CAS LX 502 5a. Modality 5.3-

Propositional attitudes There are various ways that we can embed a proposition into our utterances and express a mental attitude toward that proposition. I know that Pat ate the sandwich. I suspect that Pat ate the sandwich. I think that Pat at the sandwich. I doubt that Pat at the sandwich. These examples show varying degrees of commitment in the truth of the proposition.

Modal auxiliaries There is a class of words, modal auxiliaries, that have the same kind of effect. Pat might have eaten the sandwich. Pat must have eaten the sandwich. Pat could have eaten the sandwich. How can we paraphrase Pat might have eaten the sandwich?

Pat might have eaten the sandwich We know how to characterize Pat has eaten the sandwich in terms of possible worlds. By asserting that, we assert that the actual world is one of the ones on the left here. How does Pat might have eaten the sandwich differ? Pat has eaten the sandwich Pat has not eaten the sandwich

Epistemic modals When is Pat might have eaten the sandwich true? When is Pat must have eaten the sandwich true? Pat has eaten t.s. Pat hasn’t eaten t.s. What I believe is false. Pat has eaten t.s. What I believe is true. What I believe is false.

Epistemic modals When is Pat might have eaten the sandwich true? When is Pat must have eaten the sandwich true? Pat has eaten t.s. Pat hasn’t eaten t.s. What I believe is false. Pat has eaten t.s. What I believe is true. What I believe is false.

The modal base Epistemic modals restrict the assertion to just the possible worlds in which what I know/believe is true. This set of worlds is called the modal base. Pat might have eaten the sandwich. There’s a world in the modal base in which Pat has eaten the sandwich. Put must have eaten the sandwich. Every world in the modal base is one in which Pat has eaten the sandwich.

Other modal bases You must stay attentive. You should clean your office. You may leave. How can we paraphrase these? Same sort of thing, but a different modal base (in the likely interpretation).

Other modal bases Pat can leave. Pat can write software. Pat can juggle. Yet a different modal base. Notice that these are somewhat ambiguous, although different modals have different preferences for the modal base they use.

Modal bases Epistemic Worlds in which what I know/believe is true. Deontic Worlds in which a certain standard of propriety is met. Root Worlds that are consistent with the facts.

Subjective/objective deontic modals The deontic modal base can be interpreted in a number of different ways. I should work faster. Objective: according to the rules Subjective: according to my own standards You may leave. Objective: according to the rules/law Subjective: according to me (permission)

May vs. might, Can vs. could Different modals can communicate different forms of likelihood, and have tendencies toward different modal bases. Pat may come. Pat might come. Pat can bend a spoon. Pat could bend a spoon. Pat must fix the spoon. Pat should fix the spoon.

Can vs. could Certain pairs of modal look as if they’re tense variants: can/could, may/might, will/would, shall/should. Pat can’t move his arm. Pat couldn’t move his arm. Tracy can’t stay out past midnight. Tracy couldn’t stay out past midnight. John’s wife can’t be very rich. John’s wife couldn’t be very rich. The “future tense marker” will can also be considered to be a modal (rather than tense proper).

Connection with conditionals If there is a blizzard, classes are canceled. Restricting attention to worlds in which there is a blizzard, all of those worlds are also worlds in which classes are canceled. Classes can/may be canceled. Restricting attention to the modal base, there is at least one world in which classes are canceled.

Marking modality In general, marking modality means raising a hypothetical situation and commenting on it. We can do this with adverbs as well: Probably, John ate the sandwich. John might have eaten the sandwich. Certainly, John ate the sandwich. John definitely ate the sandwich.

Wanting and hoping The verbs want, hope, etc. are also interpreted in a way similar to modals. I want to buy a pony. Restricting attention to worlds that are those in which my desires are satisfied, I buy a pony is true in those worlds.

Accessible worlds I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester. In those worlds in which my desires are satisfied, I teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays? There seems to be a secondary relativization on worlds that are “accessible” from the actual world.

Mood Verb forms that mark the realis/irrealis distinction are generally said to show distinctions in mood. Saeed’s examples from Ngiyambaa: yuruN-gu Nidja-Ra. Rain-erg rain-pres ‘It is raining.’ (realis) yuruN-gu Nidja-I-aga. Rain-erg rain-CM-irrealis ‘It might/will rain.’ (irrealis) The subjunctive/indicative distinction in Romance languages often reflects realis/irrealis.

Evidentiality Another class of mood markers are the evidentials, expressing the source of the information. Basic categories of evidentials (Willett 1988, 132 languages): Personal experience Direct (sensory) evidence Indirect evidence Reported evidence (hearsay)

(Non-evidentials) We could imagine a lot of possible sources of information, but only a small set ever seem to appear as grammatical morphemes. So, none of these: Experience reported by a loved one Divine revelation Legal edict Parental advice Heartfealt intuition (gut feeling) Learned through trial and error Teachings of prominent elder/authority

Evidential examples Wiki-caxa-w “It’s bad weather (directly exp.)’ Wiki-caxa-k’u“It was bad weather” Wiki-caxa-k-pid“It looks like bad weather (inference from physical evidence)” Wiki-caxa-k-qad’i“It sounds like bad weather” Wiki-caxa-k-wa.d“I’m told there’s bad weather” Wiki-caxa-k-it-wad“I’m told it was bad weather” Makah

Evidentiality hierarchy It seems that in languages that encode evidentiality, they come in a hierarchy: Personal experience >> direct (sensory) evidence >> indirect evidence >> hearsay Speaker use (highest applicable) Typologically unmarked (e..g., personal experience vs. others) Languages may combine adjacent categories (Makah: direct or personal, Jaqi: direct or indirect evidence)

De re vs. de dicto When we talk about propositional attitude verbs (think, believe, doubt, say, …), there’s a detectible ambiguity: Pat thinks that the brightest student is a spy. De dicto belief: belief about description. De re belief: belief about individual(s).

De re vs. de dicto Mary believes that a movie star was caught shoplifting last week. Mary claimed that an astronaut stole her homework. John thinks that Mary claimed that an astronaut stole her homework. De dicto for claim, de dicto for think. De re for claim, de dicto for think. De re for claim, de re for think.

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References (evidentiality) Speas, Peggy (to appear). Evidentiallity, logophoricity and the syntacctic representation of pragmatic features. To appear in Lingua. Willett, Thomas (1988). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticalization of evidentialty. Studies in Language 12:51-97.