Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science POSC 2200 – Modern Conflict Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

Unit Five: Modern Conflict “Managing Insecurity, The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s)” Required Reading: Globalization of World Politics, Chapter 23. John Mueller. “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security, Vol. 13(2), (Fall 1988), Pp. 55-79. Outline: The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction? History of Disarmament and Arms Control The Global Non-Proliferation Regime Contemporary Challenges Conclusions

1) The Impact of “WMD’s”: “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s)”: Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons distinguished by their lethality and inability to discriminate targets E.g. Non combatants likely to be killed Usually have to combined with a method of “delivery” –missiles etc. What is the value of these capabilities? Cheaper then conventional armies – ultimate form of asymmetric warfare Highly effective form of deterrence Can be a significant source of compelence and political leverage E.g. North Korea

Drawbacks? Risk of proliferation (?) = increases risk of use “Horizontal Proliferation”: More states/actors develop WMD’s “Vertical Proliferation”: Those that have WMD capabilities create more . . . . Realism: Could make general war obsolete (Waltz) Or . . . .

John Mueller: “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons” Responding to central Realist explanation of the “long post war peace” Caused by nuclear weapons? Source of restraint War amongst great powers less likely Mueller: Horrors of WWII & “satisfaction of winners” made post war period peaceful – not nuclear weapons

John Mueller: “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons” Example of “misperception” – belief system? Realist believe evidence of peace fits existing theory focused on power capabilities . . . Leads Waltz to believe that gradual WMD proliferation may not be a problem! Peace may be explained by other factors – Realists may be learning wrong lesson from history . . . !

Drawbacks? Risk of proliferation (?) = increases risk of use “Horizontal Proliferation”: More states/actors develop WMD’s “Vertical Proliferation”: Those that have WMD capabilities create more . . . . Realism: Could make general war obsolete (Waltz) Or . . . . Could radically redistribute power – raises possibility of preemptive wars (Waltz?) Other Approaches: Use of WMD’s is likely

2) History: “Arms Control”: Restrictions on the research, manufacture and deployment of certain kinds of weapons systems Reduce the spiral effect of arms races – limit growth Prevent proliferation of dangerous weapons “Disarmament”: The Policy of eliminating states’ offensive weaponry Reduce stockpiles of weapons - All, or some kinds Both key aspects of liberal approach to “managing insecurity”

Motivations? 1) Reduce tensions that lead to war . . . General liberal belief that “security dilemma” can be reversed through cooperation 2) Save $$$$ Periods of arms control correspond with financial problems 3) Reduce environmental and health hazards E.g. Nuclear weapons testing Great Depression and financial problems of 1970s-1990s

History: Why? Generally, arms control a 20th Century phenomenon Changing technology – weapons became increasingly lethal from WWI onwards . . . . Est. 40,000,000 casualties

Post WWII: Nuclear Arms Control Problem: Rapid growth in number of nuclear weapons The “missile gap” 25 Treaties since 1963

3) The Nuclear Global Non-Proliferation Regime Two major components: Bilateral efforts to control “vertical proliferation”/support disarmament (USA and USSR/Russia) Multilateral efforts aimed at “Horizontal Proliferation” E.g. the “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”

A) Bilateral Efforts (US and USSR): “Strategic Arms Limitations Talks – SALT I & II” (1972 & 1979) Tried to stop growth – stabilize arms race Freeze in number of offensive weapons “Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty – ABM” (1973) Agreed to stop developing missile defense systems Systems would destroy incoming missiles Thought to be destabilizing (e.g. Deterrence) US withdrew in 2002 . . . .

End of “Cold War” – States intensify arms control efforts: “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START I” (1991): Nuclear warheads reduced to 6,000 each 1,600 “delivery vehicles” Expired 2009 “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – START II” (1993) Nuclear warheads to be reduced to 3,000 each (2007) “MIRV’s” banned Treaty never ratified – Russian response to US missile defense initiatives

“Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty – SORT” (2002): Further 2/3 reduction in number of warheads No limitations on MIRV’s Expired last year!

Bilateral Efforts: Success? Problems? Number of warheads cut by at least 80% Helped manage the breakup of the Soviet Union – only Russia became a nuclear power Problems? MAD doctrine remains in place “Tactical” weapons unregulated U.S. “National Missile Defense (NMD)” program since 1999 has blocked new agreements . . .

US National Missile Defense Initiative: “Deterrence” and WMD’s a) “Second Strike Capability”: Ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons in event of surprise attack E.g. “SSBN’s” Impact so negative aggressor will not risk attack b) “First Strike Capability”: Ability to launch a first strike that eliminates possibility of second strike If feasible, this reduces deterrence(!) Warsaw Pact – who is it Mirror opposite of NATO

US National Missile Defense Initiative: Response to “Horizontal Proliferation”: = Create capability to shoot down incoming missiles Implications: Reduces possibility of successful “first strike capability” against US Reduces possibility of successful “second strike capability” for other states Impact on “balance of power” and stability? Impact on WMD arms control? Impact on Canada?

B) Multilateral WMD Arms Control: Focused on “proliferation” of dangerous weapons – WMD’s but consistent with the security concerns of powerful states (!) 1) “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT)” (1968, renewed 1995) Bans sales, acquisition and production of nuclear weapons in all states not recognized as nuclear powers: “NWS” = US, UK, Russia, France and China “Non-nuclear states” subject to IAEA inspections

2) “Partial Test Ban Treaty” (1963): Banned atmospheric and underwater testing of nuclear weapons Number of tests higher after the treaty (!) Did not ban underground tests 3) “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)” (1996-?): Proposed complete ban on nuclear weapons tests – supported by UN General Assembly Legally binding if all 44 countries with atomic energy ratify treaty Status = ? Undermined by existing nuclear powers France, Britain, Russia all ratified China, Israel, India, Pakistan and the US have not – though some not testing

4) “Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)” (1995): Most “producers” of technology capable of delivering, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons have agreed to not share with non-nuclear states . . . but the agreement does not appear to be very effective(?) Missile technology is easy!

4) Contemporary Challenges: Criticisms of the “Global Non-Proliferation Regime”: Too focused on nuclear weapons – chemical, biological and radiological weapons are equally concerning Unfair! – NWS get to keep their capabilities Regime does not deal with the risks posed by “sub-state” or “transnational actors” E.g. Post Cold War stockpiles of “legal” Soviet WMD’s increased likelihood terrorists could get them “Horizontal proliferation” is happening anyway!

Non-proliferation regime under strain? Proliferation is easy and it is the “fast track” to international power The NPT’s – the “lying liars and the lies they tell” club Israel? Libya and Iraq? North Korea? Iran? The “New Nuclear Powers” Indian and Pakistan However, most states have honored the treaty despite incentives to break it

Number of Nuclear Weapons Detonations?

5) Conclusions – Security, War & Strife: 1) Is conventional “general war” becoming obsolete? Yes, but . . . mechanisms of preventing war focus mainly on these kinds of conflicts E.g. “collective security” 2) Why is modern war a mainly “southern” phenomenon? Because southern states lack power to deter attack (Waltz) Because northern states have a normative consensus against war with each other (Mueller) Because that’s where the “failed states” and humanitarian violations occur . . . .

“International Trade and Finance” 5) For Next Time . . . Unit Six: International Political Economy “International Trade and Finance” Required Reading: Globalization of World Politics, Chapters 16 and 27.