14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284 and its implications Colin Rowat, co-ordinator Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq 14 February 2000 Liberation & CLESIP meeting

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq About CASI n a registered society at the University of Cambridge; n narrow humanitarian mandate: u exclusively concerned with the humanitarian consequences of sanctions on Iraq; n does not support Saddam Hussein's regime; n does not take a position on: u military sanctions on Iraq; u US/UK bombing of Iraq.

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Overview n Context of SCR 1284 n SCR 1284 u Preamble u A. Unmovic u B. Kuwaiti claims u C. Humanitarian improvement within OFF u D. Sanctions’ suspension n Questions n Conclusions

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Context: search for consensus? n US/UK bombing (12/98): u no UN authorisation, dubious motives u Unscom not allowed back to Iraq n Panel reports commissioned (1/99) u Humanitarian report: Annex II of S/1999/356 (30/3/99) n French proposal (13/1/99) + UK/Dutch proposal n 17/12/99 SCR 1284 passed with 4 abstentions n (intellectual context: these sanctions have failed)

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284: Preamble n commitment to, among other things: u "establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons” u "sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, Iraq and the neighbouring States” n expressed since SCR 687 (3/4/91) but largely ignored

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284: A. Unmovic n Unmovic = Unscom + disarmament panel recommendations, “as appropriate” u greater independence from Member States (“International Civil Servants subject to Article 100” of UN Charter) n gives Unmovic up to 135 days to return to Iraq u behind schedule (Blix’s appointment) u approving “organizational plan” may be easy u getting into Iraq probably harder

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284: B. Kuwaiti claims n re-iterates Iraqi responsibility to return Kuwaiti and third country property and nationals u Kuwait claims 605 missing persons cases still open u Iraq continues to refuse to co-operate with the “Tripartite Commission” established to address these concerns

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284: C. Humanitarian improvement within OFF n Caveat: “Regardless of the improvements that might be brought about in the implementation of the current humanitarian programme … the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is such that they cannot be met within the context of the parameters set forth in resolution 986 (1995) and … resolution 1153 (1998).” [Humanitarian Panel Report]

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Selected measures in section C

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq SCR 1284: D. Sanctions’ suspension n “intention” to suspend sanctions if Iraq co-operates “in all respects” for 120 days n “fundamental objective” of the suspension is “improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq” n suspensions “subject to the elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures” n two fold uncertainty: u co-operate “in all respects” on undefined work plan u what sort of suspensions?

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Questions n will Iraq co-operate? u France, China and Russia abstained u regime more stable than in 1991 u 1284 offers regime few carrots but asks it to trust US n will Iraq be back in the news in 2000? u getting Unmovic in risks tension u U.S. election year: avoid or play tough? n humanitarian consequences? u little promise of more money v. lots already in account

14/2/00Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq Conclusions n humanitarian possibilities real but less than Panel’s u does the FCO have projections for expected humanitarian outcomes of If not, unclear that 1284 can be regarded as a serious humanitarian initiative. n sanctions’ suspension link to GoI co-operation reaffirms failed 1991 formula n failure to take trust building steps (i.e. can GoI trust US?) likely to hinder implementation