1. The Sunshine Mine Disaster: A case study for emergency response

2. Sunshine Mine - Kellogg, Idaho Largest & richest silver mine in US

3. On the morning of May 2, 1972, the mine manager & superintendent away attending shareholder’s meeting

4. 7:00
173 men began work

5. The Path Inside

6. 11:30
Electricians at electric shop on 3700 level, smelled smoke, & shouted a warning

7. Electrical Shop

8. Foreman’s Office
“Blue Room”

9. 11:40
They reported smoke to Foremen Harvey Dionne & Gene Johnson who were eating in “Blue Room”

10. The foremen traveled down to the 910 raise to find source of smoke
They found smoke, but no fire

11. Smoke Location

12. When CO detected, fire doors automatically closed & miners were to travel to #10 shaft to ride “Chippy Hoist” out

13. Evacuation Plan

14. Foremen delayed evacuation for 20 minutes looking for fire

15. Foremen Gene Johnson called for evacuation of mine
12:00
Foremen Gene Johnson called for evacuation of mine
Word spread there was a fire & they were to evacuate

16. 12:05
4400 level crew called for “Chippy Hoist” when they saw smoke in shaft - no response from hoist room

17. The “STENCH” would take 26 minutes to reach all areas
12:05
The safety engineer went to compressor room & activated stench warning system
The “STENCH” would take 26 minutes to reach all areas

18. “Chippy” operator station was overcome by smoke
12:05
“Chippy” operator station was overcome by smoke
Double-drum hoist operator told to prepare to lift people with production hoist
He was still running production & had not heard of fire

19. Most workers aware of fire when smoke entered their workplaces
Men dispatched to relay verbal warnings to others in remote locations
Within a short time of detecting smoke, most workers went to #10 shaft station

20. The main “double drum” hoist not designed to move men
A smaller 12-man car was quickly put in place
The small lift made operation very slow

22. 12:10
Men hoisted to 3100 level & directed to walk one mile out to Jewell Shaft

23. Most had never been to 3100 level before
Normal path out was to ride motor down on 3700 which was full of smoke

24. Evacuation Plan

25. He sent 2 miners to wait by fans & he would give signal to stop fans
Gene Johnson determined intense smoke resulted from short circuit in ventilation system & now making things worse
He sent 2 miners to wait by fans & he would give signal to stop fans
12:30

26. Ventilation Plan
Bad Air
Good Air
Twin 150 hp fans

27. Main fans no longer pull fresh air, they pump bad air to working areas
Short Circuited
Bulk heads meant to control air flow fail forcing smoke through the main shaft
Main fans no longer pull fresh air, they pump bad air to working areas

28. Signal never came & the two were found dead by fans
Foreman Gene Johnson also perished from smoke
With the fans still churning, smoke was forced further into mine

29. Foreman Harvey Dionne remembered an exploration shaft that had been drilled down from under the Jewell
He removed the safety covering to allow fresh air to reach the 4800 level
12:15

30. Exploration Shaft
This 48” shaft was big enough to deliver breathable to the far west section of 4800

31. Jewell shaft was where air entered mine & main travelway for miners

32. He died after helping dozens of men escape lower levels
Greg Dionne took over “Caging” job passing out self-rescuers & helping men use them
He died after helping dozens of men escape lower levels

33. 1:02
All hoisting at #10 shaft ceased when double drum hoist man was overcome

34. 90 Minutes Foremen Give Instructions to Evacuate Smoke Detected
Last Miner Hoisted Out
Surface Notified
Supervisors Look For Fire
Stench Warning Deployed
Warning Reaches Miners
11:30
11:45
12:00
12:15
12:30
12.45
1:00
90 Minutes

35. Those who escaped were not counted either
It was difficult to determine who was still in the mine because the list of workers was kept inside mine at foreman’s office
Those who escaped were not counted either
Most showered & either went home or to a bar called “The Long Shot”

36. The Self Rescuer Question

37. Two Models of were available
BM-1447

38. Not required in hard rock or metal mines in 1972
There was a shortage of W65 rescuers available due to demand from coal mines
W 65
BM-1447

39. Self Rescuer Uses hopcilite to turn CO into breathable CO2
Byproduct of reaction is heat - survivors had 2nd & 3rd degree burns on mouths
Air tests found Oxygen below 5% & CO above 3000 PPM
Oxygen levels below 16% are immediately dangerous to life
Autopsies determined most died within 40 to 60 seconds of exposure

40. Rescue efforts took seven days

43. Two miners, Tom Wilkinson & Ron Flory, were found alive & in good condition at the 4800 level
They were saved by fresh air shaft that Harvey Dionne uncovered by Jewell shaft

44. Safe Zone
The air supplied by the open shaft provided the two miners with a small “safe zone”

45. Probable cause of fire was spontaneous combustion of refuse near scrap timber used to backfill worked out stops
Extensive ground falls & caving occurred in immediate area when timber supports were consumed, making investigation of area impossible

46. that should affect your emergency response plan
5 lessons learned at
Sunshine Mine
that should affect your emergency response plan

47. Understand Murphy’s Law, “Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong”
Lesson #1
“Only shaft fires could create evacuation problems in hard rock mines - the walls aren’t flammable & floor is wet.”
Understand Murphy’s Law, “Whatever can go wrong, will go wrong”
Plan for every contingency

48. Lesson #2
“When manager is away, everyone can pretty well figure out what to do in event of emergency”
Everyone needs to have clearly defined roles
Need to understand what to do & who has authority

49. Assume worst & hope for best
Lesson #3
“The fire may not be that bad. Lets check it out & see if we can take care of it without disrupting production.”
Assume worst & hope for best
Decision to delay evacuation for 20 minutes cost miners their lives

50. Lesson #4
“We have detailed written emergency response plan that exceeds legal requirements. As long as signs in place, we don’t need to train or conduct drills ”
Plan called for miners to be dropped off in a section they had never seen & walk out in poor visibility
A team can have world’s greatest game plan on paper, but if not practiced, it will never work the way they planned

51. Lesson #5
“Our communication system is sufficient. We have “party line” phones on every level & word of mouth can carry message to all working areas.”
“Party line” was jammed with miners trying to figure out what was going on
Emergency communications must be clear, understandable & reach all affected employees

52. What other factors turned this fire into one of the most tragic mine disasters in our nation’s history?

53. 9 Major Factors Contributing to the Severity
(Taken from the final report)

54. 1. Emergency escape way system was not adequate for rapid evacuation

55. 2. Top mine officials were not at mine & no person had been designated as being in charge of the entire operation

56. 3. Company personnel delayed ordering evacuation for 20 minutes while they searched for the fire

57. 4. The series ventilation system used caused all persons to be exposed to smoke & carbon monoxide

58. Some self rescuers provided not maintained in useable condition
5. Most underground employees had not been trained in use of provided self rescuers & had difficulty using them
Some self rescuers provided not maintained in useable condition

59. 6. Mine survival training, including evacuation procedures, barricading, & hazards of gases, such as carbon monoxide had not been given mine employees

60. The emergency fire plan developed by company was not effective & did not conduct evacuation drills

61. 8. Abandoned areas not sealed to exclude contaminated air from entering ventilation air stream

62. 9. Ventilation system controls did not allow isolation of #10 shaft, hoist rooms & service raises or compartmentalization of mine
Smoke & gas able to move unrestricted into almost all workings & travelways

63. REMEMBER THAT ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE

64. This ship builder thought his design could not sink

65. This mayor thought his levees would hold

66. VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
DO YOU HAVE A PLAN FOR…
HEALTH EMERGENCY
FLOOD
TRAGIC ACCIDENT
SUICIDAL TRESSPASSER
DOWNED POWER LINES
TORNADO
PETROLIUM SPILL
HIGHWALL FAILURE
VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
BELT FIRE