1. cold war: brings peace? International institution: a false promise?
Xiao Wei (I37027)
Professor Jaechun Kim

2. John J. Mearsheimer:
Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War
“We may wake up one day lamenting the loss of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations.”
”…the prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically now that the Cold War is receding into history.”

3. A ”Hard” Theory of Peace “Bipolarity” & “Multipolarity”
Model:
Bipolarity: The Cold War (two superpowers)
Multipolarity: Europe in 1914 (France, Germany, Great Britain, Austria- Hungary, and Russia as great powers)

4. One dyad (across which war might break out)
Bipolar System
One dyad (across which war might break out)
Big Power
Big Power
Allegiance from minor powers

5. Multipolar System
Many Dyads
Possibilities of Big Wars:

6. What will keep the peace in the future?
3 dimensions:
1) it will be multipolar
2) the distribution of power among the major states
3) the distribution of nuclear weapons – are less certain
The “Europe Without Nuclear Weapons” Scenario
The “Current Ownership” Scenario
The “Nuclear Proliferation” Scenario
Three scenarios of the nuclear future in Europe are possible:

7. The “Europe Without Nuclear Weapons” Scenario
A nuclear-free Europe has the distinction of being the most dangerous among the post-Cold War orders
The caution, the security, the rough equality, and the clarity of the relative power that nuclear weapons bring would be lost
Does not appear to be in the cards

8. The “Current Ownership” Scenario
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union retain their nuclear weapons, but no new nuclear powers emerge in Europe
Germany will prevent it over the long run. The Germans are not likely to be willing to rely on the Poles and the Czechs to provide their forward defense against a possible direct Soviet conventional attack
The small states of Eastern Europe will have strong incentives to acquire nuclear weapons
A scenario in which current ownership continues, without proliferation, seems very unlikely

9. The “Nuclear Proliferation” Scenario
Mismanaged proliferation could produce disaster; well-managed proliferation could produce an order nearly as stable as that of the Long Peace
Proliferation process itself could give the existing nuclear powers a strong incentive to stop a non-nuclear neighbor from joining the club (eg: Israel used force to stop Iraq from acquiring a nuclear capability)
Proliferation would increase the risk that nuclear weapons would be fired by accident or captured by terrorists or used by madmen
Proliferation in Europe will undermine the legitimacy of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this could open the floodgates of proliferation worldwide.

10. Flaws of the 3 Scenarios
The 1st Scenario: (Is War Obsolete?)
This scenario rests on the “obsolescence of war” theory, which posits that modern conventional war had become so deadly by War is yesterday’s nightmare.
Doubt: if any war could have persuaded Europeans to forswear conventional war, it should have been the First World War
There is no systematic evidence demonstrating that Europeans believe war is obsolete. Even if it were widely believed, attitudes could change.

11. Flaws of the 3 Scenarios
The 2nd Scenario: (Is Prosperity the Path to Peace?)
This scenario based on the theory of economic liberalism: states are primarily motivated by the desire to achieve prosperity and that leaders place the material welfare of their publics above all other considerations, including security. ( Wrong)
States are not primarily motivated by the desire to achieve prosperity.
States operate in both an international political and an international economic environment, and the former dominates the latter when the two systems come into conflict. Survival in an anarchic international political system is the highest goal a state can have.
When security is scarce, states become more concerned about relative than about absolute gains. (they ask of an exchange not “Will both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?”)

12. Flaws of the 3 Scenarios
The 3rd Scenario: (Do Democracies Really Love Peace?)
This scenario rests on the “peace-loving democracies” theory:
1) the authoritarian leaders are more likely to go to war than leaders of democracies, because authoritarian leaders are not accountable to their publics. In a democracy the citizenry which pays the price of war, has a greater say in what the government does.
2) the citizens of liberal democracies respect popular democratic rights
Flaws:
1) the historical record shows that democracies are every bit as likely to fight wars as are authoritarian states
2) mass publics, whether in a democracy or not, can become deeply imbued with nationalistic or religious fervor

13. Missing the Cold War Three policy prescriptions:
1) the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe
2) Britain and the United States, as well as the Continental states, will have to counter any emerging aggressor actively and efficiently, in order to offset the ganging up and bullying that are sure to arise in post-Cold War Europe.
3) a concerted effort should be made to keep hypernationalism at bay, especially in Eastern Europe.

14. The False Promise of International Institutions
“Institutions” defined by John J. Mearsheimer:
“A set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe unacceptable kinds of behavior. …These rules are typically formalized in international agreements, and are usually embodied in organizations with their own personnel and budgets.”

15. Institutions in a Realist World
1) the rules reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power
2) the most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it
3) institutions are merely an intervening variable in the process (e.g. NATO)

16. Three Institutionalist Theories
Liberal Institutionalism
Collective Security
Critical Theory

17. Liberal Institutionalism
Causal Logic:
Institutions can produce cooperation
1) Rules can increase the number of transactions between particular states over time
2) rules can tie together interactions between states in different issue areas.
3) a structure of rules can increase the amount of information available to participants in cooperative agreements so that close monitoring is possible
4) rules can reduce the transaction costs of individual agreements
Flaws In The Causal Logic:
1) states’ ignoring of relative-gains concerns are rather uncommon in the real world
2) liberal institutionalism itself has little new to say about when states worry about relative gains
3) even in circumstances where realist logic about relative gains does not apply, non-military logics like strategic trade theory might cause states to think in terms of relative gains

18. Collective Security
The theory deals directly with the issue of how to cause peace
Causal Logic:
1) states must renounce the use of military force to alter the status quo
2) “responsible” states must not think in terms of narrow self-interest when they act against lonely aggressors, but must instead choose to equate their national interest with the broader interests of the international community.
3) states must trust each other
Flaws In The Causal Logic:
1) this is an incomplete theory because it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another
2) states are like to thwart efforts to confront an aggressor with preponderant power

19. Critical Theory
The theory makes claims about the prospects for changing state behavior. They aim to transform the international system into a “world society” where states are guided by “norms of trust and sharing”
Causal Logic:
1) critical theorists aim to create a world in which all states consider war an unacceptable practice, and are not likely to change their minds about the matter
2) assumes that ideas and discourse are the driving forces that shape the world, although it recognizes that structural factors have some, albeit minor, influence,
3) be likely to be quite intolerant of other discourses about international politics, esp. realism
Flaws In The Causal Logic:
1) Questions: What determines why some discourses become dominant and others lose out in the marketplace of ideas? What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of discourses?
2) critical theory itself emphasizes that it is impossible to know the future

20. Conclusion
“There is a downside for policymakers who rely on institutionalist theories: these theories do not accurately describe the world, hence policies based on them are bound to fail.”
Discussion
Do you agree with John Mearsheimer’s view?