The rapid emergence of the Cold War after the end of World War II surprised some observers. In some ways it could have been expected based on historical,

The rapid emergence of the Cold War after the end of World War II surprised some observers. In some ways it could have been expected based on historical, ideological and geopolitical considerations. The United States and the Soviet Union had emerged from World War II as the two global superpowers, although the USSR had paid a much heavier price for its victory in economic and human terms. The UK, the other great power to emerge victorious, was economically prostrate and would soon begin to lose its influence abroad. Moreover, the US and the USSR had been suspicious of and hostile to each other since the Bolshevik Revolution of Each saw itself as embodying a social model and an ideology (liberal capitalism vs. communism) profoundly incompatible with the other. Nonetheless, the transition from wartime allies to enemies was not inevitable and was, in part, the result of the events and decisions of these years. Acting out of their perceived national interest, both the United States and the Soviet Union favoured the creation of two opposing blocs, competing for influence over a devastated European continent. By the end of 1947, the initial hopes that the Allies could continue to cooperate peacefully had been replaced by a vision of two political and social systems fundamentally at odds, and engaged in a struggle for global supremacy.

Wartime collaboration
After Hitler’s sudden invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom set aside their differences and mutual distrust to work together against the common enemy. Between 1941 and 1945, the Big Three established economic and military cooperation, and portrayed their allies in a favourable light. The most visible efforts at collaboration were the three wartime conferences in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, which took place between November 1943 and August These meetings provided the opportunity for the Big Three to discuss the evolving campaign against the Axis forces, but also to stake out their positions for the new postwar order. As the outcome of the war appeared less and less in doubt, the tensions between the allies would quickly resurface. One of the earliest points of contention was the fate of Poland, which was contested between a communist-supported government and a government-in-exile backed by the US and the UK. Given Poland’s strategic position on the USSR’s borders and its symbolic value as Hitler’s first victim, the issue was especially delicate.

The Tehran Conference Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin celebrating Churchill’s 69th birthday during a dinner at the British Embassy in Tehran, 30 November Source: Imperial War Museum, ID# A Re-used under the terms of the Non Commercial Licence. From 28 November to 1 December 1943, the leaders of the “Big Three” allied powers (Franklin D. Roosevelt for the United States, Winston Churchill for the United Kingdom and Joseph Stalin for the Soviet Union) met in person for the first time in Tehran (now capital of Iran) to discuss the common strategy against the Axis powers. Although Roosevelt and Churchill had already met several times and had a close relationship, neither of them had met Stalin yet. The meeting therefore, in addition to discussing military matters, also served to establish a working relationship between the three leaders.

Roosevelt and Churchill vis-à-vis Stalin
‘I began almost as soon as we got into the conference room,’ [Roosevelt] told [U.S. Secretary of Labour] Frances Perkins. ‘I said, lifting my hand to cover a whisper (which of course had to be interpreted), “Winston is cranky this morning, he got up on the wrong side of the bed”. A vague smile passed over Stalin’s eyes, and I decided I was on the right track… I began to tease Churchill about his Britishness, about John Bull, about his cigars, about his habits. It began to register with Stalin. Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so, the more Stalin smiled. Finally Stalin broke out in a deep, hearty guffaw, and for the first time in three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it was then that I called him “Uncle Joe”. He would have thought me fresh the day before, but that day he laughed and came over and shook my hand.’ Source: The Churchill Project, Hillsdale College Michigan, USA Roosevelt was eager to create a positive relationship with Stalin, and in order to do so he at times highlighted a different approach to dealing with him than the approach adopted by Churchill. During the conference, the American president refused to meet alone with Churchill so as to avoid displeasing Stalin, although he did meet the Soviet leader without Churchill. In the course of the meetings, he also occasionally engaged in some teasing of the British Prime Minister that was meant to ingratiate himself with Stalin and establish some sort of personal empathy. Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953), p. 343.

Roosevelt and Churchill vis-à-vis Stalin
[If Roosevelt] “knew how to deal with American problems and domestic politics, he knew little of Soviet mentality, or had been badly advised. It was not enough, as he evidently thought, to clap Russians on the back and say they were good fellows, in order to reach a mutually advantageous agreement with them. Something more subtle was required. He was dealing with a semi-Asian Power, and a communist one into the bargain. Nor did I like his taking sides with Stalin, ostensibly as a joke but nevertheless tactlessly, in allusions to British colonialism. Nothing was said about Russian colonialism, or for that matter American. I felt he was too ready to play into Stalin’s hands.” A.H. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (New York: Coward McCann, 1967), pp Churchill had allegedly been warned by Roosevelt that he would make some jokes at his expense. More important, however, was the difference between the American and British approaches that these episodes suggested, and on which a British interpreter who was present in Tehran later commented. Virginia Cowles, Winston Churchill: The Era and the Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953), p. 343.

The outcome of the conference
At the Conference, Churchill presented Stalin with a ceremonial sword (the "Sword of Stalingrad"), as a gift from King George VI to the citizens of Stalingrad and the Soviet people, to commemorate the Soviet victory at Stalingrad. In the picture, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov shows the sword to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the conference room at the Soviet Legation in Teheran, Iran, on 28 November 1943 while Churchill and Stalin look on. Voroshilov allegedly mishandled the sword, causing it to fall to the ground. Source: Imperial War Museum, ID# E Public Domain In Tehran, the three leaders not only discussed military strategies, but also began to sketch out an outline of the postwar world. The most important decisions concerned the opening of a second front in Western Europe with an Allied invasion of France and the support for Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia. In addition, they also dealt with Turkey’s involvement in the war and with economic assistance for Iran. Regarding the shape of Europe after the end of the conflict, the “Big Three” also discussed informally the future of Poland and a new German-Polish border after the war, as well as possible zones of occupation in Germany. The fate of the Baltic and Eastern European states that had been occupied by the Axis powers or had joined them in the war was also touched upon. But Churchill and Roosevelt did not press Stalin on this because they needed Soviet participation in the military effort. Finally, the leaders also discussed the composition of the proposed United Nations, which had first been discussed during the Moscow Conference, a month earlier.

The Yalta Conference Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin posing for a picture in Yalta. Source: The National Archives, ID# INF 14/447. Public domain, UK. The “Big Three” met again more than a year later, in February 1945, at the Livadia Palace near Yalta, in Crimea. The discussions included the continuing war against Germany and Japan. The Allies agreed on pursuing the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany, on the postwar occupation zones and on the issues of demilitarization and war reparations. The US and the UK also wanted the Soviet Union to enter the war in the Pacific against Japan, which Stalin eventually agreed would happen once Germany had surrendered. The creation of the United Nations and its membership was also discussed, with a compromise reached on the participation of two socialist republics (Ukraine and Belarus) out of the 16 that Stalin had initially requested. However, since the outcome of the conflict no longer appeared in question, the issue of the reorganisation of postwar Europe was more pressing than in Tehran. Url: Country: United Kingdom Creator: UK Government Publisher: The National Archives (Accession number INF 14/447) Date: 1945 Usage rights: Public Domain (UK)

Soviet presence in Eastern Europe
At the time of the conference, the Red Army had already occupied Poland, Belarus and the Baltic States, and was just 65km from Berlin. Soviet presence in Eastern Europe was already a reality with which its Western allies had to reckon, and made Stalin’s position at the conference much stronger. Roosevelt and Churchill obtained from Stalin a commitment to join the Declaration of Liberated Europe, promising to allow the people of Europe to create democratic institutions of their choice. Despite these reassurances, however, the Soviet Union had already begun to encourage the formation of communist-dominated regimes in Eastern Europe, and its Western allies were unable or unwilling to challenge Stalin at this stage. US Army map describing the situation of the war at the time of the conference. Source: "Atlas of the World Battle Fronts in Semi-monthly Phases to August 15th 1945: Supplement to The Biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943 to June to the Secretary of War”. Public Domain, USA

Post-war German borders
Map showing the four occupation zones and the territories ceded to Poland and the USSR. Source: IEG-Maps project, Andreas Kunz, B. Johnen and Joachim Robert Moeschl, University of Mainz. CC BY-SA 2.5 Generic Post-war Germany’s territory would be divided among the four Allied powers, and the Ruhr area would be placed under international supervision. Stalin agreed to the creation of a French zone, which Churchill and Roosevelt advocated, only on condition that it would be carved from the American and British ones. The Big Three also agreed on the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s eastern border, ceding the territories east of it and the southern part of East Prussia to the re-established Poland. North-eastern Prussia was to be placed under Soviet administration.

The Pacific Front “It is still a long, tough road to Tokyo. It is longer to go to Tokyo than it is to Berlin, in every sense of the word. The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan. On the contrary, we must be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the Pacific. But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. I say that advisedly, with the thought in mind that that is especially true if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.” Roosevelt’s address to Congress after the Yalta Conference, 1 March 1945. Source: Miller Center, University of Virginia. In Yalta, Roosevelt was willing to adopt a conciliatory tone towards Stalin’s claims on Eastern Europe in part because he wanted to ensure Stalin’s commitment to declare war on Japan. Although the Allied commanders believed that the tide had turned on the Pacific front, the prospect in February 1945 was of a long and costly fight. The atomic bomb had not yet been tested, and a campaign based on amphibious landings in Japan would likely result in massive US casualties. While Roosevelt and his advisers believed that the Nazi surrender would not bring the war in Asia to an end, they hoped that the Soviet intervention would convince Tokyo to come to the negotiating table. Stalin, for his part, was eyeing Japanese-held Manchuria to expand Soviet territories in Asia.

Post-Yalta debates in Washington
[After Yalta, US policymakers wanted] “to stiffen American policy in connection with the war against Japan. Joseph Grew believed that ‘once the Soviet Union entered the war in the Far East, then Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea will gradually slip into Russia’s orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan’. Grew wanted a policy review to decide ‘whether we are going to support what has been done at Yalta’ (that is, the concessions made to the Soviet Union in the Far East) or whether these concessions would in some way be withdrawn. But the War Department successfully opposed reconsideration. The War Department wanted to do nothing that might interfere with prompt Russian entry into the war against Japan, for Soviet assistance ‘almost certainly will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives’. Secretary Stimson also thought it foolish to raise so controversial an issue with the Russians without a clearer notion of whether the atomic bomb would work, and thus provide an alternative to relying on Soviet participation. Post-Yalta debates in Washington Some American policymakers were in fact worried about an increase of Soviet influence in Asia, and there were debates after Yalta about reconsidering some of the agreements reached at the conference. The account by historian Daniel Yergin, a specialist in International Relations, details in particular the doubts expressed by Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, the second highest-ranking officer of the State Department. As this excerpt suggests, by the beginning of diplomatic concerns about Soviet influence after the end of the war were often competing with the military imperative to reach a swift conclusion to World War II, in this case embodied by Defense Secretary Henry Stimson, who was in charge of the War Department. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp

A French critique of the conference
“In fact, without discussing the general content of the Communiqué, which, despite its expansiveness, its universality and its references to the Atlantic Charter, still resembles ‘a great power dictating its wishes to the world’, we find, among the resolutions of the Three, a certain reticence and notable absences which would intrigue even the most innocent minds. […] But what worries us still more is the silence observed by the Three with respect to the role of the major powers in the international peace initiative, the principles of which were outlined at Dumbarton Oaks and reviewed and corrected in Yalta. […] In other words, will the major powers continue to try to impose their will on those nations arbitrarily qualified as minor? Our hopes are quite slim, we must admit, and one might wonder whether this was not how the Russians and Americans entered into a compromise which led to the exchange of concessions —concerning, firstly, their neighbours and, secondly, the treatment reserved for Germany — which have led to an overall accord. […] we continue to deem that the Three have committed a blunder in excluding France from discussions that may reach reasonable conclusions only with France present. For some Europeans, the Yalta Conference seemed to show a tendency by the Big Three to settle the most important questions among themselves then later impose them on their allies. The French, whose great power status was especially in question, were among those who resented this. In an article published in a journal that had been an important voice of the French resistance, the author criticised the character of the Yalta Conference and hoped for a more participatory model. On this front, he made little distinction between the US and the USSR. Marcel Gimont, “De Yalta à San Francisco”, Combat, 14 February 1945. Source: Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l’Europe (CVCE).

British views on Stalin
Message from Sir John Balfour to the Foreign Office, 12 March 1945 “In all this there is a well-defined long-term policy which, so far as it can at present be foreseen is summed up in the word ‘Security.’ […] We must at all times make allowance for the Bolshevik mentality, which, if it has repudiated the idea of world revolution as a fixed aim, is still infected with suspicion of the bourgeois world, Marxist in outlook, and imbued with a rough and ready disposition indiscriminately to lump together as ‘Fascist beasts’ all those who criticise or appear to obstruct the will of the Soviet Union. […] On the other hand, as a shrewd realist, Stalin, so far as can be judged, has no wish to overreach the limits within which he can prudently exercise autocratic power. Although ‘deadly proud’ and quick to react against the slightest suggestion of Soviet inferiority or bad faith, Stalin and the more sensible of his followers are no less imbued with a jealous wish to raise the reputation of the U.S.S.R. in the eyes of the world. It follows that where, but only where, the Allies have just cause for complaint that their legitimate interests are being set at nought, a restraining influence can be brought to bear by appeals to Stalin himself on matters of real importance. Source: Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), British views on Stalin In a message sent to the Foreign Office on 12 March 1945, the British minister in Moscow, Sir John Balfour, described Soviet foreign policy as a mixture of centuries-old attitudes and new ideological zeal. The USSR, he argued, was driven by the need to attain “security” and traditional Russian notions of power. At the same time, the “Bolshevik mentality” of suspicion towards the bourgeois world played an important role. Stalin appeared to be steeped in the revolutionary outlook but also a realist careful not to endanger his power. Balfour’s conclusion was that Western powers should exploit the desire of the Soviet leadership for prestige and recognition of their status, carefully selecting when to pressure Stalin. Creator: Public Record Office, Kew, Surrey

The Polish question Residents of Łódź greet the Soviet tanks entering the city, January 1945. Public Domain, Ukraine The fate of Poland was one the most delicate issues discussed in Yalta, and the one that created the first serious cracks in the wartime alliance. The Soviet Union had occupied the eastern part of Poland in 1939, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and ruthlessly repressed its population. After the Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the whole country was under German occupation until the beginning of 1945, when the Vistula-Oder Offensive of the Red Army liberated key Polish cities such as Kraków, Warsaw, Poznań and Łódź. By 1944, two competing governments claimed to represent the Polish people. The first was the Polish Government in Exile, which had fled to Paris and later to London after the Nazi invasion and was recognised by the Western powers. The second was the Lublin Committee, or Polish Committee of National Liberation, which was sponsored by the Soviet Union and controlled by communists and leftists loyal to Moscow.

Roosevelt on the Polish Question
My dear Marshal Stalin: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind. In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences. Roosevelt on the Polish Question In a letter to Stalin during the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt expressed his concerns about the disagreement between the Allies over the Polish government. The American president, however, remained careful to adopt a conciliatory tone and to explicitly stress the priority of maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union and close military cooperation. Extract of letter from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin, 6 February 1945. Source: Wilson Center. Public Domain, US.

Post-war Poland’s borders
Map of Poland’s borders following the Curzon Line in the East. Creator: radek.s CC BY-SA 2.5 In Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt modified their initial opposition to the Soviet Union retaining the territories occupied in The Big Three agreed to shift Poland’s eastern border to the Curzon Line, which had been proposed after World War I by the British Foreign Secretary as the border between Poland and the Soviet Union and later used to divide Poland between Germany and the USSR in 1939. The UK and the US, which still needed Soviet cooperation against the Axis powers, were also reluctant to increase tensions with Stalin on an issue that, given the presence of the Red Army, seemed like a virtual fait accompli. In exchange for the territorial losses in the east, Poland was compensated with land from Germany, even though its territory still decreased by 20% and millions were forced to migrate.

Allied report of the Yalta Conference
“A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland [...] The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.” Charles I. Bevans (ed.), United States Treaties and International Agreements: , Vol. 3, p At the Yalta Conference Stalin pushed to recognise the pro-Soviet government in Lublin as the official one, rather than the Polish government in exile in London. The Big Three reached a compromise, calling for the establishment of a provisional government of national unity including representatives from both. In return for the concession, Stalin had to assure Churchill and Roosevelt that the soviet Union would respect Poland’s future sovereignty, and that free and fair elections would be held. The source on the right is the report of the conference, signed on 11 February 1945 by the three Allied leaders, with the text of the agreement.

Stalin on the Polish Question
“For the Russian people, the question of Poland is not only a question of honour but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Poland is a question of life and death for Russia”. Stalin on the Polish Question Poland was a top priority for Stalin and the Soviet leadership in general. The first priority was to retain control of the eastern part of the country, which had been occupied in Another concern that Stalin voiced was that of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union on its western border. Presenting it as a defensive need after the Nazi invasion had inflicted devastating losses to his country, he argued that the annexation of eastern Poland was not negotiable. The first quote, a report by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes from Yalta, expresses this rationale. As the second quote by foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov suggests, the USSR viewed Eastern Europe as a region that would inevitably fall under more or less direct Soviet control, while the US and the UK would exert their influence over the western part of the continent. Stalin as quoted in J.F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1947), p. 25. “How governments are being organized in Belgium, France, Greece, etc, we do not know. We have not been asked, although we do not say that we like one or another of these governments. We have not interfered, because it is the Anglo-American zone of military action.” Note from Soviet foreign minister Molotov in February about Western protests over Poland’s future. Quoted in Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), p. 121.

Polish reactions to Yalta
Forces of the Polish Army under General Władysław Anders (the “Anders’ Army”) in the Soviet Union in early The Anders’s Army, formally Polish Armed Forces in the East, was formed in 1941, after Stalin was pressured to release thousands of Polish prisoners of war. Source: Władysław Anders “Bez ostatniego rozdziału. Wspomnienia ”, Warsaw, 1989. Public domain, Poland, US To many Eastern Europeans, the reluctance of the Western powers to challenge Stalin’s plans amounted to a betrayal of the wartime promises and rhetoric of self-determination. Yalta became the symbol of the Allies’ willingness to sacrifice Poland’s borders and freedom, and the communist regime itself used it to stoke anti-Western sentiment. The feeling of betrayal was especially acute for the Polish military formations that had fought under British command on the Mediterranean front, many of them from the eastern region of Kresy. When Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union would keep the territories seized after the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, thirty officers and men from the II Corps committed suicide. Url: Country: Soviet Union? Creator: unknown Publisher: Władysław Anders "Bez ostatniego rozdziału.Wspomnienia ", Warsaw 1989, many editions before 1994 Date: Early 1942 Usage rights: Public Domain (Poland, US)

The “Trial of the Sixteen”
In March 1945, as Roosevelt and Churchill watched with increasing concern, the NKVD (Soviet internal security) arrested sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground State, who had been invited to Moscow under the pretext of holding talks. The “Trial of the Sixteen”, a staged trial held a few months later despite Western protests, resulted in several prison sentences based on forged accusations of planning a military alliance with the Third Reich, spreading propaganda against the Soviet Union and stockpiling weapons. It dealt a serious blow to anti-Communist forces in Poland. Thousands of political activists and opponents were also persecuted in the following years. Western leaders did little to counter the Soviet Union’s tightening grip on Poland, but they understood the implications of Stalin’s actions. In a letter written a few days before the arrests, US ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman wrote to Roosevelt that “We must come clearly to realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know it”. The judges at the trial of the Sixteen Polish leaders in Moscow, June 1945. Source: Imperial War Museum, ID# HU Re-used under the terms of the Non Commercial Licence. Letter from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Joseph Stalin, 29 March 1945 “So far there has been a discouraging lack of progress made in the carrying out, which the world expects, of the political decisions which we reached at the Conference, particularly those relating to the Polish question. […] In the discussions that have taken place so far your Government appears to take the position that the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity which we agreed should be formed should be little more than a continuation of the present Warsaw Government. I cannot reconcile this either with our agreement or our discussions.” Source: Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), pp Source Harriman letter: Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts, Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin,

The British position on Poland
In a message to his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in May 1945, Churchill returned again to the issue of the “Polish deadlock”, suggesting that only another meeting between the Big Three could resolve it. The British prime minister feared that a withdrawal of the US Army would result in a “tide of Russian domination sweeping forward”, and leaving Poland completely isolated. He argued that the Western powers should negotiate a settlement with the USSR on Eastern Europe ― an “early and speedy showdown” — before the American presence was weakened. If they failed to do so, he concluded, there were “no prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of preventing a third world war”. Memorandum from William D. Leahy to Edward Stettinius, Jr., 11 May 1945. Source: The National Security Archive, The George Washington University

These are critical days and it would be a great pity if time were wasted in indecision or in protracted negotiation. If the Polish Government had taken the advice we tendered them at the beginning of this year, the additional complication produced by the formation of the Polish National Committee of Liberation at Lublin would not have arisen, and anything like a prolonged delay in the settlement can only have the effect of increasing the division between Poles in Poland and also of hampering the common action which the Poles, the Russians and the rest of the Allies are taking against Germany…… I have several times drawn Mr. Mikolajczyk's attention to the dangers of delay. Had he been able to return after the very friendly conversations which passed between him and Marshal Stalin, and also the conversations which he had with the Lublin National Liberation Committee; had he been able to return, with the assent of his colleagues, I believe that the difficulties inherent in the forming of a Polish Government in harmony with the Lublin Committee, might well have been overcome. In that case he would be at this moment at the head of a Polish Government, on Polish soil, recognised by all the United Nations…. Speech by Winston Churchill in the British House of Commons, 15 December 1944 vol 406 cc Churchill on Poland In a speech to the British House of Commons on 15 December 1944, Churchill sought to blame the Polish government in exile and its leader, Stanisław Mikolajczyk, for the failure to reach an agreement with Stalin and the Polish communists.

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, AND FOR THESE ENDS to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples, HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations. The Preamble of the UN Charter Source: United Nations The United Nations On 26 June 1945, 50 out of 51 of the original members of the United Nations signed the UN Charter in San Francisco (Poland, which was not represented at the conference, signed in October). The founding of the UN was one of the last instances of the spirit of wartime cooperation that some — Roosevelt in particular — hoped could extend beyond the end of the conflict.

Truman and Stalin On 12 April 1945, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died of a stroke in Warm Springs, Georgia. The presidency passed to Harry S. Truman, who had only been vice president for three months and had not been included in the discussions about most major issues relating to the war, including the development of the atomic bomb. The new US president met Stalin for the first and only time at the Potsdam conference, in July In his diary, he later recorded his impressions of the Soviet leader, describing him as straightforward but reasonable, and concluding optimistically that “I can deal with Stalin. He is honest -- but smart as hell” (see the larger quote on the left). Unlike his predecessor, however, Truman quickly came to distrust Stalin and the possibility of peaceful cooperation in the wake of the expansion of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe. Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman at the Potsdam Conference, 20 July 1945. Source: National Archives and Record Administration, ID# Public Domain, US Promptly a few minutes before 12 I looked up from the desk and there stood Stalin in the doorway After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes and no to questions after hearing all the arguments. It pleased him.. I can deal with Stalin. He is honest -- but smart as hell. Truman’s Diary, Potsdam, 17 July 1945 Source: Robert H. Farrell, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980). Quote:

The Potsdam Conference
Round table meeting at Potsdam including Stalin, Attlee, Truman and their advisers. Source: Imperial War Museum, ID# BU Re-used under the terms of the Non Commercial Licence The last of the three wartime meetings of the Big Three was held just outside Berlin between 17 July and 2 August 1945, just nine weeks after the Third Reich had surrendered unconditionally. Stalin was the only leader who had also been present in Yalta, as Clement Attlee replaced Churchill as British Prime Minister following Labour’s victory in the general election of July 1945. Not surprisingly, negotiations on post-war Germany and the future of Poland and Soviet-occupied Eastern and Central Europe dominated the conference.

Poland and Austria The decisions made at the Yalta Conference about Poland’s borders were confirmed in Potsdam. Germany ceded parts of East Prussia and the city of Danzig to Poland, which in turn lost the eastern region of Kresy to the Soviet Union. Overall, Poland lost around 45% of its prewar territories in the east and 12 million citizens. In addition to the occupation of Germany, the Big Three also agreed on the division of Austria along similar lines. The Allies had already declared the Anschluss of 1938 invalid, and had agreed to restore the country’s sovereignty at the end of the war. Austria and its capital Vienna remained under joint occupation until 1955, when it was accorded full independence in exchange for a commitment to perpetual neutrality. German territorial losses to Poland (in green) compensated for Soviet annexation of previously Polish territory (in yellow, in addition to other regions on the eastern border not shown here). Public Domain The occupation zones in Austria between Creator: Master Uegly. CC BY-SA 3.0 unported

The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity
“We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.” Charles I. Bevans (ed.), United States Treaties and International Agreements: , Vol. 3, p Finally, the Big Three in Potsdam recognised the Soviet-controlled Provisional Government of National Unity, formed in June after negotiations between the Polish communists and the Polish People’s Party of Stanisław Mikołajczyk. Although the communist Polish Workers’ Party was a minority in the Provisional Government, its members maintained control through the backing of the Soviet Union and the monopoly on key positions. This recognition by the Big Three meant in effect the end of international recognition of the Polish government-in-exile, based in London, which had maintained significant influence in the country throughout the war. The decision was therefore harshly criticised by anti-communist opponents.

The emerging division The first successful testing of the atomic bomb by the United States, in July 1945, was a significant turning point in the relationship between the Allies. The use of the new weapon against Japan, while aimed at speeding up the end of the conflict on the Pacific front, also sent a message to the Soviet Union about American military power. In the following months, although the wartime collaboration did not officially give way to hostility, each side looked at the other’s actions with suspicion. The US and the UK saw the imposition of communist regimes in Eastern Europe as proof of Soviet expansionism, whereas Stalin presented his moves as aiming to guarantee his country’s security. By the beginning of 1946, speeches by both Stalin and Churchill provided a rhetorical escalation of the relationship between the Big Three, suggesting an increasing division between two blocs and raising the fears that the new geopolitical rivalry would lead to another conflict.

The Manhattan Project: The first test of an atom bomb
On 16 July 1945, the day before the Potsdam Conference began, the United States conducted the first test of a new implosion-type plutonium bomb. The detonation was the culmination of the Manhattan Project, launched in 1942 in partnership with the UK and Canada, to develop a new weapon of unprecedented destructiveness. The success of the “Trinity” test, in the New Mexico desert, immediately influenced the talks in Germany. While it would play the decisive role in bringing the war in the Pacific to an end, with the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the atomic bomb also changed radically the relations between the Big Three, who were growing increasingly suspicious of each other’s motives. Mushroom cloud caused by the atomic explosion during the Trinity test on 16 July 1945. Source: LIFE Photo Archive, ID# 96ad5a9a5c94664e. Public Domain, US

Churchill’s version “I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! Of extraordinary power! Probably decisive on the whole Japanese war! What a bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told.…. As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. “How did it go?” I asked. “He never asked a question,” he replied. I was certain therefore that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long.” Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp During the Potsdam Conference, Truman informed Stalin of the successful atomic test. The accounts provided by both Truman and Churchill portrayed Stalin as unaware of the significance of the event, and not at all curious about its details. According to the US president, all Stalin said was that he was glad to hear about it and that he hoped Americans would make “good use of it against the Japanese”.

Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov’s version
“I do not recall the exact date, but after the close of one of the formal meetings Truman informed Stalin that the United States now possessed a bomb of exceptional power, without, however, naming it the atomic bomb. As was later written abroad, at that moment Churchill fixed his gaze on Stalin’s face, closely observing his reaction. However, Stalin did not betray his feelings and pretended that he saw nothing special in what Truman had imparted to him. Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors subsequently assumed that Stalin had really failed to fathom the significance of what he had heard. In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. “Let them. We’ll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up. I realized that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb.” Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), pp Soviet Marshal Georgii Zhukov’s version Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who had led Soviet troops in the final advance through Germany, recalled the event very differently. In his version, the Soviet dictator saw the new weapon in light of the emerging rivalry with the United States, and reacted by pushing for Soviet research to speed up. Given the discovery of a significant network of Soviet spies among the scientists working on the Manhattan Project, it is in fact unlikely that Stalin was completely unaware of what the US was working on at the time.

The Soviet interrogation of Niels Bohr
The USSR’s rush to catch up with the United States on nuclear technology started immediately. In November 1945, Soviet agents posing as scientists met with Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who had worked on the Manhattan Project. Under the pretence of searching for equipment that had been stolen by the Nazis, the Soviet agents asked Bohr questions about his research that had been prepared in advance in Moscow by scientists dealing with the atomic problem. In a memorandum to Stalin, the chief of Soviet secret police Lavrentiy Beria explained that Bohr was “famous as a progressive-minded scientist and as a staunch supporter of the international exchange of scientific achievements”, which had convinced Soviet leadership to approach him. The questions revolved around both the theoretical issues behind the new technology and the practical details of how the bomb had been manufactured and deployed. As the quote suggests, however, some questions were also concerned with the military implications of the bomb, and its use in a war. Niels Bohr in 1935. Public Domain, EU Question: Do you know any methods of protection from atomic bombs? Does a real possibility of defense from atomic bombs exist? Answer: I am sure that there is no real method of protection from atomic bomb. Tell me, how you can stop the fission process which has already begun in the bomb which has been dropped from a plane? It is possible, of course, to intercept the plane, thus not allowing it to approach its destination--but this is a task of a doubtful character, because planes fly very high for this purpose and besides, with the creation of jet planes, you understand yourself, the combination of these two discoveries makes the task of fighting the atomic bomb insoluble. Memorandum “The Interrogation of Niels Bohr”, 28 November 1945. Source: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). Translated for Cold War International History Project by Mark H. Doctoroff and published in CWIHP Bulletin No. 4, Fall 1994, "Soviet Espionage and the Bomb.” Record ID#:

Evaluating the bomb as a weapon
Between 1945 and 1949, the US enjoyed a nuclear monopoly. As the Cold War tensions increased, the use of the bomb as a weapon inevitably became a consideration. The ambivalent approach of the American government during these years was clear in a memorandum from June 1947. The authors of the study conceded the unprecedented destructive capability of the atomic bomb, which had the potential to “depopulate vast areas of the earth’s surface” and leave “only vestigial remnants of man’s material works”. While they hoped for the outlawing of war and international control of weapons of mass destruction, however, they argued that the US should continue to manufacture and stockpile such weapons. The bomb also forced Americans to adapt their military forces, strategies, and national defences to the new reality of potentially devastating surprise attacks. “The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon”, 30 June Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File. Atomic Test - Crossroads. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum

Gouzenko’s defection Igor Gouzenko died in 1982 and his wife Svetlana in They are buried together and their tombstone bears the inscription: “We chose freedom for mankind”. Wikimedia Commons Photographer: AnaConvTrans CC BY-SA- 4.0 International The efforts to acquire nuclear secrets often occurred through extensive networks of espionage and counterespionage that had been in place even during the Allies’ wartime cooperation. The revelations about these spies after the end of the war, however, contributed to the souring of the superpowers’ relations and the change in popular perceptions of the other. In September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, defected to the West delivering extensive evidence of Soviet espionage. His revelations led to the discovery of communist spy networks in Canada and in America, and are considered an early turning point in the Cold War. Gouzenko’s defection led to over half of all the convictions passed under Canada’s Official Secrets Act. Alternative: Creator: AnaConvTrans CC BY-SA 4.0 International

Eastern Europe falls under Soviet control
As the Red Army marched westwards in , it occupied countries with pre-existing democratic institutions and in which communists were often relatively small minorities. The transition from military occupation to control of the political and economic levers required years, but was already apparent by the end of World War II. In most countries it followed a similar pattern. Power was gradually concentrated in the hands of Stalinist cadres while maintaining a democratic façade to reassure Western observers. These cadres were initially instructed to join wide coalitions of anti-fascist forces, usually demanding positions that enabled them to control police and security forces. These broad coalitions were later replaced by others in which Stalinists would have the upper hand, and neutralise or co-opt other parties and public figures sympathetic to their stated socio-economic reforms. Finally, communists would expel other parties from government and ban them, establishing complete control over domestic life and formally creating socialist republics in line with Moscow. The map shows the expansion of Soviet direct or indirect control over Eastern Europe during and after World War II. Wikimedia Commons Author: Mosedschurte CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported

The situation in Poland
A unit of the communist paramilitary police ORMO (“Volunteer Reserve brigade” of the communist police force) during a street parade at the Victory Square in Warsaw, 9 June 1946. Source: Dzieje.pl. Pierwsze powojenne lata cz. 2 Public domain, Poland British and American policymakers continued to observe the situation in Poland with particular concern. Although the communists were only one of the participants in the Unity Government that had resulted from the agreements in Yalta, they had reserved for themselves key posts to keep the other political forces in check. Throughout the early post-war years, a virtual civil war between the communist security forces, assisted by the Red Army, and armed opposition in Poland took place. A national referendum took place in June 1946, known as the “Three times yes referendum” because there were three questions on the ballot paper and the communists campaigned for a “yes” vote to each question. This raised further concerns in the West. The results were heavily rigged by the communists through intimidation and the falsification of votes, and the referendum failed to meet democratic standards.

The Iran crisis of 1946 Between the end of 1945 and the beginning of 1946, another crisis outside Europe contributed to the fraying of the relationship between the three powers. In 1941, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union had jointly occupied Iran as a preventive measure, and used the country as a crucial supply line to provide American and British assistance to the USSR. The Big Three, however, had agreed to withdraw from Iran six months after the end of the war, guaranteeing its future sovereignty and territorial integrity. While the US and the UK had withdrawn their troops by 2 March 1946, the Soviet Union refused to do so, and encouraged the creation of two pro-Soviet separatist republics near its border; Azerbaijan and Mahabad (a Kurdish self-governing state within Iran). Fighting between the separatists and the Iranian forces lasted for months, but US diplomatic pressure on the USSR eventually led to the dissolution of the two republics. The episode contributed nonetheless to the increasingly negative view of Soviet moves by the Western powers. The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in Wikimedia Commons Author: PANONIAN CCO 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication

Stalin on future East-West conflicts
“It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism. […] The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute "spheres of influence" in its own favour -- by employing armed force. […] The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no skeptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system. Stalin on future East-West conflicts In his first major public speech after the end of World War II, on 9 February 1946, Stalin claimed that the “capitalist development of the world economy” would make another war inevitable. The speech, coming at a time when observers were already concerned about Stalin’s intentions, had a great impact on Western audiences. It seemed to confirm the worst fears of a communist drive for worldwide domination based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, rather than the image of Stalin as a pragmatist. Party hard-liners Malenkov and Kaganovich actually went further than Stalin, proposing the Soviet Union go its own way in world affairs. Transcript: Audio: Joseph Stalin, Speech delivered at a meeting of voters of the Stalin electoral district, Moscow, 9 February 1946, Source: Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center. Record ID#:

Churchill’s “Iron curtain” speech
Harry Truman and Winston Churchill on stage at Westminster College before Churchill delivers his “Sinews of Peace” speech in Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946. Source: Courtesy of Missouri State Archives, Image#: CID_ Public domain In March 1946, Winston Churchill was invited to deliver a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, where he received an honorary degree. President Truman was also in attendance. The former British prime minister expressed the concerns of many policymakers, who by this time doubted Stalin’s peaceful intentions. However, this came as a surprise to a large part of the Western public, which still had a favourable view of the Soviet Union. In his speech, Churchill referred for the first time to an “iron curtain” separating Western and Eastern Europe, the latter under increasing control from Moscow. He denounced the attempts by Communist parties across Eastern Europe to impose totalitarian control, and the gradual establishment of “police governments”. Churchill also warned against a policy of appeasement toward the Soviet Union with words that echoed the main principles of what would become the containment policy: “From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength. And there is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially military weakness”. Churchill Archive

Stalin’s reactions to Churchill’s speech
“The Germans made their invasion of the U.S.S.R. through Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Germans were able to make their invasion through these countries because, at the time, governments hostile to the Soviet Union existed in these countries. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union has lost irretrievably in the fighting against the Germans, and also through the German occupation and the deportation of Soviet citizens to German servitude, a total of about seven million people. In other words, the Soviet Union’s loss of life has been several times greater than that of Britain and the United States of America put together. Possibly in some quarters an inclination is felt to forget about these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget about them. And so what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, anxious for its future safety, is trying to see to it that governments loyal in their attitude to the Soviet Union should exist in these countries” J. V. Stalin, Interview to Pravda Correspondent Concerning Mr. Winston Churchill’s Speech at Fulton, March 1946. Source: Marxists Internet Archive. Public domain Stalin’s reactions to Churchill’s speech A few days after Churchill’s speech, Stalin responded in an interview to the Soviet newspaper Pravda. He called the speech “a dangerous act, calculated to sow the seeds of dissension” among the Allies, and characterised Churchill as a “racist” and “warmonger”, explicitly comparing him to Hitler. Stalin rejected the accusation that the USSR was undermining the democratic systems of the Eastern European countries and placing them under its control. He pointed to the German invasion during World War II, and the massive losses that it caused, to argue that the Soviet moves were merely defensive and aimed at securing its Western frontiers.

The containment policy
As Cold War tensions increased, American policymakers became convinced that the Soviet Union was a threat to international peace. What they lacked, however, was an explanation for the behaviour of the Kremlin that at times appeared puzzling. Diplomat George Kennan provided US foreign policy with a conceptual framework that explained Soviet foreign policy by placing it in the context of Russian tradition and Communist ideology, and formulated what came to be known as the containment policy. The US, Kennan argued, should demonstrate its willingness to resist Soviet expansion through a mixture of economic and military aid to allies all over the world. Rather than by military confrontation, the United States could eventually prevail by exploiting the internal contradictions and flaws of the Soviet system. Kennan’s views became the blueprint for successive administrations, and defined America’s Cold War approach toward the Soviet Union. The Truman doctrine made explicit unprecedented, open-ended commitment to engage in a political, economic, and potentially military confrontation on a global scale.

George Kennan’s “Long Telegram”
Only two weeks before Churchill’s address in Fulton, a young American diplomat had begun to formulate the premises of the foreign policy that would guide the US and the West throughout the Cold War. In February 1946, the US Department of State asked George F. Kennan, a diplomat stationed at the Moscow Embassy, why the Soviet Union opposed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Kennan, who until then had felt that his opinion was being ignored, jumped on the request and replied with a 5-part, 5,500-word telegram outlining the central tenets of Soviet foreign policy and his recommendations on America’s response. The “Long Telegram” provided American policymakers with an explanation for Stalin’s often puzzling actions and statements by placing Soviet foreign policy in the context of Russian tradition and Communist ideology. Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall, 22 February Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers. Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum

The Roberts telegram Kennan’s counterpart at the British Embassy in Moscow, Frank Roberts, was reaching similar conclusions at around the same time. In a telegram sent to the Foreign Office on 21 March 1946, he analysed Soviet foreign policy and recommended a strategy of containment against its expansionism. Roberts argued that security was the dominant concern of the Soviet elites: Russia felt both vulnerable and insecure, seeking to establish a protective belt of Soviet republics, with acquiescent or subservient near-neighbours, to extend its influence and control strategic territories. Compromise with the West could be found where its interests were not threatened, but any perceived encroachment would be resisted, with force if necessary. Communist ideology was an important factor, according to Roberts, serving to maintain Stalin’s grip on the country. However, he thought it “possible, though difficult” to reconcile British and Soviet aims, “granted the right mixture of strength and patience and the avoidance of sabre-rattling or the raising of prestige issues”. Roberts’ advice was in fact to pursue a less ideologically rigid approach to the USSR than Kennan’s, reflecting in part a weakened and exhausted power faced with the enormous costs of WWII. Sir Frank Roberts in 1949. Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery CC BY-NC- ND 3.00.

The “X article” Kennan’s telegram elicited a widely positive response among American policymakers, who felt it stated what they were increasingly coming to believe in the light of recent Soviet moves. In 1947, an article titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” appeared in the influential Foreign Affairs magazine under the pseudonym “X”. The author was later revealed as Kennan himself, and the article came to be perceived as the official view of the US government, even though that was not his original intention. The article restated the points made in the Long Telegram, although Kennan placed greater emphasis on the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in shaping Soviet conduct, and used for the first time the word “containment”, which had never actually appeared in the telegram itself. The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. [...] Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manœuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. ‘X’ (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Foreign Affairs 25 n. 4 (July 1947),

Critiques of containment
Kennan’s containment policy was rapidly adopted by successive administrations. Two prominent critics, however, pointed out the limits of this policy and the potential implications for America. Journalist Walter Lippman responded to the “X article” by warning that a worldwide struggle with the Soviet Union would force the US to align itself with “dubious and unnatural allies” in the name of a shared anti-communism. In addition, it threatened to neglect Europe, compromise the possibility of an enduring peace settlement and lead to an attempt to turn the United Nations into merely an anti-Soviet coalition. Paul Nitze, a colleague of Kennan at the State Department and an influential figure in shaping post-war American defense policies, criticised what he saw as the reactive aspects of the containment policy, which was based on the premise of countering Soviet aggression. Nitze argued instead for a significant buildup of US military power that would allow it to take the initiative in the Cold War. Paul Nitze during his time as Secretary of the Navy ( ). Source: US Navy. Public domain, US

The Novikov telegram “Reflecting the imperialistic tendency of American monopoly capital, US foreign policy has been characterized in the postwar period by a desire for world domination. […] With this objective in mind broad plans for expansion have been developed, to be realized both diplomatically and through the creation of a system of naval and air bases far from the US, an arms race, and the creation of newer and newer weapons. […] The current policy of the American government with respect to the USSR is also directed at limiting or displacing Soviet influence from neighboring countries. Telegram from Nikolai Novikov to the Soviet Leadership, 27 September 1946. Source: Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Wilson Center, Record ID# While Western leaders were concerned with Stalin’s actions, distrust and suspicion of the Western powers were also widespread in Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Nikolai Novikov, was ordered to write a top secret report on U.S. foreign policy. The “Novikov Telegram”, sent on 27 September 1946 and released in the 1990s, described the advent of a more aggressive American foreign policy aimed at undermining the security of the Soviet Union. He cautioned the Soviet leadership that the Truman administration was bent on imposing US political, military and economic domination around the world. Novikov noted the increase in the size of the army and the “colossal growth” of military expenditures to establish a system of bases all over the world. Throughout the document, Novikov tied together explicitly the military and economic dimension of American foreign policy. He warned the leaders in Moscow that “it ought to be fully realized that American preparations for a future war are being conducted with the idea of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of American imperialists is the chief obstacle in the American path to world domination”.

Crises in Turkey and Greece
Fighters of the communist Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), date unknown Source: The State Archives of the Republic of Macedonia (DARM) Public domain, Republic of Macedonia The first application of the new policy of containment took place in early 1947 during the crises in Greece and Turkey. Both countries had traditionally been within the British sphere of influence, and neither had Soviet troops stationed within their borders. Both of them, however, were in turmoil. Turkey was involved in a dispute with the USSR over the Turkish Straits, and Greece was engulfed in a civil war pitting communist-backed guerrillas against a government recognised by the West. In late 1946, the British government informed the United States that it would suspend its support of the two countries due to its dire postwar economic situation. American policymakers feared that, without help, the two countries might fall prey to communist subversion.

The Truman Doctrine On 12 March 1947, President Truman addressed the US Congress requesting its approval for a $400 million aid programme to the Greek and Turkish governments. In order to justify this measure, Truman portrayed the aggression towards third countries by totalitarian regimes as a threat to American national security. Outlining a policy that broke sharply with the previous American tradition of peacetime isolationism, he argued that misery and want pave the way for totalitarian regimes, and that “the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms”. Failure by the US to support these countries’ hopes for a better life, Truman argued, would not only endanger the peace of the world, but also the welfare and security of America itself. The so-called “Truman doctrine” became a cornerstone of American foreign policy during the Cold War, and marked the adoption of the containment policy. US President Harry Truman addresses Congress outlining the Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947 Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum. Public Domain, US “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” President Harry S. Truman’s address before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947. Source: Avalon Project, Yale University Transcript: Or

Henry Wallace on the Truman Doctrine
“March 12, 1947, marked a turning point in American history. It is not a Greek crisis that we face, it is an American crisis. It is a crisis in the American spirit… Only the American people fully aroused and promptly acting can prevent disaster. [Truman] proposed, in effect, that America police Russia’s every border. There is no regime too reactionary for us provided it stands in Russia’s expansionist path. There is no country too remote to serve as the scene of a contest which may widen until it becomes a world war.[…] I say that this policy is utterly futile. No people can be bought. America cannot afford to spend billions and billions of dollars for unproductive purposes. The world is hungry and insecure, and the peoples of all lands demand change. President Truman cannot prevent change in the world […] But once America stands for opposition to change, we are lost. America will become the most-hated nation in the world. […] When President Truman proclaims the world-wide conflict between East and West, he is telling the Soviet leaders that we are preparing for eventual war. They will reply by measures to strengthen their position in the event of war. Then the task of keeping the world at peace will pass beyond the power of the common people everywhere who want peace. Certainly it will not be freedom that will be victorious in this struggle. Henry A. Wallace, Speech on the Truman Doctrine, 27 March 1947. Source: TeachingAmericanHistory.org Henry Wallace on the Truman Doctrine Former vice president Henry Wallace reacted very critically to the Truman Doctrine, judging it an attempt to double down on the failed British policy in Greece and Turkey. Wallace, who had consistently advocated friendly relations with the USSR, warned that a military approach rather than one of economic reconstruction would be “the best salesman communism ever had”.

The institutions of containment
The United States began to establish the institutional structure that would support the containment policy. The first initiative was the Marshall Plan, a massive programme of economic aid for the countries that the war had devastated. The Plan aimed to counter any attempts by communists to exploit public reactions to the high levels of poverty and destruction. An intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was also created to conduct espionage and counter-intelligence operations. Finally, the US broke with its long-standing tradition of isolationism in peacetime, and remained committed to Europe’s defence. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would only be established in 1949, the Truman administration encouraged the initial attempts by Western European governments at cooperation over security, such as the 1948 Treaty of Brussels. The hardening of American policy also had repercussions on European political life, as communists were expelled from the French and Italian governments. By 1947, the two blocs were emerging more clearly.

Communism in France and Italy
Members of the Italian Communist Party at a demonstration in favour of the Soviet Union, November 1948. Public domain, Italy The two Western European countries of greatest concern to the United States were France and Italy. Strengthened by its participation in the resistance movements during WW2, the Parti communiste français (PCF) and the Partito comunista italiano (PCI) had well-organised cadres and could rely on mass followings. Initial fears of armed insurrections were replaced by the prospect of communists coming to power either by infiltrating the state or through democratic elections, thus demonstrating the appeal of communist ideology even beyond the countries occupied by the Red Army.

US policy towards France and Italy
American policymakers devoted particular attention to the question of how to counter communist influence in France and Italy, seeing them as a crucial test of strength for the Western alliance. Plans were drawn up not only to deal with the prospects of invasion or internal subversion, but also to address the cultural suspicions and the widespread anti-Americanism. The Truman administration eventually drew up a flexible approach that relied on a combination of political and cultural elements: pressure on local governments, material aid for reconstruction, support for private actors sympathetic with US goals (moderate unions, the Catholic Church, the noncommunist Left), and efforts to promote a positive image of American society and policies through its information services. A copy of the “Psychological Operations Plan for the Reduction of Communist Power in Italy” (code name “Clydesdale”), 21 February 1952. Image: Andrea Scionti Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum.

The expulsion of communists from the French and Italian governments
In the spring of 1947, both France and Italy still had unity governments that included all the major forces of the wartime resistance. At a time when the Cold War tensions were increasing, these coalitions could no longer hold. While domestic conflicts also played a part, the Truman administration explicitly pressured both French Premier, Paul Ramadier and Prime Minister, Alcide De Gasperi in Italy to expel the communists from their governments, warning them that American assistance would be dependent on their countries’ political “stability”. In May 1947, a few weeks apart from each other, both governments removed their communist ministers. Ministers of the first De Gasperi government in The unity government included the leaders of the Christian Democracy Alcide De Gasperi (first from left), the Socialist Party’s Pietro Nenni (second), and the Communist Party’s Palmiro Togliatti (third). Public domain, Italy (see notes) Source: L'Humanité. Organe Central du Parti Communiste Français. dir. de publ. Cachin, Marcel ; RRéd. Chef Vaillant-Couturier Paris: L'Humanité. Copyright: (c) L‘Humanité

Poverty and communism For American policymakers, removing communists from the coalition governments of its Western European allies was only part of the solution. In fact, many in Washington were concerned that a failure to address the economic devastation of the war would strengthen communism’s appeal among the poor, ensuring its expansion through the ballot box rather than invasion. General Lucius Clay, the American High Commissioner of occupied Germany, had expressed this fear by observing that “There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on a thousand”. Descriptions of widespread poverty like this reinforced the Truman Administration’s belief that the containment of communist expansion would necessarily require a sustained programme of economic assistance to European countries. “Along the Via Vittorio Veneto, in Rome’s most luxurious cafés, aristocrats were discussing, over cream puffs, how to get out of Italy in a hurry. In front of the cafés, crippled children on crutches hobbled in a pathetically grotesque dance, hoping for a few lire from wealthy passers-by. It is such contrasts, an expression of the fact that Italy’s upper classes still live in luxury while two million unemployed must worry about their daily bread, that help Communism most in Italy. “How to Hang ON”, Time, 19 April 1948 .

Convincing the American public
In order to implement such a policy, however, the Truman administration had to overcome the widespread desire among Americans to focus on domestic prosperity rather than remain involved abroad. The notion of massive economic aid to foreign countries, especially those that had until recently been fighting against the US, needed to be “sold” to the American public. Former president Herbert Hoover, whom Truman had asked to study the situation in Europe, acknowledged as much in this letter. Letter, Herbert Hoover to Harry S. Truman, 19 January Truman Papers, Official File. OF 950B: Economic Mission as to Food and Its Collateral Problems (Hoover Mission). Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum

The announcement of the Marshall Plan
The actual details of this programme were outlined by US Secretary of State George Marshall, who had toured Europe in the winter of On 5 June 1947, Marshall addressed the graduating class of Harvard University after receiving an honorary degree. In his speech, he offered a massive aid programme and took the opportunity to explain the rationale for American involvement in the reconstruction of Europe to a domestic audience that had traditionally been sceptical about peacetime commitments abroad. “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” ‘The Marshall Plan’, Speech by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall”, 5 June 1947. Source: History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Congressional Record. Url:

The Soviet reaction to the Plan
“The so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the organization is ignored. As the experience of the past few months has shown, the proclamation of the doctrine meant that the United States government has moved towards a direct renunciation of the principles of international collaboration and concerted action by the great powers and towards attempts to impose its will on other independent states […] the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the United States and direct interference by the latter in the internal affairs of those countries. Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union. The United States had initially extended the invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies as well. After some initial hesitations, however, Stalin rejected the offer, fearing it would give Americans the possibility to interfere in the Soviet plans to establish command economies within its bloc. The Soviet Union therefore also prevented Eastern European countries from attending the preparatory meetings for the Marshall Plan, even though some – especially Poland and Czechoslovakia – had demonstrated their interest. In a speech given to the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet deputy foreign minister accused the US of using the Marshall Plan to impose political pressure through economic means, explicitly labeling it an aggressive move on America’s part. Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinsky, Speech to the UN General Assembly, September 1947. Source: Jussi M. Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp

The Cominform “The need for mutual consultation […] has become particularly urgent at the present juncture when continued isolation may lead to a slackening of mutual understanding, and at times, even to serious blunders. In view of the fact that the majority of the leaders of the Soviet parties (especially the British Labourites and the French Socialists) are acting as agents of the United States imperialist circles, there has developed upon the Communists the special historic task of leading the resistance to the American plan for the enthrallment of Europe, and of boldly denouncing all coadjutors of American imperialism in their own countries. At the same time, Communists must support all the really patriotic elements who do not want their countries to be imposed upon, who want to resist enthrallment of their countries to foreign capital, and to uphold their national sovereignty. In response to American initiatives, the Soviet Union promoted its own initiatives to increase the coordination between communist parties. On 5 October 1947 the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was created. Stalin had called the meeting in part to respond to the different positions among Eastern European governments about participating in the Marshall Plan The Cominform included seven Eastern bloc communist parties (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, which was expelled the following year after the Stalin-Tito break). The French and Italian communist parties were also invited to join, and specifically tasked with obstructing the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine in the Western bloc. Zhdanov at the Founding of the Cominform, September 1947”, Documents on International Affairs , pp Hanhimäki and Westad, The Cold War, 50-52,

From Tehran to Containment
This collection has been developed by Andrea Scionti of the Historiana Historical Content Team. Source: Wikimedia Commons Creator: San Jose, 2006 CC BY-SA 3.0 unported Cold War Military Alliances (San Jose, CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported)

The rapid emergence of the Cold War after the end of World War II surprised some observers. In some ways it could have been expected based on historical,

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The rapid emergence of the Cold War after the end of World War II surprised some observers. In some ways it could have been expected based on historical,

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Presentation on theme: "The rapid emergence of the Cold War after the end of World War II surprised some observers. In some ways it could have been expected based on historical,"— Presentation transcript:

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