1. Mission Analysis Brief MPAT TE-5
CTF Khokh Chono
05 August 2003

2. Purpose
The purpose is to brief the Commander on the results of the staff’s mission analysis, propose a restated mission and Commander’s intent.
Obtain Commander’s guidance for COA development.

3. Agenda CTF Area of Operations (AO) Threat Situation
Facts / Assumptions / Limitations
Strategic/Operational Centers of Gravity
Tasks (Specified, Implied, Essential)
Force Structure Analysis
Risk Assessment
End states (Operational/Strategic)
Proposed CCTF Restated Mission and Intent Statements
Proposed CCIR
CCTF Feedback / Guidance

4. CTF OPERATIONAL AREA
AYLAND
BELAND
MONGOLIA
CHINA
RUSSIA
BEIJING
ULAANBAATAR
CHOYBALSAN
NOVOSIBIRSK
BUFFER
ZONE
BARUUN URT
Describe CTF Operational area and insert images as appropriate.
TO GIVE YOU A BROAD OUTLINE OF CRISIS ACTION PLANNING:
A SERIES OF LOGICAL STEPS THAT RECOGNIZE A PROBLEM, DEVELOP POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS, THEN ALLOW FOR THE PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF AN OPORD

5. CTF AREA OF OPERATIONS
Ayland
Mongolia
Beland

6. Republic of Ayland Area: 195,311 sq. km (75,410 sq. mi)
Terrain: mountainous (plateau in eastern portion)
Climate: extreme cold winters (-30 C). Short, warm summers
Population: 726,000
Capital and major city: Choybalsan (pop. 125K)
Economic mainstay: agriculture, livestock breeding, mining (copper, molybdenum)
Power: coal
Government: parliamentary democracy
Country formed in 1946, out of post WWII agreements
The Republic of Ayland is located in northeast Asia between Mongolia and Russia, and has an area of 195,311 sq. km (75,410 sq. mi). The total population of the country is 726,000. The capital of Ayland is Choybalsan, with a population of 125,000. The predominant religion is Tibetan Bhudhist Lamaism.
Ayland is generally mountainous. The western part of the country also contains numerous lakes, including the saltwater Uvs Nuur, largest lake in the country, and Khovsgol Nuur, a fresh water lake that contains most of the country’s fresh water. The eastern portion of the country, including the capital, Choybalsan, and the disputed area, is generally flat.
Ayland’s climate is characterized by very cold and long winters, often with little snow. Average daily temperature may drop below -30 C. Summers are short, quite warm and occasionally very wet. Spring and autumn rarely last more than 5-6 weeks. Zud is a weather phenomenon consisting of a blizzard and bitter cold, preceded by a draught.
The economic mainstay of the country has been livestock breeding, mining and agriculture. Ayland has 5 million head of livestock, mostly sheep. Coal provides most of the country’s energy requirements.
Ayland is a parliamentary democracy. The chief of state and head of government is the president, elected by direct popular vote. The country is divided into six provinces and one capital district. Provincial governors are elected by direct popular vote.

7. Republic of Beland Area: 214,322 sq. km (82,750 sq. mi)
Terrain: desert steppe
Climate: extreme cold winters (-30 C). Short, warm summers
Population: 831,000
Capital and major city: Barun-Urt (pop. 147K)
Economic mainstay: agriculture, livestock breeding, mining
Power: coal
Government: parliamentary democracy
Country formed in 1946, out of post WWII agreements
The Republic of Beland is located in northeast Asia between Mongolia and China, and has an area of 214,322 sq. km (82,750 sq. mi). The total population of the country is 831,000. The capital of Beland is Barun-Urt, with a population of 147,000. The predominant religion is Tibetan Buddhist Lamaism.
Most of Beland is dominated by the Gobi Desert, which stretches into China. Only the southern sliver is true desert; the rest is desert steppe.
Beland’s climate is characterized by very cold and long winters, often with little snow. Average daily temperature may drop below -30 C. Summers are short, quite warm and occasionally very wet. Spring and autumn rarely last more than 5-6 weeks. Zud is a weather phenomenon consisting of a blizzard and bitter cold, preceded by a draught. The combination is deadly to the herds that are the mainstay of the rural economy, since the draught weakens the animals, and the blizzard covers the ground.
The economic mainstay of the country has been livestock breeding, mining and agriculture.
Beland is a parliamentary democracy. The chief of state and head of government is the prime minister, selected by the majority party of the parliament. The country is divided into three provinces and one capital district. Provincial governors are elected by direct popular vote.

8. THREAT SITUATION Conventional Terrorist Environmental
Ayland and Beland ground forces continue to exchange fire, citing “provocations” by the other side.
Air and ground forces from both sides aggressively patrol oil reserve area - numerous clashes.
Terrorist
Terrorist activities continue in disputed area. Terrorist cells operating out of Dislocated Civilian camps.
Beland blames “rogue” elements for the continued terrorist activities.
Environmental
Thousands remain homeless and unprepared for harsh winter.
Multiple diseases present in DC camps.
Due to extreme summer drought, there is very high probability of a “Dzud” starting in November

9. C2 Estimate Ayland Forces.
Ayland forces around the disputed area are garrisoned north of Tamnsagbulag outside of the disputed area, but still within the 30 Km Weapons Exclusion Zone.
Ayland forces conduct daily patrols throughout their side of the buffer zone
Total combat effectiveness estimated at 70% pre-conflict strength (from 10,000 to 7,000).
Losses are primarily in infantry units
Air assets at 80 %. Losses are due to operational reasons rather than combat.
Ayland forces stationed in western area of country are near 100% combat effective.

10. C2 Estimate Beland Forces.
Beland forces around the disputed area are garrisoned in Halha Horoo in the vicinity of Camp Urt, outside of the buffer area.
Beland forces conduct daily patrols throughout their side of the buffer zone
Total combat effectiveness estimated at 85% pre-conflict strength (from 20,000 to 17,000).
Losses are primarily in infantry units
Air assets at 80 %. Losses are due to operational reasons rather than combat.
Beland has suffered minor equipment losses
Beland forces stationed in western area of country are near 100% combat effective

11. C2 Estimate
Terrorists.
TPFDL activity reported in Camp Asar in Ayland, and Camps Dalai, Urt and Tuul in Beland
TIP/TPFDL Leaders:
Milkitary Commander – Trebor Relsneh
Political officer – Norahs Elahcm
LNO to TIP – Etep Ecilefed
Terrorist cells are most likely supported by black market arms suppliers and unknown elements of Beland forces

12. C2 Estimate Local Population.
Both Ayland and Beland population suffer low morale based on environmental conditions, infrastructure damage, terrorist activity, banditry, medical conditions, and a lack of basic needs.
Population of Tamsagbulag is 60% ethnic Aylander, 40% ethnic Belander.
Ethnic Belanders in Tamsagbulag resent the arbitrary nature of the new border and Ayland rule

13. HIGHER’S MISSION
GENERAL STAFF ARMED FORCES MONGOLIA (GSAFM) ASSUMES LEAD NATION RESPONSIBILITIES IN ESTABLISHING A COALITION TASK FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING PEACE OPERATIONS IN THE DESIGNATED AREA OF OPERATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ULAANBAATAR AGREEMENT AND UNSC RESOLUTION 1527 IN ORDER TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REGION.

14. Commander’s Intent
(1) PURPOSE. ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY IN AO TO ENABLE THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY UN, IO, AND NGO COMMUNITY.
(2) METHOD. DIRECT, WHEN APPROPRIATE, THE COMMANDER CTF KHOKH CHONO TO CONDUCT PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO SET THE CONDITIONS THAT SUPPORT THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN AYLAND AND BELAND. MAINTAIN SEPARATION OF FORCES, ESTABLISH A BUFFER ZONE ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, COMBAT TERRORISM AND ASSIST UN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS TO SUPPORT RAPID RESTORATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND HELP SET CONDITIONS FAVORABLE FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN AYLAND AND BELAND. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE ALL NECESSARY MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR MISSION.
(3) ENDSTATE. CTF KHOKH CHONO RESTORES SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT, ALLEVIATES IMMEDIATE DISASTER RELATED HEALTH ISSUES, SUBSTANTIALLY RESTORES INFRASTRUCTURE CRITICAL TO HA EFFORTS, BORDER REGIME AND BUFFER ZONE ARE OPERATIONAL, EFFECTIVE CT MEASURES ARE IN PLACE, CTF TASKS EFFECTIVELY TRANSITIONED TO AYLAND AND BELAND AUTHORITIES OR A FOLLOW-ON UN PKF. CTF REDEPLOYED.

15. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
Mongolia
Gnd Forces HQ 1
MR Regiment 7
Special Bns 2
Engr Regiment
Comm Rgmt
Chemical Rgmt
Logistics Rgmt
Gnd Trans Rgmt
Field Hospital 5
Fighter Wing
Helo Sqdn
Airlift Wing

16. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
Australia
Inf Bn 1
Canada
Logistics Unit
Engr Sqn
Med Tm
C-130 4
ROWPU
Bangladesh
MP Co
Brunei
Provost Co
France
Surgical Tm
Fiji
Engr Co 3

17. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
Indonesia
Inf Bn 1
Mauritius
Eng Plt
Med Tm
C-130
Nepal
Japan
Engr Tm
Surg Tm
New Zealand
MP Co
ROWPU 2
Philippines
Korea
Russia
MR Regiment
Engr Co
Singapore
Inf Co
Madagascar
Civil Police Unit
Helo 4

18. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING
Sri Lanka
Engr Co 1
Tonga
Inf Co UK
C-130 2
Thailand
Inf Bn
C-17
SF Det
Helo 4

19. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNINGUS
USMC MEU 1
C4I Comms Pkge
Bn Landing Tm
C-130 4
Helo Sqd
C-135 5
Spt Gp C5 2
Flt Surg Tm
C-17
COMPHIBRON
CA Bde (HHC)
LPD
CA Bn
LSD
PSYOP TF
USMC Comms Co
SF TF

20. FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNINGUS
US Army Bde ( - ) 1
US Army Avn Bn ( - )
HQ ( - )
Medivac Plt
Inf Bn
Heavy Lift Co
Spt Bn ( - )

21. FACTS Majority of Forces available for 6 months
Over-flight rights granted for Russia and China
Both parties have agreed to a UN cease-fire and buffer-zone
UN Mandate and UB Agreement in place
Terrorists continue hostile action in the disputed area and in some of the Dislocated Civilian (DC) camps
Infrastructure damage
Railroads, roads, power, landmines, water and mines, hospitals
TCC nations responsible for 5 days of sustainment

22. FACTS Rogue elements not abiding to agreements Lead Nation is Mongolia
Epidemics in several DC camps
14 total DC camps (10 in Ayland and 4 in Beland) - 125,000 (34,000 refugees)
Humanitarian Coordinator “leading” humanitarian effort from the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) including setting relief priorities
Donor pallets: 3,300 pallets (C-130)

23. FACTS
Epidemics (pulmonary and bronchial infections, Hep A and B, trachoma, SARS, and brucellosis) in several DC camps
Bubonic plague transmitted via marmots in AUG-OCT
Preparations for harsh winters in DC camps is inadequate
USMC/USN assets available thru C+30
PACOM Contingency Communications Package (CCP) is available for duration of CTF mission
Rapid deployment of CTF forces NLT NOV 2003
Operational Control/Tactical Control (OPCON/TACON) of forces is in accordance with MOUs between participating nations

24. ASSUMPTIONS
Due to extreme summer draught, there is very high probability of a “Dzud” starting in October
Terrorists (TPFDL) will attempt to disrupt MNF & UN / IO / NGO efforts
Ayland and Beland continue to abide by Agreement
Beland and Ayland will provide law & order in Non-occupied zone (less camps)
Primary APOD can support air operations
Surface to air threat
TPFDL is well armed and organized, and receives support from significant elements of the population within the disputed area

25. ASSUMPTIONS Ayland/Beland Support as Host Nation extremely limited
Permissions for overland transit granted by Russia/China
IO/NGO will distribute HA to DC camps
Strategic lift available and may move IO/NGO HA material
APODs/SPODs/SLOC will remain open
SPOD/APOD: Vlad (Rus)/ULN (Mon), Choybalsan (Ay), Sainshand NE (Be)
APODs will not have sufficient POL and de-icing equipment
Certified Airlift/Airdrop will be required and possible

26. LIMITATIONS Constraints: required actions (must do)
Must abide by mandate, Intl Law & ROE
Deploy by 15 Nov
Coalition interoperability (Incl Comms & Intel)
Establish a BZ with dimensions IAW the UB Agreement
Prepare for extreme cold weather operations
Restraints: prohibited actions (must not do)
Use U.S. Navy & Marine forces for a period greater than 30 days

27. CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND DECISIVE POINTS
Threat COGs / DPs:
Strategic
Perceived legitimacy of TPFDL by supporters of TIP & by supporters outside the AO
Operational
Command and control network and infrastructure
Tactical
Local recruitment & support in DC Camps for TPFDL
Rogue elements of Ayland & Beland
Decisive Points
Access to DC camps
Base of Operations
Capability to spread the TPFDL message
Examples of COGs:
- Strategic: The will of a nation’s people to support a war; a certain national leader, a choke point (Straits of Gibralter), etc.
- Operational: The key element of a nation’s military force (Irag’s Republican Guard), capital ship (aircraft carrier), theater ballistic missiles, etc.
- Tactical: Key defensive strong points, reserve forces, tactical aircraft types, etc.

28. CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND DECISIVE POINTS
Friendly COGs / DPs:
Strategic
Coalition legitimacy & MNF political will
Public support for return of peace & stability
Operational
Coalition cohesiveness & effectiveness
Tactical
Local/Regional support for MNF
Ability to conduct MNF operations under Dzud conditions
Decisive Points
C2 systems
Lines of Communication (Incl Support lines)
Ability to enforce the BZ
Examples of COGs:
- Strategic: The will of a nation’s people to support a war; a certain national leader, a choke point (Straits of Gibralter), etc.
- Operational: The key element of a nation’s military force (Irag’s Republican Guard), capital ship (aircraft carrier), theater ballistic missiles, etc.
- Tactical: Key defensive strong points, reserve forces, tactical aircraft types, etc.

29. SPECIFIED TASKS
Deploy forces rapidly into the AO, quickly establishing command, control and communications capabilities to facilitate timely arrival of MNF forces and logistical support.
Establish strong coordination links with SRSG Mr. Bataar Dorj.
Secure the borders and maintain buffer zone.
Maintain separation of Ayland and Beland armed forces.
Create conditions in Ayland to support restoration of law and order.
Be prepared to temporarily assure execution of security functions (includes detaining, transporting and turning over of lawbreakers to proper authorities).
Help develop and assist with the CT efforts
Once Ayland authorities fully assume active role, continue to support CT efforts by providing information. 2

30. SPECIFIED TASKS
In conjunction with governments of Ayland & Beland, develop a CT plan to eliminate the terrorist threat in Ayland & Beland, in particular in the disputed area & DC camps
Facilitate HA/DR operations.
Plan for extreme cold weather operations and effect on CTF forces. Also plan for effects this weather will have on Dislocated Civilians.
Develop and implement Information Operations campaign in support of CTF under the UN mandate.
Execute mission handoff to appropriate authorities.
Redeploy forces. 2

31. IMPLIED TASKS Establish and secure APOD
BPT provide support to civilian agencies
Conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with Ayland & Beland CT forces 3

32. ESSENTIAL TASKS Secure the borders and maintain buffer zone
Facilitate HA/DR operations
Execute mission handoff to appropriate authorities
 1. Identify tasks. To identify tasks, the staff first lists all the specified tasks. These are usually stated in the higher headquarters’ warning order .
2. Next, develop implied tasks -- tasks that are not specifically assigned, but must be accomplished to perform the mission. These should not be inherent tasks; that is, actions staff or subordinate commands will do in accordance with standing operating procedures.
3. Finally, determine essential tasks -- from the first two categories, what are those tasks that are required to achieve the conditions that define success?

33. INITIAL FORCE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Engineers
Extreme cold weather capable aircraft
SOF air assets (insertion/extraction/logistic support)
CT capable SOF force (capable of recovery operations)
Vehicles
Tracked vehicles/chained tire vehicles, snow removal equipment
General transportation
Tactical PSYOP forces
Intelligence assets:
UAV
Linguists, translators, and interpreters 3

34. RISK ASSESSMENT Mission Accomplishment Risks / Mitigation:
HA / DR efforts inadequate -
Provide secure environment; respond to RFAs
Mission essential failures due to Extreme Cold Weather
Identify mission essential equipment; prioritize winterization preparations; develop backup / recovery plans
Preposition supplies
Disease
Preventative & Operational Medical measures
Terrorist
CT operations
High force-protection procedures
IO Campaign
Mines -
Awareness training; de-mining operations
Mission Risk example:
Forward presence vs.
risk of provocation
1. The next, important step, is to conduct an initial risk assessment. Risk is defined as the “probability and severity of loss linked to hazards”. Thus, there are two components to risk assessment: first, what is the adverse impact on our operation of a certain event or situation, and second, what is the probability, or likelihood, of such an event occurring. Furthermore, what measures can we take to mitigate against, or minimize, the risk. In risk assessment, the staff determines the initial broad risks associated with the mission.
2. For example, in a peace enforcement operation, we might say a forward presence of large contingent of military forces most likely will provoke a negative response by certain elements of the local population. We determine that the negative response will be limited to a probable initiation of demonstrations targeted against the forces. We determine that the likelihood, or probability, of this event-demonstrations-is very high, but that the advantages to our forward presence far outweigh the potential adverse impacts. We also determine, that even if such an event occurs, the adverse impact to our mission is minimal. We can also take measures to safely mitigate against such actions,
3. Other potential risks to consider in our assessment may be the damage to civilian infrastructure, terrorist activities, the weather…or other aspects
3.a. Key questions the planners should ask are: What are the particular risks associated with the mission? Do limitations, assigned tasks, or assumptions create risk? What degree of risk is higher headquarters willing to accept? What can we do to minimize risk? 

35. END STATE Strategic End State conditions
Peace & security established in Ayland & Beland
Operational (military) End State conditions
Secure & stable environment
Alleviate immediate disaster related health issues
Substantially restore infrastructure critical to HA efforts
Border regime & BZ are operational & effective
Effective CT measures in place
Transition tasks to Ayland, Beland &/or PKF
1. Determine the desired end state. Higher headquarters may have provided guidance and focus for multinational task force operations in an intent statement, which may include strategic or operational implications, or both.
2. As basic principle, end state conditions must contribute to ultimate success of the operation.
3. Conditions to end armed conflict that apply to an enemy force, might include eliminating its ability to continue aggressive operations, command and control certain sized operations, and support or reinforce operations For a HA/DR, it may be a return to the pre-crisis situation; for example, basic public services:electrical power, sewage, & water distribution restored.
4. It is important understand the difference between preliminary end state conditions, often described as a military end state, and a broader set of end state conditions, when military force is no longer the principal means to attain the strategic ends. The broader end state typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational and military conditions.
5. Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends international efforts to protect interests in a situation. The term end state simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.
6. In our example, desired end state for CoalitionTask Force BAYANIHAN is to restore the infrastructure and leave a mechanism in place to allow the host government to maximize its relief efforts. Specifically, the task force end state includes achieving these conditions:
a.  Vital lines of communication adequate to alleviate human suffering reestablished.
b.  Displaced persons camps prepared for turnover to the host Government.
c. Systems to conduct search and rescue missions established.
d. A robust system to continue the coordination of international HA projects established.

36. PROPOSED CTF RESTATED MISSION
No later than 15 November, CTF KHOKH CHONO will secure the borders and maintain buffer zone, facilitate HA/DR operations in order to set the conditions to facilitate peace & security in Ayeland & Beland.
On order, execute mission handoff to appropriate authorities 5

37. PROPOSED COMMANDER’S INTENT Purpose:
Set the conditions to facilitate peace & security in Ayland & Beland
Method:
Secure the borders and maintain buffer zone
Facilitate HA/DR operations
End state:
Secure a stable environment, alleviate immediate human suffering, mitigate the effects of the Dzud, substantially restore infrastructure critical to HA efforts, BZ is operational & effective, effective CT measure in place, MNF transitions to appropriate authorities & MNF redeployed

38. COMMAND & CONTROL PROPOSED INITIAL CCIRs
PIR
Accurate predictions of Dzud conditions or extreme weather in AO
Locations, intentions & capabilities of TPFDL
Non-compliance by parties to UB Agreement
FFIR
Accurate assessment of HA/DR requirements
Operational capabilities of all MNF units
Status of LLOCs into/out of AO
UN/NGO/IO capabilities to support HA/DR
EEFI
Counter-terrorism capabilities and disposition
MNF scheme of maneuver & timing
Communication networks
QRF disposition

39. COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE

40. CPG-1 Guidance Under a CTF HQ: Main Effort: Security & HA/DR in zone
Establish TF-A (in Ayland) & TF-B (in Beland)
Examine organizing subordinate TF components by either function or mission; recommend procedures for coordination of air assets
Supporting Effort: Establish TF-CT (MAF)
Mission: CT in AO

41. CPG-2 Guidance Under a CTF HQ:
Organize CTF components by service (i.e., CARFOR, CAFFOR, CMARFOR, etc.)
Main effort: BZ maintenance, CT campaign & security
Supporting effort: HA / DR, CMO

42. CPG-3 Guidance
CTF is established as a Coalition Civil Military Operations Task Force (CCMOTF)
Main effort: Civil-military Operations
Supporting effort: security
Organization: IAW MNF SOP, Chapter C-7, Figure C-7-A-1, CCMOTF Organizational Model

43. CPG-4 Guidance Under a CTF HQ:
AO divided into sectors (Main & Supporting Efforts determined by Sector Commanders)
Organize CTF components by sector
CTF Component CDRs are lead force in a sector
Several nations may be assigned to a sector
Nations are assigned responsibility for all missions (except CT) in sector
MAF responsible for CT campaign

44. Commander’s Guidance
The importance of adequate planning & preparations for extreme cold weather conditions cannot be over-stressed.
All COAs must focus on the ability to operate effectively in extreme cold weather conditions at all levels of operations. Failure to do so, will result in unfeasible COAs & risk mission failure.