1. Challenges in the Contemporary Peacekeeping Environment A Personal Perspective 21 September Presented by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Armitage MBE
Intention to provide insight into the development in UK military doctrine for the military contribution to peacekeeping missions
Current UK doctrine influenced heavily on the experiences gained from Bosnia
The environment has changed and a review was long overdue
Fighting in Afghanistan for over 10 years has naturally heavily influenced the military training and operational experience to cater for counter insurgency in a fragile state
Important to refresh ourselves with other types of operation, especially as our withdrawal from Afghanistan comes closer by the minute.
As such, for the next 15 mins or so I intend to discuss some of the developments as we try to understand better the peacekeeping environment, before briefly highlighting what I perceive as being some of the challenges facing China as it continues to develop its involvement in peacekeeping operations, with the view to adding combat troops to its contribution of enablers at present.
Although I have been the lead on the doctrine development my understanding of Chinese peacekeeping is very limited. I was very fortunate to have travelled to China earlier this year to meet and discuss peacekeeping with both the PLA and PAP. The visit was fascinating and to see and hear at first hand the contribution being made by China was impressive. Both training facilities were rightly proud of their output and contribution to the peacekeeping environment, both on operations and in the provision of international training courses. And that is it, so I state up front my observations are based on very little evidence yet the insight I gained from my short visit was unique.
28 Mar – Visit to People’s Liberation Army Peacekeeping Centre all day including travel.
29 Mar – Visit to People’s Armed Police Peacekeeping Centre AM/lunch and People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Science. The latter had visited DCDC 3 years ago.
Senior Colonel Zhang Li gave a broad overview of the PLA’s involvement in UN peacekeeping with the aid of slides. The first Chinese peacekeeping deployment was in Since then Chinese troops have deployed on 20 UN missions, sent a total of 18,000 troops and had 9 peacekeepers killed. China is the largest troop contributing nation among the P5. It committed $US 288M to peacekeeping in Currently over 2000 PLA are deployed on UN operations, it has 6 staff in the DPKO in New York and they are currently filling the post of Commander UNIFCYP a 2* post. The post is held by Maj Gen Chao Liu.
All PAP peacekeeping courses appear to focus on UN mission entry-standard skills only: the skills include language training (English), driving, shooting, and a basic understanding of the mission (if deploying), mandate, standard operating procedures, human rights, law enforcement, and protection issues. The PAP peacekeeping centre is very proud of its contribution to peacekeeping operations.
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

2. CONTEMPORARY ENVIRONMENT
Why now?
Remove ambiguity
Remind ourselves of the differences between current operations and peacekeeping
Reflect better the contemporary environment
What drove our review?
Out of date doctrine – didn’t really reflect the contemporary environment.
There are ambiguities between different organizations which does not promote integration among the different actors, both military and civilian
Nuances between peacekeeping and what we are dealing with currently on operations (especially the mindset – not having an enemy, understanding the peace process and the need for tactical patience)
Enhance better understanding of what was meant by supporting a peace process as an impartial actor – and the use of force in these instances.
The debate will help shape both the UK’s and NATO’s doctrine.

3. PEACEKEEPING
Is the technique designed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, however fragmented, where major hostility has halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.
Key Points:
Why Confusion
Consequences of confusion – different language, expectations (mil, civ and population),
Had this notion from earlier peacekeeping models that peacekeeping did not involve force where as peace enforcement did. Old days of Ch 6 rather than the contemporary Ch 7 missions.
Implications – 2 tier system: rely on others
Requirement to use force if needed
Key elements: a ceasefire or peace process (a desire to pursue a peaceful process to gain resolution), major hostility has finished although violence is still likely to occur (implications on resources, training, C2, etc).
The importance of the peace process – why are you there?
Based on a ceasefire – no ceasefire / peace agreement then you are probably doing something else, requiring a different approach
Actors will most probably pursue spoiler behaviour – understand how to deal with it and how your actions will impact on the peace process.
Careful not to empower others through your actions

4. PEACEKEEPING / PEACE ENFORCEMENT RELATIONSHIP
Multidimensional
Peacekeeping
Peace
Enforcement
Benign
Coercive
Military Approach

5. UN Peacekeeping Guidelines: 2008
PEACE ENFORCEMENT
.. involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorised to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace..
Distinguish between robust and PE – clear distinction.
Take away the 2 tier approach
Fill the void of Ch 6.5 with a robust approach supported by the mandate and political will
UN Peacekeeping Guidelines: 2008

6. ROBUST PEACEKEEPING (the requirements)
Domestic political will to implement the mandate
Understanding of why you’re there
Understanding the environment
Resourced and trained appropriately
An agile and effective chain of command
The ability and willingness to act
Explain robust peacekeeping (key for argument) – understanding why you are there, political backing, resourced, trained, effective chain of command, ability and willingness to act. Demonstrated in posture and performance. But want to refer to it as simply peacekeeping – robustness is implied for all contributing troops.
A force that is trained and resourced appropriately to meet the demands of the mandate, and is agile enough to respond to events in a timely and effective manner. It must understand why it is there, who it is working alongside, and how to operate collaboratively.

7. Conflict Prevention Peace Enforcement Peacekeeping Peace Building
Cease-fire
Peacemaking
Conflict Prevention
Political
Process
Left with a clear framework
Of course overlaps as transition from war to peace, fighting to ceasefire, etc.
Always in the shadow of an on-going peace process
What does this mean to the way we conduct ourselves – understand the implication of your actions.

8. PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES
Consent
Impartiality
Minimum Force for Self Defence and Implementation of the Mandate
Political Primacy
Legitimacy
Cause no Harm – Conflict-Sensitive Activity
An Integrated Approach
Based on experience – supporting a peace process
Once you start losing the principles then you’re in something else – a new approach could be required
Go through each and highlight key points
Legitimacy – performance, fulfilling the mandate – among the many audiences (population, warring parties, regional actors, etc)
Cause no harm – conflict sensitivity. Understanding the impact (potential impact) of your actions on the peace process.
Integrated approach - collaboration

9. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY
Understanding
The political environment
The operating environment
Partners (collaborative working)
The need for a posture that deters acts against the agreement / ceasefire / mandate
Protection of civilians
The importance of understanding
UN USG PK: 2 key challenges facing the UN are PoC and deterrence.
How do you perform these tasks while complying with the principles?

10. CHALLENGES FACING CHINA
Willingness to conduct robust peacekeeping:
Interference versus impartiality
Authorise the use force to implement the mandate
Willingness to accept casualties
Ability to conduct robust peacekeeping:
Decentralised command
Capability
Ability to integrate with other actors
Ability to capture lessons learned
Political will: non-interference – very difficult to achieve if in agreement to the impartial status of pk troops. Inevitably it is very difficult to maintain impartiality however the degree of variance could impact legitimacy. Seen as not being there for the right reasons.
Decentralised command: mission command based on doctrine – not sure there is the equivalent operational level doctrine – a handrail to offer a way to consider certain issues / problems. Helps shape training and education. Tactics and procedures for the soldiers – what is there for the commanders? The ability for local commanders to make informed decisions based on an understanding of the peace process and the impact of such actions. Easier to do nothing rather than take the risk, even if lives are at stake. Weak posture may be exploited and difficult to restore once lost.
Training: It’s more than training for the mission. It’s organisational culture – how your army operates. How decisions are made,
Use of Force: the willingness and ability to use or threaten the use of force in the fulfilment of the mandate.
Integrated: how the military integrates its activities with other agencies, etc. Limited interaction between PAP and PLA. It takes time to change an approach – a way of working, etc. Different cultures, not similar to working in China, etc.
Mission command based on understanding – doctrine, guidance?
Interference versus impartiality
Robust peacekeeping – too many gaps and left with a benign force
Summary Of Observations.
China is rightly very proud of her overall peacekeeping performance, particularly being the largest troop contributor among the P5 countries. Some PLA officers we spoke to envisaged the deployment of formed combat forces in the longer term as a natural progression. This is not the official view.
There is no direct comparison to the UK idea of joint/operational doctrine. China uses policy guidelines (top down) and tactical regulations (bottom up).
China’s PSO policy is rooted in: UN Charter, UN Resolution, consent of the host nation, and no interference with domestic affairs of other countries. No interference places them in a strange situation, esp. in Ch 7. They will avoid.
China PSO regulations are based on tactical experience which provide techniques and procedures to use in certain circumstances and are therefore the equivalent of UK Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). What do commanders have?
They do have a detailed lessons learned process based on formal post-operational reports and interviews which is very similar to ours. These tend to be produced in stovepipes by service. It is not sure how much of this is incorporated into current TTPs. Need to enhance learning – highlight mistakes. Culture.
China has no operational doctrine. The PLA (including the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF)) and the PAP work in isolation of each other under a common national policy. There is no equivalent of PJHQ and there appears to be no coordination between services other than at a very superficial level. Concerns on understanding the wider issues – acting in accordance to the mandate / political process
The PAP appear to be more advanced in PSO thinking than the PLA. This is partly because the PAP Centre was formed in 1991 and is now 20 years old. The PLA Peacekeeping Centre is only 3 years old. It is also because on UN operations, the PAP have more interaction with local people because they are assisting with the training of local civilian police forces.
The PLA/PAP peacekeeping organisations did not seem to understand the need to coordinate with each other directly. They have similar views shaped by policy, but only meet at conferences or during the actual deployment. Integration is fundamental – can they do this?
The PLA only provides niche capabilities: engineering, transport and medical that support the UN mission only, not the population of the host nation. While the PLA now contributes greater numbers of peacekeepers since they first contributed UN observers in 1990, the tasks that they undertake have only increased slightly in scope since 2000.
Politically, it will be some time before the PLA will be up to or willing to undertake robust peacekeeping. Commanders will need to be trained to develop the mindset to make difficult decisions on the spot under pressure, such as protecting civilians, and will probably not do so in the absence of official policy. Nevertheless there is some indication at the working level from those personnel with peacekeeping experience, that they were keen on expanding their tasks to include the deployment of combat forces to undertake robust peacekeeping.