“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results” Sir Winston Churchill 1874-1965, English statesman.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Air Force Core Functions
Advertisements

Building a Strategy for Combating Terrorism. “We have to fight terrorists as if there were no rules, and preserve our open society as if there were no.
Joint Worldwide Training and Scheduling Conference Can Be A Mechanism For Joint Force Development.
Unified Land Operations
INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL OPERATIONSUnclassified Special Operations Overview Click arrow below to continue WARNING - This document contains technical data.
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED US Special Operations Command The overall classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED Lt Gen Bradley Heithold, USAF Vice.
Special Operations Center of Excellence
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07; and Army
ARSOF WARFIGHTING CHALLENGES
Department of The Air Force. To fly, flight, and win in Air, Space, and CyberspaceMission.
Applications in Acquisition Changing Defense Environment.
Sea Air Space Symposium PB16 Budget Issues RADM Barry Bruner Director, Programming Division OPNAV N8O April 2015.
United States Air Force: Air Doctrine – Air and Space Superiority Objective: Comprehend how the United States Air Force is structured in terms of missions.
Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC DCSINT.
Australian Army “ Future Trends and Combat Effectiveness” Brief to Manoeuvre Warfighting Conference Manoeuvre Centre of Excellence 10 September 2014 BRIGADIER.
Department of the Army. Overview Role of the Army Organization of the Army The Army Modular Force.
ADP 1 The Army.
Making Strategy.
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37; and Army
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Industry Day Brief 18 September 2014.
United States Army Combined Arms Center
Commander’s Intent & Guidance
JDP 3-40 Security & Stabilisation: The Military Contribution JDP 3-40 Security & Stabilisation: The Military Contribution Presentation by Lieutenant Colonel.
Deliberative Working Document - Predecisional FOUO Supporting the Secretary’s Top Priorities Eric Coulter, Deputy Director OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation.
Australia’s National Security Apparatus Ms Vikki Templeman Director Strategic Assessments and Long Range Planning.
0 Peter F. Verga U.S. Department of Defense 2 Definitions Homeland Security – A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United.
1 Department of the Army G-3/5 Strategic Plans, Concepts, & Doctrine Division UNCLASSIFIED Modeling and Simulation in an Era of Persistent Conflict Classification:
Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC DCSINT.
3. Post-9/11 US Strategy How much has changed? How much has stayed the same?
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5.4: Public Affairs Operations.
Joint Training Challenges of Irregular Warfare/COIN and Full Spectrum Training Requirements Brief for WJTSC LtCol John Merna, J7/9-TJ 23 September.
THEME FOR 12 TH ARF HDUCIM NDU ISLAMABAD - PAKISTAN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)
OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF THIS BRIEFING IS UNCLASSIFIED United States Southern Command SOUTHCOM’s Role and Responsibilities in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.
1. 2 USAF CONOPS & AIR AND SPACE POWER REVIEW Chap 23 & 24.
Air Force Strategy to Resources
Strategic Implications of Virtual Warfare: by Captain Terry C. Pierce USN Explaining Virtual Warfare as a Strategic Disruptive Innovation Explaining Virtual.
United States Air Force: Air Doctrine – Provide Global Capability
A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
The Department of the Navy. Role of the Navy Organization of the Navy Naval DoctrineOverview.
Warfare Communities of the Fleet and Marine Forces
HUMAN DIMENSION MCDP 1 OVERVIEW Understanding of the physical dimensions of combat.
Defense Policy Making You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.
Operations Overview The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions.
 The benefits of interior lines could be gained either by central position or superior lateral communications.
The Navy’s Strategy VADM John Morgan 9 March 2006.
Chapter 8 War and Strife. Security Issues Global trends, see: –Human security.
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
Emerging Global Trends and Strategic Challenges in the Coming Decade Marvin J. Cetron, President, Forecasting International June 12, 2012 Emerging Global.
Winning the Next War 1 Winning the Next War: Institutionalizing Lessons Learned from Today’s Regional Conflicts The American Institute of Engineers Conference.
Employment Considerations: Considerations at the Outset of Combat
UNCLASSIFIED 6/24/2016 8:12:34 PM Szymanski UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 15 Pages Space Policy Issues - Space Principles of War - 14 June, 2010.
2 Agenda Command Mission ……………………………… Command Relationships ……………………..…….4 Fleet Assets……………………..……………………. 6 Sailors and Civilians………..……………………….
GORT Planning/Guidance Session with LTG Barclay
Current Event Brief!.
International Security and Peace
“Existing world order is being redefined.” Henry Kissinger Jan 2015
Making Strategy.
The Russian Way of War TEFOR G-27
Name of the idea Description and Military Application Maturity
Name of the idea Description and Military Application Maturity
Department of the Army.
Department of the Navy
CIO G-6 Signal Conference
Fires Conceptual Framework Supporting Multi-Domain Battle
Multi-Domain Battle: Achieving Cross-Domain Synergy
Joint Protection of the Sea Base
Civil Affairs’ (CA) Role In Stability PKSOI Lead (Liddick)
The Future of Coalition Warfare
FY 2007 Department of Defense Budget
Presentation transcript:

“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results” Sir Winston Churchill 1874-1965, English statesman

Army 2020 Operational Environment Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare Deter and Defeat Aggression Project Power Despite Anti- Access/Area Denial Challenges Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities Provide a Stabilizing Presence Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations Prevent Shape Win The Possible The Unthinkable The Probable Futures Crime Cyber Persistent conflict Among the People Regional Aggression Proliferation, Globalization, Modernization Global Trends Resource Competition Demographics & Migration WMD Shifting Alliances Extremism Growing Debt Pacific focus Rise of Asia Economic Malaise Arab Spring Competition for Space Technology Proliferation A dynamic and rapidly changing security environment as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012

A Wide Range of Potential Challenges Near Peers Insurgents Proxies States Terrorists Transnational Groups Criminal Organizations Para-militaries Near-states Threats Driven by Competition for: Wealth Resources Political authority Influence Sovereignty Identity Legitimacy Lethal: weapons technology proliferates to all forces, no longer linear relationship between econo mic and military power Unexpected opportunists and suppressed threats will emerge from conflicts in a complex environment Complex Environment: Multiple Actors No Controlling Actor Asymmetric Threats Chaotic Conditions Extreme Complexity Technology Enabled Information Domain Enduring: persistent adversaries, difficult to defeat with blurred transitions from conflict to post-conflict. Shaping Forces: U.S. Dominance Radical Ideology/Theology Technology Proliferation Social Media access Demographics Economics Cyber Asymmetric: sidestep U.S. preferred way of war, deny ISR and strike options, exploit cyber, protract conflict , and project conflict to the homeland The Army must be operationally adaptive to defeat these complex challenges that will blur the distinctions of past conflict as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012

Character of Conflict in 2020 Threat components: Nation States or Proxies with a range of capabilities Desire to preclude U.S. from executing its “way of war” Capabilities that affect the strategic calculus -- missiles, nuclear weapons and terror sponsorship … specifically designed to impact U.S. actions CONUS ISB Complexity JOAC ASB Gain/Maintain Access Threats Area Denial Anti Access Capabilities: SAMs, MANPADs, ATGMs, Rockets, IEDs Anti-access and area denial campaigns … strategic thru tactical levels Engage at small unit level where they perceive a greater chance to obtain overmatch and achieve success Use violence, intimidation and coercion against U.S. supporters WMD capable… but still seeking nuclear Avoid detection and targeting by operating among the people Slow down or halt our momentum using anti-tank missiles, IEDs, air defense and SOF Increased use of robotics and unmanned aerial systems Employ electronic warfare to counter US precision and C4ISR Conduct sophisticated information campaigns designed to erode US will and support The Army must be capable of decisive action against a wide array of adaptive and complex threats as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012

What the Army Must Do: Through the Lens of Defense Strategy Narrow Lens Deter Defeat Army also did missions outside this narrow lens Proxies Insurgents Near States Terrorists Deter & Defeat Criminal Organizations CT/IW HD/ DSCA States Specific Threat Specific Location Presence Nuclear Deterrence Expanded Focus Cyber & Space Counter WMD Defeat A2/AD Specific threat, degree of certainty and location drove: Doctrine Equipment Training Organizational Structure Force Posture Stability/ COIN HADR Expanded Focus Project Power Gain and Maintain Access Unified Land Operations Wide Lens What the Army Must Do: Prevent, Shape, and Win: Strategic guidance requires the Army to conduct a wide range of missions while retaining the ability to focus more narrowly on projecting power to deter and defeat aggression once a specific threat emerges. The combination of a narrow focus within a wide lens allows the Army to adjust more rapidly to potential threats. Historic Examples: 1920-30s Rainbow Planning Airmobile Active Defense AirLand Battle Last decade: Counterinsurgency The Army must maintain a high level of operational adaptability as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012

Draft ACC: Meeting the Challenges 3-2 The Military Problem: What must the Army do to educate its leaders and organize, equip, and train units to protect U.S. national interests and successfully execute the primary missions outlined in defense strategic guidance? Given the operational environment, requirements of strategy, and the Army’s role in the joint force ….. 3-3 Central Idea: The future Army must develop operational adaptability – a quality that Soldiers and leaders possess based on critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity and decentralization, a willingness to accept prudent risk, and an ability to make rapid adjustments based on a continuous assessment of the situation. Operational adaptability requires: Resilient Soldiers and cohesive teams Mastery of the operational art Ability to combine all available capabilities Flexible organizations and adaptable institutions   3-5 Components of the Solution (What the Army Must Do): Prevent conflict: Train, equip, and posture capable and credible forces to deter adversaries Shape the operational environment: Provide a sustained, stabilizing presence to gain access, understand the operational environment, build partner capability, and set conditions for operations; integrate special operations and conventional forces Win decisively and dominantly: Deploy forces, prevail in war and defend the homeland in support of joint force commanders 3-6 Supporting Ideas: Project military power despite anti-access/area denial challenges Align forces regionally Enhance advisory capabilities Conduct cyber and space operations Establish war termination objectivesd Adapt force generation and maintain an operational reserve Preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force Desired End State: An Army that has the ability to rapidly deploy forces and conduct a wide range of missions including shape, which requires forces to gain, sustain, and exploit physical control over land and resources, defeat enemies, and exert influence over people by physical and psychological means. as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012

Major Army 2020 Ideas Redesign Brigade Combat Teams Review Logistics Concept of Support Create a New ARFORGEN Model Maintain an Operational Reserve Create Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigades Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges Create Regionally Aligned Forces Integrate Special Operations and Conventional Forces Improve Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Mission Command Assign / Align Brigades to Divisions and Corps Enhance Army Advisory Capability Implement a New Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Ensure Reversibility and Expansibility Transition from today’s force to the Army of 2020 in an era of fiscal austerity and still accomplish all that the Army must do as part of the Joint force as of 09 1230 Apr 12 AUSA ILW 12 April 2012