Nuclear Nonproliferation Michael Whitaker, Manager International Safeguards Program Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Early Nonproliferation Attempts United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) Created on 24 January 1946 Established within the UN Countries represented on Security Council The control of the nuclear bomb was an issue that was contemplated from the outset. [On 15 November 1945] The United States, Canada and the United Kingdom issued a “Three Nation Declaration on Atomic Energy” in which they suggested that a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission should be created to “consider problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy and related matters”. This commission was created on [24] January1946 and established within the United Nations with representatives from the members of the Security Council Presentation_name

UNAEC: The Baruch Plan (June 1946) “International Atomic Development Authority” (IADA) Debates until 1948 First atomic test by USSR, September 1949 UNAEC: Dissolved in 1952 Ambassador Bernard Baruch of the United States presented to the UNAEC the plan that bears his name. It proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority (IADA) that would be entrusted with managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security. Baruch made an important addition to the conclusion of Acherson and Lilienthal. He was concerned with the problem of enforcing IADA’s decisions and he insisted that there should be no veto of any power regarding IADA’s conclusions. On September 1949 the USSR exploded its first nuclear bomb. The growing tensions of the Cold War gradually extinguished all hope of a world free of nuclear weapons. At the end of 1949 after 200 sessions and more than two years of sterile debate, the UNAEC concluded its work. The commission was officially dissolved in 1952. Presentation_name

Atoms for Peace Speech U. S. President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953 at the United Nations General Assembly International recognition of the danger of nuclear weapons Realization of the danger of proliferation of this technology Promoted development of an international atomic energy agency Advanced discussions to limit the use of nuclear weapons Promoted peaceful use of nuclear technology

Development of the IAEA Negotiation of the IAEA Statute from 1954 – 1956 Approved by 81 nations in October 1956 In force July 29, 1957 Establishment of the IAEA is achieved Amended in 1963, 1973 and 1989 Available at http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html

The Statute Article II - objective is to ensure that special nuclear materials are only used for peaceful purposes Article III – Functions: Assistance with research and development of nuclear energy Technical exchange and collaboration Training of scientists and engineers Establish and administer safeguards of special nuclear materials Safety standards for peaceful atomic purposes Article XII – Agency safeguards Establishes the rights and responsibilities for the Agency to apply safeguards in various states Basis for inspections and responsibilities for inspectors

The First IAEA Safeguards Systems The Agency’s Safeguards System of January 1961: INFCIRC/26 The first extensive Agency’s Safeguards System of February 1965: INFCIRC/66 INFCIRC/66 Rev 1 and 2 (1966 and 1968) Still applied for certain facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan 1962: First Safeguards Inspection (verification of design of a 3 MW(th) reactor in Norway) After months of discussion and several reviews, the Board of Governors approved, on 31 January 1961, the principles and procedures for applying safeguards to reactors up to 100 MW(th), officially known as The Agency's Safeguards System (1961), document INFCIRC/26. The first Safeguards System was a complex system that had to be revised by a working group that took a “business-like” approach. As a result a new system emerged: INFCIRC/66. This new system, in turn, was revised two times to make it applicable to reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants and went into effect in a number of countries at that time notably Japan.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime Background Missile crisis in Cuba (1962) France and China joined the ‘Nuclear Club” (1960 and 1964) Limited Test Ban Treaty (U.S. + USSR, 1963) Opened for signature on 1 July 1968, at ceremonies taking place in London, Moscow, and Washington, D.C 59 States would become signatories to the NPT that day Treaty entered into force in 1970, following ratification by 40 States Party Most widely accepted arms control agreement with nearly 190 parties today Britain´s Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart (second from right, seated) signs the NPT on 1 July 1968 at Lancaster House, London, witnessed by United States Ambassador David Bruce (far right, seated) and Soviet Ambassador to Mikhail N. Smirnovsky (second from left, seated).

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Adopted June 12, 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970 Objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament Establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA, which also plays a central role under the Treaty in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes Article I – prohibits NWS from transferring weapons material and technology to NNWS Article II – prohibits NNWS from receiving such materials and support Article III – acceptance of safeguards negotiated with each member state (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or CSA)

The NPT (cont’d) Article IV – State rights for developing peaceful nuclear programs Article V – shared benefits from peaceful use of nuclear explosive devices with NNWS Article VI – nuclear weapons disarmament Article VII – regional treaties for nuclear weapons free zones Article VIII – amendment procedures Article IX – membership/signatory procedures Article X – signatory withdrawal in the case of extraordinary events that relative to the Treaty that jeopardize the supreme interests of the country Article XI – deposition procedures

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) NPT's main objectives: To stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, To provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear option, To encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and To pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS): Five states which had detonated a nuclear explosive device before 1 January 1967 [China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States] Not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear weapon state To pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (Article VI) Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS): Undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices (Article II)

CSA Structure and Content Information Circular 153 (corrected), June 1972 Part I Defines the general structure and content of agreements for safeguards implementation in individual States Defines the roles and responsibilities of the State and the IAEA relative to safeguards implementation within the State and nuclear materials under safeguards Requires that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement Addresses implementation and termination of safeguards

Continuity of Knowledge – C&S INFCIRC 153 (cont’d.) Part II Safeguards objective: timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. Nuclear material accountancy is primary tool Containment and surveillance are complementary tools Means to verify the CORRECTNESS of a States declaration Continuity of Knowledge – C&S Verification - NDA Accountancy - DA

International Safeguards Article III of the NPT “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the IAEA and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. (…)”

International Safeguards International Safeguards are: Arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials Verification is a key element in the international system to ensure that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes Nuclear safeguards are a means of reassurance whereby non-nuclear weapons states demonstrate to others that they are abiding by their peaceful commitments Specific objective is to verify whether declared nuclear material remains within the civil nuclear fuel cycle and whether or not it is being used solely for peaceful purposes

International Safeguards Safeguards inspections require that: Operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material Records and the actual nuclear material are audited Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation

International Safeguards Problems 1980-90s Iraq, Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq and Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.

The Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) Addresses weakness in traditional safeguards Iraq’s clandestine program discovery in 1991 Issues with verification of State declarations in the DPRK Strengthens the effectiveness and improves the efficiency of the safeguards system Expands the State’s obligation for providing information on all nuclear related activities Complementary and managed access to verify information Strengthened analysis techniques Wide area environmental sampling Multi-entry visas for Agency inspectors to conduct unannounced inspections

INFCIRC/540 (cont’d) Agency responsibilities to protect sensitive information National security Commercially sensitive Amendments to existing subsidiary arrangements and facility attachments Annex I defines activities covered under the AP Annex II defines equipment subject to the AP Means for verifying the COMPLETENESS of a State’s declaration

Other Nonproliferation Efforts Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Protects against unauthorized removal of nuclear material and sabotage Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports 46 participants Success dependent upon State level rules and regulations The Zangger Committee 37 members that address specific issues related to Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Prohibits production of fissile material for nuclear weapons Initiated in 1993 but no agreement to date Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors

Technical Cooperation Government agreements Interagency reviewed and approved Broad scope or focused effort May require State governing body approvals Not easily accomplished Organizational agreements Must be compliant with national rules and regulations Require detail procedures at the organizational level Are generally more focused to address specific technologies Academia Fundamental research Student exchange programs

Summary Nuclear nonproliferation efforts have been ongoing for more than 50 years The creation of the IAEA and enforcement of the NPT emphasizes importance the international community places on reducing the threat of nuclear weapons 170 States have safeguards agreements in force 89 have signed and ratified both a CSA and the AP 52 were verified to have no diversion of fissile materials and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities The IAEA encourages technical collaboration between States This collaboration provides advancements in safeguards technology and methods that strengthen safeguards Continued success is dependent upon international support

References http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Other s/infcirc153.pdf http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/i nfcirc540c.pdf Van Sickle, M., Kovacic, D., International Safeguards 101: Introduction and Overview, January 2010 http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2002/sgarticle_02.sh tml Rauf, T., Drawing Safeguards Conclusions, Presentation to the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee, April 29, 2004