activities Other information Plan safeguards activities Conduct safeguards activities

25 Safeguards activities are implemented in a flexible manner, based on evaluation Verification of declared nuclear material and activities - according to Safeguards’ criteria Conduct complementary access Find and evaluate more information to complete the picture of the States nuclear programme – open source – request from State – conduct further activities Resolve questions or inconsistencies with regard to State’s declarations Follow-up on issues of safeguards significance

26 Strengthened Safeguards Measures Traditional Measures under CSAs Nuclear Material Accountancy Containment and Surveillance Design Information Verification Additional Protocol Measures Expanded declaration Complementary Access Broader Environmental Sampling Strengthening Measures under CSAs Environmental Sampling Remote Monitoring SSAC Cooperation

27 Integrated Safeguards Optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under CSAs and additional protocols. Broader safeguards conclusion allows for reductions in verification effort for some categories of declared nuclear material. Involves a redistribution of resources from nuclear material verification activities to the implementation of additional protocol measures.

28 Despite strengthening measures, limitations remain There are limits on information and access that States must provide The Board recommended modification of small quantities protocol (SQP) An Advisory Committee of the Board (Committee 25) is considering further improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards Within existing legal framework Voluntary Expanding technical capabilities Cooperation and transparency of States facilitates safeguards implementation

29 Conclusion Drawing the broader conclusion that all nuclear material has been placed under safeguards requires the additional information and access under the additional protocol. Ensuring that this conclusion is credible requires a rigorous State evaluation process. Implementation of integrated safeguards will result in savings in inspection effort.