Chapter 2: Origins of Intelligence-Led Policing

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The new police ‘The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. To these ends all the efforts of police must be directed’ Mayne, S.R. (1829) Instructions to “The new police of the Metropolis” (London: Metropolitan Police).

Drivers for change Complexity in policing and the performance culture Managing internal risk The demand gap Limitations of the standard model of policing Organised and transnational crime Changes in technology

The growing paperwork burden Police administrators demand greater internal accountability In the ‘knowledge is power’ culture, police overproduce information to retain in case it might be useful An obsession with reporting drives internal audits and monitoring systems Redundancy in retaining paper and electronic records creates duplication and drains resources. Ericson, R.V. and Haggerty, K.D. (1997) Policing the Risk Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

Lack of investigative innovation “In many fundamental respects, the investigation process, though showing some advances, seems to have been relatively uninfluenced by significant changes in policing, the crime problem and technological advances made in the past thirty years. In the main, it is our view that progress in police criminal investigative efforts remains largely isolated from broader police efforts to respond more effectively, more efficiently and more resolutely to the crime problem in general.” Horvath, F., Meesig, R.T. and Lee, Y.H. (2001) 'National Survey of Police Policies and Practices Regarding the Criminal Investigations Process: Twenty-Five Years After Rand' (Washington DC: National Institute of Justice). Page 9.

Demand gap (UK)

Demand gap (US)

US policing landscape Fragmented and uncoordinated organizations Mistrust of the word ‘intelligence’ Community policing era Slow emergence of problem-oriented policing Rapid emergence of Compstat

Fragmented and uncoordinated Type of agency Number of agencies Number of full-time sworn officers Local police 12,766 446,974 Sheriff 3,067 175,018 State 49 58, 190 Special jurisdiction 1,481 49,398 Constable/Marshal 513 2,323 US non-federal police agencies and officer totals, 2004

Police departments per 1 million population

Fragmented and uncoordinated – solutions? 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Every department with 75 of more sworn officers should develop an intelligence capability Led to development of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) network, and Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies (28 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 23) – known as 28CFR23

Demonizing intelligence House Committee on Un-American Activities Some police kept dossiers on communists or communist sympathizers, and civil rights activists FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO), which ran from 1956 to 1971, rapidly moved from its original aims of targeting foreign intelligence agencies during the Cold War to spying on American citizens and dissident political bodies “Many activists publicized their intelligence files as a badge of honor, often to the embarrassment of the police” Carter, D.L. (2004) 'Law Enforcement Intelligence: A guide for State, Local, and Tribal Enforcement Agencies' (Washington DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services). Page 25.

Crime Commission of 1965 President Lyndon Johnson’s Crime Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice Started 1965, published report 1967 ‘The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society’ Recommended that: the police work especially hard in minority communities, they make attempts to regain legitimacy and offset the unpopularity of the police through community relations programs.

Problem-Oriented Policing Herman Goldstein and the Madison, Wisconsin police department Newport News Police Department and SARA Scan Analyze Respond Assess Eck, J.E. and Spelman, W. (1987) 'Problem solving: Problem-oriented policing in Newport News' (Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum).

Compstat Started in the Crime Control Strategy meetings of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) January 1994 Police Commissioner William Bratton, newly hired from the city’s Transit Police by Mayor Rudy Giuliani

9/11 After Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, the IACP held a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit (spring 2002) Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) formed Created the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan Key theme that resonates throughout the plan is the need to overcome the ‘long-standing and substantial barriers that hinder intelligence sharing’ Also to use the plan as a ‘mechanism to promote intelligence-led policing’ (GIWG 2005: iv)

UK: New public management New public management movement in the UK began in the early 1980s 1993 Sheehy Inquiry into Police Responsibilities Police and Magistrates Courts Act A focus on greater ‘efficiency, effectiveness and economy’ Sporadic emergence of problem-oriented policing

Further developments Helping with Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively Existing policing roles and the levels of accountability lacked integration and efficiency The police were failing to make the best use of resources Greater emphasis on tackling criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes Saw problems as: insufficient interview training forensic potential not utilized scientific support under-resourced pattern of activity highly reactive intelligence work having low status and under-resourced failure to exploit crime pattern analysis and informants

Policing with Intelligence (HIMC, 1997) Policing with Intelligence: Criminal Intelligence – a Thematic Inspection on Good Practice Key factors that HMIC considered to be vital in promoting intelligence-led policing: enthusiastic and energetic leadership that endorses intelligence-led policing and promotes it through a Director of Intelligence; a published strategy that sets the intelligence agenda for a force; an integrated intelligence structure so that analysts can work at the hub of operational policing activities; criteria to measure performance; the forging of effective partnerships with local agencies that may be able to help police combat local crime and disorder problems

Mike Maguire and Tim John Reviewed criminal intelligence systems in 8 UK forces. Concluded: Major organizational reforms can only be implemented with wholehearted commitment from the senior officers in the force It is vital that all officers understand overall purposes and expected benefits and their own contribution The possible negative influence of broader ‘cultural’ factors should not be underestimated System should be continually monitored and reviewed Objectives and strategies should be reviewed at intervals, informed wherever possible by evaluations of outcomes Access to resources, such as surveillance teams, should be seen to be equitable Maguire, M. and John, T. (1995) 'Intelligence, Surveillance and Informants: Integrated Approaches', Police Research Group: Crime Detection and Prevention Series, Paper 64.

National Intelligence Model National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), commissioned by Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), released National Intelligence Model (NIM) in 1999

Summary of main factors relevant to development of intelligence-led policing Universal factors Complexity in policing Managing internal risk The demand gap Limitations of the standard model of policing Organized and transnational crime Changes in technology

Summary of main factors relevant to development of intelligence-led policing – country specific US Policing landscape UK Policing landscape Fragmented and uncoordinated New public managerialism and oversight Demonizing ‘intelligence’ Sporadic emergence of POP Community policing era Helping with Enquiries Slow emergence of POP Policing with Intelligence Rapid emergence of Compstat National Intelligence Model 9/11 and homeland security