Power, Global Security, and the Emerging Responsibility to Protect Norm in the UN Alina Syunkova Stanford University

The Responsibility to Protect and Global Security A shifting security environment—and new national strategies for coping with emerging threats—has given rise to the formulation of new standards of collective behavior. The traditional inviolability of state sovereignty has been compromised. Nevertheless, as before, it is the strategic interests of powerful states, and not international norms, that are likely to govern interventions. A shifting security environment—and new national strategies for coping with emerging threats—has given rise to the formulation of new standards of collective behavior. The traditional inviolability of state sovereignty has been compromised. Nevertheless, as before, it is the strategic interests of powerful states, and not international norms, that are likely to govern interventions.

Overview Implications of norm: theoretical legitimacy of interventions v. questionable practice Implications of norm: theoretical legitimacy of interventions v. questionable practice Paper’s key arguments, observations: norm reflects hierarchy, power struggles among UNSC Permanent Five Paper’s key arguments, observations: norm reflects hierarchy, power struggles among UNSC Permanent Five Paper’s conclusions Paper’s conclusions The norm’s global security implications The norm’s global security implications

“Responsibility to Protect” Implies “Sovereignty as Responsibility” IMPLICATION I.: right of UNSC to define global peace and security threats— refugee flows, human suffering, democratic government ousting, ethnic cleansing, international terrorism, and proliferation of WMD—and authorize action against them. IMPLICATION I.: right of UNSC to define global peace and security threats— refugee flows, human suffering, democratic government ousting, ethnic cleansing, international terrorism, and proliferation of WMD—and authorize action against them. IMPLICATION II.: controversial moral, if not yet legal, right of unauthorized intervention in cases of supreme humanitarian emergencies. IMPLICATION II.: controversial moral, if not yet legal, right of unauthorized intervention in cases of supreme humanitarian emergencies. E.g. Kosovo, 1999: “illegal but legitimate”. E.g. Kosovo, 1999: “illegal but legitimate”.

Rhetoric v. Reality

Despite the general recognition of these rights, in practice the UN Security Council has been inconsistent in authorizing and conducting interventions. The recent crisis in Darfur illustrates that altruism is not the main impetus of interventions. Despite the general recognition of these rights, in practice the UN Security Council has been inconsistent in authorizing and conducting interventions. The recent crisis in Darfur illustrates that altruism is not the main impetus of interventions. This paper takes a common view that the norm is geopolitically constructed by strategic interest- driven states. But, which states and what interests gave rise to the responsibility to protect norm in international relations? This paper takes a common view that the norm is geopolitically constructed by strategic interest- driven states. But, which states and what interests gave rise to the responsibility to protect norm in international relations?

Key Stipulations The responsibility to protect norm in the UN arose to counter-balance increasing unilateralism and assertiveness of the U.S. in pursuing its security goals. The responsibility to protect norm in the UN arose to counter-balance increasing unilateralism and assertiveness of the U.S. in pursuing its security goals. The norm reflects strong states’ strategic concern with maintaining or increasing their level of power in international society, rather than altruism or neo-imperialistic ambitions. The norm reflects strong states’ strategic concern with maintaining or increasing their level of power in international society, rather than altruism or neo-imperialistic ambitions.

Paper: Empirical Findings The paper’s approach was to analyze the stance of each of the Permanent Five at the regional roundtables conducted by the ICISS in The paper’s approach was to analyze the stance of each of the Permanent Five at the regional roundtables conducted by the ICISS in China and the U.S. were mostly opposed to the norm; Great Britain and France were its key advocates; and Russia’s stance was generally western, reflecting a shift away from former Soviet ideology, and a willingness to embrace of the principles of international society. China and the U.S. were mostly opposed to the norm; Great Britain and France were its key advocates; and Russia’s stance was generally western, reflecting a shift away from former Soviet ideology, and a willingness to embrace of the principles of international society.

Paper: Empirical Findings Contrary to common belief, the norm does not primarily reflect “U.S. neo-imperial interests”; materially strained and lacking domestic political support, it is wary of codified interventionism. Contrary to common belief, the norm does not primarily reflect “U.S. neo-imperial interests”; materially strained and lacking domestic political support, it is wary of codified interventionism. Surprisingly, Russia has great incentives to endorse the norm, strategically cooperating with international society. Surprisingly, Russia has great incentives to endorse the norm, strategically cooperating with international society. ICISS Co-Chairs G. Evans (right), M. Sahnoun (left); J. Manley, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada (center).

“Permanent Five” Hierarchy United States Undisputed military, economic power. China Economic power. Great Britain and France Use ideological power to constrain U.S. actions through the UN. Russia Latent geographical, material, human resources. Must gain ideological power to realize economic potential.  Power- maintenance struggles among the world’s five most powerful states are manifested in the rise of the responsibility to protect norm.

Case-Study: Failure of the Norm in Darfur, 2003-present Since 2001, the responsibility to protect norm has become widely recognized. E.g. in March 2005 Kofi Annan urged nations to endorse the responsibility to protect in his statement to the UN General Assembly, and in his report, In Larger Freedom. Since 2001, the responsibility to protect norm has become widely recognized. E.g. in March 2005 Kofi Annan urged nations to endorse the responsibility to protect in his statement to the UN General Assembly, and in his report, In Larger Freedom. However, it has not been applied to the crisis in Darfur, 2003-present. The U.S., UN, and EU have relinquished action to the AU. However, it has not been applied to the crisis in Darfur, 2003-present. The U.S., UN, and EU have relinquished action to the AU. This supports the argument that the responsibility to protect has in reality little to do with the imperative to intervene on altruistic or “imperialistic” grounds. This supports the argument that the responsibility to protect has in reality little to do with the imperative to intervene on altruistic or “imperialistic” grounds.

The Responsibility to Protect and the Future of Global Security A shifting security environment—implying new strategies for coping with emerging threats—has necessitated new standards of behavior in “world policing”. Most importantly, new norms have compromised the historic inviolability of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, as before, it is the strategic interests of powerful states, and not international norms, that are likely to govern interventions. A shifting security environment—implying new strategies for coping with emerging threats—has necessitated new standards of behavior in “world policing”. Most importantly, new norms have compromised the historic inviolability of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, as before, it is the strategic interests of powerful states, and not international norms, that are likely to govern interventions.

Is “humanitarian intervention” an unrealistic concept?

End of Presentation Power, Security, and the Emerging Responsibility to Protect in the UN. By Alina Syunkova Stanford University