Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command A Warfare Center of Excellence Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference of the Mine Warfare Association 11 May 2011 Mr. Marvin Heinze NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense This brief is Unclassified

This slide is Unclassified Our Discussion Today Mission / Requirements Capability / Capacity Exercises Preparation Related efforts This slide is Unclassified

Mine Warfare in the United States …It happens… Lake Ponchartrain, 2004 Floating IED discovered ivo visiting dignitary Sacramento River, 1980 “Patriotic Scuba diver’ closes the shipping channel Chesapeake Bay, June 1942 U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines 3 ships sunk 2 ships damaged

MHD MCM Policy / Mission DoD is the lead MOTR agency for mine countermeasures in the Maritime Domain (NSPD41/MOTR) Navy has DoD maritime mine countermeasure capability, implying MCMRON and MCM forces will be needed to counter mine and UWIED threats No civil authority MCM capability Specific domestic MCM Mission not defined Interagency equities and priorities CONPLANs have general mission DHS will plan for the prevention and detection of sea mining…(MOTR)

USN MIW Operational Framework COMTHIRDFLT COMSIXTHFLT COMSEVENTHFLT COMSECONDFLT COMFOURTHFLT COMFIFTHFLT VCOM NMAWC + MIW Battle Staff COM NMAWC VCOM NMAWC USW COE (ASW + MIW) CTF xx CTF xx CTF xx CTF xx CTF xx CTF xx SMCM Class Advocate COMCMRON FIVE COMCMRON SEVEN COMCMRON TWO Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and training

MHD/S MCM Response Capability Command and Control MIWC in San Diego MCM CDR in San Diego Rapidly deployable AMCM MH-53E in NORVA Limited capability Confined water Deployable - - UMCM UUVs, Divers, MMS EOD PLT, MMS PLT Neutralization UUV PLT Rapidly deployed Confined water Capable SMCM Ships in San Diego Long response times Limited capability Confined water This slide is Unclassified 6 6

Today’s MHD/S MCM Response Capacity Initial Leadership MIWC LNOs COMCMRON staff UUVs 2 X UUV PLT Mk 18 UUVs Divers 2 X EOD MCM PLT 1 X VSW Dive PLT Follow on Leadership NMAWC VCOM and staff Aircraft 4 - 6 MH 53E Various MCM equip Ships 2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM Marine Mammals MK 7/8 MMS 6+ dolphins

Experimentation / Exercises in MHD/S MCM 2008-2009 4 events in 2 years Change detection Experimentation Low Frequency Broad Band Synthetic Aperture Sonar 2010 Bay Shield 10 MCM CDR Training (MHS) Frontier Sentinel 10 MCM CDR Training (MHD) Experimentation High clutter limits current mine hunting effectiveness Improving change detection techniques and procedures Use of data fusion center Advanced new sonar technologies LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target discrimination MHD MCM CDR training

Exercise Bay Shield 10 Quick Look 2 Mines Found NMAWC OBJECTIVES Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV MCM planning and execution using Port Folder and “change detect” tactics Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission Conduct MCM Ops within a multi-agency Unified Command structure Areas of MCM ops Goods USCG/USN interaction and integration MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement with the COTP/UCP Valuable CONUS MCMC training for MCMRON 2/ DIV 31 Preparations for Frontier Sentinel Others Large number of contacts overwhelm mine hunting capacity Incident Command System proficiency needed Limited UCP secure comms

Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview 25 May – 11 Jun 2010 PURPOSE Bilateral homeland defense/ security exercise to conduct information / intelligence sharing, conduct mine countermeasures operations, conduct sea trial experimentation, conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and response to synchronize the operational planning process.

Frontier Sentinel 10 Participants US Navy: COMSECONDFLT NMAWC COMCMRON TWO ONR HM14 DET NOMWC EODMU ONE & SIX US Coast Guard: SECTOR Hampton Roads DOG (MSRT, MSST) Canadian Navy: JTF Atlantic 2 x MCDV Fleet Diving Unit NMAWC OBJECTIVES Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission Train MCMRON TWO Conduct Sea Trial Experiments Improve confined waterways TTP

Trident Fury 2011 Esquimalt, Canada Overview What: TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise involving US and Canadian Forces. Where: Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt Approaches and Constance Banks - When: 02-13 May 2011 Objectives - Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations - Conduct integrated MCM operations - Exercise interagency interoperability Improve confined waters MCM tactics Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC Assess MCM capability and capacity Participating Forces

Homeland Defense Port Surveys and MIW Port Folders Baseline Survey Port Folders Quick response guide for MCMC Port folders cover 17 DoD ports all complete as of Dec 2010 bi annual updates started Posted on Enterprise Knowledge Management (eKM) Bottom Roughness Bottom Sediments Clutter Density Doctrinal Bottom Change Detection Results Baseline imagery New imagery Port Folders accelerate port opening Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification Change detection results: Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects Reduces clearance time by ~30% Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted

Related MHD MCM efforts Naval Postgraduate School 2008 -“A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in US Ports” Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 2009 -“MIEDs in Ports and Harbors” study Center for Naval Analysis 2008 -“Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and Security” 2011 - “Mine Clearance in support of Homeland Security” NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division 2011 – “Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study” This slide is Unclassified

This slide is Unclassified MHD MCM way ahead Better define specific requirements Defense Whole of government Improve confined waters equipment Neutralization UUV One pass Detect to Engage Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission package Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining Better threat awareness Effective surveillance Cooperative efforts with port entities This slide is Unclassified

Questions?

Mine Warfare Direct Costs USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS SADAF 02- Moored Contact USS TRIPOLI LUGM I- Moored Contact Mine Cost Ship Damage $1,000 $57 Million Mine Cost Ship Damage $1,000 $10 Million USS PRINCETON MANTA- Bottom Influence Mine Cost Ship Damage $10,000 $100 Million This slide is Unclassified

Mine Warfare Indirect Costs Economic/Political Effects 90%+ US trade transits US ports Significant cost Global Commerce Effects ~33% World trade transits US ports Significant effect on trade Power projection 90% of military sustainment by sea Significant effect on defense operations