1. Demographic Trends in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future Sergei V. Zakharov Institute of Demography (IDEM) State University – Higher School of Economics (HSE) Moscow, Russia szakharov@hse.ru Russian Demographic Situation Informal seminar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace January 26, 2012 Washington D.C.

2. Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility During the Demographic Transition in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1980, period 1897-2010 2 Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. Demographic Research. Vol. 19, p.910 ( http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/ ). (Updated for 2010 data) http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/

3. Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2010, per 1000

4. The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: Whether considerable growth of fertility is possible? 4 Optimism of Policy Makers, Pessimism of Theorists and Common Sense of People Common Sense of People

5. Policy makers and general public show unfounded optimism: the fertility problem seems easily manageable and therefore must be solved At ordinary level, it is believed that the money (benefits) solves everything The official ideology (including such an active player as the church) rely on the ideas of traditionalism and national patriotism According to them, the new population policy adopted in 2007, no doubt, gives positive results Professional skepticism is not taken into account 5 OPTIMISM OF POLICY MAKERS

6. Russian Specialists believe that the Change in Future Fertility is not that Uncertain The plausible value is 1.5-1.7 for foreseeable future (up to 2030) Completed cohort fertility tends to stabilize at this level Special adjusted period fertility measures controlling for age and parity stand for that Public opinion surveys about desired and expected number of children support this as well Russian and international experience tell us that family policy focusing on fertility stimulation mostly has tempo rather than quantum effects 6 PESSIMISM OF THEORISTS

7. How would Policy Measures-2007 affect your childbearing-related behavior?, a question of the RusGGS-2007 Would have as many children as planned but sooner then planned – 10% Would have, perhaps, more children than planned – 8% Will certainly have more children than planned – 1% Measures will have no effect: respondents will not change their plans regarding the number and timing of births – 81% 7 COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE

8. 8 Period Parity Progression Ratios: Russia, 1979-2010 Period Parity Progression Ratios: Russia, 1979-2010 (Proportion of women moving from parity n to parity n+1 during the calendar year) VISIBLE EFFECTS OF NEW POLICY MEASURES?

9. Intentions of having the next child, respondents aged 25-35, % ParityGGS-2004GGS-2007GGS-2011 0918587 1717472 2293232 3223020 All646667 COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE

10. Actual and Projected CTFR According to Different Scenarios, Russia, 1930-1985 Birth Cohorts

11. MORTALITY The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: 11 Mortality Decline is a Challenge and a Categorical Imperative

12. Life Expectancy at Birth in G8 Countries, Males (left) and Females (right): 1960-2009 12

13. Proportion of Men and Women of Age 20 expected to live through Age 60: Germany (Western and Eastern), 1960-2005, and Russia, 1960-2009, % 13

14. 14 Correlation between Life Expectancy and Age-Standardized Mortality Rate from Alcohol PoisoningRussia, 1955-2006 (Е. Andreev) Correlation between Life Expectancy (red curve) and Age-Standardized Mortality Rate from Alcohol Poisoning (blue curve): Russia, 1955-2006 (Е. Andreev) Russian Chronic Disease

15. The difference in life expectancy at birth between men and women in selected countries, 2009, HFA

16. Infant mortality rate in some countries, HFA

17. Infant mortality in Russia: ROSSTAT estimates and IDEM estimates adjusted for dead children with low birth weight

18. For Specialists the Uncertainty of Future Mortality Change is High (1/2) Reasons for Optimism: A sustained historical downward trend in infant and child mortality The fight with a dangerous alcohol consumption has started The Health national project has substantially increased public investment in health The program of hypertension control, apparently, has a positive effect Importation of medical technology actively continues 18

19. Life Expectancy in Several Eastern European Countries: 1970-2007 Lessons of Neighbors 19

20. Contribution of age groups and major classes of causes of death to change in life expectancy in Russia, 2005-2010, males

21. Contribution of age groups and major classes of causes of death to change in life expectancy in Russia, 2005-2010, females

22. For Specialists the Uncertainty of Future Mortality Change is High (2/2) Reasons for Pessimism: The long-run trend since mid-1960s is negative Significant fluctuations in mortality at middle (working) ages, which began during the anti-alcohol campaign in the mid of the1980s No signs of the second epidemiological transition (life expectancy in the elderly population is not increasing) System of free public health deteriorates. National programs and reforms in public health are chaotic, inconsistent, and often have the character of PR events. The system of expert evaluations of program effectiveness is absent. 22

23. MIGRATION The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios: 23 Immigration: Salvation or Trojan Horse?

24. 24 Net Migration in Russia: registered in 1970-2008 and adjusted after 2002 Census in 1989-2002, thousands ( annual change of permanent population due to immigration) The Myth of the Rough Stream

25. Uncertainty of Immigration Future: Inconsistent State Policy, Nationalistic Sentiments of Public Russian government policy focuses on bureaucratic measures to combat illegal immigration. The policy of integration and absorption is declarative in nature. Program to bring Russian-speaking and skilled expatriates/ «compatriots» back to Russia is an ineffective propaganda campaign. Socio-cultural distance between migrants and Russian citizens is growing because of the arrival of the titular ethnic groups from Central Asia Extremely low tolerance of the Russian population to migrants, bordering on chauvinism. Significant part of the political elite shares the ideas of conservative nationalism. 25

26. Uncertainty of Immigration Future: a fast growth in numbers of guest workers in response to an increasing demand In Russia, the disproportion between the vast territory and a shrinking population is increasing Sustained growth of the Russian economy is hardly possible not only without structural upgrades, or radically higher returns on human capital, but without an increase in migration The number of migrant workers in the country is increasing rapidly. In 2005 it was 1% of the total employed, in 2010 - more than 10% Russian business lobby reinforces its interest in immigrants 26

27. Projections of Net Migrants Needed to Avoid Population Decline (Replacement Level of Migration) in 2000-2050: Russia and Germany, thousands GermanyRussia Constant Total population Constant Age group 15-64 Constant Total population Constant Age group 15-64 2000-2025 6978118161112015951 2025-2050 10209125141377619805 Total 17187243302489635756 Average per year 330460470680 Source: Replacement Migration. United Nations. 2001. ST/ESA/SER.A/206 27

28. 28 Number of Registered Labor Migrants, millions The total number of labor migrants in Russia is 6-7 millions (estimates of the Independent Center of Migration Studies) Inescapable Reality