EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

PEACE OPERATIONS Examine a Model Establish the Environment Discuss Evolution in the 90s Principles and Policies Challenges and Options

The Complex Emergency Model

Definition “A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a dramatic disruption in the political, economic and social situation, resulting from internal or external conflict or natural disaster, seriously disrupting the population’s capacity to survive and the national authorities’ capacity to respond, and which requires a consolidated multi-sectoral international response” IASC of the United Nations

Modern Complex Emergencies Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

Modern Complex Emergencies Range of Military Activity Support Combat Security Compliance Operations Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

Modern Complex Emergencies Range of Civilian Activity Support CM Humanitarian Mitigation Disaster Response Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

Modern Complex Emergencies Civil - Military Coordination Disaster Management Humanitarian Assistance Peace Operations

PEACEKEEPING Pragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis For 40 + years peacekeeping was: Based on resolution of interstate conflict Conducted post an agreement Separated Forces or Monitored Agreements Classic or Traditional Peacekeeping

FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING Interstate Conflict Governments Functioning and in Control Government Infrastructure intact Military and Police Structures operating Judicial Systems in place International Rules operable Minimum Contact with Population Minimum Involvement with Civilian Agencies

EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES Traditional peacekeeping Implementation of Complex Agreements and Settlements Preventive Deployment Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force Co-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping Forces Provision of Humanitarian Aid Peace Enforcement

FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING Intra-state Conflict Governments ineffective or not in control Factional Political Groupings & Leadership State Infrastructure broken down Judicial & Police Breakdown Military factions & Warlords Weapons proliferation There are no Rules Intermingled with Populations Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs

NEW YORK TIMES “Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ... There should be a shift back towards more limited objectives like policing cease-fires”. “UN peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It makes no sense to continue eroding it’s credibility by asking it to do what it cannot”. New York Times - 1996

“Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only re-thinking the means but also the methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security Council. Secretary-General Kofi Annan 1998

CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII

CHAPTER VI Peaceful settlement of disputes The Council provides assistance at the request of the parties Council has authority to investigate Investigation is not normally military until accord is arranged – then military assess role a peace operation could play A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful resolution of the dispute PKO assists in consolidating the peace and building confidence Forces are lightly armed for self defense

CHAPTER VI As a result there are conditions to a Chapter VI operation: Consent of the parties is required A cease-fire needs to be effective A comprehensive agreement should be signed Parties assist the deployment of the force Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to establish the status of the forces – there is no other legal basis under Chapter VI) Self-defense ROE are developed

CHAPTER VII “The Decision to Use Enforcement Power” Conflict is ongoing High risk that conflict may start again Parties are not in agreement Rogue elements are not included (increased risk to UN forces – force protection) Risk of external intervention Presence of other national forces in the area Risky internal situation – violence / human rights abuses / banditry / weapons Self defense insufficient to protect deployed forces A legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (SOFA cannot be agreed)

CHAPTER VII “The Use of Force” does not tell you to use force actively is not combat operation Provides the full range of options including up to and including enforcement powers Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to international peace and security Non use of force options –ie sanctions Use of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resort Establishes the legal context for intervention and the use of force

CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST Chapter VII PKO assists in consolidating the peace PKO enforces the will of the SC Parties request assistance Commit to peaceful resolution Political will of the parties Consent to the operation Effective cease-fire Comprehensive agreement Parties assist the deployment Signature of SOFA Conflict is ongoing Risk of renewed conflict high Parties not in agreement Risky internal situation Rogue elements not included Risk of external intervention Presence of foreign forces Self defense judged insufficient Legal basis for intervention needed SOFA

Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Chapter VII Chapter VI Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression Pacific Settlement of Disputes Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

1990 ISSUES Wider Range of Tasks Change in the Composition and Needs of Missions Only the Traditional Model of Peacekeeping Available

SECURITY COUNCIL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN THE 90’s A wider application of the peacekeeping model Development of hybrid mandates

PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Preventive Deployment Disarmament Peace Restoration Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Civil Police Operations Gross Violation of Human Rights Human Rights Monitoring Regional Enforcement Supervision of Elections Protection Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Co - Deployment Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

Chapter VII Tools Comprehensive Mandate Clear Military Tasks Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Trained) Effective Command and Control Structure Authority to Use Force Appropriately Robust Rules of Engagement Legal Basis for Intervention

WHAT CAN THE UN DO? WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO? Classic Peacekeeping Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VII elements Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations – this requires a coalition of the willing / lead nation / multi national force WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?

CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS UN has no Combat Operations Capability Logistics no combat logistics system contractor based support Authority over National Forces authority uncertain inadequate command & control stucture nations reaction to forces under threat Different Cultures military cultures leadership & managerial backgrounds training standards

OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES The UN may authorize a region / coalition to conduct the mission To a regional organization A coalition of the willing (MNF) A framework / lead nation in a coalition To a Nation capable of executing the mission The UN may decide to mange the mission Form a UN multi-national force Designate a framework / lead nation concept

WHY AUTHORIZE The operation has a high risk of combat operations taking place UN missions take a long time to deploy and deployment time is critical Support for funding cannot be generated A region or coalition offers forces

UN MANDATED OPERATIONS COALITION OF THE WILLING / MNF UN mandate authorizes the mission Lead nation generates the forces Lead Nation appoints Force commander Participating Nations pay all costs Lead Nation coordinates & provides day to day political direction Lead Nation coordinates & provides ROE UN FORCE UN sponsored mission UN generates the forces UN appoints Force Commander Mission paid by assessed contributions Political direction by UN (through DPKO) UN ROE

TYPICAL COALITION / MNF MANDATE PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

TYPICAL UN PKO FORCE MANDATE PEACE CONFLICT WAR PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT Separation of Forces Humanitarian Aid Truce Supervision Peace Restoration Preventive Deployment Disarmament Collective Enforcement Economic Assistance Demining Gross Violation of Human Rights Civil Police Operations Human Rights Monitoring Supervision of Elections Protection Regional Enforcement Restore Civil Institutions Safe Areas Transition Assistance Ecological Disaster Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

CHANGING PRECEPTS Revision of principles Impartial status Sovereignty Consent Impartial status Broader range of tasks Time constraints Limitations on Resources Political effort Military sacrifice Humanitarian Basis for Intervention

CONSENT Who Gives Consent? International Bodies UN Security Council UN General Assembly TCNs Third Parties Parties to the Conflict Military Organizations Military Factions Local Commanders Warlords Provides Legitimacy Strategic Level Environment Operational & Tactical Level Environment

End state can only be political, economic and social in nature NO MILITARY SOLUTION End state can only be political, economic and social in nature Expensive tool Military can temporize maintain situation reduce levels of violence induce compliance Blunt instrument of political power

OPERATIONAL PHASES MILITARY CRISIS STABILISATION CIVILIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT OPERATIONS CRISIS STABILISATION LIFE SUPPORT POLITICAL LIFE SAVING ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CIVILIAN 5 to 10 years?

SRSG UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE UN SG Deputy SRSG National Authorities UN SG SRSG Human Rights Component Deputy SRSG Military Force Humanitarian Component Observer Force Police Component Administrative component Election Component

COALITION OR LEAD NATION PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE Coalition NCAs UN SG Military Force SRSG Deputy SRSG Human Rights Component Humanitarian Component Election Component Police Component Administrative component Observer Force Component Component Component Component

Military Role in Peace Operations SRSG Manage the mandate Coordinate effort of components Deputy Provide unity of effort Military Force CIVPOL Humanitarians Elections Development Human Rights Reconstruction Primary military mission security training support security / protection / transport emergency medical security on sites / protection / transport / medical assistance to the election process secure environment / engineering /transport / materiel assistance to the reconstruction process assistance to long term development

REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION Legitimacy Consent -at key levels Legal Basis Credibility Credible Force Achievable Mandate and Military Plan Operating Environment Signed Agreement End State with achievable goals Integration of Effort with other Components REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION

SUMMARY OF CHANGES Chapter VII Operations will be the norm Multi-dimensional, Multi-national Operations Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and Social Solutions Integration of Tasks under One Mandate Full Range of Civilian Intervention New Coordination Mechanism Broader Range of Military Tasks Complementary Roles for Components