Semantics & Pragmatics (2) JPN494: Japanese Language and Linguistics JPN543: Advanced Japanese Language and Linguistics Semantics & Pragmatics (2)

Explicature vs. Implicature Explicature: “what is said” (literal meaning) Implicature: “what is meant” “Ken is a vegetarian” (A) ‘We should prepare vegetarian food too’ (B) “I have a final tomorrow” (A) ‘I cannot go to movies tonight’ (B) A (conversationally) implicates B. (B is a conversational implicature of A.) cf. A implies B, A entails B. implicature = enrichment of meaning

Grice’s (1975) distinction of: Explicature Conventional Implicature but vs. and Even Joe passed the exam. vs. Joe passed the exam Conversational Implicature In modern linguistics, “implicatures” typically refer to “conversational implicatures” [Explicature + Conventional Implicature] = what is coded Conversational Implicatures = what is inferred (and can be suspended/cancelled)

Grice’s proposal: Conversational Implicatures are calculable from: What is the source of “conversational implicatures”? Are they all about “common-sensical” inferences? Grice’s proposal: Conversational Implicatures are calculable from: the linguistic meaning of what is said the assumption that the speaker is observing the conversational maxims contextual assumptions of various kinds (worldly knowledge)

Conversational Maxims The Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. or Be helpful.

Conversational Maxims Maxim of Quality (Truthfulness) Do not say what you believe to be false Do not say that for which you lack evidence Maxim of Quantity (Informativeness) Make your contribution as informative as is required Do not make your contribution more informative as required Maxim of Relation Be relevant Maxim of Manner Be perspicuous Avoid obscurity of expression Avoid ambiguity Be brief Be orderly

A: “Do you want to come to the baseball game?” B: “I have a final tomorrow” Implicature: ‘B cannot come to the baseball game’

“Some of the students are doing well.” Implicature: ‘Not all students are doing very well.’ “It’s warm out there.” Implicature: ‘It isn’t hot.’

A: “Where is Joe?” B: “He’s either in his office or in Amy’s office.” Implicature: ‘B doesn’t know whether Joe is in his office or in Amy’s office.’

Conversational maxims are sometimes breached on purpose. (The car breaks down) “This is great.” “She sang ‘Home Sweet Home’” vs. “She produced a series of noises corresponding exactly to the melody of ‘Home Sweet Home’”

A modern version of Gricean Maxims Levinson’s (2001) three heuristics: The Q-heuristic: “What you do not say isn’t the case” The I-heuristic: “What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified” The M-heuristic: “What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal”

Maxim of Quality (Truthfulness) Do not say what you believe to be false Do not say that for which you lack evidence Maxim of Quantity (Informativeness) Make your contribution as informative as is required Do not make your contribution more informative as required Maxim of Relation Be relevant Maxim of Manner Be perspicuous Avoid obscurity of expression Avoid ambiguity Be brief Be orderly Q-heuristic; I-heuristic; M-heuristic

The Maxim of Quality plays a different rule: whether the speaker tells the truth or lies is an issue separate from whether (s)he communicates effectively. The linguistic meaning, the other three maxims, and the shared knowledge determine the “utterance meaning”. Whether the speaker believes in the “utterance meaning” is a separate issue.

generalized vs. particularized conversational implicatures generalized conversational implicatures: more invariable/systematic than particularized implicatures.

A: “What time is it?” B: “Some of the guests are already leaving.” PCI: ‘It must be late.’ A: “Where’s Joe?” PCI: ‘Joe may have left already.’ The shared GCI: ‘Not all of the guests are already leaving.’

The Q-heuristic: “What you do not say isn’t the case” “Some faculty members are friendly.” +> ‘Not all faculty members are friendly’ “It’s possible that he’ll be elected.” +> ‘It’s not certain that that he’ll be elected’ Q-implicatures based on some semantic scale are called “scalar implicatures” (e.g. certain > likely > possible; all > most > some)

“Joe had an ice cream or a coffee.” +> ‘He didn’t have both’ Joe had an ice cream or a coffee (but not both). Joe had an ice cream or a coffee (or both). If you had an ice cream or a coffee in that restaurant, you need to see a doctor immediately. and > or

“If John comes to help us, we can fix the car by tomorrow.” +> ‘(For all the speaker knows) John may or may not come, and we may or may not be able to fix the car by tomorrow’ “Since John will come to help us, we can fix the car by tomorrow.”

The general scheme of the Q-heuristic: P implicates not-Q, where Q entails P

“John has $44.” +> ‘John has exactly $44.’ A: “We need $44 to buy tickets, and I forgot my wallet”. B: “No problem, I have $44.” “I have $44” literally means “I have at least $44”?

The square root of 9 is 3. The three companies decided to cooperate with each other. the third prize, a three-ply rope

John was talking to a woman. ‘To the speaker’s knowledge, the woman John was talking to may not be his wife, mother, sister, etc.’ {wife, mother, sister} > woman John was reading a book. ??‘To the speaker’s knowledge, the book that John was reading may not be Moby Dick, The Scarlet Letter, etc.’ {Moby Dick, The Scarlet Letter} > book

John admires {him/him}. John admires {himself/himself}. John admires {himself/*himself}. John admires {*him/him}.

“What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified” The I-heuristic: “What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified” “Minimal specifications get maximally informative or stereotypical interpretations.” John turned the switch and the motor started. +> ‘P caused Q’, ‘P, and as a result Q’

I don’t think John is the culprit. Joe doesn’t like Sue. +> ‘Joe dislikes Sue.’ I don’t think John is the culprit. +> ‘I think John is not the culprit’ cf. John didn’t claim that he was innocent. John claimed that wasn’t innocent. If John comes, Mary will leave. +> ‘If and only if John comes, Mary will leave’

John turned the switch and the motor started. List up the possible situations where P and Q are both true. Among possible situations, pick up the most stereotypical, simple, coherent, and/or salient ones. The utterance is likely to describe one of such “select” situations.

Joe doesn’t like Sue. List up possible situations where “Joe doesn’t like Sue” holds. Among the possible situations, pick up the most stereotypical, simple, coherent, and/or salient ones. The utterance is likely to describe one of such “select” situations.

If John comes, Mary will leave. List up possible situations where “If John comes, Mary will leave” holds. Among the possible situations, pick up the most stereotypical, simple, coherent, and/or salient ones. The utterance is likely to describe one of such “select” situations.

The M-heurstic complements the Q-heuristic. The M-heuristic: “What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal.” (abnormal = complex, verbose, prolix, non-standard) The M-heurstic complements the Q-heuristic. “Bill stopped the car.” “Bill caused the car to stop.” (indirectly/not in the normal way, e.g. using the emergency brake.) “Sue smiled.” “The corners of Sue’s lips turned slightly upward.”

“John could solve the problem” “John had the ability to solve the problem” “John turned the switch and the motor started” “John turned the switch and almost immediately thereafter the motor started” “Sue went to school/church/bed/…” “Sue went to the school/church/bed/…”

Simple, standard expressions pick up the stereotypical, coherent, or salient interepretations. Complex, unusual expressions pick up the complement.

The general scheme of the Q-heuristic: P implicates not-Q, where Q entails P A Q-implicature is based on some semantic scale. The general scheme of the I/M-heuristics: P implicates Q, where Q entails P An I- or M- implicature is based on norms concerning the use of linguistic forms.

The iconicity principle: “Formal complexity corresponds to conceptual complexity.” (Haiman 1985)