Mediation in the Arab-Palestinian Conflict: What Role Can the EU play? Dr. Martin Beck Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Amman, Jordan

Content 1.Theory: 1.1 Basic Assumptions 1.2 Structure of the Isr.-Pal. Conflict 1.3 EU Mediation: Leverage Points? 1.4 EU Mediation: Success Conditions 2. Empirical-Historical Analysis: 2.1 Before 1967: No chance, no will /80s: Declaratory policy of a „Civilian Power“ s: Limited success 2.4 Since 2000: Even more limited success

1. Basic Assumptions No „veil of uncertainty“ (Oran Young) anymore in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict No „zones of agreement“ etc. to be discovered anymore in the Israeli-Palestinian case No succesful mediation without power capabilities (in the Israeli-Palestinian case): Thus, finding leverage points is crucial. To find them, we first need to identify the structure of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

1.1 Until 1967: Deadlock Situation Arabs Israel CD C Bi-National State, Partition of Israel 2:2 Arab Rule over Israel 1:4 D Arab Recognition of Israel 4:1 Israeli Rule over Israel Non- Recognized by the Arabs 3:3 M, N, P

1.2 Since 1967: Dilemma Situation PLO Israel CD C Limited Palestinian Sovereignty over EJ, W, G 3:3 P Unconditional Israeli Withdrawal from EJ, W, G 1:4 P D Palestinian Waiver of Sovereignty 4:1 P Prolonged Occupation 2:2 M, N

1.2 Leverage Points for EU Mediation Palestine : limited (diplomatic recognition) - after 1993: strong (conditioning political rents) Israel - Since 1967: very limited (partly due to US support of Israel)

1.3 Success Conditions for EU Mediation Palestine: : Low - Since 1993: High (PLO: Rents!) Israel - Since 1967: Very low (certain degree of sensitivity but very low degree of vulnerability) Overall (in terms of the conflict as a whole) : Low - Since 1993: Significant only if US puts pressure on Israel

2.1 Before 1967: No Chance, no Will Deadlock Situation: No scope for mediation European actors were rather escalating than moderating the conflict: - Suez War s: strong French military support towards Israel

/80s: Declaratory Policy of a „Civilian Power“ Declaration of Venice: - the Palestinian issue more than a „refugee problem“ - PLO „will have to be associated with the negotiations“ - „the Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position (…) to exercise fully its right to self-dermination.“

/80s: Declaratory Policy of a „Civilian Power“ The declaratory approach has often been critisized as weak However, taken context conditions for granted, not much more could have been achieved. Succesful insofar as the European position—the recognition of the Palestinians as a people and the PLO as its legitimate representative— shaped world politics.

s: Policy of Conditionality with Limited Impact Impact: Western including European rent donations were the most important single factor causing the Oslo agreements However, two major problems of Oslo: - Asymmetry in benefits for Israel and the PLO - Exclusion of the societal level

2.3 Since 2000: Policy of Con- ditionality with Even Less Impact Limited Impact: PLO/Fatah (but Hamas!) Administration rather than regulation of the conflict Direct Negotiations will come in 2010 (most probably still in August) Yet, chances of a durable conflict regulation are very low.

3. Conclusion General conditions for EU mediation are rather difficult: - Complicated (Graduated) Dilemma Situation - No leverage point in the case of Israel - No leverage point in the case of Hamas Therefore, EU success in mediation has been limited. Yet, sometimes its impact is better than its reputation (declaratory policy of the 1970/80s)