COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/INITIATIVES AMBASSADOR BONNIE D. JENKINS COORDINATOR FOR THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAMS U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE The idea of cooperation and coordination among states and with relevant IO’s and initiatives are themes one sees throughout the nuclear summit preparations, the communiqué and work plan.

Nuclear terrorism is a global threat Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Nuclear terrorism is a global threat It is important to advance a common approach and commitment to nuclear security at the highest level Nations must work together through dedicated international organizations and initiatives to address the threat Many programs and initiatives focused on this effort that can benefit from increased coordination Global efforts need continuous coordination Why do we need cooperation and coordination? Why so important? Reduce “burden” that Mr. Jun referenced yesterday regarding the many ongoing activities

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives An underlying goal of the Nuclear Security Summit was to come to an agreement on working cooperatively on securing nuclear material worldwide and prevent illicit nuclear trafficking Highlighted recent and future efforts for the global community to take to improve the security of nuclear materials

NSS Comments, Communiqué and Work Plan Statements made at the Summit and the Communique and work plan themselves highlight the role of cooperation and coordination to achieve global nuclear security.

U.S. Statement at the Nuclear Summit The U.S. noted that by working with existing legal and multilateral nuclear security frameworks, U.S. nuclear security cooperative activities help states worldwide meet their security obligations

Comments at NSS “Cooperation on nuclear security is one of the most effective ways the international community can respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism” “Enhanced international and regional cooperation is the way forward to combat the proliferation of WMD and their related systems” “We should work together through international frameworks to promote global nuclear security and combat nuclear terrorism” These are examples of the emphasis nations put on the issue of cooperation and coordination and with working with IO’s and initiatives/frameworks.

Communiqué “ Participating States will work together, as appropriate, to ensure that nuclear security cooperation mechanisms are complementary, reinforcing, efficient, consistent with related IAEA activities, and appropriately matched to indentified needs in those States requesting assistance” Agreement by all the participants to this…

Communiqué “Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation” “Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security” “Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation.” “We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states” Cooperation among states as well is a major theme

Communiqué Reference to the Work Plan: Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Communiqué Reference to the Work Plan: “We issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations” Communiqué: Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance.

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives The Work Plan lays out a number of nuclear security related international organizations and initiatives that play an important role in nuclear security Recognizes that securing nuclear material encompass a number of different initiatives, activities and organizations Outlines comprehensively relevant international organizations and initiatives in the area of nuclear security Need to actively find ways to coordinate at each opportunity

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Four-year global effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material Encompasses the many programs and activities that fundamentally seek to prevent the chances of terrorists from obtaining nuclear material Securing material at the source, converting reactors, and removing nuclear material Must also bolster our ability to detect smuggled material, recover lost material, identify the materials origin, and prosecute those who are trading in these materials Nuclear security is a perpetual commitment, requiring ongoing vigilance as threats change, equipment wears out, and technologies advance Continued efforts by the international community will be required In this respect, the four-year effort encompasses this same theme.

International organizations and Initiatives

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Relevant IO’s/Initiatives: International Agreements International Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1887 and 1540 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) G8 Global Partnership (GP) Global Threat Reduction Initiative Non-governmental Organizations and Industry activities and initiatives Will review some of these in the upcoming slides You have seen thee in various slide yesterday and today

International Atomic Energy Agency Communiqué: “Reaffirmed the role of the IAEA in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities.”

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives The IAEA manages and implements a number of activities and programs designed to assist Member States with securing nuclear and radiological materials, responding to nuclear and radiological incidents, and, more generally, enhancing their nuclear security frameworks. IAEA has a unique role in the global nuclear security regime. The IAEA’s involvement in nuclear security issues is wide- ranging and significant.

IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) : Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) : Assists Member States in strengthening their national nuclear security systems. A team of international experts examine the State’s system of physical protection, compare it against international best practices, and make recommendations for improvements. A great service the IAEA provides states is the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Missions. This was created by the agency to assist states in strengthening their national nuclear security regime. IPPAS provides peer advice on implementing international instruments, and agency guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities. During an IPPAS mission, the state’s physical protection system is reviewed and compared with international guidelines and internationally recognized best practices. Based on this review, recommendations for improvements are provided including follow-up activities and assistance. Following IPPAS recommendations, actual upgrades of physical protection systems were initiated in several Member States through bilateral support programs. At the request of a member state, IPPAS assembles a team of international experts who assess the state’s system of physical protection, compare it with international best practices and make recommendations for improvements. IPPAS missions are conducted both on a nation-wide and facility-specific basis.

IAEA Nuclear Security Plan IAEA Nuclear Security Series Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives IAEA Nuclear Security Plan IAEA Nuclear Security Series IAEA Information Circular 225 The objective of the Nuclear Security Plan is to contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction. The objective is also to assist adherence to and implementation of nuclear security related international legal instruments, and to strengthen the international cooperation and coordination of assistance given through bilateral programs and other international initiatives in a manner which also would contribute to enabling the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy and of such applications with radioactive substances. Nuclear security issues relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities are addressed in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidelines series of publications. These publications are consistent with, and complement, international nuclear security instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, UNSCR1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The IAEA has completed its Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities: Information Circular (INFCIRC) 225/Rev. 5. This Information Circular provides guidance and recommendations for developing and implementing the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The United States has long pushed for the INFCIRC/225 to be revised again to address the post 9/11/2001 threat environment and to conform with and provide guidance for implementation of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and UNSCR 1540 obligations. As a result, the latest version, the fifth revision, provides guidance for planning and implementing effective physical protection regime.

United Nations Communiqué: “Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations” Work Plan: “Noting the need to fully implement UNSCR 1540 …in particular as it relates to nuclear material” U.S. Statement at the NSS: “At the United Nations, we unanimously passed UNSCR 1887 endorsing the goal of securing all nuclear materials…”

UNSCR 1887 Relevant Provisions “Expressing its support for the convening of the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security, “Affirming its support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, “Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years

UNSCR 1540: Three Primary Obligations To refrain from providing support to non-State actors seeking WMD, under UN Chapter VII First formal decision taken by the Security Council to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security To prohibit non-State actors from engaging in specified activities relating to WMD, including the acquisition and use, attempted acquisition and use, and the financing of the acquisition and use of such items. To take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. Ambassador Heller will discuss UNSCR 1540 in more detail UNSCR 1540 Proliferation of WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security

UNSCR 1540 UNSCR 1540 does not alter the “rights and obligations” of state parties to other treaties and regimes. Provides a flexible system that responds to assistance requests and coordinates with other governments on technical assistance to enable recipients to meet their 1540 obligations Works in coordination with other programs. 1540 sets out obligations for States, and States have discretion on how to implement their obligations.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) Communiqué: “Recognize the role and contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism” Work plan: “Participating States encourage…expanded participation in and commitment to international initiatives and voluntary cooperative mechanisms aimed at improving nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism.”

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) International partnership of 82 nations and 4 observers that works to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism. Co-Chaired by the U.S. and Russia. Shares best practices and facilitates coordination with pre- existing efforts to assist partners in strengthening their nuclear security capacities. Conducts multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations. Partners make a political commitment to implement the Statement of Principles on a voluntary basis. All partners have endorsed the Statement of Principles, which is a set of core nuclear security principles encompassing the full spectrum of deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives. The goal of all GICNT activities is to develop plans, policies, and procedures to assist GICNT partners in building and enhancing their capabilities. These activities provide an opportunity for partner nations to share information and expertise in a voluntary, non-binding framework. GICNT events are only open to GICNT Partners and Official Observers. To become a partner, a nation just writes an official letter endorsing the Statement of Principles and seeks the approval of both of the Co-Chairs (the U.S. and Russia).

Introduction of GICNT’s Implementation and Assessment Group (AIG) The AIG is an informal advisory body of partners which, upon direction of the GICNT Plenary, coordinates activities and works to create practical products that aid partners in implementing the Statement of Principles In June of 2010, Spain was endorsed as the first AIG Coordinator Oversees working groups focused on developing products related to key GICNT functional areas such as nuclear detection and nuclear forensics All products are shared via a secure online web-portal accessible only to GICNT partners The IAG was activated by the GICNT Plenary Meeting in June 2010. It essentially serves as the “working arm” of the GICNT. Current working group leads are Netherlands (nuclear detection) and Australia (nuclear forensics) Example Products: Best Practices or Core Competencies, Model Action Plans, minimum capabilities, etc.

G8 Global Partnership Communiqué: “Recognize the role and contributions of the G8-led Global Partnership” Work Plan “Participating States welcome the intent of the G-8 Global Partnership…to undertake additional programming to enhance nuclear security”

G8 Global Partnership Initial focus on Russia/FSU but now global focus Mission: To keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists or states that support them. Pledge of $20 billion (2002 – 2010) from 23 partners. More than $18 billion allocated to date. Primary multilateral commitment to finance, implement, and coordinate WMD threat reduction activities globally. Initial focus on Russia/FSU but now global focus Annual Annex Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States

G8 Global Partnership Successes: Improved accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials. Enhanced nuclear, biological, and chemical security. Dismantled nuclear submarines and safe storage of removed spent fuel. Improved detection of nuclear and radiological materials and prevented illicit trafficking by improving border security capabilities. Engaged and redirected to peaceful purposes scientists, technicians, and engineers who have WMD, missile, and related expertise.

G8 Global Partnership Muskoka Summit (2010): G8 leaders: Asked senior experts to evaluate results to date. Asked senior experts to develop options for programming and financing beyond 2012 focusing on: Nuclear and radiological security. Biosecurity. Scientist engagement. Facilitating implementation of UNSCR 1540. Reiterated interest in the potential participation of additional countries. Current efforts Extension beyond 2012 Implementation of expansion of activities beyond Russia and the FSU Projects will continue in Russia and FSU Last year first time Annex has global annex New Partners New Activities

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Non-governmental bodies: Nongovernmental organizations, nuclear industry, private sector and other stakeholders play an important role in the global effort to secure nuclear material Communiqué: “Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture”

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives Work Plan: “Participating States will promote cooperation, as appropriate, among international organizations, governments, other stakeholders, and academia for effective capacity building.” WINS:

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives World Institute for Nuclear Security. Goal: help improve security of nuclear and high hazard radioactive materials so that they are secure from unauthorized access, theft, sabotage and diversion and cannot be utilized for terrorist or other nefarious purposes. Provides an international forum for those accountable for nuclear security to share and promote the implementation of best security practices. Produces international best practices guides, hosts workshops, and produces a number of other related publications. Its members consist of both organizations and individuals to have some accountability for nuclear security. It promotes different organizations working together in partnership.

Cooperation and Coordination with Relevant International Organizations/Initiatives The international NGO community hosted an event on the first day of the Nuclear Security Summit to raise awareness of the importance of nuclear security among the NGO community The day following the Nuclear Summit, the international nuclear industry representatives met to discuss issues related to nuclear security and the special role they play in these issues. Also meetings on margins of the Sherpa meeting in Argentina.

Additional Relevant Initiatives Include Capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation Promotion of a nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, engagement and training Cooperation to prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking Sharing of information and expertise on nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement

Additional Relevant Initiatives Include Regional organizations Centers of Excellence and Regional Training Centers Export controls and border security Global Threat Reduction Initiative ISTC: US, Canada, Japan, EU - The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) is an intergovernmental organization connecting scientists from Russia, Georgia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with their peers and research organizations in Canada, EU, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway and the United States. Since 1995, when the first Armenian project was launched, ISTC has funded 163 science projects to a total value of 38.6 million USD ISTC facilitates international science projects and assists the global scientific and business community to source and engage with Russian and CIS institutes that develop or possess an excellence of scientific know-how. STCU: Canada, EU, US - The Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of expertise related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The STCU vision: for a safer and better world, to assist former WMD experts in the transition to self-supporting, peaceful activities in the international science and business communities...and to do so using the best professional practices. Since 1993, private companies and government agencies from the European Union, United States, and Canada have used the STCU to manage over 1430 R&D projects, worth over $200 million. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entered into force on 8 February 1987 and as of 30 June 2008 had 136 Parties as signatories. The Convention is the only legally binding international instrument in the area of physical protection of nuclear material and one of the 13 international counter-terrorism instruments. It establishes measures related to the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses related to nuclear material. On 8 July 2005, States Parties to the CPPNM adopted by consensus an Amendment to the CPPNM. Whereas the obligations for physical protection under the CPPNM covered nuclear material during international transport, the Amendment to the CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It also provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences. The Amendment will enter into force when it has been ratified by two-thirds of the States Parties of the Convention. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: The Convention imposes an obligation on State parties to establish the offences within the scope of the Convention as criminal offences under their national laws and to make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties, which take into account their grave nature. Further, the Convention imposes the obligation to establish jurisdiction, territorial as well as extra-territorial, as may be necessary, over the offences set forth in the Convention. IAEA: In March 2002, the IAEA Board of Governors approved a three-year plan of activities in the area of nuclear security and the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF), to which Member States were called upon to contribute. The NSF was established to support, amongst others things, the implementation of nuclear security activities to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. Annual progress reports on the implementation of the NSF were provided in 2003 and 2004. In 2004, the General Conference invited continued implementation of the Agency’s three-year Nuclear Security Plan of Activities. The Fund was extended when, in September 2005, the IAEA Board approved a new Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2006-2009. In September 2009, the Board of Governors approved a new Nuclear Security Plan covering the period 2010–2013. GTRI – to provide international support for countries’ own national program to secure nuclear and radiological materials 1. Convert research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel 2. Remove and secure excess nuclear and radiological materials 3. Protect at-risk nuclear and radiological materials from theft or sabotage The US GTRI cooperating with the IAEA and over 100 countries to reduce the nuclear risk

Next Steps and Conclusion

Coordination Mechanisms Initiatives themselves provide coordination International organizations provide coordination mechanisms Need to strengthen and solidify existing coordination efforts Work Plan provides a mechanism for coordination Future NSS meetings a venue to continue discussions on this topic Initiatives: GICNT, GP, 1540 IAEA Need to harness and keep this going forward

Cooperation and Coordination: A Continuous Effort Need to continually address challenges of cooperation and coordination How does the work of the IO’s and the initiatives work together to achieve the larger goal of nuclear security What are the viable existing mechanisms that can be used to help promote coordination and cooperation How to we emphasize the strengths of particular organizations or initiatives to minimize redundancies How do we incorporate the work of organizations outside the government into government efforts Some of these are being address and we need to continue to focus on how we do this. It is a constant effort.

Conclusions WMD proliferation and terrorism is a global threat International cooperation is imperative Important to work through and with international organizations and engage in international initiatives Requires a multi-disciplinary approach encompassing many activities that must be sustained Enhanced coordination and implementation will improve outcomes.

Thank You