1. Defense Acquisition University 21st Annual Symposium
Colonel Robert Gearhart, USMC
Division Chief, J6I
Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J6)
The Joint Staff
Good morning and thank you for that nice introduction. i am honored to be here at this important conference and thank you for allowing me to “pinch hit” for the chairman…I will do my best to represent him.
june is an important month in the history of the united states' military. on this date in 1918, the marines were awarded the croix de guerre from the french for their heroic actions at belleau wood. in just days we will also celebrate the anniversary of two of the biggest turning points of world war ii, the battle of midway [was fought on the 4th of june 1942] and the invasion of normandy [was the 6th of june 1944.]
i selected those two major turning points in world war ii, BECAUSE the united states’ military is again at a turning point. we are at the brink of a TRANSFORMATION in the way we conduct JOINT FORCE operations.
JOINT VISION 2020 AND MORE RECENTLY THE JOINT OPERATIONS CONCEPTS DESCRIBE A “NETWORKED” FORCE LINKED AND SYCHRONIZED IN TIME AND PURPOSE. THIS JOINT FORCE IS CAPABLE OF FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE BASED ON ITS ABILITY TO SENSE, UNDERSTAND, AND ACT FASTER THAN ANY ADVERSARY IN ANY SITUATION. A TERM USED OFTEN to DESCRIBE JOINT OPERATIONS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT IS NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS.
1 JS SLIDE PRESENTATION.ppt

2. What is Network Centric Operations?
A “networked” Joint Force that is linked and synchronized in time and purpose
Decisive combat power derived from a fully connected and interoperable force
Shared battlespace awareness
Faster decision cycles… increased tempo
Information, knowledge, & decision superiority
Revised methods of conducting operations / C2?
Reduced sensor-to-shooter kill chain time
Massed “effects” rather than forces
IN ITS SIMPLEST CONTEXT, NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS TRANSLATES INFORMATION INTO A DECISIVE WARFIGHTING ADVANTAGE. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS NEW FORCE ARE: INFORMATION SHARING, COLLABORATION, SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE BATTLESPACE, AS WELL AS KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMANDER’S INTENT. THIS INFORMATION ADVANTAGE TRANSLATES INTO A WARFIGHTING ADVANTAGE THAT IMPROVES COMMAND DECISIONS AND SUPPORTS “EFFECTS” BASED TARGETING, RESULTING IN INCREASED LETHALITY IN COMBAT.
FIRST LET ME STRESS THAT the network ALONE DOES NOT CREATE NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS. ADMITTEDLY, WITHOUT ROBUST C4 CAPABILITIES, YOU CANNOT CREATE A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT. BUT C4 IS REALLY AN ENABLER. ROBUST CONNECTIVITY, COMMUNICATION AND SHARED AWARENESS IS WHAT CREATES THE ENVIRONMENT necessary FOR NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS, AND is what will DRAMATICALLY INCREASE MISSION EFFECTIVENESS.
Second, and more importantly, i believe that transformation to network centric operations is one of the most complex, difficult, and far-reaching initiatives ever attempted.

3. The “Playing” Field Shooters Sensors Command & Control People Networks
We all know what the “playing field” is:
Resources spent modernizing / developing new sensors
Resources towards creating , fielding, modernizing new shooters or called “Effectors” to support EBO (Effects Based Operations)
Developing new C2 capabilities: Maximizing shared awareness, collaboration and info sharing
Must educate current and future leaders to maximize the capabilities of a network centric environment
Networks being built, linking:
Sensors (regardless of the platform)
Shooters (regardless of Service)
Decision makers (regardless of the location)
Networks

4. The Global Information Grid
i’d like to spend a few minutes discussing THE CONDITIONS FOR Creating thIS netWORK centric environment. one of THE DEPARTMENT’S top priorities is the development and fielding of critical technologies that will set the conditions for network centric operations. The gLOBAL iNFORMATION gRID is a STRATEGIC TO TACTICAL internet-LIKE infrastructure that ALL UNITS CAN plug INTO FROM ANY WHERE IN the WORLD. ultimately, EVERYTHING WILL HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO BE LINKED ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID. ALL SENSORS, SHOOTERS, C2 PLATFORMS, LOGISTICS SYSTEMS.
TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED END-STATE OF A ROBUSTLY NETWORKED FORCE, THE JOINT FORCE REQUIRES AN INCREASE IN BANDWIDTH CAPABILITY AT ALL LEVELS, AND A FOUNDATION FOR IMPLEMENTING COMMON DATA STANDARDS AND SERVICES THAT FOSTERS INFORMATION SHARING… BUT BEYOND INCREASED BANDWIDTH ITSELF, WE NEED TO MAKE SURE THAT WE ARE USING THE BANDWIDTH THAT IS AVAILABLE IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER.
THE OBJECTIVE OF DOD IS TO PROVIDE INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) BASED SOLUTIONS AND PLATFORMS THAT MAXIMIZE THE USE OF SPACE, HIGH-SPEED FIBER OPTICS, AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE JOINT FORCE, POLICY MAKERS, AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL.
Every battlespace entity is a potential node

5. Potential Impacts of a Network Centric Force
What are the implications to doctrine, joint force organization, and the conduct of warfare of the Task, Post, Process, Use (TPPU)?
Unity of Effort vs. Unity of Command
How does the Joint Force Commander “manage critical information” in a “sea” of data?
Is decentralized execution feasible where higher level commanders and staffs will have near real time situational awareness and access to information?
Blurring of the lines between strategic / tactical level
How much to do we automate the “kill chain”?
Do will allow C2 systems to clear fire in close proximity to troops or civilians?
Impact on current processes for fire support coordination?
Impact of JTRS, where every platform is a potential node? Component vs. JFC positioning of network nodes to support objectives?
How do we manage the network? Does the J-6/G-6 direct the placement of weapon systems to support the network?

6. Forces vs. Bandwidth DEPLOYED FORCES BANDWIDTH 3200 250 99
542,000
350,000
This chart contrasts the number of deployed forces in Desert Storm, Kosovo and Enduring Freedom with the amount of bandwidth used. A pretty dramatic comparison. OIF 30 times the BW, half the troops. If you didn’t think ones and zeroes were important this certainly should make you reconsider.
BANDWIDTH IS A CRITICAL ENABLER TO A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT. THIS CHART CONTRASTS THE NUMBER OF DEPLOYED FORCES IN DESERT STORM, NOBLE ANVIL (KOSOVO) AND ENDURING FREEDOM & IRAQI FREEDOM WITH THE AMOUNT OF BANDWIDTH USED. A PRETTY DRAMATIC COMPARISON. OIF AND OEF USED 30 TIMES THE BANDWIDTH BUT DEPLOYED JUST OVER HALF THE TROOPS. THIS HIGHLIGHTS THE INCREASED EMPHASIS AND IMPORTANCE OF MOVING INFORMATION.
THAT SAID, I’D LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT THAT WE NEED TO BE SMARTER ABOUT HOW WE WRITE APPLICATIONS AND INSTILL SOME DISCIPLINE IN OUR PROCESSES TO MAXIMIZE EFFICIENT USE OF OUR BANDWIDTH.
250 99
51,400
DESERT STORM
NOBLE ANVIL
ENDURING/IRAQI FREEDOM
(2003)
(1991)
(1999)

7. Acquisition Discipline-
Core Enterprise Services (9) + Application Program Interfaces
ELIMINATE BANDWIDTH
CONSTRAINTS
DEPLOY TRUSTED
SERVICES
Identity Mgmt Infrastructure (PKI, Biometrics);
Network Defense (Enterprise Sensor Grid)
IMPROVE
SENSEMAKING
Block 2 (All CESs) in 3 Spirals
Policy & Architecture Direction
NCOW Reference Model
IPV6 Implementation Completed (Goal)
CAC Fully Deployed 40 Gb
Terrestrial HAIPE IP
FY04
FY 05
FY 06
FY07
FY08
FY09
Joint Tactical Radio System
Joint Tactical Radio System
Software Communications Architecture
Software Communications Architecture
Software Communications Architecture
Software Communications Architecture
Provides IP
Provides IP - -
based, self
based, self - -
managed,
managed,
BLOS, mobile data and voice
BLOS, mobile data and voice
Cluster 1 Vehicular & Army Rotary Wing
Cluster 4 Airborne
WNW
Cluster 2 Handheld
communications services
communications services
Cluster 5 Handheld, Manpack, Embedded
IOC
Cluster 3 Maritime & Fixed Station
IOC Cluster 2
IOC Clusters 1,4,5
Cluster 3
GIG Bandwidth Expansion
GIG Bandwidth Expansion
Optical Mesh IP Network
Optical Mesh IP Network
Optical Mesh IP Network
Optical Mesh IP Network
Optical Bandwidth
to Ground Sites
Provides ubiquitous, secure, robust
Provides ubiquitous, secure, robust
Optical Bandwidth to
IPV6
optical IP foundation network
optical IP foundation network
STEP and Teleport sites
Integrated GIG Network
Integrated GIG Network
Integrated GIG Network
Integrated GIG Network
IOC
FOC
TCA SATCOM
TCA SATCOM
FY 11 1 2 3 4
Incorporates mobile/tactical users and
Incorporates mobile/tactical users and
Wideband Gapfiller
Wideband Gapfiller
TSAT (CY10 Launch)
TSAT (CY10 Launch)
Optical IP Networking for
global intelligence via optical cross
global intelligence via optical cross
Joint Operations
Optical Bandwidth Support for
Reachback Capabilities
Wideband Networking
links and EHF IP links
links and EHF IP links
Centers and ISR locations
Additional Global Hawk UAVs
for Deployed Forces
for UAVs and Other ISR
Net
Net - -
Centric Enterprise Services
Centric Enterprise Services
Provides information and data
Provides information and data
WHY ON EARTH WOULD I SHOW A SLIDE OF THIS COMPLEXITY IN THIS SETTING?
[PAUSE]
MY INTENT, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE DETAILS, IS TO SHOW THAT ACQUIRING A NETWORK IS PROBABLY AS COMPLICATED AS PROCURING ANY ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEM. THE BIG DIFFERENCE IS A LOT MORE ORGANIZATIONS ARE INVOLVED. WE MUST HAVE A LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE IN OUR ACQUISITIONS, WHICH MAY MEAN A LITTLE APPETITE SUPPRESSION. FURTHERMORE, WE MUST ACCOUNT FOR TECHNOLOGICAL AND BUDGETARY RISKS AND THE IMPACTS TO OTHER PROGRAMS.
Block 1 (All CESs) in 3 Spirals
services to all GIG users
services to all GIG users -
Enterprise Systems Management -
Messaging -
Discovery -
Mediation -
Collaboration -
User Assist -
IA/Security -
Storage Services -
Application
IA Programs
Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth
Enables trusted computer, networking,
and data services to all GIG users 1 Gb
Terrestrial HAIPE IP 10 Gb
Terrestrial HAIPE IP 40 Gb
Space HAIPE IP(FY2010)
Horizontal Fusion Portfolio Op Op Op Op - - - -
Intel
Intel
Intel
Intel
Data
Data
Data
Data
Applications Processes
Applications Processes
Applications Processes
Applications Processes
Means/tools to enable the smart pull
Global Net -
centric
Improved Shared Access to
Automated
Collaborative
Multi -
INT
Surveillance and
FY 10
and fusion of data by users
Targeting
Collateral ISR data
Tagging of
Collection
Fusion for
Selected Sensor
Management
Warfighters
and Combat
Support Data
Deployment
Improved Shared Access
Improved
ISR Battle
ISR Battle
of Collaborative
to Combat Support
Strategic &
Tactical C2
Management
Applications
Management
to Joint
Data Net -
Centric
ForceNet
ForceNet
Commanders
Enterprise Services
Deployable
Deployable
Future Combat System
Future Combat System
Net
Net - -
Centric DCGS
Centric DCGS
CJTF HQs
CJTF HQs
(FCS)
(FCS)
(examples)

8. Satellite Communications
Advanced Extremely High Frequency System (AEHF)
Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS)
Transformational Communicational Satellite (TSAT)
Bandwidth
Bottomline: Strategic Agility--Delivering mixed capabilities (commercial, military, varying frequencies) to a wide variety of warfighter requirements, anywhere in the world on short notice
Paradigm shift/flip flop during IRAQI FREEDOM: 70%--30% commercial v. MILSATCOM bandwidth; DESERT STORM: 30%-70%
Coalition Information Sharing
Bottomline: Coalition warfighting is a requirement (unilateral ops is unrealistic) and to enable that…we must rapidly share information among varying coalition partners and quickly also adjust mid-fight
Central Command,and European Command efforts were successful for IRAQI FREEDOM, but were ad-hoc and are difficult to duplicate for future actions
Joint Forces Command is leading development efforts create a standardized coalition information sharing architecture as a component of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters initiative
Blue Force Tracking
Bottomline: Blue Force tracking is in its infancy; during IRAQI FREEDOM we provided unprecedented Situation Awareness/SA to the warfighters—we must get better—we still suffer from independent non-interoperable systems development amongst the Services and Combatant Commands
Solution is more than proliferation of tracking devices; it includes integration, interoperability, and dissemination
Final vision is for the availability of accurate, near real time blue force information (to include combat identification) within the joint battlespace
USJFCOM has lead under Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) initiative
Transformational Ground Maneuver
Bottomline: Rapid pace, geographic dispersion and non-linear characteristics of the ground maneuvers outstripped abilities of legacy mobile data communications and C2 systems to support
US Army’s legacy Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), originally designed for voice C2 from semi-permanent nodes, could not fully support C2 requirements—Ground-based mobile communications my from Kilobit circuits to gigabit networks
Must minimize program slippages and synchronize terminal/space segment fielding

9. Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
TCS
GIG-BE R R
Teleport
Teleport R R
THE LAST CRITICAL BANDWIDTH CAPABILITY I’D LIKE TO DISCUSS IS THE JOINT TACTICAL RADIO SYSTEM OR JTRS. JTRS PROVIDES TACTICAL UNITS NETWORK CENTRIC CAPABILITIES THROUGH CONNECTIVITY TO THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID. JTRS IS AN IP-BASED, SOFTWARE PROGRAMMABLE NETWORK DEVICE THAT WILL PROVIDE REAL-TIME VOICE, DATA AND VIDEO COMMUNICATIONS AMONGST JOINT AND COALITION FORCES. LIKE SPACE, JTRS HAS A NUMBER OF TRANSFORMATIONAL IMPLICATIONS.
FOR EXAMPLE, JTRS AS THE BACKBONE NETWORK WILL POTENTIALLY DRIVE US TO HEIGHTENED JOINTNESS LIKE WE HAVE NOT SEEN TO THIS POINT. WE NEED TO BE ARMED WITH COMPREHENSIVE, YET SIMPLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT TOOLS THAT WILL ALLOW JOINT FORCES TO RAPIDLY ADAPT AND MANAGE THE NETWORK IN A FLUID ENVIRONMENT TO MEET OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES.
AGAIN LET ME RE-EMPHASIZE THAT SIMPLER IS BETTER…WE MUST MAKE NETWORK AND CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AS SIMPLE AS OPERATING A HOME ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM…[PAUSE]…WELL, ACTUALLY WE NEED TO MAKE IT SIMPLER THAN THAT, SINCE ONLY MY SON RYAN CAN WORK OUR ENTERTAINMENT SYSTEM.
ANOTHER REASON JTRS IS GOING TO BE AT THE CENTER OF JOINT OPERATIONS IS THAT OUR FUTURE CONFLICTS WILL BE FOUGHT “ON THE MOVE”. TSAT AND THE MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM (MUOS) ARE TWO SPACE PROGRAMS THAT WILL SUPPORT THIS “MUST HAVE” CAPABILITY. WE ARE GOING TO BE CONSTANTLY RECONFIGURING COMMUNICATIONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IN THE FUTURE WE WILL STAND UP NETWORK NODES THAT WILL HAVE TO MOVE WITH THE FIGHT.
IN TODAY’S MILITARY, MOBILITY HAS A NEW MEANING, WE MOVE BOTH COMMUNICATION NETWORK NODES AND PEOPLE. SO WE NEED YOUR HELP IN DEVELOPING SYSTEMS THAT ARE ROBUST AND SUPPORT OUR COMMS ON THE MOVE. IN THE NEXT FIGHT, I CAN EASILY IMAGINE THE DRIVE TO BAGHDAD, AS QUICK AS IT WAS, BEING CONSIDERED SLOW IN COMPARISON.
THE SECOND CRTICAL ENABLER OF A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT IS THE DATA. TO ACHIEVE GOALS SUCH AS REDUCING THE “KILL CHAIN” FROM WHEN A TARGET IS ACQUIRED BY A SENSOR UNTIL A SHOOTER LOCKS ON, WE MUST HAVE FUSED INTELLIGENCE AND SEAMLESS DATA INTEGRATION. WE MUST ALSO DECOUPLE LEGACY C2-TO-SENSOR STOVEPIPE GRIDS AND EXPLOIT MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SHARING OF INFORMATION. R
JTRS

10. Deployable Joint Warfighting
Deployable Joint C4 and C2
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)
Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2)
ANOTHER OVERARCHING PRIORITY IS DEVELOPING AND FIELDING A RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE JOINT WARFIGHTING C4 CAPABILITY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2). THE ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY A JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS IN AN UNCERTAIN AND FLUID ENVIRONMENT IS A TOP PRIORITY WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
IN ADDITION TO CREATING STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATIONS AT EACH REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND AND USJFCOM, THE JOINT FORCE REQUIRES A DEPLOYABLE, SCALABLE AND INTEGRATED C2 INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SUPPORTS A STANDARDIZED SET OF JOINT C2 CAPABILITIES, INTEGRATED APPLICATIONS, AND HARDWARE. THE DEPLOYABLE JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM (DJC2) IS THE MATERIAL SOLUTION FOR PROVIDING A COMMON INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT FOR A SJFHQ OR JOINT FORCE COMMANDER AND STAFF.
THE INTENT IS TO MINIMIZE THE REQUIREMENT TO HAUL SCORES OF SERVERS FORWARD, YET REMAIN SCALABLE AND MOBILE. THROUGH CONNECTIVITY TO THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID, WE WANT TO PROVIDE JOINT COMMANDERS WITH WORLDWIDE ACCESS TO CRITICAL DATA AND SERVICES IN A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT. THE CHALLENGE TODAY IS TO ENSURE THAT DJC2 SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF COMBATANT COMMANDERS AND IS FIELDED ON TIME WITH THE NECESSARY MOBILITY ASSETS AND PERSONNEL TO INSTALL, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM.

11. Multinational Information Sharing
Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) is consistently a top Combatant Command challenge
Technology and lessons learned can also apply to Interagency
There is no perfect solution – but we need to reduce the 84+ programs and initiatives
Coalitions are here to stay
Need secure, timely information exchange
ENABLING INFORMATION SHARING TO IMPROVE JOINT, INTERAGENCY AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS IS A KEY EFFORT. MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY HIGHLIGHTED BY THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS AS ONE OF THEIR GREATEST NEEDS, AND ALSO ONE OF THEIR BIGGEST CHALLENGES. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, IN OUR STUDIES AND WORK, WE’VE FOUND THAT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING EXTEND INTO THE INTERAGENCY AS WELL.
OVER THE YEARS, WE’VE ACCUMULATED A NUMBER OF MULTINATIONAL INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAMS. SOME HAVE BEEN BROAD REACHING AND SOME HAVE BEEN SINGLE USE CAPABILITIES THAT NEVER SEEM TO GO AWAY. I REALIZE THERE IS NO ONE-SIZE FITS ALL SOLUTION, BUT WE DON’T NEED THE 80 PLUS INITIATIVES THAT ARE OUT THERE NOW. WE NEED TO NARROW THE FIELD AND GET ON WITH BUSINESS. WE KNOW WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS ARE AND WE MUST FIELD A CAPABILITY THAT PROVIDES COMMANDERS, AND OUR MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY PARTNERS THE ABILITY TO FREELY EXCHANGE INFORMATION IN A SECURE AND TIMELY MANNER.
Future warfighting will be joint and coalition – relying on Interagency participants!

12. Information Assurance
We need to:
Refine our security posture and TTPs across the board
Field smart tools to alert us on network anomalies, intrusions, attacks and provide forensics
Reduce timelines for complying with Information Assurance Vulnerability Assessments (IAVAs)
A risk taken by one is a vulnerability assumed by all
Improve training standards for everyone who uses, operates and maintains networks
Continually assess and prepare for future threats
THE LAST ITEM I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU TODAY IS INFORMATION ASSURANCE. I’VE MENTIONED THE NEED FOR A SECURE NETWORK A COUPLE OF TIMES, BUT I REALLY CAN’T STRESS SECURITY ENOUGH. AS WE PROGRESS TOWARD NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS THE NETWORK BECOMES OUR CENTER OF GRAVITY AND COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE IS THE ACHILLES HEEL. COMMANDERS NEED TO BE ABLE TO TRUST THE INFORMATION ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID, KNOW IT WILL BE THERE WHEN NEEDED AND THAT IT WILL BE ACCURATE AND AUTHENTIC.
GIVEN OUR INTERCONNECTIVITY, A RISK ACCEPTED BY ONE, BE IT SLOPPY PROCEDURES OR FAILURE TO APPLY A SECURITY PATCH, WILL BE A VULNERABILITY ACCEPTED BY ALL. NOTHING KEEPS ME AWAKE AT NIGHT MORE THAN IMAGINING AN INTRUSION INTO OUR TRUSTED NETWORKS. PLEASE DON’T THINK I BELIEVE OUR NETWORKS ARE NOT WELL PROTECTED. BECAUSE THEY ARE! HOWEVER, WE NEED TO CONTINUE IMPROVING OUR INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND NETWORK DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.
TO THAT END, WE NEED TO FURTHER REFINE THE INFORMATION ASSURANCE ROADMAP. WE NEED TO LOOK AT THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID ARCHITECTURE AND REVIEW CURRENT POLICIES, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES. WE NEED TO DEVELOP HIGH SPEED ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGY THAT WILL SUPPORT SYSTEMS SUCH AS GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID – BANDWIDTH EXPANSION AND TSAT. WE ALSO NEED TO WORK TOWARDS A LONG TERM GOAL OF CREATING A SINGLE, GLOBAL SIGN-ON ENVIRONMENT THAT RECOGNIZES WHO YOU ARE, AND DETERMINES ACCESS TO INFORMATION BASED ON USER PRIVILEGES AND LOCATION. IN THE INTERIM, WE NEED TO REASSESS OUR TOTAL NETWORK SECURITY POSTURE, END-TO-END, ACROSS ALL NETWORKS. LAST, WE NEED TO ESTABLISH A CORPS OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE PROFESSIONALS WHO ARE TRAINED TO A STANDARD AND ENSURE THEY HAVE THE TOOLS TO PROPERLY DEFEND OUR NETWORKS.
FROM A JOINT STAFF PERSPECTIVE, I WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON ADVOCATING THE REQUIRED WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES THAT OUR JOINT FORCES NEED. I BELIEVE IT’S IMPERATIVE THAT WE MAINTAIN OUR SUPERIORITY IN SPACE AND WANT TO ENSURE THAT WE BUDGET AND FUND FOR THESE MUST HAVE CAPABILITIES.
As the network becomes our center of gravity, computer network defense becomes our Achilles heel

13. Conclusion We are at the brink of a major change in warfighting
C4 is the critical enabler to network centric operations
We need to face the many challenges ahead together
Regardless of technology it all comes down to people
The end result will be increased lethality, increased precision and reduced vulnerabilities
IN MY SHORT TIME HERE, I HAVE TRIED TO GIVE YOU A SNAPSHOT OF SOME OF THE JOINT C4 OVERARCHING PRIORITIES. HOWEVER, THERE ARE GOING TO BE BUMPS IN THE ROAD. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A SEA CHANGE IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF WARFIGHTING.
THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES ARE JUST ONE ENABLER THAT WILL CREATE THE ENVIRONMENT FOR NETWORK CENTRIC OPERATIONS. WE WILL NEED TO PUT AS MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE OTHER ENABLERS, SUCH AS CONCEPTS OF OPERATION, ARCHITECTURAL PRODUCTS AND, OR COURSE, TRAINING AND EDUCATION. THERE WILL BE MANY CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES AHEAD AND AS I SAID, THIS IS A JOURNEY. GENERAL MYERS HAS STATED THAT TRANSFORMING OUR ARMED FORCES WILL NOT BE AS MUCH TECHNICAL BUT CULTURAL. THE ELUSIVE “HUMAN FACTORS” ARE SOMETHING WE CANNOT AFFORD TO OVERLOOK.
THE NET RESULT WILL BE A PROTECTED AND INTEROPERABLE NETWORK THAT SUPPORTS JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL FORCES IN ANY AND ALL WARFIGHTING ENVIRONMENTS.
THANKS AGAIN FOR INVITING ME TO SPEAK HERE TODAY, I LOOK FORWARD TO A COUPLE OF VERY PRODUCTIVE YEARS AS WE CHARGE FORWARD TOGETHER IN TRANSFORMING OUR FORCES TOWARDS A NETwork CENTRIC WARFIGHTING ENVIRONMENT.

14. UNCLASSIFIED
Questions?
UNCLASSIFIED

15. Defense Acquisition University 21st Annual Symposium
COL Robert Gearhart
Division Chief, J6I
Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (J6)
The Joint Staff