1. Managing Food Insecurity in Ethiopia By Teshome Erkineh, Ethiopia For The Side Event at COP12 10 th November 2006 Nairobi, Kenya CLIMATE RISK MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE

2. Topic of Discussion ICountry profile II Climate change and its effect on food security III Factors for success to avert major famine in 2002/03 (Practical experience) IVCurrent Response Strategies to Manage Food Insecurity V Gaps and constraints in the use of climate information VI Conclusion VII Recommendation

3. Topography: Complex feature with Altitude ranges from a hight of 4620 mt. Above see level at mount Ras Dashen to as low as 110 mt. Below see level in the Dalol depression A wide range of agro-ecology zones mainly: Environment: diversified climate due to the above complex topographical feature with different patterns of rainfall distribution and temperature at different time of the year Economy: dependant on agriculture and it is Major source of food and income Food Security Situation Food security is dependant on rain fed agriculture 45% of the population is food insecure An average of about 15 million are chronically food insecure An average of 6.3 million people are under food emergency between 1990-2004 consequently An annual of about 670,000 mt. Food aid was required at the same period I- Country Profile

4. II_ Climate Change and its Effect on Food Security Rainfall variability is very high and its pattern is very complex Disaster is mostly due to drought resulting wide spread crop failure Recurrent drought resulted famine and alarming level of malnutrition a) Major droughts years and their consequence during the last four decades YearAffected PopulationHuman Loses 1972/731.9 million250,000 1983/848 millionOne million 1999/0010.6 million No accurate recorded figure but excess mortality have been reported 2002/03Over 13 millionNo Major death

5. b) Major Factors for the deaths of people and existing opportunities YearOpportunitiesCausesPolicy Outcome 1973/74 Inadequate information Inadequate preparedness Inadequate capacity National Early Warning System established in 1976 1983/84 Early warning system exists Information exists Knowledge about the disaster threats exists Lack of good governance Inadequate preparedness Delayed response by the humanitarian community Emergency Food Security Reserve established. A reserve that can provide emergency food for about 4 million people for three months

6. YearOpportunitiesCausesPolicy Outcome 1999/00 EW information Adequate emergency food reserve Conducive policy environment available Political influence on humanitarian response Reluctance by the Humanitarian community and wait and see policy No major policy outcome

7. III_ Factors for Success to Avert Major Famine in 2002/03 Compared to Previous Years (Practical Experience) Climate information mainstreamed in disaster management and development Multi-sectoral emergency response mechanism strengthened Efficient and effective partnership established with all humanitarian partners Timely and frequent situation monitoring and information sharing mechanisms established

8. a) Climate Information Mainstreamed in Disaster Management and Development The capacity of National Meteorological Agency (NMSA) responsible for climate information improved The Agency disseminate seasonal, monthly, 10 daily and three days and daily climate information to its users Various communication medias such as radio, TV, newspapers, weather bulletins and workshop used Climate information become one major component of the National Early Warning System and NMSA become one active member of the National Early Warning Committee The system regularly evaluate the impacts of the agency's seasonal forecasts and other climate information on food security and advise the relevant institutions to take the necessary risk reduction activities The National Early Warning System’s information on the other hand linked to the disaster management structure and become one of the most important tool for disaster management and response

9. b) Multi-sectoral emergency response mechanism strengthened National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee Top decision making body in any matter of disaster prevention, management and response Chaired by the D. P. Minister and Minister of MoARD Consists of various ministers as a member Crisis Management Group Responsible for day to day operational matters Chaired by DPPA D/ director Consists of members from MoARD, MoH, MoWD, DPPA & EWS Four sectoral Taskforces (Health, Water, Agriculture & Food) Responsible for sectoral disaster management and response activity Each of them chaired by the respective ministry Humanitarian partners are members in their area of interest

10. c) Efficient and effective partnership established with all humanitarian partners An Early Warning Working Group, a group that consists of all organization (UN Organization representatives, Donors & NGO’s) jointly closely monitor situations, conduct assessments, identify needs and feed information to the disaster management system. The crises Management Group meet on a biweekly bases and work close together to avert the crisis The Technical Taskforces (Health, Water, Agriculture and food) chaired by the respective ministries meets on a weekly base with humanitarian organizations (UN Organization representatives, Donors & NGO’s) and coordinate their efforts and works. A Technical Information Management Exchange forum which involves all interested humanitarian agencies established and meet on a biweekly bases and discuss on the over all disaster management performance, constraints, bottlenecks and suggests solutions

11. d) Timely and frequent situation monitoring and information communication established 2002/03 Drought Information communication Timeline TimeActivity and events January, 2002 Seasonal forecasts for the second rainy season (February-May) issued by NMSA & disseminated to users February, 2002 Both NMSA and the NEWS started monitoring the performance of the season against the forecast First signal of below performance observed from the beginning This was critical time for planting in some parts of the country March,2002 Improvement observed in the performance of the rain This was anticipated to improve the agricultural activities April, 2002 Below to much below normal performance rain reported Highly drought and food shortage vulnerable parts of the country remained dry The fist indication of the development of drought crisis reported by the NEWS May, 2002 NMSA disclosed below to too much below normal rainfall in most parts The NEWS reported sever damage on short maturing crops, delayed planting and sever damage on early development stage of long cycle crops and unsuccessful efforts farmers repetitive planting EWWG carefully assessed the performance of the season since February and decided to launch rapid assessment through out the country to evaluate the impact of the failure of the season on food security

12. Timeline cont. TimeActivity and Events June, 2002 Multi-agency food security assessment conducted The assessment result confirmed the failure of the season and the livelihood of sever food shortage in 2003 NMSA issued its 2 nd seasonal forecast for the main rainy season (June-September) and confirmed that EL-NINO event is developing The NDPPC advised to reactivate its regular meeting and take all necessary drought mitigation measures July, 2002 NMSA and the NEWS continued monitoring the situation and reported poor performance The likelihood of disaster in 2003 became clear The NEWS issued the first special alert and provided warning about the looming crisis in 2003 Government and other humanitarian partners took some mitigation measures (provision of short maturing seed to farmers to plant as large area as possible using the main rainy season, advised farmers to use water more effectively etc.) August,2002 Rainfall performance showed improvement but it was too late to save most of the crops EWWG Reviewed the situation once again and launched a second round national assessment

13. Timeline cont TimeActivities and Events Various international and local humanitarian organizations and individuals including the media visited the affected areas The assessment mission predicted the magnitude of the problem and estimated the food need in 2003 Sept., 2002 The government prepared contingency plan to avert major crisis in 2003 and disclosed to the international communities The Govt. also launched an intensive awareness creation campaign side by side Nov,/Dec, 2002 The EWWG conducted the final harvest assessment and confirmed that 2003 will be a major disastrous year The government launched its appeal to the international community to respond timely and adequately to avert major famine in 2003 Jan-April, 2003 Monitoring of food security situation continued by the EWS Government and the humanitarian community intensified their intervention Reports of sign of malnutrition received and the food shortage problem reached at its pick in April

14. IV- Current Response Strategies to Manage Food Insecurity Until 2004 response to food insecurity (chronic and acute) was mainly dominated by emergency food aid Response through emergency food aid helps to save lives but not livelihood The 2002/03 drought and famine became a major turning point to shift from emergency food aid to disaster risk management Current strategy to address food insecurity Poverty reduction strategy:- Agricultural Development Lead Industrialization (ADLI) Reduce chronic food insecurity through food security strategy which includes productive safety net, introduction of improved agricultural technology, emphasis on water development and harvesting, resettlement etc. Acute food insecurity through emergency food aid and weather insurance

15. V_ Major Gaps & Constrains to Effectively Utilize Climate Information Inadequate coverage of weather stations Poor capacities of existing stations Poor communication facilitates to collect timely information from weather stations and to disseminate advisory services to end users Highly centralized analytical capacity Lack of users capacity to process, analyze and interpret climate information from various sources Low level of end users involvement in the use of climate information

16. VI- Conclusion Drought is a natural phenomenon. It was there in the past, It is still present and it will continue in the future Drought is not a cause for famine development and human suffering but famine is a failure of human beings to act timely and adequately Regular flow of climate information and its integration with food security monitoring and early warning is a prerequisite to address climate induced disaster Early warning information alone cannot be a solution to any drought crises unless it is linked with decision making in disaster management and response. Usually it is not a failure of EW information that leads to crisis but poor governance, a failure to respond timely and adequate, reluctance to act, the strategy of wait and see

17. VII_ Recommendations Improve technical capacities of producers so as to increase the quality and credibility of Met. Information Improve technical capacities of both producers and users Expand meteorological stations and increase coverage Strength the capacities of existing Met. Stations Enhance communication infrastructures and expand the use of electronic media Establish direct link with end users particularly the farmers and enhance their capacity to use Met. Information Involve the media effectively in the dissemination of climate and early warning information

18. Thank You!!!