EXERCISE September 2015 Jakarta, Indonesia GEMA BHAKTI 15 US Foreign Humanitarian Assistance September 2015 Jakarta, Indonesia This brief is classified:

Field Offices Overseas Office of the Administrator Lead Federal Agency Bureau for Democracy, Conflict & Humanitarian Assistance Bureau for Legislative & Public Affairs Bureau for Global Health Bureau for Econ Growth, Education & Environment Bureau for Policy Planning & Learning Bureau for Management Bureau for Food Security USAID is divided between functional and regional bureaus. The agency has approximately 9,410 employees – 3,858 of which are U.S. citizens. Of US personnel, 55% are foreign service officers and 44% are civil service employees. Foreign service nationals (locals) make up the biggest share of USAID employees at 4,388. To top it all off, 85% of USAID’s efforts are executed through US-based government contractors and NGOs. In total, US Foreign Assistance amounted to only 0.7% of the FY14 federal budget. PACOM’s USAID counterparts would be at the Bureau for Asia (excluding Pakistan) and field-based staff working in 25 countries across the region. Not all countries have dedicated USAID Missions and the regional office is located in Bangkok, Thailand. There are various functional bureaus covering public health, education and the environment. However, the most relevant bureau that crosses paths with the DoD is the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (phonetically pronounced DACHA). “DACHA” has various offices for covering food security, stabilization operations, democracy promotion and civil-military coordination. The Office of Civil-Military Cooperation or CMC is the primary USAID interface with the DoD and officers are exchanged at USAID Headquarters, the Pentagon, COCOMs and other major DoD organizations. For example, CMC placed two Development Advisors at PACOM and one PACOM staff officer at their HQ in Washington. [click to trigger red circle] For the purposes of this course, the only entity within “DACHA” of importance to you is the Office for US Foreign Disaster Assistance or OFDA. There are less than 400 total OFDA personnel – mainly staffed by direct government hired personal services contractors (PSCs). OFDA is the lead in the USG for organizing and managing foreign disaster assistance Develops overall response strategy Provides on-scene management in support of U.S. Ambassador Provides USG funding to implementing partners Collects and analyzes information on the response Primary reporting source for the total USG response OFDA works with other offices within “DACHA,” USAID’s regional bureaus and overseas missions (among other partners) to ensure a seamless hand-off of assistance from relief (including recovery) to development entities. Office of Program, Policy & Management Office of Food for Peace Center of Excellence on Democracy & Human Rights Governance Office of Civilian Military Cooperation Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Office of Transition Initiatives Office of Conflict Management & Mitigation Office of Crisis Surge Support Staff Office of American Schools & Hospitals Abroad Africa Asia Middle East Europe & Eurasia Latin America & Caribbean Afghanistan & Pakistan Affairs Field Offices Overseas

U.S. Interagency Process Taking a look at the Request for Assistance (RFA) process, we need to begin with the actual event and the affected state’s response. If the affected state ascertains that they are unable to respond effectively, there may be a “welcoming” or acceptance of aid from the international community. [Click once to build out] After the disaster, the designated Mission Disaster Relief Officer (MDRO) in the US Embassy will verify the scope and magnitude of the event and the humanitarian impact and notify the Chief of Mission. Depending on the nature of the disaster, the post’s Emergency Action Committee (EAC) may be convened. The MDRO’s initial point of contact for response options should be the OFDA regional advisor in the affected region to ensure effective communication and coordination. Based on discussion with all involved, the MDRO will draft the disaster declaration cable for approval by the Chief of Mission. To request assistance from OFDA, the Chief of Mission should satisfy the following criteria: Is the Affected State requesting or willing to accept US assistance? Is the disaster beyond the capacity of the affected state to respond effectively? Is it in the US interest to respond? For countries without a US diplomatic presence (i.e. Cuba, North Korea and Iran), the Assistant Secretary of State for the affected region may declare a disaster via an action memo from the US State Department to the USAID-OFDA Director. The President has the authority to set the terms and conditions of the aid provided. As a general rule, assistance provided by USAID/OFDA lasts about 90 days, although the agency may continue monitoring and evaluating projects for a longer period. Under the legislation governing disaster assistance, the President is authorized to borrow up to $50 million in any fiscal year from any part of an existing international assistance program if funding within the USAID/OFDA budget is inadequate. Generally, this money is borrowed from programs already planned for countries within the region. Once OFDA responds as the lead federal agency, OFDA and the country team will determine response options. All or some of the following will be considered: USAID Response Options Grants – $50k grant releasable within 24hrs to the USAID Mission or Embassy – which is then provided to local Red Cross/Crescent society or similar local disaster response organization; also contract implementing partners – typically NGOs with a presence in the country. It can be raised to $100k. Commodities (non food items like plastic sheeting, blankets, kitchen sets, water blaters, hygiene kits, water treatment units etc.. These commodities are strategically warehoused in facilities in OFDA has warehouses strategically placed in Dubai, Miami and Pisa, Italy Regional Advisors - already in-country or in the region; have established relationships; could quickly link up with authorities in the affected state Assessment Team Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) - OFDA may deploy a disaster assistance response team (DART) into the disaster area to assist in the coordination of the DR effort. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of the U.S. government response to a foreign disaster. Its composition and specific mission will depend on the nature, severity, and duration of a particular disaster. The DART will also be the key focal point for the U.S. military. In an extreme case, active duty military (wearing civilian clothes) were actually part of the Ebola Response Dart in West Africa in 2014. The DART operates in five functional areas: management, operations, planning, logistics and administration. Depending on the scope of the disaster and composition of the team, the DART is capable of making assessments, recommending response activities, managing relief activities, coordinating distribution of relief and supplies, liaison with government officials and NGOs. Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams (HAST) focus on the requirements for military support to the relief effort. Confusion between HAST mission and the OFDA mission may occur. For example, if the HAST goes beyond assessing requirements for military support and assesses the needs of the affected population, this may lead to confusion as results/recommendations are briefed up to higher. To prevent confusion, both the DART and the \ HAST should reach a consensus on those differences. OFDA would contend that the HAST should stay in its lane and limit its assessment to the unique military capabilities it would most likely employ. Response Management Team -Once a DART is deployed, a Washington DC-based RMT is also activated to provide a link between the responders and national authorities (like the White House National Security Council, State Department and USAID headquarters) However Additional support from other USG departments? For example, experts from the Department of Health and Human Services were mobilized to provide support to the cholera outbreak in Haiti; experts from our Department of Energy were mobilized for the nuclear plant disaster in Japan following the earthquake/tsunami. USAID could also draw from local municipalities, like the Los Angeles Country Fire Department, which is only one of two INSARAG qualified urban search and rescue organizations in the United States. Does the DoD have a unique capability? As illustrated earlier, the vast majority of USG responses – approximately 90-95% - continues without DoD support. [Click once to complete build out] DOD FHA Process: DOD has no direct legal or fiduciary authority to self-initiate emergency FHA operations with one limited exception: Immediate Response Authority (IRA) to conduct emergency relief operations at the scene of a crisis in order to save lives and prevent great human suffering in the initial 72 hours. (Per Immediate Response Authority (IRA) Executive Order 12966 - Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1995 & DODD 5100.46, 6 Jul 12).  If OFDA and the Chief of Mission request DoD support to the relief effort, then a formal memo is drafted (which will serve as an interagency agreement) via the Executive Secretary of the Secretary of State to the Executive Secretary of the Secretary of Defense. The “EXECSEC Memo” should detail the capabilities needed (i.e. logistics etc..) rather than any individual asset or unit. Once the SECDEF approves, the Joint Staff will task the relevant COCOM through a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Execution Order (EXORD). The COCOM will then work closely with the lead federal agency, USAID-OFDA , and the country team to identify specific requirements.

U.S. Military in Disaster Relief U.S. military may be involved when: a unique capability is needed civilian response capacity overwhelmed civilian authorities request assistance The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort humanitarian response but supports civilian relief agencies. Going back to the EXECSEC Memo. Technically, the Office of the Secretary of Defense does no simply rubber stamp the State Department’s request. The Secretary of Defense must determine that the military may be involved when: and when a unique military capability is required to provide some assistance when there is no civilian alternative (civilian capabilities have been overwhelmed) a foreign government requests US assistance Also note that when DoD becomes involved there needs to be a clear mission, at minimal risk, and not affecting the military’s day job. Further, the Department requires that USAID validate the requirement for military assistance based on in-country assessments. We will get into more detail of the validation process later Although not legally obligated to do so, DOD’s disaster response policy is consistent with the U.N.’s “Oslo Guidelines” and other generally accepted civ-mil practices. When involved: clearly defined military mission risks should be minimal not affect core DOD missions

U.S. FHA ConOp Prescriptive USPACOM guidance to military commanders Framework to inform partner nations on USPACOM support Baseline for training and preparing USPACOM commanders The USPACOM Standing FHA CONOP builds the strategic and operational construct for planning, preparing, executing and assessing FHA operations and will be applied to situations when USG agencies requests DoD assistance for natural disasters, pandemic/emerging infectious diseases and CBRNE. Prior to Cedric Rescue (1-7 days) – Save lives of those trapped or isolated with no way to get assistance, and without which they will die.. This phase includes the IRA granted to local commanders. Relief (3-50 days) Support provisions of basic survival needs and prevent secondary effects such as disease Recovery

FHA Command & Control Models USPACOM Commander has three response options: Small-Scale: Minimal support from USPACOM, typically executed by a single service component providing limited forces. Medium-Scale: Single Service with joint enablers and command element augmentation to ensure an effective USPACOM response. The C2 aspects for FHA, much like warfighting, are arguably the most contentious and difficult of decisions for the PACOM Commander. PACOM follows a functional theater components USPACOM disbanded the standing JTF and has moved to what has been coined – the “living C2 concept.” This concept, coupled with the PACOM Commander’s drive to “operationalize” the PACOM staff, assigns C2 models as per the scale and nature of the disaster. The establishment of a JTF will not be automatic and a C2 structure should address the specific needs of the Affected State and broader interagency and international community priorities. Every disaster is different. We will be exploring three scalable C2 models. The base C2 construct in-theater is structured by function rather than by service component. There are four components: Theater Joint Functional Land Component Commander (TJFLCC) – Led by USARPAC (SOCPAC and MARFORPAC are members) Theater Joint Functional Maritime Component Commander (TJFMCC) – Led by PACFLT Theater Joint Functional Air Component Command (TJFACC) – Led by PACAF Theater Joint Functional Special Operations Component Command (TJFSOCC) – Led by SOCPAC Currently, these roles are focused primarily on Phase Zero. For example, the USARPAC CG, GEN Brooks, has coordinating authority (not command authority) on phase zero land component activities in the Asia-Pacific. Large-Scale: May require the formation of a JTF.

FHA C2 Option – Small Scale Model CJCS POTUS SecDef USEMB Affected State USG LFA USPACOM USAID/OFDA NDMO OSOCC Requiring minimal support from USPACOM, a small scale response is typically executed by a single service component providing limited forces (e.g., two C-130’s to move HA supplies). Designation of the supported operational commander is a CDRUSPACOM decision informed by joint operational planning. Though any component may be designated as the Supported Operational Commander, MARFORPAC (primary) and USARPAC (alternate) are tasked in the PACOM Theater Campaign Order as the primary components to designate an on-scene commander (OSC). Since a service, MARFORPAC, has been designated PACOM’s “first responder” for the regional presence and expeditionary capability, the theater joint functional component structure doesn’t really apply for FHA operations. However in the next C2 model, there will be a role for the joint functional components. TJFSOCC SOCPAC TJFACC PACAF TJFMCC PACFLT TJFLCC USARPAC MARFORPAC Service Components will execute operations under current authorities and support the USPACOM Battle Rhythm as equal members. (TJFLCC Implementing directive 071803Z Feb 14) AS Military Supported Commander MNCC DJTFAC/ DJC2 National Command Combatant Command OPCON Coordination Support (Enablers)

FHA C2 Option – Medium Scale Model CJCS POTUS SecDef USEMB Affected State USG LFA USPACOM USAID/OFDA NDMO OSOCC Requiring minimal support from USPACOM, a small scale response is typically executed by a single service component providing limited forces (e.g., two C-130’s to move HA supplies). Designation of the supported operational commander is a PACOM Commander decision informed by joint operational planning. Just as with the small-scale model, MARFORPAC (primary) and USARPAC (alternate) are tasked in the PACOM Theater Campaign Order as the primary components to designate an on-scene commander (OSC). TJFSOCC SOCPAC TJFACC PACAF TJFMCC PACFLT TJFLCC USARPAC MARFORPAC Examples: ACCE CRG Eagle Vision Examples: Ships NMCB EPMU Examples: Sustain Mvmt Mortuary AS Military Examples: PSAT PAT Supported Commander MNCC DJTFAC/ DJC2 National Command Combatant Command OPCON Coordination Support (Enablers)

FHA C2 Option – Large Scale Model CJCS USEMB Affected State USG LFA USPACOM USAID/OFDA NDMO OSOCC In a major disaster, the scope and scale of the response may require formation of a Joint Task Force (JTF). Upon establishment of a JTF, each component will be represented via functional component elements, as required, to ensure an effective USPACOM response. The JTF will be task organized according to mission requirements defined by joint operational planning and the OSC. In response to Super Typhoon Haiyan, the initial C2 model employed by PACOM was the medium scale model, whereby 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade out of Okinawa was the OSC. As additional naval assets became available, the response move to a large-scale model with the establishment of a JTF headed by the III MEF CG (three star). 3rd MEB became the land component commander (LCC) This was a controversial decision at PACOM at the time and leaves open questions on whether a JTF was necessary. From a strictly humanitarian support perspective, 3rd MEB was adequately supporting all MITAM requests. Once the JTF was established around D+8, 3rd MEB was already beginning to transition humanitarian support to the international community and the affected state. Notably, according to OFDA, only one MITAM request remained when the JTF became operational. TJFSOCC SOCPAC TJFACC PACAF TJFMCC PACFLT TJFLCC USARPAC MARFORPAC MNCC AS Military JTF ACC LCC MCC National Command Combatant Command OPCON Coordination Support (Enablers)

FHA Lines of Effort HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT USPACOM Endstate Phases Assess II Respond III Execution IV Transition V Redeployment Phases MILITARY-TO-MILITARY SUPPORT SECURITY SUPPORT O Prepare USPACOM Endstate Lines of Operations Preparedness, Training, & Assessments SETTING CONDITIONS Strategic Communication CONTINUOUSLY SHAPE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT The priority focus must be to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the AS and/or the affected population, hence the relative size of that arrow in the graphic. Historically, DOD assistance has four lines of operation captured in the USPACOM FHA Operational Design Humanitarian Support Mil-Mil Support Security Support Strategic Communication Coordination. The transition of assigned tasks is the one cross-cutting theme applied throughout the response. The OSC will minimize the footprint of response forces. Furthermore, USPACOM response forces must be self-sufficient to avoid competing for resources with the humanitarian response effort, and should not create dependencies on the USG/DOD by the affected population. Transition planning and coordination must start immediately for all tasks. ICW DOS/USAID, each unique capability will be transitioned (together or separately) to trusted partners The LOEs follow the accepted 6-phase scheme of maneuver. This briefing will focus on phases 1 through 5. Phase 0, as alluded to in the overview module, focuses on the TCP activities of readiness, capacity building and preparedness. For purposes of this module, we will focus on Humanitarian Support and the Military-to-Military Support lines of operation. DoD only provides unique capabilities or those where capacities are overwhelmed MAIN EFFORT IS HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT to provide assistance to the affected population Mil-to-mil support must directly enable AS military response to the disaster When required, security activities will bolster AS security forces. DoD elements/contingents must be self-supporting to not become part of the problem All support to the FHA effort must be coordinated by DOS and USAID/OFDA with the HN DoD activities will “do no harm” and not compete with HN agencies or civilian firms Communications Coordination must ensure aligned USG messages and inclusion of and focus on the AS leadership and overall humanitarian effort to reinforce HN legitimacy Transition planning and coordination must start immediately for all tasks. ICW DOS/USAID, each unique capability will be transitioned (together or separately) to trusted partners Employment Principles 10

Humanitarian Support LOE Framework Lines of Operations Preparedness, Training, & Assessments SETTING CONDITIONS End State: Lives saved, AS & HA community no longer needs DOD assistance MEDICAL CARE ENGINEERING / CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES IMAGERY LOGISTICS / MOBILITY Most Likely Least Likely Phases I Assess II Respond III Execution IV Transition V Redeployment O Prepare This LOE is characterized by the provision of Humanitarian Support activities as coordinated by USAID/OFDA. As demonstrated on the graph, USPACOM capabilities address identified humanitarian gaps, activities supporting other humanitarian organization efforts or, as required and requested, provide direct humanitarian support to the affected population. As described earlier in the “unique capabilities” slide, the lines of operation that serve the Humanitarian Support LOE are: Logistics/Mobility Imagery Engineering/Critical Infrastructure Medical Care Humanitarian Supplies These activities are based on the most requested DoD capabilities in the past, but they shouldn’t be considered all-inclusive nor give the impression they will be required for every mission. As mention earlier, key considerations for effective military support to the humanitarian effort are the coordination with the Federal Lead avoiding mission creep beyond disaster relief not duplicating or competing with services provided by the affected state or other relief actors The end-state is that lives are saved and the affected state and humanitarian community no longer needs DoD assistance. Transition of every HADR task, coordinated by DOS/USAID, will be handed off through one of three options: Affected State / UN Agency/ International Organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations USG Interagency / Affected State Civilian contract Task is complete and does not require handoff (non-transferable) CONTINUOUSLY SHAPE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION MAIN EFFORT Support to relief logistics accounting, stockpiling, management and movement for distribution Support AS and relief medical services for immediate disaster caused casualties Support the provision of humanitarian supplies where no other sources are available Support the relief effort with imagery, engineer assessments, sanitation and planning Support relief mobility requirements: roads, bridges, ports for movement of relief supplies All support to the humanitarian effort must be coordinated by DOS and USAID/OFDA with the AS. DoD will not take on HADR missions/tasks from other agencies or AS Military. Transition of every HADR task, coordinated by DOS/USAID, will be handed off through one of three options: to HN / UN Agency/ IO / NGO; for USG Interagency / HN Civilian contract; task is complete and does not require handoff (non-transferable) LOE Parameters 11

On-Scene DoD RFA Process OFDA generates or receives request for DoD support from USG organization implementing partners, other bilateral donors, UN Agencies, NGOs, Affected State Civilian Organizations and host nation military. There can be instances where these requesting organizations go directly to the US military for support. However, according to the RFA process, that would be more appropriate for Affected State military. OFDA, with USG country team, validates and prioritizes requests. Ensure that DoD’s disaster relief is appropriate (i.e. have all foreign civilian or host nation alternatives?) Prioritize JTF disaster response mission assignments, given limited resources Capture DoD measures of success and progress toward humanitarian end- state Validated requests forwarded to DOD for review and execution The process for requesting military support will start with the requesting agency submitting an RFA (either in the OFDA format or UN Form) The importance of OFDA validation is more than just ensuring the DoD isn’t “doing harm” or mission creeping, but it’s a prerequisite for DoD O&M funds to be reimbursed with Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Action (OHDACA) funds. Although OHDACA is DoD money, the rules require that USAID-OFDA validate before those funds can be exercised. With the exception of Immediate Response Authority, if the DoD provides humanitarian support without validation, then it will come out of that services O&M budget. What does the validation process look like? Things that the OFDA logistician might look at: Is the request for military support a unique capability. Is it time critical Is there a real need Location/Prioritization/Alternative Civilian Asset This is where the OFDA liaisons work closely with the Embassy, their DoD counterparts in the JTF, National Disaster Management Organization, and the UN. OFDA identifies what our implementing partners have to move (third party goods), validates the need, and works with the JTF to establish the Request for Assistance “RFA” process. May use the MITAMs or Mission Tasking Matrix. However, to the fullest extent possible, you should “self-validate” those requests that could be clearly rejected or re-directed to a more appropriate organization. All requests for humanitarian support you have determined to be supportable, must not move forward without validation. 12

Mil-to-Mil Support LOE Framework Line of Operations MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE RECOVERY Preparedness, Training, & Assessments ENGINEERING / IMAGERY SETTING CONDITIONS End State: AS military no longer needs US assistance SUPPLIES / COMMUNICATIONS MAINTENANCE / PARTS LOGISTICS / MOBILITY Most Likely Least Likely Phases I Assess II Respond III Execution IV Transition V Redeployment O Prepare Support to the AS military and military-to-military coordination is an important consideration for effective support to response efforts. This LOE is characterized by DOD support to the AS military that will enable them to conduct relief operations. A key consideration is that our support cannot be interpreted as providing humanitarian support (i.e. US lift carrying relief supplies to a distribution point) but that we are enabling the AS military to do so (i.e. US fixes AS lift to move supplies, or US lift moves soldiers/relief workers to a distribution point to conduct relief). Finally, activities under this LOE must be directly connected to the AS military conducting relief efforts, support for other military activities are not to be considered in this environment. Key considerations for effective support to the AS military are: coordination with the U.S Federal Lead; focus solely on enabling AS military support to disaster relief (avoiding mission creep); and clearly identified support transition back to AS military. CONTINUOUSLY SHAPE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION DoD only provides unique capabilities or those where other capacities are overwhelmed Limited to supporting AS military so they can conduct immediate relief operations Provide mobility and movement support to locations so AS military can conduct HADR Support AS maintenance efforts to keep relief mission essential equipment operational Provide limited military supply support to allow AS forces to conduct relief operations Support AS military with relief related engineering and imagery support Support efforts to make or keep military infrastructure operational that is critical to the relief effort such as: military APOD & SPOD serving as relief hubs, bases being used as evacuation or distribution centers A definitive transition plan must be coordinated and well know to the AS military (time, capacity, funding) LOE Parameters 13

Security Support LOE Framework Line of Operations Preparedness, Training, & Assessments SETTING CONDITIONS End State: AS security forces no longer need US assistance AFFECTED STATE GOVERNMENT & POPULATION TNT, CRIME AND VEO USG and AMCIT SECURITY SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN EFFORT FORCE PROTECTION Most Likely Least Likely Phases I Assess II Respond III Execution IV Transition V Redeployment O Prepare The Security Support LOE is a supporting effort for the task force. Having said this, security of the task force remains a primary concern for all planning and activity considerations, risk must be constantly evaluated. Overall, the AS security system remains the lead for security throughout the disaster area, and their nation. Task force support to AS-led security will focus on filling gaps for protecting relief operations, and maintaining stability for response organizations to work. As required, the task force may also be called upon by the COM to protect and/or evacuate American Citizens so task force contingencies must account for this possibility. Organizations at all levels will also maintain awareness of potential security threats from disruptive groups and organizations, working closely with AS security units to deter, and when required defeat them. Key considerations for effective security are: coordinating all security requirements with AS security organizations; ensuring AS organizations are present for, and lead all civil policing and protection type activities; task force protection is adjusted as required but maintains an acceptable national minimum standard; and any security tasks performed by U.S. forces are transitioned to AS security forces as quickly as possible. CONTINUOUSLY SHAPE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION DoD only provides capabilities where AS Security capacities are overwhelmed All security must be coordinated with the AS security system/organizations DoD elements/contingents should be prepared to be self-supporting to not detract from AS security efforts DOD must be prepared to protect and/or support evacuation of AMCIT Permission to carry arms must be approved nationally Direct policing functions with the public is not authorized without national and AS approval, and must have AS presence/leadership Support should be directly related to security of the Humanitarian response effort Transition planning and coordination must start immediately. ICW DOS, each security capability will be transitioned as quickly as possible LOE Parameters 14

US Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Questions?