UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 1 Colonel Trey Turner and Major Jay Adair 16 Oct 2009 Deadly Persistence Integrating Armed UAV’s and Ground Forces in Kandahar

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 2 To provide an overview of the integration of UAVs and ground forces in Kandahar province during 2008 Aim

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 3 The Operating Environment The 2 PPCLI Battle Group Integrating UAVs into the Joint Tactical Fight Agenda

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 4 This brief deals with the employment of UAVs, not necessarily “striking” with PGMs from UAVs We operated in a “UAV Laboratory” and the lessons learned are applicable across the spectrum The key to the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles is the “man” Optimal employment of UAVs demands a nuanced understanding of the environment gained only through interaction with the population on the ground UAVs and the potential of UAVs influence the manner in which the enemy fights Bottom Line Up Front

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 5 “It's not necessarily the strong enemy, it's the very weak institutions of the state... in that weakness, you have Taliban influence able to move in there, and through coercion of the people, assert that influence.” LTG Eikenberry – 10 May 2006

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 6 Uzbekistan RC Capital Tajikistan China PANJSHER WARDAK BAMIAN GHAZNI PAKTIKA PAKTIA NANGARHAR KONAR BAGHLAN BADAKHSHA TAKHAR KONDUZ SAR-E POL FARYAB BADGHIS HERAT GHOWR FARAH HELMAND ZABOL KANDAHAR NIMRUZ LOWGAR DAIKONDI ORUZGAN Kabul BALKH JOWZJAN NURESTAN SAMANGAN KHOST PARWAN LAGHMAN Turkmenistan RC West RC South RC East Pakistan 41 Nations Total  58,932 Top Contributors: US 25,300 UK 8,600 Germany 3,600 Canada 3,400 Italy 2,900 France 2,700 Netherlands 2,000 Poland 1, Nations Total  58,932 Top Contributors: US 25,300 UK 8,600 Germany 3,600 Canada 3,400 Italy 2,900 France 2,700 Netherlands 2,000 Poland 1,700 NATO/ISA F and OEF Mandates USFOR-A:13,717 RC North Iran KAIA KAF L As of: 13 Feb 09 6

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 7 Security Summary 2008 Baluchi Area NWFP FATA Major INSURGENT Lines of Operation Kinetic Event Density Increasing 24% Afghans perceive improvement, 19% perceive worsening (Sep 08 poll) 70% of kinetic events continue to occur in 10% of the districts 33% increase in Kinetic Events IED events up 27%....single largest cause of casualties ISAF/OEF Deaths: up 35% Civilian Deaths: up 40% - 46%*

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP KAF 20 km KANDAHAR Kandahar KAF

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 9 TYPICAL PANJAWYI AND ZHAREY TOPOGRAPHY

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 10 PANJAWYI AND ZHAREY – FROM THE GROUND

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 11 Operational Context Offense Defense StabilityStability StabilityStability Offense Defense StabilityStability Offense StabilityStability Defense FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS OPERATIONAL THEMES2008

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 12 The Kandahar Battlespace Ideologically motivated Taliban Sociologically motivated mujahideen Tribal Militias POPULATION ISAF ANP, ABP,AHP ANA Narco- militia GIRoA Population BG operated in permissive, semi-permissive, non-permissive urban and rural terrain! From TFH Briefing Apr 08

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UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 14 The 2 PPCLI Battle Group

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 15 Battle Group Organization E (+) (-) JDCC OMLT POMLT ATTACHMENTS The BG Team 848 Regular Force Soldiers 174 Reserve Force Soldiers

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 16 The Battle Group role is to SHAPE the battlespace through lethal and non-lethal action in order to set the security conditions that ENABLE successful ANSF action, development and governance initiatives within the AO –The BG “buys time” to allow Afghans to take control Battle Group Role So What? – Protect the Population, Enable other Organizations

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 17 Fight in a manner that will allow the war to be won –BG role extends far beyond neutralizing insurgents Influence Afghans –Convince neutrals to support GIROA »Protect/Isolate from the insurgency and its effects –Retain support of those who already support GIROA »Protect from the insurgency and its effects –Mentor and facilitate the mentorship of all elements of the GIROA –Convince insurgents supporters to support GIROA »Hunt and Kill those who need to be killed Battle Group Role – Layman’s Terms NO BETTER FRIEND NO BETTER FRIEND NO WORST ENEMY NO WORST ENEMY

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 18 We must focus on the word succeed instead of win in this campaign –Success is tied to the will of the Afghan people Battle Group Role – Succeeding versus Winning Succeed – “to make good, thrive prosper, or progress in order to accomplish a favourable aim or outcome” Win – “to acquire, be victorious or triumph as a result of a fight”

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 19 Effects Created by the BG Weeks Months/Years Years SECURITY AND STABILITY (ME) FACILITATE DEVELOPMENT Battle Group Provincial Reconstruction Team Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team BUILD ANSF CAPACITY

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 20 The Carrot and Stick Approach Government Supporters Government Sympathizers Neutral Population Insurgent Sympathizers Insurgent Supporters Insurgent Fighters Consolidate and Strengthen ProtectPersuadeDissuadeDeterMarginalize and Defeat FRIENDLYHOSTILE Exploit fault lines and break Alliances Part of the Solution Part of the Problem

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 21 COIN as an Argument TALK FIGHT TALK A Fight – Talk Proposition

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 22 How the BG Operated ACCENTUATE POSITIVES MITIGATE NEGATIVES INFORMATION OPERATIONS PRIMARY ACTIVITIESPHYSICAL OUTPUTEFFECTS OUTPUT (messages to TA) FRAMEWORK OPS TARGETING DELIBERATE OPS Responsive, visible, combined force Precision collection – Understand the Environment – Find the enemy Combined Deliberate Ops – Fix and Finish We are here to protect you (the population) with ANSF on behalf of the GIROA. We see what goes on in the battlespace and will kill those who fight against the GIROA. We (the ANSF and ISAF) are stronger than the insurgency and will ultimately prevail.

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 23 The Kandahar Battlespace – A Vicious Cycle CF focus resources and establish presence in certain area. CF presence attracts insurgents who carry out attacks against CF. Population avoids contact with CF but remain susceptible to insurgent influence. Population moves from area to avoid the coercion from the insurgents and conflict between CF and insurgents. CF increase force protection – increase distance from population How do we break the cycle?

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 24 Focusing Effort – The Stability Box Concept KEY DISRUPT HOLD BUILD BUILD AREA Selected where there is support for CF and this support will have disproportionate influence in surrounding area. PRT main effort. Permanently presence. Must protect population 24/7. No kinetic ops in here without PRT authorization. BUILD AREA Selected where there is support for CF and this support will have disproportionate influence in surrounding area. PRT main effort. Permanently presence. Must protect population 24/7. No kinetic ops in here without PRT authorization. 1 HOLD AREA OMLT main effort. Mission is to protect Stab Box from direct insurgent influence. No development occurs in this area. Focused IO efforts on elders and leaders to gain consent. Criteria for development needs to be established to be eligible for PRT benefits. Once criteria met, BUILD AREA expands into this area. HOLD AREA OMLT main effort. Mission is to protect Stab Box from direct insurgent influence. No development occurs in this area. Focused IO efforts on elders and leaders to gain consent. Criteria for development needs to be established to be eligible for PRT benefits. Once criteria met, BUILD AREA expands into this area. 2 DISRUPTION AREA Remainder of AOR. Focus of BG and SOF activity. Aim to disrupt insurgents and degrade their ability to influence in other areas of the Stab Box. DISRUPTION AREA Remainder of AOR. Focus of BG and SOF activity. Aim to disrupt insurgents and degrade their ability to influence in other areas of the Stab Box. 3

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 25 The key to success…

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 26 UAVs in COIN

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 27 One Man’s Vision “ We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may be fought by airplanes with no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now that there will be no basis for comparison. Take everything you’ve learned about aviation in war, throw it out of the window, and let’s go to work on tomorrow’s aviation. It will be different from anything the world has ever seen.” Gen Hap Arnold, USAAF VJ Day, 1945

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 28 “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly, we can lose this fight.” General Stan McChrystal COMISAF 16 June 2009 Airpower in COIN

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 29 Another Man’s Vision “We pray to Allah we have American soldiers to kill… but added these bombs from the sky we cannot fight” Taliban Fighter

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 30 Spectrum of UAV Employment IPB Target acquisition Reconnaissance CAS –FMV Support –Air Strike Coordination –Direct fire support –Dynamic targeting (hunter-killer) ISRStrike

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 31 everything looks like a nail If all you have is a hammer,

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 32 The Team

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 33 Keys to Successful Integration Developing and Maintaining key relationships –Intelligence cells communicating –Pilots speaking to pilots –Debriefing is the norm Understanding the capabilities of the UAV Controlling the asset at the appropriate headquarters –Controlled at the HQ that can shorten the kill chain the most Common operating picture Unity of command Ensuring JTACs and an S2 representative were on duty in the BG TOC –Tracking and striking targets requires patience – the UAV is only as persistent as those operating it

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 34 The Power to Decide – The Certainty to Act TACPISR OS2 Ops Battle CaptS3 Recommendation to Commander – Strike/No Strike

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 35 Keys to Successful Integration Synchronizing ground and air manoeuvre –Battlefield organization – tactical “deep fight” –Ground manoeuvre creates a reaction from the insurgents –Armed UAVs unnerve the enemy and force them to make mistakes Establishing procedural controls that shortened engagement times Establishing common sight picture on the application of ROE Accepting the Positive Identification (PID) of the enemy reflects the enemy’s adaptive nature and evolves

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 36 Keys to Successful Integration Employing an effective targeting methodology –Determines the most important “things we do everyday” Counterinsurgency Triage –Those who cannot be influenced –Those who support us –Those who can be influenced Answers the question: “Where can we have the greatest impact”? –What are intended effects? »How do we achieve those effects? Does not replace detailed operational planning

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 37 Keys to Successful Integration Employing an effective targeting methodology –Focus on MVTs (people) as the centre of mass –Method – complete a series of targeting cycles F3EAD –Find – cross-cueing of all sensors –Fix – the “unblinking eye” –Finish – strike –Exploit – face to face cross-talk –Analyze – face to face cross-talk – shared analysis –Disseminate – info sharing and process refinement

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 38 Targeting Framework Find Exploit Finish Analyze Fix Disseminate (Example) TargetingCycle AAR facilitates adaptation Intelligence Pursuit Lethal/Non- lethal Physical/Moral Fix Targeting Cycle initiated by “FIND”

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 39 The Team

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 40 A long road…

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 41 Doing the Right Thing…Amidst Chaos

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 42 Questions

UNCLASSIFIED C Coy 2 VP 43 Colonel Trey Turner Major Jay Adair Contact Information