1. Securing the Seas in Southeast Asia
Jaime Burnell
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore

2. "Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs
"Uranium could also lead to the construction of bombs. A single bomb of this type, carried by boat and exploded in a port, might very well destroy the whole port together with some of the surrounding territory."
Letter to US President Franklin Roosevelt on 2 August 1939

3. Diving Instruction Manual Recovered from Afghanistan
“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam”
“ Wa a’iddu lahum mastata’tum min quwwatin wa min ribatilkhaili ”
And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war

4. Overview The Context The Geography of Threat Importance of SEA SLOCs
Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain
Intention, Capabilities and Opportunities
Groups with maritime terrorist capabilities in SEA
Response

5. Southeast Asia
Ground zero of maritime threats, both from piracy and terrorism
Home to several Islamist Terror Groups
Al Qaeda network
Planning for USS Cole attack
Planning for attack against US naval facilities and assets
KMM plan to attack an US ship in 2001
Plan to attack an US ship in Surabaya, Indonesia
SuperFerry 14 ( February 2004) – worst maritime disaster

6. Geography of Threat
Straits of Malacca: The busiest shipping line in the world - linking the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific
Sunda and Lombok
The Singapore Straits
Located within or astride geographic archipelagoes, inhibited with large populations with less than ideal social, political and economic conditions
Narrow channels, shallow reefs and thousands of tiny islands - ideal for piracy and other water-borne crimes
Three of the world’s worst piracy zones are the waters off the Muslim nations of Indonesia, Bangladesh and Somalia. Problems posed by sea-borne terrorism are most severe in the Straits of Malacca, transited by 50,000 ships a year, where a combination of traditional piracy and indigenous Muslim extremist movements combine to make maritime passage especially unsettling. Indonesia continues to experience the highest number of attacks, with 103 reported incidents in 2002 and 121 in 2003.
About 50% of world's large ships - oil tankers, container vessels and other bulk carriers - regularly transit the Straits of Malacca, the open sea between Malaysia and Indonesia.
Each day, 600 ships sail through the straits, those carry Asian products to Western markets and bring raw materials to Asia. Half of Asia's oil imports transit the Straits of Malacca

7. Maritime Terrorism
Terrorist attacks against maritime sectors generally rare- 1.9% of all international incidents over last 30 years
Due to:
Most terrorists are tactically conservative
Little experience of the maritime environment
Requires specialist equipment and skills
Profusion of other fixed land targets offering higher visibility and greater ease of access
Overall impact potential low- unless very high profile (USS Cole) and sensational (Achille Lauro, 1985) than media-accessible land targets.
2% is a broad category including attacks on ports
Most terrorists are ‘land-lubbers’ and traditionally tactically conservative: go for tried and trusted methods, opt for the course of least resistance.
This is general, not always true
Often requires specialist equipment and skills
Boat/ship operation
Boarding techniques
International attention
Attacks on ships don’t make headlines the way attacks on aircraft do
Davao vs. Lady Mediatrix
Not a personal connection to the sea
Difficult for media to cover is at sea
Lack of a clear community to be victimized

8. High Profile Maritime Attacks
1974- Hijacking of a Greek freighter in Karachi (Pakistan)
1985- Seizure of the Achille Lauro
February Bombing of a Phillipine ferry (45 killed)
October Suicide attack against USS Cole (17 Killed)
October 2000: LLTE Suicide attack against SL navy
October French Tanker Limburg 158,000 t. of crude oil
February Superferry 14
Potential targets- Queen Mary 2
Oct 23: Suicide bombers ram four boats packed with explosives and sink a navy gunboat and a troop carrier berthed at Trincomalee naval harbour

9. Factors Increasing Perceived Threat Tactical
Restricted operational space on land - Target hardening of land based targets and aviation sector
Opaque and amorphous environment
Vast areas of un-policed waters
Lax port security, poor coastal surveillance, profusion of targets, trend toward ‘skeleton crews’
Terrorists showing increasing tactical sophistication
Increased terrorist resource constraints
Increasing terrorist-criminal nexus esp. piracy

10. Factors Increasing Threat Potential Perceptual/Psychological/ Systemic
Maritime Sector as conduit of Global activity
Perception as alternative venue for mass casualty attacks, targeting LNG carriers/terminals, refineries, petrochemical installations, cruise ships and passenger liners
Copy Cat Phenomenon: Precedent of USS Cole bombing- generated enormous political capital, underscored vulnerability of vessels at port
Lack of a coordinated International Response

11. Assessing Terrorist Threat in the Maritime Domain
When rising interests meet with capability

12. Motivation/Intention
Terrorist Groups known to be using shipping for transport of banned and contraband goods as well as for human smuggling
A shift in strategy towards economic targets –Limburg, Bali, Kenya, Pakistan, Al- Khobar, Istanbul
Al Qaeda:- Inclination to target businesses - smuggling bombs including nuclear or radiological devices
Demonstrated capability to deliver the same tactics time and time again
Can replicate land capabilities in the maritime domain

13. Terrorist Groups with Maritime Terrorist capability
The number of contemporary terrorist groups with a maritime capability is few
The best known are:
PIRA
LTTE
Al Qaeda
The Contras
Palestinian Groups – PFLP, Hamas
ASG, GAM, MILF
PFLP: People’s Front for Liberation of Palestine; Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement IGE:
RUF: Revolutionary United Front Sierra Lone
FARC: The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia; ELN: the National Liberation Army

14. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) ASG- Basilan Island
Hybrid group – about 50% traditional mariners
Links with AQ, JI and LTTE
Based on Basilan Island: Conducted attacks around the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the Southern Philippines, East Malaysia, and Indonesian Kalimantan.
Conducts maritime weapon smuggling operations as far away as Sulawesi and Maluku.
Highly proficient in conducting brown (riverine) and green (coastal and archipelagic) water operations during both night and day.
Blue water capability limited- lack the maritime logistics necessary to sustain extended operations
Links with JI and Al-Qaeda and LTTE
Very Limited
Medium to High

15. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Nadzmi “Commander Global,” planned many maritime operations including the kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001.
Galib “Commander Robot,” led the 2000 Sipadan maritime kidnapping raid.

16. ASG Attacks Sasa Wharf, Davao City- 02 April 2003 Filipina Princess
Superferry 15
These ships were pier-side Sasa wharf, Davao City when it was bombed

17. ASG Attacks SuperFerry 14 - February 2004
Joint operation by ASG, JI and RSM
Worst maritime terrorist act

18. Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippines
Strong links to Al-Qaeda/JI
Demonstrated capability
Our Lady Mediatrix (2000)
Small arms attack on Philippine Navy Ship (2000)
Sasa Wharf, Davao City Bombing (2003)
Allegedly made enquires with North Korea for a possible sale of a mini submarine
Intent limited to their Area of Operations
MILF is the largest, most capable rebel group in the Philippines. It is highly skilled at using IEDs with electronic detonators, and has proven its ability to use these devices against maritime targets such as ports and ferries.
Links
Provided training camps
Osama provided “venture capital”
Believed JI participation in the JI attacks
Continual contact with Indonesian groups.
Our Lady Mediatrix. Ozamiz City. 2 IEDS in coaches. Killed over 50 and wounded over 40.
Only about 50 attacks in history have killed more than 50 people.
May 00- MILF was blamed after a Philippine Navy ship docked in Cotabato City in Mindanao came under attack from grenades and automatic weapons
Sasa Wharf- 2003
Ammonium nitrare, 16 Killed , 55 injured, Two large ferries loading/unloading. One was Superferry 15
similar attack on Davao City Airport
MILF is in continual contact with Indonesian Islamic groups such as JI and Wahdah Islamiyah by way of its maritime smuggling network.
MILF has strong links to Al-Qaeda and JI. In 1999, MILF leader Hashim Salamat admitted to receiving “significant funding” from Osama bin Ladin. MILF, JI, and Al-Qaeda have all planned or executed maritime operations and are likely to have shared share maritime strategies, tactics, and/or equipment. It is believed that the 2003 attacks in Davao city, including one against a port, were a joint MILF/JI operation.
25 Feb IEDs hidden in coaches being carried by Our Lady Mediatrix, a Philippine ferry, exploded when the ship was docking in Ozamiz City. The blast and ensuing fire, stoked by a truckload of dried copra, killed 52 people and wounded 42. The ship was completely destroyed. Government sources blamed MILF for the attack.
An IED killed at least 16 people injured 55 others near the passenger terminal at Sasa wharf, Davao City. The ammonium nitrate-based IED was placed inside a box and left beside a barbecue stall outside the fenced passenger terminal that was packed with passengers, bystanders and vendors. The IED was apparently timed to maximize casualties exploding at 7:13 p.m., just a few minutes after passenger vessel Superferry 15 arrived from Manila and while another vessel, Filipina Princess, was boarding passengers bound for Cebu City. Investigators blamed the attack on a MILF Special Urban Terrorist Action Group (Sutag) working in collaboration with JI and Al-Qaeda. They also suggested the culprits were the same as those responsible for the 4 March 03 bombing of the Davao City airport which killed more than twenty people. 5 Indonesians are among the suspects
Very Limited
Medium to high

19. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) “Free Aceh Movement”
Straits of Malacca - Singapore, West Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Myanmar and into the Indian Ocean as far west as Sri Lanka
Contacts with smuggling syndicates ( narcotics people, stolen goods, petroleum, and arms) and pirate gangs operating across the Straits of Malacca
Very Limited
Medium to high

20. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Sympathizers among ethnic-Acehnese in Penang (Malaysia) and Islamic mariners in Southern Thailand (PULO)
‘Kidnap for Ransom’
Tirta Niaga IV, Exxon Mobil Tender
September 200- claimed protection money from the users of the straits
2001
June 2001, first kidnap for ransom- Tirta Niaga IV
Sept 2001, AP Television report Tengju Ishak Daud, states all ships transiting must request permission
Really happen?
GAM says its TNI
I’ve interviewed them
Ask permission
Malaysian says its TNI
Kidnap for ransom attacks began
First gernade launcher used in SOM (Ocean Silver)
2002
Attack on Exxon Mobil Tender. 9 Indonesian kidnapped
2003
May – Aug 2003 Eight attacks in Aceg
Penrider- Aug Weapons, 14 miles form Port Kelang. Very far south

21. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)
Indonesian Marines burn suspected GAM crafts
Impact of Tsunami
Peace Agreement

22. Al Qaeda
Estimated to have 15 to as many as 300 vessels of varying sizes
“Prince of the Sea” - Abdulrahim Mohammed Abda Al-Nasheri mMasterminded the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden
A 180-page file listing “targets of opportunity,” included large cruise liners sailing from Western ports
Diving manual recovered from Afghanistan -“Let our goal to be the triumph of the religion of Allah and invading the seas and diving to its deeps, lets us make the necessary preparation and power to triumph Islam”
Al-Qaeda’s former chief of naval operations, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, captured in Yemen in November, 2002, has given CIA investigators information that reinforces concerns about plans for terrorist attacks against shipping. Al-Nasheri has reportedly admitted playing a key role in organising the attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg.
Al-Nasheri, nicknamed the Prince of the Sea, is also said to have confessed to planning attacks on shipping in the Strait of Gibralter. Early in 2002, Al-Nashri sent a team of several Afghan-trained Saudis to Morocco to prepare for bomb-laden speedboat attacks on US and British warships as they passed through the strait between the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. Morocco is just 12 miles from Gibralter across the strait. The Moroccan intelligence service foiled the plot but a key operative escaped.

23. Al Qaeda Attacks
Plotted an attack on the British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal as it passed through the Gibraltar Straits to participate in the US led coalition war against Iraq – supported by Salafia Jihadia
Plan to attack NATO ships in the Straits of Gibraltar, thwarted by the Moroccan authorities
Plans to bomb the Fifth Fleet Headquarters in Bahrain
February 2002 plan to hijack a passenger airliner and crash it onto a US warship in the Indian Ocean (AQ Ass. Groups in SA)

24. Jemaah Islamiyah No dedicated maritime organization
Used maritime domain extensively for sending recruits to training camps in Philippines
Conducted covert surveillance of maritime assets in Singapore, including oil refinery facilities on Jurong Island and a US vessel at the Changi Naval Base
Increasing coordination between JI, ASG, MILF and RSM

25. New Configurations- New Threats
SEA terror groups – ASG/MILF/JI currently enhancing their underwater capabilities
2 JI members reportedly training 23 ASG and MILF elements in scuba diving & underwater demolition skills
Upon completion of the training, the graduates will be divided into groups - each tasked to conduct underwater bombings against seaports and vessels in Mindanao
Capability can be replicated elsewhere

26. Conclusion Must focus on degrading the land capabilities of the groups
To change focus: from the land to the sea instead of just ‘At Sea’ - "securing the littoral"
Interdiction and constant disruption of the LIMO capabilities  thereby degrading of "capabilities" and minimising the "opportunities" of the asymmetric maritime threats

27. The risk of terrorist attack can perhaps never be eliminated, but sensible steps can be taken to reduce the risk. The issue here is how seriously do the governments take the threat of maritime terrorism…Post-Limburg, we cannot continue to hope for the best and ignore the lessons.“
(International Maritime Bureau (IMB)of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)