Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster Ethical lacking at NASA Jeremy Neill March 2, 2000

Outline Background of Challenger Background of Roger Boisjoly Events from 1977 – 1/28/86 Different ethical choices Events after the disaster

History of Challenger Second shuttle built Designed for testing only Later converted for actual missions Nine successful launches First (and last) mission in Teacher In Space Program

Roger Boisjoly 25+ years of experience before Challenger Joined Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster program in 1985 Assigned as a Technical Troubleshooter Member of various engineering and ethics societies

First signs of trouble 1977: Morton Thiokol first discovers joint rotation problem Nov 1981: O-ring erosion discovered after second shuttle launch Jan 1985: Worst case of O-ring erosion yet, on coldest launch yet

Boisjoly’s role Analyzed O-ring erosion on Jan 1985 flight Presented findings to superiors and Marshall Space Flight Center Presented findings to Flight Readiness Review Board for subsequent flight Originally indicated erosion and blow by caused by low temperatures, but NASA asked for a softened position for Board

Additional concerns Analysis of April 1985 flight shows primary O-ring never sealed Additional tests indicate a launch of 50 degrees or lower could result in failure NASA asks Morton-Thiokol for booster seal problem presentation Boisjoly presents similar info to SAE to get help. NASA orders it tuned down

Pre-flight Teleconference Meeting with KSC/MSFC on Jan 27 Engineering team indicates launches below 53 degrees may have O-ring failure. “Prove it.” Managers ask for offline discussion. “Take off your engineering hat.” Decide to launch anyway, temp predicted 18, actually hit 8 NASA asks for further comments. Engineers stay silent

Day of launch Right O-ring at 28 degrees, ice on shuttle Puffs of smoke at launch pad Good luck: Blow-by causes oxidation glaze to fill gaps in O-ring seal Bad luck: Worst wind sheer hits shuttle. Flex breaks glaze apart Flames escape SRB and hit External Tank

Ethical Implications Supervisors clearly ignored problems NASA downplayed problem 9 years Could Boisjoly have done more? Spoken up at end of teleconference? Separately notified upper NASA management? Leaked issue to press? Still has to keep his job.

Events since launch O-ring design revised Launch decision now made by astronaut Boisjoly won Prize for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility from AAAS Teachers In Space Program canceled

Sources of more information http://www.onlineethics.org/moral/boisjoly/RB-intro.html http://www.fas.org/spp/51L.html http://www.uoguelph.ca/~mgravell/ http://ethics.tamu.edu/ethics/ethics/shuttle/shuttle1.htm http://www.bowdoin.edu/dept/physics/astro.1998/astro15/ http://www.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/resources/orbiters/challenger.html http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/5.78.html

Summary NASA knew about O-ring issue Boisjoly repeatedly urged the issue Management ignored the advice of professional engineers Space program set back several years Some good changes at NASA resulted