Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing Steven Clagett Director Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing Steven Clagett Director Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Trends in Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11 The Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes remain focused on the fundamental goal of preventing the spread of technologies that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) recognize the increased need for effective multilateral export controls. Regime members continue to update and modify the lists of controlled commodities and implement “catch all” controls.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls Proposals to modify the Multilateral Export Control Regime Guidelines & Annexes (Control Lists) NSG proposal to notify Partners of approvals for controlled nuclear items to non-partners Support for multilateral initiatives, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation Ensure effective implementation of “catch all controls” for all commodities to end users (countries, companies, or individuals) of concern Provide multilateral notifications of U.S. denials to utilize the “no undercut” policies

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls Sanctions Consultations with foreign governments and commercial entities Outreach efforts with U.S. industry to stress the importance of export control compliance Strong enforcement of the law against violators International outreach programs to assist other nations implement a effective export controls

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security MTCR Update Plenary: September 2002 Warsaw, Poland Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to discuss changes to Annex controls Update on the new International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Missile proliferation Focus on regional nonproliferation issues. MTCR Plenary has added an Enforcement Experts component.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Plenary convened May 2002 in Prague, Czech Rep. Enforcement experts meeting held in conjunction with the Plenary. Member States continued discussions on sharing NSG license approval data and proposed notification requirements. Regional nonproliferation issues. NSG Update

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Missile Technology Applications Processed (2001) Received: 949 Value: $154.3 million Received: 1036 Value: $2.2 billion Nuclear Technology Applications Processed (2001)

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Distribution of Missile Technology Licenses by Country (2001)

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Distribution of Nuclear Technology Licenses by Country (2001)

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security EPCI “Catch All” Controls The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) is designed to: Strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts; Prevent the export of technology that could contribute to missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear-weapons proliferation; and Minimize the impact on legitimate commerce. EPCI places export controls on end use and end users rather than a particular item.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security EPCI License may be denied if destined for missile, nuclear, or CBW activities or facilities. License must be obtained if the exporter knows the commodities will be used in CBW or missile activities or facilities. BIS may inform exporters at anytime that a license is required for a specific end- user if there is a possibility of nuclear, CBW, or missile activities. Any U.S. participation in nuclear, CBW, or missile activities or facilities requires a license.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Evaluation Factors Country Commodity End-Use Significance for Missile/Nuclear Development Non-Proliferation Credentials Assurances and Guarantees Risk of diversion Sanctions

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Listed in Supplement #1 in Part 740 of the EAR Programs in Countries: –China -- M-series, CSS-2 –India -- Prithvi, Agni, SLV-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite LV (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite LV (GSLV) –Iran -- Surface-to-surface, Scud –No. Korea -- No Dong, Scud –Pakistan -- Hatf-series missiles Other Countries: (Mostly Middle East) –Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen Missile Technology Projects and Countries of Concern

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Entities List The Entities List notifies exporters of a requirement for exports/reexports to specified end users. See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security India/Pakistan Sanctions On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted missile sanctions placed on India and Pakistan. On October 1, BIS reinstated a case-by-case license review policy for exports of MT and NP commodities to India and Pakistan and removed a significant number of entities from the Entity List. Entities affiliated with Indian and Pakistani missile development and their nuclear programs remain listed entities. The United States does not support Indian unsafeguarded nuclear power industry or the satellite launch vehicle development programs.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security PRC Issues Ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation concerns with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). All commodities controlled for missile proliferation concerns - except inertial navigation systems for commercial aircraft - require presidential certification prior to export. The U.S. continues to conduct missile talks with the PRC in an effort to decrease Chinese proliferation activities. Success of these talks could affect U.S. export licensing in the future.

Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty Compliance Bureau of Industry and Security Questions? Steve Clagett Director, Missile and Nuclear Technology Divisions