Institutions and Environmental Cooperation. Today Types of global environmental problems The role of international institutions (regimes): realist vs.
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Today Types of global environmental problems The role of international institutions (regimes): realist vs. institutionalist perspectives Analyzing international environmental regimes
Types of Cooperation Dilemmas Tragedy of the commons (Garrett Hardin 1968). Common resources: – non-excludable (cannot exclude additional users) – Subtractable (use by one actor reduces availability to others) – individual utility of each additional use greater than the disutility of overuse, which is shared by all. Strong incentives to overuse.
Tragedy of the Commons “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush…” (Hardin 1968, p. 41)
Externalities Activity within one state affects the environment in other states Examples?
Shared Resources Resources that extend across the jurisdiction of several states: Examples?
Linked Issues When environmental regimes have unintended consequence on other issues and vise versa. Examples?
Solutions Garrett Hardin: Privatization Government regulation/ “mutually agreed coercion.” Are these feasible in international relations?
Cooperation Coordination of polices, rules, and norms by national governments. International institutions and regimes are instruments of cooperation
Instruments: Framework convention – Set of principles, norms, goals and mechanisms for cooperation, but no major obligations Conference of parties Protocols – Specific obligations (most intense negotiations) Implementation provisions. – Reporting; monitoring (rare); trade sanctions (rare); assistance. Norms (soft rules) Voluntary codes of conduct Public-private partnerships
Realism: Assumptions Anarchic system: no central authority States want to survive States potentially dangerous (military capability) Uncertain about intentions of other states Rational: make strategic calculations how to survive
Realism Implications about state behavior Maximize power Fear each other Follow own interest defined as security and maximization of RELATIVE power War is means not an end Non-security issues (particularly environment, human rights) of secondary, if any, importance Cooperation unlikely (although “not impossible”) Institutions – irrelevant b/c reflect distribution of power
Neoliberal Institutionalism Assumptions States unitary, rational actors Anarchy: no government, but governance possible States seek to maximize utility, follow own interests Interests can be issue specific (e.g. economy, environment, security, etc.) Cooperation possible – governance without government Institutions – facilitate cooperation, can contribute to peace
Role of Institutions Facilitate Cooperation: –institutionalize iteration (long-term calculations and reciprocity conducive to cooperation) -provide information (monitor, change of strategy) -credible commitments -issue linkage -reduce transaction costs (make agreements and monitoring less costly to administer) -resolve distribution conflicts
Key Differences Definition of power Definition of interests Prospects for international cooperation Role of institutions
Interpreting environmental cooperation: Realism? -focus on hegemon, interests, power relations Liberal institutionalism? -focus on interests, power, institutions, bargaining Constructivism? -focus on norms, ideas, networks that spread ideas Other factors? -domestic politics; non-state actors; transnational actors
Regime Effectiveness: How can we tell if cooperation was successful or not? – States change policies and behavior; – Non-state actors change behavior (business, consumers, non-profit organizations, etc.); – Change in values? – Change in environmental conditions.
Analyzing Cases: What contributes to, or thwarts regime creation? Why do some regimes grow stronger over time, while others do not? What instruments are used in different regimes? Is the regime effective? Use Shrek’s rule: layers of explanation. Which explanation is more convincing? Why?