1. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC DCSINT

2. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations OPFOR FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force: Operations Introduction

3. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT To obtain an overview and understanding of the OPFOR doctrine as contained in FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force: Operations Purpose: In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military. -General Douglas MacArthur FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations OPFOR

4. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT FM 7-100.1 Organization Introduction Chapter 1: Strategic Framework Chapter 2: Command and Control Chapter 3: Offensive Operations Chapter 4: Defensive Operations Chapter 5: Information Warfare Chapter 6: Reconnaissance Chapter 7: Fire Support Chapter 8: Aviation Chapter 9: Air Defense Support Chapter 10: Engineer Support Chapter 11: NBC and Smoke Operations Chapter 12: Logistics Chapter 13: Airborne, Special-Purpose Forces, and Amphibious Operations

5. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Training for the COE Operational Environment (OE) – a composite of the conditions, circumstance, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. (JP 1-02) Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) – the OE that exists in the world today and is expected to exist in the clearly foreseeable future. (FM 7-100)

6. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT COE Premises No peer competitor until 2020 or beyond Nations will continue to field armed forces –Their actions may cause U.S. intervention –Develop diplomatic and military plans to deal with U.S. intervention –Modernize armed forces within economic constraints Advanced technology available on world market Non-state actors in any regional conflict Variables other than military capabilities affect operations

7. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables of COE Nature and stability of the state Regional and global relationships Economics Sociological demographics Information Physical environment Technology External organizations National will Time Military capabilities

8. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT How strong or how weak Where is the real strength Who is in charge Nature and aims of military campaign Kinds of threats present Kosovo, August 2001 Critical Variables Critical Variables Nature and Stability of the State

9. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Political, economic, military, or cultural Alliances and coalitions Opponents can influence our coalitions Add to military capability and broaden scale of military operations Unpredictability Nonaligned states Critical Variables Critical Variables Regional and Global Relationships

10. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT “Haves” and “have-nots”“Haves” and “have-nots” Economic differences can cause conflictsEconomic differences can cause conflicts Economic vs military superiorityEconomic vs military superiority Ability to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operationsAbility to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operations Regional and global relationships can result in military or political assistanceRegional and global relationships can result in military or political assistance “Haves” and “have-nots”“Haves” and “have-nots” Economic differences can cause conflictsEconomic differences can cause conflicts Economic vs military superiorityEconomic vs military superiority Ability to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operationsAbility to buy military technology or to conduct prolonged operations Regional and global relationships can result in military or political assistanceRegional and global relationships can result in military or political assistance TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Economics

11. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Cultural, religious, ethnic Extreme devotion to a cause Sympathetic to enemy cause Refugees and displaced persons Urban environments (cities) Impact of local population Cultural, religious, ethnic Extreme devotion to a cause Sympathetic to enemy cause Refugees and displaced persons Urban environments (cities) Impact of local population Critical Variables Sociological Demographics

12. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Information-based society and information technology -Computers -Other information systems -Civilian and military sectors Information warfare -Computer warfare -Information attack -Psychological warfare -Deception Critical Variables Critical Variables Information

13. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Media and global information flow -Transparency (access to data) -Publicize U.S. mistakes and failures -Sway public and political opinion Situational awareness -Home field advantage -Commercial systems -Human networks Critical Variables Critical Variables Information

14. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Terrain and weatherTerrain and weather Less complex and open environments favor the U.S.Less complex and open environments favor the U.S. Military forces are optimized for certain environmentsMilitary forces are optimized for certain environments Enemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantageEnemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantage Terrain and weatherTerrain and weather Less complex and open environments favor the U.S.Less complex and open environments favor the U.S. Military forces are optimized for certain environmentsMilitary forces are optimized for certain environments Enemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantageEnemies will try to use urban environments and other complex terrain to their advantage Critical Variables Physical Environment

15. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT What nations and others can — –Develop and produce –Purchase and import Overmatch U.S. systems in selected niche areas TRADOC DCSINT Adaptive counters to U.S. technological advantage Example: Advanced antiaircraft weapons could threaten U.S. air superiority Example: Advanced antiaircraft weapons could threaten U.S. air superiority Critical Variables Technology

16. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT

17. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT International humanitarian relief Transnational corporations Other civilian noncombatants –Diplomatic personnel– Tourists –Government employees– Media Critical Variables Critical Variables External Organizations

18. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Critical Variables Critical Variables External Organizations (Continued)

19. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT People, government, and military Objectives and duration of a conflict Attack the opponent’s national will and try to preserve your own U.S. national will as a vulnerability —a strategic center of gravity Victory often depends on will Critical Variables Critical Variables National Will

20. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Time drives decision making and operations Opponents see time as being in their advantage - Adjust the nature of the conflict - Prepare for adaptive operations - Dictate the tempo - Seize opportunities - Outlast the U.S. will to continue Critical Variables Time

21. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Most critical and complex variable Interacts with other variables Measured in relative terms Conventional against local or regional actors Critical Variables Military Capabilities Adaptive approaches against the U.S.

22. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Enemy, Threat & OPFOR Key terms –Enemy –Threat –Opposing force Cold War OPFOR Contemporary OPFOR Contemporary threats and other actors –Nation-state actors –Non-state actors –Real-world and training considerations

23. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT paramilitary or military in opposition The individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. (FM 101-5-1) adversaryopponent IN SHORT: An adversary or opponent. Enemy

24. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT (AR 350-2, Opposing Force Program) with intentions and military capabilitiesthat suggest mean challenge the int Stat Any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies. Threat (Potential Adversary)

25. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Military and/or paramilitary forces Nation-state and/or non-state actors Training tool Challenging and non-cooperative sparring partner Has strengths and weaknesses Thinks and acts differently Opposing Force (OPFOR)

26. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT potential adversary An organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force. AR 350-2 (1976). Cold War OPFOR Berlin Wall

27. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Many Possible Threats CONUS-Based Forces Capability to Move Our Forces Broad Range of Missions Worldwide Mobile and Lethal Forces Somalia Panama Haiti Bosnia Kosovo Desert Storm Afghanistan ??? Mission Focused on Soviet-Bloc Threat:  Soviet Union  Warsaw Pact  North Korea  Cuba Forward-Deployed Forces Overseas But We Fought Elsewhere ??? Iraq Grenada Cold War Army Today’s Army The Army of 2020 and Beyond The Army of 2020 and Beyond How the World Has Evolved… What kind of OPFOR is needed to train for COE ?

28. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT. A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces. A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces. Contemporary Opposing Force AR 350-2 (2004)

29. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Who are the actors (participants)? Nation-states (countries) Non-state actors Contemporary Threats & Actors

30. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Core states Transition states Rogue states (hostile) Failed or failing states (instability) Countries can switch categories Multinational alliances and coalitions Nation-State Actors

31. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Rogue Actors Insurgent Terrorist Drug-trafficking Criminal Non-State Actors

32. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Refugees/IDPsRefugees/IDPs International humanitarian relief organizationsInternational humanitarian relief organizations Refugees/IDPsRefugees/IDPs International humanitarian relief organizationsInternational humanitarian relief organizations TRADOC DCSINT Transnational corporationsTransnational corporations MediaMedia Transnational corporationsTransnational corporations MediaMedia Non-State Actors Non-State Actors Third-Party Actors

33. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Contemporary OPFOR Characteristics Baseline OPFOR –“The State” Described in terms of eleven critical variables of COE Not a peer competitor to the U.S. Dominant in the region Capable of challenging the U.S. in the region Forces designed for regional threats –Broadened context –Terminology

34. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Contemporary OPFOR Characteristics (Continued) Flexible Thinking Adaptable Initiative

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36. Previous Slide TRADOC DCSINT Introduction Introduction Summary FM 7-100.1 organization COE premises COE critical variables Enemy, threat and OPFOR Nation-state and non-state actors Contemporary OPFOR characteristics