EU Policy Coordination Beyond 2010: Towards an Inclusive Governance Architecture Jonathan Zeitlin European Union Center of Excellence University of Wisconsin-Madison

2 Plan of the presentation I. Looking backward: the governance of the Lisbon Strategy, –A critical overview in three phases II. Looking forward: towards an inclusive governance architecture for the post-Lisbon era –Architectural design principles for EU policy coordination –Governance options beyond 2010: status quo, Lisbon minus, or a new inclusive architecture? –Risks and opportunities for EU social policy coordination

3 A. Architectural design principles for EU policy coordination 1) Enhance overall policy coherence –Avoid multiple, overlapping, inconsistent strategies 2) Improve horizontal coordination and cross- sectoral synergies, without sacrificing core policy objectives –e.g. economic growth, full employment, social cohesion, environmental sustainability 3) Ensure autonomy, specificity, and visibility of sectoral processes needed for effective coordination of complex policy fields

4 Architectural design principles (2) 4) Promote mutual learning and evidence-based policy making –Through consistent reporting against common indicators, diagnostic monitoring, peer review, and evaluation of different national approaches to achieving common European objectives 5) Mobilize increased commitment and participation by Member State governments, national publics, and other stakeholders –Including civil society and subnational actors

5 B. Governance options for EU policy coordination beyond 2010 Option 1: the status quo –Retain existing architecture of Strategy for Growth and Jobs OMC on Social Protection and Social Inclusion to feed in to growth and jobs objectives; Integrated Guidelines and National Reform Programmes to feed out to support EU social cohesion goals The path of least resistance But mutually reinforcing dynamic between Lisbon Strategy and OMC/SPSI has not worked effectively since 2005 relaunch

6 An incoherent, unsustainable approach Disconnect between form and content of Integrated Guidelines –Guidelines remain unchanged from , but explanatory text becomes more social Renewed Social Agenda calls for reinforcement of OMC/SPSI through closer links to Lisbon Strategy Leaves the EU with multiple, overlapping, potentially inconsistent mega strategies –Lisbon, Sustainable Development, Energy Policy for Europe, OMCs (SPSI, Education and Training, etc.)

7 Option 2: Lisbon minus Cohen-Tanugi Report, Euroworld 2015 –Recast Lisbon as European strategy for globalization –Refocus internal component on competitiveness and innovation Interlink environmental, social, and economic dimensions of a knowledge-driven economy and society, without monopolizing national and European policies in these areas In social policy, concentrate on education, lifelong learning, mobility, globalization adjustment, integration, population ageing, flexicurity, and relaunching social dialogue –Termed Lisbon plus, but should really be called Lisbon minus, because of narrower scope relative to Strategy for Growth and Jobs

8 Architectural design flaws Leaves the EU with overlapping, potentially inconsistent strategies –Coordination of coordination would become a major problem at both European and national levels Risks subordinating social and employment policies to competitiveness and innovation objectives, without providing a legitimate and effective mechanism for reconciling countervailing but equally indispensable goals Narrower scope makes it even less likely to inspire national ownership and participation than the Strategy for Growth and Jobs

9 Option 3: a new, inclusive governance architecture EU needs a new overarching strategy for the post-Lisbon era based on four equal, mutually reinforcing pillars: –Economic growth –Full employment –Social cohesion –Environmental sustainability

10 A cockpit, not a Christmas tree Each pillar should have its own objectives, guidelines, targets, indicators, national strategies, peer review, and evaluation process Incorporating these common sectoral objectives and indicators into the EUs overarching strategy is not like adding ornaments to a Christmas tree, but rather like equipping a cockpit with the full set of instruments needed to avoid flying blind

11 Reconceiving the Integrated Guidelines and National Reform Programmes In order to avoid overload, IGs and NRPs should be reconceived as twin apexes of a synthetic policy coordination process built up from sectoral OMCs for each pillar –Sites where conflicting priorities can be reconciled, not unified/centralized replacements for sectoral coordination processes themselves –Each sectoral policy coordination process should explicitly incorporate indicators for monitoring mutual interactions between them feeding in/feeding out, mainstreaming, ex ante/ex post impact assessment

12 Maximize opportunities for mutual learning To maximize opportunities for mutual learning, MS should report consistently on progress towards each objective/guideline, using common European indicators as far as possible –Common indicators should be outcome-oriented, responsive to policy interventions, subject to clear/ accepted normative interpretation, timely, & revisable –Indicators should be sufficiently comparable and disaggregable to serve as diagnostic tools for improvement/self-correction by national/local actors, rather than as soft sanctions/shaming devices to ensure MS compliance with European targets –Limitations of existing Lisbon Assessment Framework

13 Promote horizontal coherence and cross- sectoral synergies through joined-up thematic strategies Proposed for flexicurity and active inclusion –Could be extended to child poverty/well-being, active ageing, gender equality/work-family reconciliation Adoption of common European principles Intensive follow-up, monitoring, and evaluation –Joint indicators and assessment frameworks –Thematic peer reviews & comparison of good/bad practices –Full involvement of all relevant actors –Network of local observatories (proposed for active inclusion) Possible use of EU recommendations –Common and/or country specific

14 Expand stakeholder participation Open up sectoral coordination processes and NRPs to active participation by civil society and subnational actors –Ensure coordination of NRPs by Prime Ministers offices rather than Finance or Economics ministries –Revive/reinvigorate NAPs for employment & inclusion –Promote local and regional action plans –Develop indicators of participatory governance Timely involvement in all phases of the policy cycle Two-way dialogue rather than one-way consultation Benchmark national performance & compare practices

15 C. Risks and opportunities for EU social policy coordination Subsidiarity –Member States retain primary competence for the organization of their social protection systems –Wide variations in institutional structure of national welfare states & political sensitivity of reforms –Understandable reluctance of Member States to move beyond common social objectives/indicators to European guidelines, targets & country-specific recommendations

16 But the horse is out of the stable But MS are already subject to EU guidelines and recommendations on reform of their social protection systems for financial sustainability and higher employment under Lisbon Strategy Renewed Social Agenda proposes extending targets, common principles, enhanced monitoring, and recommendations to OMC/SPSI Question is not whether but how EU should be involved in coordinating MS responses to common challenges of social protection reform, while respecting legitimate national diversity

17 Backdoor harmonization? Experience of European Employment Strategy shows that EU guidelines & recommendations need not lead to backdoor harmonization or imposition of one-size-fits-all policy models –Employment guidelines have proved adaptable to wide variety of employment systems across EU, encouraging convergence of objectives, performance, & broad policy approaches, but not harmonization of programs, rules, or institutions –Country-specific recommendations have added value to national policy making by feeding back results of peer evaluation into domestic debates, and drawing attention to overlooked problems even in best- performing Member States

18 Dynamic subsidiarity OMC should be understood as a new form of dynamic subsidiarity –Based not on a rigid allocation of competences, but instead on collaboration between different levels of governance in which each participating unit contributes its distinctive expertise and resources to tackling common problems cutting across jurisdictions

19 Loss of autonomy? Even those in favor of strengthening the social dimension of the Lisbon Strategy may fear that incorporating the OMC/SPSI into a new inclusive governance architecture could weaken EU social policy coordination and reduce its autonomy A legitimate concern, as demonstrated by the experience of the EES since 2005 But retaining procedural autonomy while sacrificing political influence is the greater risk facing OMC/SPSI, since MS are already subject to one-sided coordination of social protection reforms under the Strategy for Growth & Jobs

20 Procedural safeguards Risk of reduced autonomy for EU social policy coordination would be offset by new governance architecture based on four equal, mutually reinforcing pillars Consistent with this balanced, inclusive governance architecture, it would be important to ensure that NRPs are coordinated by Prime Ministers offices rather than by Finance or Economics ministries, and that the EUs Spring Socio-Economic Summit is prepared by the General Affairs Council rather than Ecofin

21 Realizing the original promise of the Lisbon Strategy With this new governance architecture in place from 2010, European social, economic, environmental, and employment policies could at last begin to work together in a mutually reinforcing way to deliver faster sustainable growth, more and better jobs, and greater social cohesion, as envisaged by the designers of the original Lisbon Strategy eight years ago.